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The puzzle that concerns this research project is that of why even prioritised 
government policies are not necessarily implemented, either at all or within their 
allocated time frame. The combined contexts of firstly political and economic transition, 
and secondly a clash of two distinct policies – economic and environmental – can 
make it easier to answer this question. The last few decades have seen a growing 
international drive to reduce the negative environmental impact of economic activity. 
Government regulations play a pivotal role in this trend, but while their clarity, scope 
and suitability have been improving across the globe, they often fail to achieve desired 
outcomes. This is especially true in transitional countries. In the post-Soviet states, 
industrial development can have significant global consequences, but implementation 
of environmental protection has often been significantly slower than in more developed 
countries despite the strong official rhetoric about their importance. 
Governments face significant barriers to implementation. To uncover what they are and 
why they persist, this project draws together interview data from 77 interviews (see 
Appendix A) from four oil-extracting regions across the post-Soviet space. They are the 
Nenets Autonomous Okrug in the Russian Arctic; the Republic of Tatarstan in southern 
Russia; Atyrau, the oil capital of Kazakhstan; and Baku, the capital city and key oil-
extracting region of Azerbaijan. Implementation gaps and their causes in each region 
are contrasted to establish the degree of explanatory power of variables derived from 
inter-regional differences and from prominent literature on public administration and 
other disciplines relevant to environmental policy and oil.  
The first variable investigated is foreign influence, seen as direct and indirect impact of 
foreign and international NGOs, oil firms and developmental and financial institutions 
and organisations. The second is state capacity, seen as the quality of domestic 
regulation and the capacity of executive government structures to enforce it. The last 
variable explored is that of economic conditions, which takes into account economic 
sectors and their contribution to government budgets.  
The analysis shows that while all variables can have an impact on implementation 
gaps, they can do so in unexpected ways. Furthermore, although all variables prove to 
be important for successful implementation, they do not ensure it, working either 
together or individually. For example, foreign actors can introduce post-Soviet 
countries to better practices and technologies through norm diffusion, but their 
equivocal behaviour means that the new norms are not necessarily internalised. 
Similarly, the quality of regulation and state capacity for enforcement can drive 
implementation only so far without the political will to channel them appropriately. The 
variable of economic conditions is the only one that shows a consistent link with the 
dependent variable, although it cannot explain implementation gaps in all contexts. 
Comparative analysis does, however, reveal some clear catalysts: implementation 
appears least successful in contexts of low political stability, with associated levels of 
corruption, while polluters’ conceptualisation of environmental spending as an 
investment rather than a cost can help drive implementation. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
Over the last half-century, governments across the globe have come to recognise 
environmental protection (EP) as a separate policy area. Today, nearly all countries 
incorporate such policies into their general policy repertoire. Many have also 
established environmental ministries, committees or other official structures to deliver 
environmental policy. The countries of the former Soviet Union (FSU) are no exception. 
Indeed, environmental politics was adopted there even before the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, accompanied by the creation of an extensive and relatively cohesive 
institutional framework to deliver and implement EP policies. Following the collapse of 
the USSR, these frameworks were often further elaborated by individual FSU 
governments.  
At the same time, the political and economic transition that followed independence 
from the Soviet regime brought greater awareness of the consequences of 
environmental damage to the general population of FSU states, leading to increased 
public calls for better EP implementation. The process of transition has also brought a 
greater understanding of EP values and principles to the governments of these 
countries, and many adopted a strong public discourse on the importance of EP. 
Furthermore, the governments of Western countries, as well as international institutions 
and organisations, have often provided extensive advice and assistance on updating 
and improving EP policy, legislation and even state capacity for implementation in the 
FSU space. As such, FSU governments have for some time appeared set to deliver 
effective EP implementation.   
However, FSU countries have modest EP improvements to show for all their work in 
the decades following independence. Despite all their preparation, FSU governments 
appear to struggle to actually implement their EP policy commitments. This represents 
the puzzle which motivates the current research topic: why is it that even relatively well-
designed governmental environmental policies are not necessarily implemented, 
despite strong political rhetoric as to their importance and the social pressure to 
implement them? The literature does not have a great deal to say in answer to this 
question. While the evolution of environmental politics and policy in the FSU space has 
received substantive academic attention, the question of their implementation has 
attracted limited research.  
Ineffective EP implementation in FSU countries is often explained by the more general 




literature can be a useful starting point, it does not necessarily capture or help explain 
the unique challenges of EP implementation; for example, its success tends to be more 
context-sensitive, and therefore far less centralised, than that of more traditional 
government policies. Logically, analysis of EP implementation should also be local; 
however, the majority of research on implementation in the FSU countries takes a 
national perspective. This is partially due to the paucity of available data on the 
environment and its protection in the FSU space in general, and at sub-national levels 
in particular. This research project therefore aims to add to the body of literature on 
local EP implementation in FSU countries as well as to gather and present new data at 
the regional level. 
This project also adds to the exploration of existing theories relevant to implementation. 
The project’s theoretical framework synthesises a range of concepts from theories from 
several academic disciplines including political science, economics, international 
relations, and public administration. These concepts are then tested in a comparative 
analysis in order to provide thick description and increase analytical depth. The 
theoretical framework for this thesis also steps away from common practice in 
comparative implementation literature by comparing a wide range of regions across 
national and sub-national levels, as opposed to focusing on fewer or very similar cases 
at the same level.  
While still being very similar in key literature-supported aspects, and therefore 
remaining consistent with the chosen comparative approach, selected case studies 
display considerable variation in their implementation gaps (the dependent variable), 
explanatory variables, and background factors, which becomes apparent in the 
empirical chapters. In turn, the extent of this variation within the chosen research 
design adds to the robustness of the subsequent comparative analysis. At the same 
time, this approach provides a study of different generalist theories and, given the 
interdisciplinary nature of the thesis, of the relative capacity of different academic 
disciplines to explain variation in implementation gaps in non-standard contexts. 
The next chapter of this thesis further explores the central research problem by 
reviewing academic literature to date; it considers the different definitions of 
implementation success and lack thereof, as well as investigating the different 
approaches used to analyse and explain outcomes. This chapter thus presents a study 
of the different approaches to the analysis of policy implementation and their evolution. 
In order to illustrate their origins, which in turn determined their applicability, the 




and its guiding principles in the United States, to the spread of such ideologies and 
associated policies to Europe, and onwards to developing and transitional countries. 
As a result, the chapter draws together academic theories on the general 
implementation of public policy as well as on the implementation of environmental 
policies across developed, developing and transitional settings. 
Chapter 3 synthesises this profusion of theoretical and methodological knowledge to 
suit the purpose of the current study. The theoretical frameworks reviewed in the 
previous chapter are distilled to define the dependent variable as “implementation 
gaps”. The selection of a comparative, small-N approach is justified for its ability to 
deliver findings that are useful to both academic and policy communities. The chapter 
then explains the reasons for the pragmatic approach towards case study selection 
and the subsequent choice of the Most Similar Systems Most Different Outcome 
research design, which naturally flows from the characteristics of those case studies.  
This is followed by a detailed consideration of potential explanatory variables, providing 
the rationale for selecting foreign influence, state capacity and economic conditions as 
variables to be tested, as well as discussing the rejection of other factors that are 
usually associated with the chosen topic, the reported case studies, or the theoretical 
approach used: democratisation, corruption, and the resource curse. Each of the 
selected variables is then deconstructed into individual hypotheses. Finally, the chapter 
identifies potential approaches to collecting data in order to test these hypotheses, and 
indicates reasons for choosing semi-structured elite interviews despite the expected 
difficulties of conducting such research in the FSU space. Strategies for mitigating 
expected issues are noted. 
Chapters 4 to 7 offer empirical analyses of four case studies. Of these, Chapter 4 
explores implementation of environmental regulations in the oil industry of the Nenets 
Autonomous Okrug (NAO), a region in northern Russia beyond the Artic Circle 
characterised by permafrost and some of the most fragile and unique eco-systems in 
the world. Although oil exploration started here under the Soviet regime, most 
extraction did not commence until the 2010s, meaning that NAO operates some of the 
youngest and most advanced oil technology and facilities in Russia. A large number of 
oil firms work in NAO, including international companies as well as state-owned and 
private firms from a number of different countries. NAO also hosts Russia’s first and so 
far only Arctic offshore oil platform. At the same time, the region lacks domestic 
environmental civil society and attracts significant attention from international actors. In 




the only sector of notable activity. The chapter considers the impact of these factors on 
the relationships between the explanatory and dependent variables. 
Chapter 5 examines another Russian region: the Republic of Tatarstan (RT). This 
southern region is markedly different from NAO in a number of respects. Firstly, its 
climatic and geological conditions are a great deal milder. Secondly, RT has not 
attracted foreign attention: there are no international advocacy groups, international 
developmental or financial institutions, or foreign oil firms there. Thirdly, RT possesses 
some of the most depleted oil reserves, and therefore some of the oldest oil facilities in 
Russia. Furthermore, in contrast to NAO, RT has only one oil firm, which is local and 
although no longer state-owned nonetheless remains under the influence of the local 
government. Fourthly, RT’s economy is well diversified. At the same time, RT is 
distinguished by some of the most developed political and economic institutions in the 
country and a particularly cohesive social structure. The analysis presented in this 
chapter indicates that this combination of factors at times challenges the pre-supposed 
relationships in the selected hypotheses.  
Chapter 6 transports the reader to a different former Soviet Union country, Kazakhstan, 
and focusses on its main oil-producing region: Atyrau, located on the coast of the 
Caspian Sea in the west of the country. This location represents yet another 
substantively different geological and climatic context. Atyrau differs from the other two 
case studies also in other key respects. For example, although it has attracted 
considerable attention from international entities aiming to improve environmental 
protection, Atyrau has a much more active local civil society with a keen interest in the 
issue. Another example is the fact that Atyrau’s key oil deposits have been developed 
exclusively by international firms. At the same time, the region’s economy, although 
more diversified than that of NAO, is nonetheless entirely dependent on the oil sector. 
The same could arguably be said about the national economy. The analysis of these 
factors in relation to the hypotheses reveals some unexpected findings.  
Chapter 7 moves southwest across the Caspian Sea, to the coastal region of Baku-
Absheron (henceforth Baku) in Azerbaijan. Out of the four case studies, this region 
operates the oldest oil facilities; they were developed under the Soviet regime and 
continue to be operated by Azerbaijan’s single domestic oil firm, which is also state-
owned. However, the majority of Azerbaijan’s current capacity for oil extraction was 
developed following independence: 75% of all oil in Azerbaijan lies within the Azeri–
Chirag–Gunashli (ACG) oil deposits, off the coast of the Absheron peninsula, and have 




of the four, this case study has also attracted the most interest from non-commercial 
international actors. Azerbaijan in general is also more dependent on its oil sector than 
the other countries studied, while its governing institutions are some of the weakest. 
The analysis presented in this chapter confirms the low explanatory power of some 
hypothesised factors and the higher relative merit of others. In some ways, this chapter 
also brings the empirical analysis full circle by casting light on the original selection of 
explanatory variables, although a detailed analysis of this takes place in the following 
chapter. 
Chapter 8 offers a comparative analysis of the empirical discussions covered in the 
previous four chapters. This chapter highlights the variation in explanatory variables 
and discusses their relative usefulness in explaining the variation of the dependent 
variable (implementation gaps). The chapter also brings out other background 
contextual factors that may be easily overlooked in the context of individual case 
studies, especially because they are typically overlooked by selected academic 
disciplines, but whose significance is revealed when cases are contrasted against each 
other. As a result, this chapter also offers other possible explanations for the observed 
differences in implementation outcomes, as well as for the applicability of theoretical 
concept designed to explain such differences. As has already been mentioned in the 
previous paragraph, chapter 8 also revisits the merit of factors that were taken to be 
inappropriate as explanatory variables in the methodological chapter.  
The concluding chapter takes stock of the main findings of this thesis. Each variable 
and its components are scrutinised for the extent of their explanatory power. This 
chapter also highlights instances where variables showed predictive potential in 
unexpected ways. The chapter then highlights the contribution of this thesis to the 
wider academic literature, evaluating its limitations and offering suggestions for further 
research. It concludes by putting forward a proposal to synthesise natural and social 
sciences in order to explore the practical difficulties of implementing environmental 
protection policies and reflect on how policy design and institutional structures can be 








Chapter 2. Literature Review 
Introduction 
At present most, if not all, countries have adopted environmental policies and there 
exists a rich body of literature about policy-making in this sphere. A vast majority of this 
literature covers the creation and design stages of the policy cycle with there being an 
unspoken assumption that once a policy is adopted it will necessarily be implemented 
and will produce intended outcomes (Knill and Tosun, 2012: 148). However, such 
results all too often fail to materialise, and the resultant ‘implementation gaps’ (Dunsire, 
1978) are especially significant in transitional countries, such as those in the post-
Soviet space. In explaining this situation, it is important to understand the unique 
implementation barriers that even well-designed policies encounter during policy 
implementation in this particular sub-set of world states. This understanding may in turn 
help to minimise implementation gaps there.  
An exploration of approaches to studying commonly identifiable implementation 
barriers in transitional countries is the purpose of the present chapter. However, 
although there exist a number of approaches, which could produce very different 
results, not all would be suitable for the analysis of the selected context. It is therefore 
essential to review the full range of interpretations available in the field of 
implementation studies in order to select an appropriate explanatory framework for the 
particular problems to be examined later on in this thesis. This is especially important 
given the relatively broad variation on some parameters between otherwise very similar 
case studies to be analysed. This literature review therefore examines general 
approaches used to understand implementation problems as well as those few that 
have emerged for analysing transitional countries.  
A further challenge is raised by some authors (for example, Carter, 2001) who argue 
that environmental issues are different from traditional concerns of the state, such as 
inflation, employment and the balance of payments. Unlike these policy areas, that 
often have a relatively straight-forward solution, environmental issues are labelled 
'wicked' due to their multifaceted nature and difficulty of identifying causes or solutions. 
Furthermore, environmental issues are often trans-border and therefore potentially 
require not only intra- but also inter-state cooperation in order to develop and 
implement effective solutions. Given this elevation of environment policy to a different 
level, it is also important to review how literature interprets implementation problems 




mainstream literature and literature pertaining to transitional states. The matrix in Table 
1 below illustrates these categories and sets the structure for the following review.  	  
 













Part 2 Part 4 
 
It should be emphasised at the outset that although the review aims to analyse 
literature exclusively on policy implementation, there are not a great deal of 
publications available for category 3 and even less for category 4. Review in those 
parts in this chapter therefore draws on related literature fields of environmental policy 
(for category 3), and features of transition (for category 4), which are then discussed in 
terms of their impacts on implementation of selected policy in the selected context.	  
 
Part 1: General approaches in implementation studies 
The focus on policy implementation as something that does not necessarily follow from 
policy adoption arguably took root in academic debates following the publication of 
Pressman and Wildavsky’s work in 1973. Since that time, the issue of public policy 
implementation has been taken up by several academic disciplines and the aggregate 
body of literature has grown at an exponential rate (Saetren 2005). Among it, Knill and 
Tosun (2012) identify three main general categories of approaches to studying 
implementation. In the first category, the top-down approaches (Bowen, 1982; 
Mazmanian and Sabatier 1983; Sabatier 1986) measure implementation as the 




successful implementation with decision-makers at the top of policy administration. In 
the second category, bottom up approaches (Elmore, 1979; Lipsky, 1980; Maynard-
Moody et al., 1990;) accord a bigger role during implementation to those who are 
affected by policy outcomes. Implementation success or failure is therefore measured 
“by the extent to which perceived outcomes correspond with the preferences of the 
actors involved” (Knill and Tosun, 2012: 155).  
Both approaches have shortcomings, and to address these a further category emerged 
in the mainstream academic literature: the hybrid approaches that combine the first two 
and enhance them with secondary factors, such as the level of policy ambiguity or the 
political conflict surrounding the policy issue under study. For example, this wave of 
literature combined the field of implementation studies with behavioural theoretical 
approaches, such as game theory (Scholz, 1984) and principal-agent theory 
(McCubbins and Lupia, 1994; McCubbins and Schwartz, 1984). Other scholars in this 
camp aimed to refocus the field’s inquiry towards the study of ‘policy instruments’, that 
are available to policy implementers, as constraining not only policy implementation but 
also policy development in view of future implementation (McDonnell and Elmore, 
1987; Schneider and Ingram, 1990). In his own review of implementation literature, 
O'Toole (2000) concludes that academia has delivered enough evidence to prove the 
value of approaches in all three categories.  
Despite the pace of initial developments, prominent authors in the implementation field 
assess that the study of implementation became unfashionable following a peak in the 
1980s and entered decline in the 1990s (Barrett, 2004; deLeon, 1999; Lester and 
Goggin,1998; Schofield & Sausman, 2004; Winter, 1999). Saetren (2005) indicates that 
this uninterest was most noticeable in the core scholarship, or that concerned with 
public policy, which came to regard implementation studies as an “intellectual “dead 
end”” (p.566). Other disciplines, including education, health, law, and economics 
continue to study public policy implementation but are less interested in building or 
developing conceptual frameworks. As a result, the above debate on the best 
approaches for the study of policy implementation has delivered several conceptual 
frameworks (Van Meter and Van Horn, 1975; Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1980), but has 
not culminated in fully-fledged theories on the topic. Literature reviews of policy 
implementation in the 2010s continued to conclude that the existing body of work 
remains fractured, mostly descriptive, and too often anecdotal (Hupe and Saetren, 




Before moving on to the next section, it would be useful to take a closer look at the 
concepts and variables that have developed within the more analytical texts in the 
implementation literature, especially those that are of direct relevance to this research 
project. For example, the definition of ‘implementation failure’ differs in academic texts 
(Knill and Tosun, 2012; Hogwood and Gunn, 1984). At times, it is defined as non-
implementation, whereby implementation is prevented from being competed. In other 
instances, it is taken to mean unsuccessful implementation, or failure to deliver 
intended results despite full policy implementation. In turn, different combinations of 
definitions and approaches to studying implementation lead to different interpretations 
of key barriers to implementation. These include:  
• poor choice of policy instruments;  
• vague policy content (which allows for high variance of interpretation of 
objectives/responsibilities);  
• bureaucratic drift (which refers to intentional deviation by implementers based 
on their superior knowledge/experience over policy-makers; or unintentional 
divergence from policy guidelines due to high fragmentation in implementation 
delivery, usually due to a lack of intergovernmental cooperation);  
• inappropriate institutional structures (and resistance to change from existing 
institutions);  
• administrative problems (physical capacities of implementers); and 
• lack of social acceptance for new behaviours promoted by the new policy. 
At the same time, these factors have been summarised as cases of “bad execution, 
bad policy, or bad luck” (Hogwood and Gunn, 1984: 197) or as amounting to the lack of 
“political will, state capacity and public support” (Nadgrodkiewicz et al., 2012: 1), which 
gives a simplified but instructive indication of the kind of variables used by analyses 
within implementation studies. However, academia also warns that these elements are, 
to a degree, natural and expected. In contrast, 'perfect implementation' has been 
described as “morally and politically quite unacceptable as well as unattainable in a 
pluralist democracy” since it would require “perfect obedience” and “perfect control” 
(Hogwood and Gunn, 1984: 198). In that sense there will always be implementation 
gaps, and it is arguably their size rather than their existence that should be the subject 
of social scientific inquiry. 
Implementation literature also exhibits a debate on whether implementation is a part of 




a linear policy life, which squarely place implementation as a successive stage after 
policy-creation, often presupposing automatic implementation. Some interpretations 
have moved away from this view and see implementation as an 'interactive', non-linear 
process (Thomas and Grindle, 1990). This view positions implementation within the 
decision-making process, implying that implementation efforts and strategies can 
continue to change, for example in response to the popularity of a reform being 
implemented.  
A further notable observation is of the trends in literature to move away from 
descriptive accounts of singular case studies and towards the more analytical works, 
based on comparative small- and large-N studies (O'Toole, 2000). Implementation 
research has also become increasingly multidisciplinary, as has already been indicated 
in the description of hybrid approaches. Meanwhile, experiences of developed 
countries have continued to attract disproportionately high interest from policy 
implementation scholars, while health and education consistently remain favourites in 
terms of popular policies for analysis  (Saetren, 2005). 
 
Part 2: Approaches to implementation in transition 
Whereas the generalist literature on public policy implementation allows greater scope 
for developing concepts and theorising about their relationships, the more specific 
contexts, such as those on transition, call for a more empirical approach. Here, 
theories, frameworks, models and hypotheses, which have been developed in the 
generalist literature, could be tested for their capacity to explain the observable 
differentiation of efforts and outcomes pertaining to policy implementation. The 
transitional context therefore could allow for the refinement of analytical, 
methodological and theoretical approaches and some scholars have taken up this 
challenge. O’Toole (1997), for example, explores the applicability of the ‘policy 
networks’ framework to transitional contexts, to show that while such networks might 
indeed improve implementation, their natural development should not be expected.  
Overall, however, transition does not appear to be the implementation scholars’ 
favourite context for investigation and thus there is not as much literature in this camp 
as could have been hoped. For example, a 2005 review of all publications on public 
policy implementation between 1948 and 2003 (Saetren, 2005) revealed that only 16% 




Most often, works in this camp are preoccupied with drawing up lists and criteria from 
existing generalist literature. For instance, authors have compared large numbers of 
cases against such a list of implementation determinants (Struyk, 2007; De Melo et al., 
2001; Nadgrodkiewicz et al.) or assessment criteria (Dutz and Vagliasindi, 2000) to test 
their explanatory potential. Otherwise, authors apply implementation-related concepts 
to singular case studies, producing mostly descriptive accounts of policy development 
and outcomes (for example, Garnet et al., 1997). Overall, there is little in the way of 
building or testing models or frameworks.  
It is also common for authors in this literature to take a consultative attitude in 
reviewing popular approaches for selecting implementation strategies / instruments 
and comparing these to those used to transitional contexts in order to offer advice on 
improving implementation there (Lotspeich, 1995; Pleskovic, 1995; Soderholm, 2001). 
This observation reflects the findings of other scholars about the general state of 
implementation literature: that it has been slow to advance theory building or to 
develop consistently rigorous research design (O'Toole, 2000; Winter, 2012; Saetren, 
2014). 
Scholarship tends to invariably argue that transition negatively impacts on policy 
implementation, but can take different foci of analysis. Some are premised on factors 
common across contexts. For example, transition can be seen to inevitably worsen 
implementation because implementation in transitional contexts usually refers to 
reforms, rather than to continuation of existing policies. As such, implementation tends 
to upset the established distribution of power among policy stakeholders, which 
becomes increasingly obvious as implementation progresses, correlating with rising 
opposition (Thomas and Grindle, 1990). This is not so different from reform 
implementation in developed contexts. 
Other works focus on the characteristics of transition that are present to a much lesser 
degree in developed countries, and these works are therefore more context-specific. 
Eilat and Zinnes (2002), for example, assess policy ineffectiveness as directly related 
to the presence of shadow economies that characterise most transitions. In this 
context, the state itself might play an active role in the creation or persistence of 
shadow economies, engaging in unofficial deals that evade platforms where official 
regulations and sanctions can take place.  
Public feelings of unfairness and distrust towards the state in such contexts are said to 
potentially lead to the disintegration of social morals, fuelling public and economic 




could in turn create perceptions of justified intentional non-implementation by public 
actors, who instead only pretend to implement the policies for which they are 
responsible (Pritchett and de Weijer 2010). Once informal social norms are thus 
entrenched, successful implementation of formal standards via formal channels is said 
to become increasingly unlikely (Camargo and Passas, 2017). The focus on such 
conditions conclusively moves analysis away from Western countries and makes it 
specific to transitional settings. It should be noted that all types of works in this camp 
largely approach implementation at the institutional level rather than by looking at 
agency, even when agency is discussed, and thus constitute top-down analyses. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, much of the literature that touches on implementation failure 
in transitional or developing contexts is primarily concerned with economic growth and 
problems of market and political liberalisation (Armijo et al., 1994; Fidrmuc, 2003; Pei, 
2002) – issues that are again more appropriate to developing and transitional contexts 
and which are not necessarily reflected in the key theoretical frameworks for studying 
implementation, which were developed to explain developed contexts.  
Studies of implementation in developing / transitional countries also tend to identify 
institutional factors as the main barriers to sustained implementation and may therefore 
analyse the implementation of institutional reform (Balcerowicz, 1994; Fischer, et al., 
1996), as well as of policies. It is, for example, stipulated that unless working legal and 
economic institutional infrastructures are developed first, countries may never exit the 
transition stage and implementation of any public policy may continue to lag behind 
(Havrylyshyn and van Rooden, 2003). 
 
Part 3: Approaches to the implementation of environmental policies 
An extensive analysis by Saetren in 2005 of all publications on policy implementation 
by journals of the core (political science, public administration and public policy), near 
core and non-core disciplines revealed that only 5% of these, or 185 of over 3,500 
academic works, were published by environment-related journals between 1948 and 
2003. A broader examination of all publications (articles, books, chapters and PhD 
dissertations) on public policy implementation revealed that environmental policy 
attracted only 9% of all scholarship, compared by 38% attracted by education policy 




Of the above, the core (political science) publications tend to focus on environmental 
policy to a greater extent than non-core alternatives (Saetren, 2005). It is also the core 
publications that are most suited for developing conceptual frameworks and theories 
on implementation, including in respect to environmental policy. Yet attention to policy 
implementation in general has waned considerably in the core forums since the 1980s 
and does not appear to have revitalised. It therefore should not be surprising that the 
literature on environmental policy implementation (EPI) lacks theory development and 
evaluation. 
That being said, EPI is often treated as deserving separate analysis and debate from 
the more general literature on policy implementation. This is because, unlike problems 
that the more traditional public policies aim to solve, environmental problems defy 
solutions, and also because of the more significant costs of policy failure when it 
comes to the environment. Unlike traditional matters of state, environmental damage 
has a certain irreversibility (Perrings and Pearce, 1994; Hepburn, 2012). The 
contamination of physical geography caused by environmental damage, leading to 
disease and fatalities, are profoundly difficult to rectify. The truth of this took time to 
sink in both politics and academia.  
Accordingly, interpretations of issues, scope and applicability of environmental policy 
have become increasingly broad over time. These interpretations, and therefore 
approaches to studying them, also continued to change as formal environmental 
politics began to spread from the USA to Europe, and onwards to developing and 
transitional regions, all the while encountering new challenges. The changing attitudes 
in EPI literature therefore reflect the changing narrative of environmental policy. 
Changes in one cannot necessarily be understood without knowledge of changes in 
the other. The following therefore aims to balance the discussions of environmental 
policy development and EPI in order to tease out how academic interpretations and 
explanations of the EPI evolved over time.   
 
The story of environmental politics 
The very first academic texts on environmental policies in the 1960s and in the 
following few decades were dominated by the difficulties these policies faced in the 
United States (Desai, 2002). This reflects the roots of environmental politics. Having 
first found their way onto the formal political agenda under the Nixon administration in 




United States, which at the time led the rest of the world with its willingness and 
stringency in addressing environmental problems and in developing technological 
innovations for doing so (Busch and Jörgens, 2005a; Rosenbaum, 2017; Vogel, 2003).  
Environmental issues became more important in Europe around the 1970s and more 
so in the 1980s (Knill and Liefferink, 2013), which was reflected by greater academic 
interest in this part of the world around the same time (Haagsma, 1989; Hawkins, 
1984; Johnson and Corcelle, 1989; Lowe and Flynn, 1989). The literature that followed 
largely talked of policy development; analytical accounts of EPI in Europe became 
common only in the 1990s. This decade also saw an increased internationalisation of 
environmental issues as scientific research increasingly revealed their global nature 
and the need for international efforts. As a result, international organisations led by 
developed nations, such as the World Bank and the OECD, began to actively 
encourage developing countries to catch up and, in combination with natural processes 
of policy diffusion and assimilation, this led to the global spread of environmental 
politics (Busch and Jörgens, 2005a, 2005b). 
Throughout this process, resistance to environmental policies became increasingly 
apparent, then expected, and by the 1990s it became considered normal, given the 
large-scale changes to human behaviour that environmental policies often aim to 
achieve (Pearson, 1995). It also became accepted that these policies were inherently 
difficult to design effectively due to the magnitude of tasks they were meant to solve 
(Walley and Whitehead, 1994). Another cause for issues with policy design was the 
frequent political confusion over the exact goals that environmental protection was 
supposed to achieve (McCann, 2013; Turnpenny et al., 2009). 
Over time, the instances of resistance to environmental reforms began to show a 
consistent pattern: as impacts of environmental policy on established behaviour 
become more apparent during implementation, whatever initial policy popularity existed 
among the implementers and the general public begins to degenerate (Pearson, 1995). 
Political confusion from the early stages of policy design often leads to further political 
confusion as to which objectives could be compromised should they encounter 
significant barriers during implementation. Concurrently, EPI often adversely affects the 
disproportionately powerful, economically strategic, and therefore nationally important 
enterprises. These can quickly organise into coherent opposition and begin to exert 





Although such trends became noticeable across the globe, their extent and severity 
varied widely depending on a range of context-specific factors. Transitional contexts 
are one such example. However, the extent of Western influence on non-Western 
contexts should not be underestimated. Environmental policy has seen direct policy 
transfer from developed to developing and transitional countries, as well as the 
imposition by the international donors (without whom such contexts cannot hope to 
implement environmental polices) of Western models for EPI institutions and policy 
instruments upon governments in non-Western contexts (Bell and Russell, 2002). It 
would therefore be prudent first to discuss how implementation is perceived in the 
areas of academic literature that focus on developed countries before moving on to the 
analysis of transitional settings.     
 
Implementation of environmental policy in developed states 
Academic literature pertaining to developed contexts appears to be split along three 
broad interpretations (market-centric, state-centric, and behavioural), which emerged 
as environmental policy space developed over the decades. 
 
Market-centric interpretations 
When environmental policy first emerged, it was not differentiated from other policy 
areas and scholars therefore tried to understand it in terms of already available 
knowledge and theories. The policy problem was therefore first defined as a result of 
failure by both markets and governments (Hepburn, 2010) to deal with negative 
externalities – an issue typically explored and advised on by economists. Some of the 
earlier literature therefore saw the path to solving environmental issues through the 
lens of market behaviour and the role of the state in orchestrating it (Coase, 1960; 
Buchanan and Stubblebine, 1962; Turvey, 1963).  
However, by the end the 1960s, the representatives of the economics discipline began 
to realise that environmental issues were much more complex than the traditional 
matters of state to be easily plugged into economic models, and that economics did not 
therefore have the needed answers (Kneese, 1986). Nonetheless, economics literature 
continued the debate of the content and strategy of environmental policy for decades to 
come, contributing hundreds of academic works. Authors, however, concluded that 




problems, it still could not offer policy makers ‘workable’ solutions (Baumol and Oates, 
1995: 2).  
Towards the end of the 20th century the economic debate moved on to the discussion 
of policy instruments as a way of predicting compliance in the private sector. The 
debate began to move away from the analyses of Command-and-Control regulations1, 
which often concluded that governments are ill-equipped to monitor their economies to 
be able to effectively influence them (Xepapadeas, 1991; Hepburn, 2010). Increases in 
enforcement were shown as potentially responsible for growing non-compliance 
(Heyes, 2000). Specifically, the increase in the potential costs of being caught was 
observed as leading rational firms to invest in ‘uninspectability’ by, for example, 
creating dummy ‘sanitised areas’ (ibid., p.6), rather than investing in compliance. 
Meanwhile, improvements in participation by the general public were observed to also 
lead to worsening compliance results due to its capacity for upsetting unofficial 
compliance-maximising deals between public and private sectors (Harrington, 1988; 
Heyes and Rickman, 1999).  
Economics literature therefore moved to the analysis of positive incentives, such as the 
effects of subsidies (Burrows, 1979; Polinsky, 1979), and on to modelling for economic 
instruments aimed at incentivising the private sector at the level of the whole industry 
rather than the individual firm. This body of literature often took as its purpose not to 
explain or predict implementation issues, but to offer solutions, such as the adoption of 
environmental taxes / charges, including pollution permits, meant to encourage 
industry to monitor itself (Hahn and Noll, 1981; Krupnick et al., 1983). 
 
State-centric interpretations 
The limitations of the market-centric debates to deliver robust environmental policies 
attracted increasing attention from other disciplines, including law, political science and 
public administration. It fell to these disciplines to explain the continued reluctance of 
government structures to move away from the obviously inefficient Command-and-
Control measures despite the progress in the debate on alterative EPI instruments 
mentioned above.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





This led to the formation of the state-centric approaches for analysing EPI. Necessarily, 
the first few works looked at implementation prospectively and descriptively discussed, 
for example, options for enforcements (Netherton, 1968). As events in the sphere of 
environmental politics started to provide academics with greater data, analytical works 
began to emerge and often took an institutional approach to explaining specific EPI 
examples (for example, Andreen, 1989). Authors came to describe competition for 
power, the split of resources and responsibilities (Stewart, 1977), and the confusion of 
policy objectives (Lester and Bowman, 1989) between different levels of government, 
especially in federal systems, as key barriers to the implementation of national 
objectives at local levels. The nature of centrally-set policy was also criticised, for 
example, for being insensitive to local contexts, while others argued that EPI could not 
be completed unless both policies and implementing structures innovated first (Cortner, 
1976). 
However, unlike economic texts, this literature refrained from offering a wide range of 
its own models or frameworks for predicting and/or overcoming failed EPI. Reflecting 
developments in the wider implementation literature towards the end of the 1980s, 
academic works in this tradition began to test generalist conceptual frameworks in the 
context of EPI. Lester and Bowman (1989: 732), for instance, applied the Sabatier-
Mazmanian Model2 in a comparative study of waste regulations at the state level in the 
USA, commenting that a comparative approach is “essential in testing theories of 
public policy implementation”. However, works avoided developing new approaches. 
These observations are indicative of the difficulties with developing models and 
frameworks for EPI. Lester and Bowman (1989) found that modelling suffered from 
limited data, non-operationalization of variables, and the high degree of dependence 
between results and the context of selected policy. As such, although modelling for EPI 
can show explanatory power in specific instances, it does not easily generalise across 
contexts. Testing theories, rather than models, reaped similar results: for example, 
testing the significance of public participation during EPI emphasised the difficulty of 
producing generalisations from case-study analyses, on some occasions even 
precluding the analysis of the variable’s impact altogether (Desai, 1989).  
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Behaviour-centric interpretations  
The 1980s also saw the emergence of social scientific literature that studied behaviour 
of individual agents in EPI processes rather than observing institutions or the public / 
private dichotomy. The behavioural approaches tended to examine issues through a 
bottom-up lens and were concerned with, for example, the puzzle of why 
environmental interest, prevalent at the micro level of the general public, does not 
necessarily translate into environmental action either at local or national levels. 
For example, authors in this camp examined factors driving the groups targeted by 
government regulation in their acceptance or rejection of change that environmental 
policies aim to produce, and tested hypotheses against broadly defined implementation 
performance (Durant, 1984; Langbein and Kerwin; 1985). Others assessed that policy 
makers’ preconception, as opposed to investigation of both the policy problem and the 
appropriate solutions, formed a barrier to implementation (Eden, 1996; Blake, 1999).  
The focus on agency also revealed that central government and bottom-level 
implementers might understand EP goals differently. This was observed to result in the 
confusion over how and what should be implemented, leading to incompatible 
implementation efforts (Blake, 1999). However, intergovernmental conflict in the right 
context has also been shown to lead to productive intergovernmental debates, which 
could test preconceptions and lead to improved implementation (Gormley, 1986). 
Other approaches focused on the capabilities of agents to achieve changes in 
behaviour they are encouraged to make, even when they agree with the overall 
objectives. These approaches can be seen as criticising government initiatives for 
aiming too narrowly and failing to alter external constraints that prevent targeted 
groups from making desired changes (Guagnano et al, 1995; Hallin, 1995; Myers and 
Macnaghten, 1998).  
It should be noted that most non-economic works in this period of time often took a 
holistic approach in their analysis and those that took a more analytical rather than 
descriptive style kept the operationalization of tested variables intentionally vague. At 
the same time, comparative studies had been more often than not based on large-N 
samples, typically reviewing the experience of the 50 states of the USA. In-depth 






The spread of environmental politics 
Returning to the narrative of environmental politics, the debates mentioned above 
mostly focused on the experiences of the USA and the countries of the European 
Union. The key theories, models and frameworks in EPI literature were therefore 
developed in respect to these geographical locations. However, the ‘diffusion’ of 
environmental politics to less developed countries began to capture some academic 
interest already in the 1970s (Kruse, 1974). Authors with such interest stressed the 
contextual differences in implementation barriers between developed and developing 
countries (Mumme et al., 1988). These differences may also explain why these works 
were more descriptive, at most building taxonomies (Ross, 1984), and avoided testing 
conceptual frameworks that were developed to explain First World phenomena.  
The mainstream literature on the implementation of environmental policies continued to 
show increasing frustration with the development of the field. The United States was 
bemoaned for offering inadequate data (resulting from slow implementation efforts), 
which in turn precluded capacity of longitudinal analysis as well as slowing down 
theory-building (Lester and Lombard, 1990). Meanwhile, the emerging European 
literature on EPI tended to offer policy recommendations, rather than develop 
academic theory, or otherwise to mostly offer descriptive accounts of how 
environmental policies were delivered given the political structures and institutions of 
the European Union (Martin, 1994), instead of analysing whether they were actually 
implemented, and if not, why not. This correlates with academic work on the American 
environmental implementation experience at that time, which often continued trying to 
prove that implementation does not necessarily follow policy design and enactment 
(Walker, 1994), instead of examining factors that preclude EPI. 
Against this background, the international aspects of environmental politics began to 
offer more attractive opportunities for analysis. Academics began singling out 
environmental policy as a good candidate for building international generalisations 
given the “constancy in policy goals” across countries, thus helping to control for policy 
change as a factor (Ross, 1984: 491). Scholars of international relations and 
comparative politics began focusing on the phenomenon of policy convergence in the 
environmental sphere between countries at different levels of development (Busch and 
Jorgens, 2005b; Busch, et al., 2005). Yet the majority of literature that emerged 
focused on policy development, rather than policy implementation, and on developing, 




on attention to EPI in respect of transitional countries and looks at the few academic 
texts that do exist with such focus. 
 
Part 4: Implementation of environmental policy in transitional states 
The scarcity of literature on EPI in transitional contexts can be explained by a number 
of factors. For instance, the early research on EPI in transitional countries was taking 
place during the reign of the market-liberalisation paradigm, which dictated the 
importance of economic transition to begetting sustainable, consolidated 
democratisation (Przeworski et al., 2000), which were together expected in turn to lead 
to natural improvements in non-economic areas, including the adoption and 
implementation of environmental policies (Bell, 2000; Wamukonya, 2003). Accordingly, 
there is a marked scarcity of analysis on policies other than economic reform in relation 
to transitional states.  
At the same time, many scholars might have felt that the transitional contexts did not 
offer anything new for academic analysis. After all, the majority of environmental 
policies adopted by transitional states were either directly transferred from or inspired 
by Western models and designed with the invited or enforced help of Western advisers 
including First World governments, and International Governmental and Non-
Governmental Organisations. Some transitional states even have access to online 
tools allowing them to directly lift text from USA- or European-based law for use in 
domestic policy-drafting (Amengual, 2013). Meanwhile, actors that encouraged transfer 
of environmental policy from developed to developing world seemed so certain of 
success, they often advised the recipient governments to ignore all previous 
experience within their own states, believing that regimes other than 
democracy/capitalism could not produce anything useful (Gille, 2000; Baker and 
Jehlika, 1998). As such, EPI in non-developed countries may have seemed unlikely to 
provide new findings, which could in turn help explain the low initial uptake of these 
contexts by EPI researchers.  
As data on environmental policy performance started to accumulate in these states 
with time, it became increasingly obvious that a) the expected automatic improvements 
in non-economic spheres failed to materialise despite the on-going economic reform 
and b) that the foreign origin of policies, such as on environmental protection, often 
itself presented a significant barrier to implementation. This is because, advised to 




administratively alien policies and instruments, which were designed to address often 
very different problems (Boyle, 1998; Baker and Jehlika, 1998), and were therefore 
often inappropriate for challenges at hand.  
Given these observations, it also became more accepted that traditional approaches to 
studying EPI might not be appropriate for explaining phenomena in non-developed 
contexts. It emerged that approaches in the mainstream literature interpreted EPI 
issues from the perspective of developed nations by making a number of assumptions 
that did not apply to transitional or developing contexts. For example, ‘Western’ 
theories often assumed that firms were privately owned, that information about 
environmental problems was publicly available (even if the general public chose not to 
access it), and that there were channels for industry and the general public to influence 
government decisions. Transitional contexts cannot support many of these 
assumptions and exhibit significantly wider gaps between legislation and practice.  
Researchers therefore needed to adapt and the literature that emerged in relation to 
transitional countries is correspondingly more diverse than the traditional, mainstream 
body of works in the EPI field. Although state-centric and economic interpretations 
were still common, the non-developed contexts also attracted approaches from 
theories on globalisation, cultural contextualisation, resource curse, and national 
security to name a few. While this introduced increasing breadth of academic enquiry, 
each field contributed precious few works to the discussion. At the same time, much of 
this literature often mentioned policy implementation only in passing and focused 
instead on other processes as central units of analysis. Otherwise, literature might 
speak of processes related to EPI but which are either broader or narrow, such as 
‘environmental management’ or ‘policy delivery’. Otherwise, literature might not 
mention environmental policies at all, but present arguments on policy implementation 
that could be extended to EPI. Meanwhile, a lot of the literature that could similarly 
explain issues with EPI does not directly approach policy implementation. The impact 
on EPI of theories and factors that such studies explore can often therefore be only 
inferred.  
It is difficult to categorise such a diverse body of literature in similar ways as in previous 
sections and a different method might be more useful. Almost all the literature reviewed 
below has the following in common: it tends to clearly differentiate between some 
combination of the common stakeholders involved in implementation before focusing 
on reasons why they cannot, don't desire to, or don't need to comply with or enforce 




local politicians and bureaucrats, the general public, the private sector (including 
individual firms and the industry sectors they comprise), and civil society (including 
established NGOs as well as temporarily mobilised social movements). To capture the 
complexity of this wide range of institutions and agency, it is arguably more appropriate 
to organise the following part of review along the lines of the broad stakeholder groups 
and explore what the literature says about their roles and motivations in respect to EPI, 
and how these are characterised by academic analysis. Given that this research 
project focuses on the post-Soviet space as a particular example of transitional 
contexts, the following discussion draws largely on examples of academic work with 
interest in that part of the world. 
 
Macro level: government 
Academics attracted to the exploration of EPI in transitional contexts often adopt a 
comparative analytical approach and focus on countries considered as the biggest 
polluters. These states tend to be well-endowed with non-renewable natural resources 
and a lot of the pollution there results from these. A significant proportion of literature 
concerned with EPI in transitional countries has therefore concentrated on the link 
between natural resources and poor EPI results.  
Some of this literature focuses on the economic and political motivations of national 
governments that took on similar environmental obligations but had different policy 
outcomes, observing that transitional states without a single valuable, tradable energy 
resource were forced to search for new sources of energy once its free supply from the 
Soviet bloc disappeared in 1991. As such, these states often modernised by turning to 
green energy and were thus able to meet their environmental commitments 
(Andonova, 2002). In contrast, states that had at least one non-renewable energy 
resource, that at the time of the USSR’s collapse was in high demand from neighbours, 
did not have the same incentives, kept their polluting industries and were, therefore, 
slower to see EPI improvements (ibid.).  
This outcome has been tied to the tendency of rents from the sale of natural resources 
to increase state autonomy. Authors observed that since governments of these states 
do not need to rely on taxation of domestic businesses and the general public, or on 
international loans, deals and aid, they become insulated against internal or 
international pressures to address issues such as environmental protection (Aaronson, 




phenomenon is observed are described as ‘rentier’ or ‘petro’ states. It can be inferred 
that the capacity and willingness of a ‘petro’ state to perceive the needs of its people or 
the advice of external observers are diminished. This is likely to in turn detrimentally 
affect the state’s ability to deliver and implement public policies, such as environmental 
protection, in a relevant and responsible manner. 
Additionally, natural resource abundance has been tied to corruption, and identified 
with further reductions in institutional quality. This has been linked with further strain in 
capacity for implementing government policies (including environmental objectives), 
which could damage profits from key industries (Buccellato and Mickiewicz, 2009; 
Aaronson, 2011). Given that the elites controlling such industries are mostly interested 
in profits, speed and volume of industrial output tends to be prioritised over 
environmental and other regulation (Feshbach and Friendly, 1992), thus stalling the 
delivery of non-economic policy goals. Even when direct links between natural 
resources and poor EPI are not drawn, their significance is nonetheless often inferred. 
For example, natural resources in transitional contexts often cannot be developed 
without foreign investment, which is often protected against the unstable nature of 
transition by forging long-term contracts, which can have an effect of inhibiting EPI 
(Pomfret, 2011). 
Meanwhile, a prominent branch of literature focuses on resource endowment as a 
barrier to democratisation (for example, Obydenkova, 2010), which is in turn assessed 
as pivotal to the success of environmental upgrading (Congleton, 1992; Neumayer, 
2002; Payne, 1995). For example, some of the most polluting and, concurrently, most 
resource-endowed states in the former Soviet space (including Russia, Kazakhstan 
and Azerbaijan) are seen as having failed to transition into democracies, as defined by 
Western observers. The struggle between elites that should have led to 
democratisation following a change in regime (Higley and Burton, 1989; Gel’man, 
2002; McFaul, 2002; Geddes, 2004) has instead been focused on the control over 
resources in these states and resulted in the emergence of 'personalist regimes' 
(Geddes, 2004). The winners of this struggle are then said to be most interested in 
keeping things in stasis (Ganev, 2001) and any reform, including that which could have 
improved EPI, is stalled or reversed.  
Institutions that emerge from subsequent state building are said to be characterised by 
'fuzzy and vague rules and norms' (Gel'man, 2012: 301). Their sole purpose has been 
further described as lying in the provision of 'fuzzy legality' (Cohn, 2001) to otherwise 




orchestrated by transition profiteers (Ganev, 2001) weakens the state and its capacity 
to implement national policies that may have adverse effects on power-endowed elites. 
Given that the power of such elites often rests on pollution-intensive industries, it can 
be inferred that formally adopted environmental policies are unlikely to be pursued in 
practice. 
There is, of course, literature that does not focus on resources and that is instead 
interested in the more traditional institutional aspects. Authors have explored the 
relationship between different levels of government, observing that EPI is negatively 
affected by the aversion of bottom-level implementers to centrally planned policies 
(O’Toole, 1997), and by frequent political competition, suspicion and conflict between 
different structures responsible for developing and implementing government policies 
(Cummings and Norgaard, 2004). Others explore reasons for poor stakeholder 
engagement when environmental policy and laws are drafted (Soderholm, 2001) and 
link this to subsequent, inadequate implementation targets that damage 
implementation outcomes. The inadequate development of meso-institutions to 
facilitate participation capable of solving these issues has also been cited (O'Toole, 
1997).  
Some authors have concentrated their analysis on environmental legislation produced 
by central governments of transitional states and highlight issues for EPI here. These 
works are quite diverse and can highlight the undue influence of politically powerful 
firms, which tend to materialise in resource-rich countries, on policy-makers (for 
example, Urrutia, 1988) leading to legislation that circumvents the goals of 
environmental policies. Others instead discuss the unrealistic nature of environmental 
laws in transitional states, which are often seen as symbolic by concerned 
stakeholders (Soderholm, 2001; Bell, 2000) and as unsustainable by academics 
(Knudsen, 2010). 
Meanwhile, some authors focus their analyses on the more international nature of 
environmental efforts and explore reasons why transitional states often fail to deliver on 
their international environmental commitments via binding and non-binding 
international agreements. These studies have identified the following barriers to 
implementation: insufficient clarity of international objectives (Aaronson, 2011) or 
assessment criteria for compliance (O'Lear, 2007); lack of explicit punishment for non-
compliance (Harrop, 2013); the aspirational rather than realistic nature of such goals 
(Victor, 1998); and poor international leadership from the biggest polluters among 




Micro-level: local government  
Academic analyses regarding the subnational levels of government often focus on 
economic and political conditions in which these levels work. For example, it is 
frequently pointed out that local officials in the former communist space, especially in 
the first decade of their countries’ transitions, were under severe pressures to alleviate 
financial crises brought on by transition. This often forced local authorities and other 
actors to choose between local policy objectives (Hønneland and Jørgensen, 2003; 
Suopajärvi, et al., 2016), namely between maintaining adequate living standards for the 
local population, and enforcing policies (such as environmental protection), which could 
instead lead to increased unemployment and associated social ills. Although it is 
typical for a government’s economic and environmental objectives to compete, the 
choice between them was made more significant by the context of severe resource 
scarcity and rising poverty in a context of near economic collapse.  
Although authors acknowledge that there exist instances where local governments 
have successfully implemented environmental improvements despite these significant 
barriers, they do not necessarily provide a detailed analysis of how this was achieved 
beyond mentioning strong links between local governments and polluting industries 
(Thomas and Orlova, 2001). Literature instead seems to suggest that it is far more 
common for environmental policies to be marginalised at the local government level. 
The necessity to implement formal, national-level environmental policy has been 
observed to be crowded out by the realities of countervailing survival necessities of 
local political, economic and social contexts (Millard, 1998; Swanson et al., 2001; 
O’Toole and Hanf, 1998). Literature points to single-industry cities and towns, which 
host some of the most polluting industries in the post-Soviet space, as being 
particularly affected (Kryukova, et al., 2015). Although these examples could be used 
to either support or challenge traditional approaches to studying policy implementation, 
authors do not necessarily mention such formal frameworks of analysis and instead 
use more holistic methodologies. 
Some authors focus less on the capacity of local governments and more on their inter-
relationships with other actors, which could be extended to the analysis of EPI 
performance. For instance, it has been highlighted that local officials often depend on 
industry for political support (Andonova, et al., 2007) due to close patrimonial links 
between political and economic elites in transitional contexts, but also due to the need 
to support local employers and achieve greater economic growth to alleviate welfare 




some allusions to corruption in these discussions, and many studies directly focus on 
this phenomenon. The impact on the implementation of environmental and other 
governmental policies can be inferred from such studies, but direct reference is 
relatively rare. Those that do focus on implementation, arrive at conclusions similar to 
those in the literature camp mentioned directly above: economic goals win over official 
commitments to EPI; and when EPI is pursued, only ‘reactive’, short-term solutions are 
usually implemented (Millard, 1998; Baker and Jehlika, 1998).  
 
Regulatory agencies 
Literature on the processes of actual regulation sits across a wide range of 
approaches, including those that concern institutional or structural transformations, the 
extent and quality of state capacity, and the quality of written legislation. The following 
discussion examines what the different approaches reveal about EPI in transitional 
context. 
In analysing regulators’ efforts in EPI, some works take an historic viewpoint, tracing 
the origins on modern behaviour that impacts EPI. For example, the long period of 
centralised control in Russia from Tsarist to the communist era has been linked to the 
development of certain tendencies in bottom-level regulators across the post-Soviet 
space: namely, the over-dependence of administrative and regulatory structures on 
upper levels is said to have fostered a perverse tendency for bottom levels to ‘wait for 
the state to act’ even when responsibilities for action have been delegated (Walewski, 
cited in Millard, 1998: 151).  
Accordingly, the absence of experience in self-governing has been linked to the failure 
of governments and regulatory structures at sub-central levels in developing skills 
necessary for environmental policy enforcement (Kolk and van der Weij, 1998; 
Lotspeich, 1995), which forms an important part of EPI. Issues with regulatory staff 
quality have been similarly linked to historical traditions: tribalism rather than 
meritocracy has been identified as persisting within recruitment processes, including for 
environmental regulatory agencies. This has been said to perpetuate 
unprofessionalism and give rise to corruption (Cummings and Norgaard, 2004) that 
detrimentally affect the agencies’ EPI efforts. 
Cultural and historic heritage of formerly communist states has also been linked to the 
regulatory regime’s choice of taxation as the main policy instrument (Soderholm, 1999, 




been historically seen as to raise revenue by punishing non-compliance, rather than to 
influence behaviour, and this conception is still haunting policy implementation today 
(Groth, 2005). The absence of functioning accounting and auditing system has also 
been linked to the limited success of economic EPI instruments, since without them 
regulators have incomplete information about firms’ emission levels and compliance 
costs (Lotspeich, 1995). In the absence of these systems, regulatory agencies are 
forced to estimate and rely on the trustworthiness of firms’ self-reporting. It is, 
therefore, unlikely that economic policy instruments will be used effectively until 
perceptions as well as market, legal and social structures in transitional countries 
approximate those of Western economies. 
Some arguments have been made to look for causes of poor EPI within the process of 
transition rather than before it. For instance, the downsizing of the public sector, which 
often accompanies transitions of this kind, has been said to exacerbate the 
shortcomings of sub-national regulatory structures. This is because downsizing tends 
to hit the lesser-prioritised ministries and their delivery and regulatory agencies the 
hardest. This includes environmental regulatory structures, which have been politically 
marginalised, understaffed and underfunded for almost as long as they have existed in 
the formerly communist space (Bell, 2000; Amengual, 2013; Millard, 1998). Meanwhile, 
the generally low salaries offered by the public sector exacerbated the situation further 
by failing to attract or retain professional and appropriately qualified regulators 
(Forowicz, cited in Millard, 1998: 156; Cummings and Norgaard, 2004). The process of 
public sector downsizing has also frequently seen environmental and energy agencies 
being merged but losing qualified personnel in the process (Wamukonya, 2003), further 
reducing regulatory capacity for EPI.  
Others have pointed not only to the change of public structures but also to the manner 
of that change. The process of transition creates institutional instability, in which 
existing and emerging structures continue to change, split up, backtrack, leap forward 
and U-turn. The institutional theory, which dictates that institutions largely remain 
constant with only incremental change, either does not apply to transitional contexts 
(Peng & Heath, 1996), or has to be viewed as a compressed process with change 
happening at a much faster pace (Ahlstrom and Bruton, 2010). The rushed nature of 
environmental reforms has been ascribed with leading to unplanned, unguided and 
unmonitored implementation, where implementation pace often leaves no time for 




Literature has also identified that speed and effectiveness of implementation is being 
affected by the objectives and sources of sociopolitical pressures that drive them, and 
by the presence, nature and capacity of institutions for mediating such pressures into 
action (Boyle, 1998, Cherp, 2001). Yet such pressures and institutions have often 
failed to materialise in states that are further away from Central Europe. Meanwhile, 
the inability of the state to form cooperative relationships with newly privatised 
industrial sectors has been identified as having a knock on effect on the ability of the 
regulatory agencies to ensure regulatory compliance (O'Toole, 1997). Literature 
speaks of occasions where regulators lack legal powers to access industrial facilities 
for inspections; or are coerced by politically powerful individuals within and outside 
government against enforcing penalties following proven violations (Bell, 2000).  
 
Private sector  
Mixed in with the state-centric interpretation discussed in the two preceding 
subsections are some notions of economic analysis. Kerekes (1993), Lotspeich (1995) 
and Swanson et al. (2001) identify monetary constraints on firms as important barriers 
to compliance by industries: firms are seen as unprepared or unwilling to cover the 
costs of meeting environmental standards, and this stalls the delivery of environmental 
policy goals. 
Related to this analysis is Andonova et al.’s (2007) interpretation of implementation 
problems being exacerbated by the process of globalisation. This branch of literature 
‘precipitate[s] a race to the bottom in environmental policy’ (p. 783) since 
environmental regulation and other policy instruments could impose additional 
production costs and damage domestic industries’ international competitiveness. Thus, 
businesses are said to be expected to form opposition and display resistance to 
environmental regulation, preventing successful EPI.  
Concurrently, as economic activity in some of the resource-rich former-Soviet states 
began to pick up following the signing of oil-related international deals, the phenomenal 
increases of cash flows from some of the most polluting industries into the treasury, 
and subsequently into local government budgets, were expected to crowd out political 
will to pursue environmental regulation whenever environmental and economic 
concerns come into conflict (Andonova et al., 2007).  
Perhaps paradoxically, economic developments were to an extent mirrored by 




produced highly complex, entangled and sometimes nonsensical and unachievable 
environmental requirements and authors have indicated that these processes may 
have detrimentally affected EPI since ever-changing regulations can be difficult to keep 
track of (Ahlstrom and Bruton, 2010: 541).  
Frequent legislative change has been in turn accompanied by turbulent shifts in the 
institutional framework responsible for environmental protection. The number of 
uncooperative and uncoordinated public bodies with EPI responsibilities quickly 
multiplied (Bykov, 1999) and this situation has also been linked to poor EP compliance 
for its tendency to foster corruption (Ahlstrom and Bruton, 2010: 535) and create 
uncertainty (Zamulin, 2003; Amengual, 2013). Literature indicates that these settings 
led to private firms investing into finding legislative loopholes (Ahlstrom and Bruton, 
2010) and moving into the grey economy outside the regulated framework (Amengual, 
2013), instead of seeking ways to comply with environmental laws. As such, the 
literature paints a picture in which institutional and regulatory environments of the 
transitioning former Soviet Union (FSU) failed to facilitate a healthy business 
environment conducive to motivating the private sector to innovate in ways that could 
deliver successful EPI.  
Some authors have also explored the role of international firms in EPI of transitional 
countries. Pollution haven literature warns that many multinational firms look to settle in 
developing countries with weak regulatory systems precisely for the ability to outsource 
polluting behaviour (e.g. Copeland and Taylor, 1994). Corporate governance literature, 
however, hopes that multinational firms can introduce more environmentally friendly 
technology (Epstein and Roy, 1998) as well as more environmentally responsible 
codes of practice (Soderholm, 1999) into developing and transitional countries. It is 
possible to infer from such literature that the involvement of international firms could 
have a significant impact on EPI efforts in transitional states. 
 
Civil society 
Literature interested in EPI in transitional space often mentions the role of the civil 
society. For instance, it has been stressed that environmental issues gained political 
recognition in developed countries as a consequence of strong societal pressures 
through established channels for translating such pressure into political action (Boyle, 
1998), whereas environmental policies in the developing / transitional contexts are 




national governments to keep up with Western fashion (Roque, 1986: 154; Lotspeich, 
1995). In other words, authors point to the reversed order of things: whereas in the 
‘West’, environmental policies and their implementation were pushed from the bottom-
up, in non-Western states they are instead introduced from the top down without 
significant public support or cultural attitudes that could accord high socio-political 
repute (and consequently political power) to environmental institutions responsible for 
EPI. 
Authors have also highlighted the nature of civil societies in transitional contexts as 
preventing this stakeholder group from playing an active role in EPI as would be typical 
in the developed countries. For instance, it has been found that public support for 
politically unpopular policies such as environmental protection in this part of the world 
tends to be local, widely dispersed and lacking consensus on means and goals 
(Andonova, 2002: 18). This is seen as preventing civil environmental movements from 
forming into permanent NGOs that could transfer environmental concerns into a clear, 
unified voice with political weight and influence over EPI (O'Toole, 1997). 
Consequently, civil movements remain inexperienced and lacking in skills to articulate 
and communicate viewpoints between the formal EPI institutions and the wider civil 
society (Aaronson, 2011). Conversely, some authors put the lack of constructive 
conversation between public and not-profit sectors on EPI down to the latter’s 
perceptions of prevalent corruption in the public sector  (Bell, 2000) and the resulting 
cynicism towards formal government structures responsible for EPI (Bell, 2000; Slim, 
2002).  
Otherwise, civil society has been observed to prioritise more immediate needs over 
interests in the environment (Aaronson, 2012; Bell, 2000: 27), precluding civil 
participation in EPI. Authors have also identified some instances of corruption within 
environmental NGOs in the post-Soviet space (Golumb, 2003; Gunaratne, 2008), 
which could also help explain the low support for EPI across the general public. Other 
prominent issues addressed in the literature are those of human rights and the 
increasing tendency of transitional governments to limit freedoms of speech and 
association in recent decades, especially in the sphere of environmental protection 
(Feldman and Blokov, 2009). In some countries, even discussing certain politically 
unpopular matters, such as pollution by big companies, is socially and culturally 
discouraged (Bryan and Hoffman, 2008). Although not necessarily directly related to 
EPI, these works also offer reasons for the relative lack of participation compared to 





Overall, it is difficult to differentiate implementation problems in environmental policy 
from those in other policies in transitional literature. The political, economic and social 
systems that transitional governments aspire to secure for their countries via transition 
are often all entirely new. All spheres of society have to develop new perspectives, 
attitudes and behaviours. In a sense, FSU states must undergo a triple transition 
(Bunce, 1995): from communism to democracy; from command to free economy; and 
from an empire to several, individual nation-states. 
The main factor that seems to differentiate environmental policy and regulation from 
other policy fields in transitioning FSU countries is the prevailing cultural misallocation 
of importance to environmental issues. This is especially strong among the ruling 
elites, who have traditionally accorded little value to the environment. This ignorance 
only persisted as attention of the FSU governments became consumed by other major 
issues brought on by transition, including rocketing inflation and plummeting social 
welfare (OECD, 2006). 
During the communist regime, the concept of unemployment was rare. Once markets 
were liberalised, many firms either shut down or had to lay off a great number of 
workers, leaving an even greater proportion of the population in poverty. In these 
conditions, the state and the regulators could be expected to have little interest in 
handicapping even the marginal firms with additional costs of production or shutting 
them down in accordance with the official environmental regulations, for fear of 
creating additional unemployment, especially in settings where the polluter may be the 
only employer (Bell, 2000: 22). 
This is partly due to the inflexible nature of enforcement tools prescribed by the 
regulatory regimes in many transitional FSU countries, which aim to punish the 
offender instead of changing their behaviour. Tools such as 'fees, fines, criminal 
liability, and the threat of plant shutdown' (Bell, 2000: 30) paint a black and white 
approach to regulation, and enforcement of this kind is indeed not always in the best 
interests of the local economy.  
As a result of institutional inertia, environmental objectives are often put on the 
backburner until better times (Andonova, 2002). Indeed, many international financial 
institutions, who often have been and remain the main source of development / 
transformation advice and funding, themselves have for a long time treated 




and strong institutional capacity (ibid.) and have thus rarely encouraged a prioritisation, 
or even pursuit, of environmental objectives. 
This is the narrative on transitional states that emerged out of the literature review. In 
terms of limitations on governments to pursue environmental objectives, authors often 
cited: poor regulatory capacity; socio-political prioritisation of development over 
environmental concerns; and lack of transparency resulting in regulatory inaction. In 
terms of limitations on the general public to incentivise its government to prioritise the 
environment, literature highlights that environmental awareness or interest among the 
general public remains relatively poor. This condition either precludes civil engagement 
with the issue or causes social resistance to environmental regulation due to societal 
misunderstanding of its objectives (Amengual, 2013). Many authors also identified the 
transition itself as a reason for problems with administrative and regulatory capacities 
and for the plummet in popularity of environmental issues among both the general 
public and the governing elites.  
Environmental movements could help mitigate this process by educating both factions 
about the value of environment and the consequences of environmental damage. 
However, where environmental movements exist in the FSU space, they tend to be too 
diverse, or to lack resources and experience (O'Toole and Hanf, 1998). As a result, 
they fail to amount to a comprehensive, organised political movement or an effective 
educational body able to generate public acceptance and support for environmental 
objectives (Knill and Tosun, 2012).  
What comes across very strongly in the literature is that there must be a 
comprehensive, concurrent change among many different elements:  
• state capacity must be improved to become consistent, transparent, 
cooperative, accountable and corruption-free;  
• social movements must be prepared to cooperate;  
• there must be available, extensive, and evidence-based information;  
• industry must be able to comply with the aims of EPI, and  
• laws and regulations must be reasonable and appropriately flexible.  
If one element is improved but the others remain unchanged, a successful outcome is 
unlikely to emerge. 
Few studies try to apply theoretical frameworks or explicit formal models to explain the 




on implementation in transitional contexts is especially scarce. This may well be due to 
the rapidly changing institutional structures observed under transition, which defy 
categorisation and predictability (Cherp, 2001), as well as a lack of transparency in 
political and economic processes resulting in insufficient data on implementation for 
academic analysis (Andonova et al., 2007: 789). When theory is discussed, it is usually 
in the context of comparative case studies, where existing Western theories or 
taxonomies are superimposed upon empirical observations in transitional contexts. 
Overall, too many studies still focus on singular post-Soviet states and either treat them 





Chapter 3. Theoretical framework 
Introduction 
This chapter sets out the structure of research and analysis in this thesis, as well as 
explaining how and why this structure was selected. It begins by explaining the interest 
in implementation gaps as a dependent variable and explores the definition of this 
concept before deriving the central research question to be pursued in this thesis. 
Subsequent sections outline the methods and approaches that have been used in 
order to answer that question. The reason for selecting a comparative approach are 
explored, as well as the choice of countries and regions within them deemed 
appropriate for such a comparison.  
This is followed by a brief discussion of the range of explanatory variables that have 
been considered, as identified from the preceding literature review. Reasons are given 
for selecting some and not other variables. Each of the selected variables is then 
operationalized, deconstructed into composite parts, and turned into individual 
hypotheses. The last section of the chapter sets out considered and selected 
approaches to data collection. This section also mentions limitations of the selected 
approach and offers measures to mitigate these. The chapter concludes by committing 




The vast majority of academic attention is drawn to the emergence of policies as the 
more interesting stage of the policy cycle. A number of models have been developed to 
explain how and why policies arise and change. Although it has now been widely 
accepted that policy-making is a non-linear process, of which the implementation stage 
is an important part, this stage does not seem to incite the same level of interest. The 
study of policy change in recent decades has shown little interest in how policies 
perform or why they needed to change. Rather, analysis often presents a narrative of 
policy change as a natural, dynamic process (Kingdon, 1995; Sabatier, 1999; John, 
2003).   
However, a number of academics in the literature reviewed in Chapter 2 concede that 




external factors including those of structural, institutional, social and political nature. 
Such barriers can distort the appearance of a smooth, inevitable transformation of 
policies as a natural process. Just because a policy exists and has been put on the 
formal agenda of a ruling government does not guarantee policy success. As such, the 
practical reality sometimes reveals a very messy picture of policy performance where 
implementation is incomplete, counterproductive, inconsistent and contradictory 
(Larson, 1980; Malen, 2006; Hudson et al., 2019).  
In countries chosen for this research project there exist relatively coherent frameworks 
of environmental policy and associated regulations, as is discussed in the empirical 
chapters. Policy content and design are of relatively high quality, given that these 
governments have had guidance and advice from international consultants and 
governments of developed countries, where these policies originate. Yet, these policies 
have not been as successful as expected. Most often, this failure has not been the 
case of unsuccessful implementation, which implies that intended plans were put into 
action but did not deliver expected outcomes. On the contrary, very few transitional 
countries witnessed complete implementation; most policy components get stuck 
during implementation by failing to secure target groups' compliance. 
Literature review in Chapter 2 identifies the problem of such non-implementation as a 
failure on the part of the target groups to comply with government-enforced rules; and 
as a failure of the government to enforce such compliance. It is important to 
differentiate between these because they stem from different causes. Lack of 
compliance at the local level may be:  
• cultural,  
• economically driven (for example, by want for profits), or  
• politically necessary (driven by a priority to keep the population above poverty).  
Failure to enforce may be caused by:  
• poor policy design (making the policy unimplementable),  
• inadequate legal power of the regulatory agencies to implement / enforce, 
• inefficient / non-existent institutions, or  
• insufficient numbers, training or other resources needed by implementers.  
The political will to implement is yet another factor. Implementers might have reasons 
to intentionally fail. This may be due to their poor opinion of the policy goals or design. 




transitional countries with weak formal structures and a lack of transparency and 
accountability, it might be profitable not to implement. In a system where appointments 
to all tiers of society are often made by personal recommendation, making business 
difficult for important individuals might be detrimental to prospects of further personal 
promotion. It may also be the case that implementers receive unofficial financial or 
material incentives (bribes) not to implement, or they simply choose to squander 
government budgets allocated to their implementation unit on personal goals because 
conditions prevalent in transitional contexts allow for such practices to go unnoticed or 
unpunished. 
In light of the above discussion, policy 'implementation' can be conceptualised as a 
synthesis of these three components (compliance, enforcement, and political will). 
Even then, operationalising implementation success or failure is a complex task. 
Having reviewed a range of literature on the topic in the preceding Chapter, most of 
which has intentionally chosen vaguely defined approaches to extend the scope of 
analysis, this thesis has adopted the top-down concept of ‘implementation gaps’, 
defined as disparity between intended and actual results, as the most suitable 
framework for the study at hand. Accordingly, these choices set ‘implementation gaps’ 
as the dependent variable for the following analysis, in which a number of explanatory 
variables are deployed in order to explain variation in implementation success. In line 
with the conceptualisation of ‘implementation’ itself, as outlined above, explanatory 
variables are specifically tested for their ability to impact compliance, enforcement, and 
political will as interlinked but separate components that are necessary on the path to 
materialising policy intentions. 
At the same time, academic research has shown that relaxed, secretive and informal 
styles of environmental regulation can be just as effective as the stringent, formal and 
indiscriminating styles (Vogel, 1986). Therefore, the often-informal nature of regulation 
in transitional countries might not in itself be the cause of poor policy outcomes. The 
responsibility may instead lie with the component parts of regulatory regimes, which 
foster either one or another regulatory style for the purposes of policy delivery. 
Accordingly, while this research project aims to examine structural purposes, in so 
doing it approaches the representatives of the stakeholder groups involved in policy 
implementation. This represents an element of a bottom-up approach, which advocates 
a view that local actors can exert significant impact on policy delivery independently of 
policy design and content. As such, this theoretical framework marries top-down and 




This approach also helps determine the groups whose views should be considered in 
order to understand interaction between implementers and polluters (as policy target 
groups). They are national and local governments and regulatory agencies; courts, oil 
firms and their employees and subcontractors; international organisations, investors 
and institutions; the civil society, academics; and the media. In trying to understand 
how agency, represented by these groups, affects institutional and structural 
processes, which in turn produce policy outcomes, this project lends itself to a hybrid 
theoretical approach in the pursuit of answers to the question: are regulations 
successfully implemented to produce the desired policy outcomes in transitional 
contexts, and if not, then why not? 
	  
Method 
The selection of a method, with the help of which the above question can be answered, 
should also facilitate another ambition: it should help a researcher fulfil the intentions 
behind the research project. This researcher holds with Flyvbjerg’s (2006: 219) 
assessment that the primary aim of social science should lay in the development of 
generalisations. Generalisations based on the analysis of a single case study tend to 
be fragile. In contrast, the comparative method has been described as “one of the 
primary means for establishing social scientific generalisations” (Ragin et al., 1996), 
and therefore appears a logical choice to take forward the present project.  
This particular method also complements the aims of this research in a number of other 
ways. For instance, comparison allows social research to approach the conditions of 
experimental method, which is considered to be the prime method of scientific enquiry, 
but is ordinarily unattainable in social disciplines. Comparative approach does this by 
creating a type of control on variables: similarly to the true experimental conditions, 
which allow a researcher to hold constant all but a few variable, comparative analysis 
allows research to focus on a small number of key factors. This becomes possible by 
comparing across contexts and focusing on either most similar or most different factors 
between; all other factors are thus controlled for as background context (Collier, 1993). 
Although variable manipulation is not possible in social sciences, the comparative 
approach allows analysis to trace existing variation in selected factors and test whether 
such variations correlate with variation in the behaviour of the dependent variable, or 




At the same time, unlike quantitative methods, the qualitative comparative approach 
does not stifle a researcher’s ability to explore the ‘why?’ as well as the ‘what?’ when 
correlations are observed between variables (Lijphart, 1971: 685). Because analysis 
traces existing, often historic differences in social interactions, rather than causing 
them through manipulation, this methodological approach can produce ‘thick 
description’ (Geertz, 1973) that is necessary to explore causality in observed 
correlations. Importantly, the comparative approach allows for this process to be 
applied to the number of variables that is manageable for a social science.  
Furthermore, the comparative approach allows for the analysis at multiple levels 
(Denters and Mossberger, 2006): it reveals differences between social systems and 
allows for an exploration of how these differences impact on actors and institutions 
within them (Przeworski and Teune, 1970), as well as exploring the interrelations 
between the actors and institutions within and between systems. This element is 
particularly important for the current research project given its compositional structure. 
For example, even the dependent variable has been defined as essentially consisting 
of three parts (compliance, enforcement, and political will), each referring to different 
actors or institutions at various levels of government, and which are in turn inevitably 
influenced by the social, political and economic systems in which they are embedded.   
What is more, comparing across a range of cases allows analysis to make pragmatic 
observations, which could be useful to policy makers as well as academics. In regard 
to the present research project, such observations could include whether a particular 
barrier to implementation represents an international trend, or at least a trend across 
the selected world region, as opposed to being specific to a singular location. 
Conversely, the comparative method also allows the testing of concepts from broad 
theories on causal relationships that are hypothesised to apply across contexts. 
Comparison can therefore help to discern whether generalisations about social 
relationships hold and if not, then to identify the particular contexts in which they fail to 
explain occurrence and variation of the social phenomenon under study, thus helping 
to refine social scientific theories (Dogan and Pelassy 1990). This is particularly 
relevant to the present research given its interdisciplinary approach, which presents an 
opportunity to test which theorises can better predict causes for variation in 
implementation gaps. 
The necessities of data collection, the product of which is used to test the dependent 
variable, present yet another reason for selecting the comparative method. Given the 




sufficient quantitative data on these are available. This circumstance predisposes this 
project to qualitative alternatives, which does not sit necessarily easily with the often-
positivistic epistemology of political science. A comparative approach, however, allows 
for a marriage between them, allowing research to draw positivistic conclusions from 
the interpretation of qualitative data. Even so, the sensitivity of processes implied within 
the dependent variable introduces potentially significant barriers to the collection of any 
type of data. A pragmatic case selection, as opposed to a representative one, could go 
some way in mitigating such challenges and thus produce useful data (Stake, 2005). 
The principles behind the comparative method would not hinder such a resolution. 
	  
Case Selection 
The selection of a comparative method guides the selection of case studies for the 
following analysis by presenting two main approaches:  
1. those that compare very different cases with only a few variables that are the 
same across them. This approach implies that those variables are probably the 
true causes of the social behaviour the study wishes to explain. This approach 
is commonly referred to as the Most Different Systems Most Similar Outcomes 
(MDSO); and 
2. those that compare very similar cases with just a few factors being very 
different across them. This approach suggests that it is the variation in these 
factors that produces the social behaviour under study. This approach is known 
in the field as the Most Similar Systems Most Different Outcomes (MSDO) 
(Burnham et al., 2004). 
Concurrently, and in line with the earlier mention of the merit of pragmatic selection, 
the choice of case studies should be also guided by the skills that are available to the 
researcher. In the given case, this researcher is fluent in Russian language and enjoys 
an extensive knowledge of Russian-speaking cultures. Utilisation of these insights 
immediately narrows the selection to key oil-producing states of the former Soviet 
Union (FSU). Decades of direct control from Russia – under Tsars and then the Soviets 
– left a lasting heritage of literature-supported political, social, economic and 
institutional similarities between such countries. This closeness, although not absolute, 
arguably makes these countries as comparable as possible and hence determines the 




In turn, this design also helps to reduce the number of case studies and thus to avoid a 
situation where the number of variables outnumbers the number of existing cases, 
which tends to produce overly contextual findings that defy generalisation. This is 
because there are relatively few comparative oil producers within the FSU space in 
terms of volumes of extraction and developments in the hydrocarbon industry. They 
are the Russian Federation and the Republics of Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan 
(henceforth Russia, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan). Physical constraints on this project 
would in any event prevent an increase in the number of cases, but the extent of 
similarities between these three countries helps minimise the number of variables, 
providing for a manageable scope of research. At the same time, although these three 
are indeed very similar, they nonetheless have a good degree of variation to produce 
interesting and instructive research findings. This includes variation in a few literature-
supported factors that are taken as explanatory variables, and this is explored further in 
the subsequent section. The variation also includes contextual background factors 
such as geography, climate, history of industrialisation, and geopolitics – factors that 
are commonly not considered as important by academic disciplines that guide this 
research project. Selecting case studies that provide such secondary diversity, despite 
its literature-assumed lack of relevance, helps maximise experimental variation within 
the MSDO design. 
 
Consideration of possible variables 
Given that the different elements of the method and approaches described above have 
all derived from the dependent variable (implementation gaps), which was in the first 
instance distilled from the preceding review of literature in Chapter 2, the dependent 
variable was discussed at the outset of this chapter. The following text therefore 
concentrates on possibilities for explanatory variables.  
Before we begin, it bears restating that the three selected countries have a long joint 
history. Azerbaijan had been under direct Russian rule for over 150 years: between 
1828 and 1991, with a brief period of independence between 1918 and 1920 following 
the Russian revolution. Kazakhstan has similar historic ties with Russia, having been 
nominally and then officially ruled by Russia since the mid-nineteenth century and until 
the collapse of the Soviet Union.  
Given such a lengthy period of joint experience, it is only expected for the social, 




into their continued existence as independent states to share core principles. Due to 
the propensity of institutions’ historic grounding to prevent their transformation, the 
‘institutional stickiness’ (Boettke et al., 2008) can be further expected to remain for 
several decades more, ensuring the continued relevance of this thesis. Nonetheless, 
elements of behaviours that are of interest to social science have diverged between 
these states and, according to the selected research design, should be pursued for 
their potential to explain variation in implementation success (dependent variable) 
between these countries. This section explores these elements further. A number of 
variables that do not seem to vary between selected studies, but that are commonly 
tested in existing literature in isolated cases, are also discussed but their applicability is 
refuted.  
Perhaps the most striking differences between case studies are the Russian and Azeri 
governments' intolerance of civil society, and Kazakhstan’s relative (although still rather 
poor) tolerance of its proliferation – at least in the first two decades following the 
collapse of the USSR. There had been several domestic / international NGOs 
operating freely in Kazakhstan (at the time of writing this chapter), whereas Russia has 
hindered operations of foreign-funded NGOs (Feldman and Blokov, 2009: 732; The 
Economist, 2013), and Azerbaijan has exhibited similar practices – for example, the 
broadcasting of foreign (especially political) media has been outlawed (O’Lear, 2007: 
216). 
There is also good variation in state capacity vis-a-vis domestic and foreign oil firms, 
deriving from differences in contractual and licensing connections between the state 
and the private sector, with Russia and Azerbaijan being polar opposites. Although 
both countries' formal institutional capacities are relatively weak compared to Western 
states, Russia has achieved significant control over the oil industry by increasing its 
business share within private firms or by forming joint-ventures with foreign firms and 
thus increasing its ability to collect taxes, regulate industry and incentivise economic 
growth (Vanteeva, 2012). In comparison, the Azeri government has sacrificed much of 
its regulatory functions to oil profits in its contract with a BP-led consortium of foreign oil 
firms in 1994 (O’Lear, 2007; Sovacool, 2011). Accordingly, the variation in regulatory 
capacity between the case studies appears significant. There also appears to be good 
variation in the scope and quality of legislation that forms the basis for the work of the 
different countries’ regulatory agencies. 
Economic conditions are another source of difference. Russia has a recent history of a 




economic growth depends on oil and gas exports, and therefore upon global oil and 
gas prices, the economy is unlikely to collapse should oil profits vanish. Kazakhstan’s 
economy would likely suffer more, but might be rescued by exports of other natural 
resources of which it has abundance. Azerbaijan, however, has witnessed a 5-fold 
increase in oil exports since the beginning of the century, but all other economic 
sectors, apart from those directly related to oil, have seen a significant decline (O’Lear, 
2007). As such, the Azeri economy could be said to depend entirely on oil exports. 
Other factors, popular in academic disciplines relevant to the selected case studies or 
topic (oil), were also considered but not adopted because they did not pass the 
methodological test of the selected approach. These factors included democratisation, 
corruption, and the prevalence of the resource curse and the Dutch disease, among 
others. For example, available indices that measure the levels of democracy showed 
more similarities than differences between the case studies: the Economist Intelligence 
Unit Democracy Index 2014 (EIU, 2015) ranked them relatively close together and 
described all three as authoritarian regimes; the same year, Freedom House (2014) 
gave almost identical scores to all three countries, identifying them as “not free”. 
Furthermore, whether or not resource-wealthy states perform well in terms of 
transitioning to democracy is arguably irrelevant in the discussion about regulatory 
performance. Autocratic states often have the potential for better enforcement and a 
more consistent regulatory performance than democratic states where governments 
and policies can change every 4-5 years.  
Similarly to democracy indices, indices on corruption show insignificant variation. For 
example, the Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (2014) ranked 
Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan as sharing the 126th place, and Russia was close behind 
as 136th. Moreover, although it is true that natural resource industries are usually 
associated with corruption and rent-seeking, scholars suggest that these practices 
might in fact constitute a type of informal state capacity and an unofficial regulatory 
regime (Ledeneva, 2006; 2013). This, of course, does not suggest or presuppose that 
official regulations are upheld and enforced, but it does not necessarily preclude their 
successful implementation by default either. 
Similarly useful indices are not available to compare the prevalence of the other 
economic factors mentioned earlier in this section, but available academic literature 
does not suggest that the selected country case studies are appropriate for their study. 
Many of the problems that the resource curse literature tends to attribute to the curse 




and Warner, 1995; Auty, 1993; Gelb and Associates, 1988; Leite and Weidmann, 
1999: Gylfason et al., 1999; Isham et al., 2002), exceptionally poor governance 
(Ascher, 1999), regime destabilization and 'irrational and volatile' policies (Humphreys, 
2005; Karl, 1997), gang/militia warfare to protect extractive industries (Ross, 1999: 
320-1; Englebert and Ron, 2004; Obi, 2010; Pegg, 2003), or an outright civil war 
(Rosser, 2006; Collier and Hoeffler, 1998, 2002; Reynal-Querol, 2002; Ross, 2004) – 
did not seem to materialise in Russia, Kazakhstan or Azerbaijan; or at least not for long 
or to the extent claimed in this literature's theories. 
The latter three named factors have therefore been passed over for the reasons just 
outlined and the three that are being taken forward are foreign influence (private sector 
and not-for-profit); state capacity, and economic conditions. This brings case and 
variable numbers into equilibrium – three each. In order to avoid the 'many variables, 
few cases’ problem (Burnham et al., 2004) mentioned above, it was decided to take 
country regions as sub-cases. In the case of Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan this was 
relatively straightforward as the majority of oil works are situated within one (or very 
few) geographical area. Accordingly, Baku-Absheron was chosen in Azerbaijan and 
Atyrau in Kazakhstan.  
In Russia, which has multiple major oil-producing regions, two locations were selected 
to further increase the welcome variation within the ‘most similar’ design. The Republic 
of Tatarstan was selected as one of the oldest oil-extraction sites with established 
physical, legal and economic infrastructures in relation to oil. Furthermore, initial 
analysis suggested that the Republic of Tatarstan had no foreign oil firms operating on 
its territory, thus introducing further contextual variation into the MSDO design. The 
Nenets Autonomous Okrug – a contrasting Arctic region – was chosen as the second 
Russian sub-case study, for it houses some of the youngest and most advanced oil 
related infrastructures and governing institutions. Its location is also relevant to global 
environmental challenges, on which there is still relatively little research to date, in 
great part due to the Arctic’s remoteness and associated scarcity of data. Despite this 
challenge, the Nenets Autonomous Okrug was judged well suited for academic 
investigation given the recent international attention it received in the wake of 





Operationalisation of variables 
In the empirical chapters of this thesis, the dependent variable (implementation gaps), 
is assessed as the inter-relation between: a) whether there exist formal laws, standards 
and penalties as well as relevant institutions for setting and enforcing these 
(Nadgrodkiewicz et al., 2012: 6); and b) improvements in environmental indicators in a 
region. Data pertaining to b) are often available on government websites, or can be 
deduced from news articles and court hearings, but it is recognised that such data 
might not be reliable for a number of reasons. For example, data collection that leads 
to governmental environmental statistics in post-Soviet countries often suffers from 
inadequate monitoring practices and methodologies or relies on often un-validated self-
reported data by polluters; otherwise, government sources may intentionally withhold 
environmental data from the public (Denis et al., 1998; WHO, 2004; openDemocracy, 
2015; Oldfield; 2016). Meanwhile, media outlets may publish biased information, 
whereas courts of justice are well known to suffer from corruption in this part of the 
world. Therefore, measurement along the above parameters is supplemented with data 
collected through elite interviews. 
This measure, however, delivers a series of subjective implementation gaps that are 
not well suited for comparative analysis. Although very similar in principle, the three 
country case studies do not have identical environmental legislation, regulatory 
regimes, or wider institutional structures. Therefore, a) – as defined above – is 
measured through a looser interpretation of ‘regulations’ as encompassing all forms of 
formal rules that govern the conduct of oil industries, including local, national and 
international sources.  
The country case studies also face not-entirely-comparable challenges to 
implementation, and their data on environmental performance indicators are not 
necessarily similar in scopes or publicly available documentation, or based on entirely 
similar methodologies, making the definition quite subjective. Furthermore, Russia is a 
federal state, meaning that its regions have the power to pass local legislation to 
supplement national policy intentions, whereas Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan do not 
have equivalents, introducing yet further non-comparability between them.  
As such, elements listed under b) in the preceding paragraph cannot be expected to be 
directly compared across case studies. To mitigate this issue, this project draws on 
observations in literature, reviewed in the preceding chapter: the dependent variable in 




comparison and studies that fail to do this appear context-dependent and often 
struggle to produce generalisations. This is the other reason for this study’s 
conceptualisation of the dependent variable (implementation gaps) as compliance, 
enforcement and political will, as approached and defined on pages 43-45 at the start 
of this chapter.  
These three distinct elements are sufficiently inclusive and comparable to support 
analysis across the case studies despite differences in what is being implemented and 
the data that is available about the success of implementation efforts. A hypothetical 
example can help illustrate this: comparing implementation of a 5% reduction in 
greenhouse gas emissions with a 18% reduction in toxic waste by two different 
countries would be difficult given the difference in abatement efforts, costs, methods, 
stakeholders, and environmental impact. It would be more meaningful to instead 
compare whether there has been a change in enforcement efforts by regulators, and in 
the corresponding compliance efforts by polluters. The distance between a) and b) in 
the comparative chapter therefore refers to the extent of change produced in 
compliance, enforcement and political will. This approach has also proved useful for 
empirical analysis in instances where data described in the preceding paragraph, such 
as on changes in environmental indicators, is incomplete or publicly unavailable. 
A number of explanatory variables are to be measured against implementation gaps 
across explained definitions in order to understand which factors produce causal 
differences in the dependent variable. Three explanatory variables have been 
identified, as discussed in the previous section. Table 2 illustrates the variables' 















Foreign advocacy groups 
Foreign oil firms 
Exposure to international processes 
State capacity 
Quality of environmental regulation 
Quality of regulatory agencies 
Economic conditions 
Presence of non-oil related sectors and their 
economic contribution relative to the oil sector 
The presence of foreign advocacy groups and foreign oil firms is fairly straightforward. 
Each of the case study regions is investigated in terms of what foreign actors are 
present there, their conduct, interactions with other actors, and consequent impact on 
environmental policy implementation (EPI). Interactions with international processes 
are similarly operationalised – by exploring any international treaties that the case 
study regions might fall under, and whether local actors interact with international 
financial or developmental institutions, or have benefited from overseas education and 
travel. The impact of such exposure is then analysed in relation to the EPI. The 
presence of foreign NGOs and exposure to international processes are analysed in 
view of their impact on the political will to a greater extent than on other components of 
the dependent variable (implementation gaps), and the presence of foreign oil firms 
deals mostly with compliance. 
State capacity is often described as incomplete, partial, unofficial and selective in 
analysis of post-Soviet countries, and thus the effect of state capacity can be harder to 
operationalise in comparison to the above variable. Measurement has therefore been 
done along more practical lines: regions have been investigated for the quality of 
national and regional EP regulations; existence and type of environmental enforcement 
agencies; and quantity and quality of regulatory personnel and available equipment. 
Differences in these are analysed in relation to their impact on enforcement and, to a 
lesser degree, compliance components of the dependent variable. 
Economic conditions are operationalised based on key economic data for each region 




existing economic sectors. Analysis focusses on the impact of these circumstances on 
the political will and enforcement as components of implementation gaps.  
It was expected that information on some of the above measures for operationalisation 
would be difficult to collect in the post-Soviet space for reasons similar to those 
mentioned in the opening paragraph of this section. Data from elite interviews were 
therefore expected to be useful not only in regard to implementation gaps, but also for 
explanatory variables. These supplementary data have been collected with the help of 
a semi-structured interview design pursued with a wide range of stakeholders. The 
concluding section of this chapter further explores this approach. 
Meanwhile, the following section explains in greater detail the hypothesised 
relationships between the dependent variable and the component parts of the 
explanatory variables. The role of stakeholders and the rationale for the proposed 
causal direction of these relationships is discussed in view of the observed events in 
the case studies. 
	  
Hypotheses 
Explanatory variable 1, Hypothesis 1 – Foreign Advocacy Groups 
Civil society can be of great value, if not indispensable (Brinkerhoff, 2005), for 
successful, durable (Gopakumar, 2009) and sustainable (Koc et al., 2008) 
implementation of state initiatives, especially in transitional settings (Wampler and 
Avritzer, 2004). For example, it can bring “flexibility and adaptability to the decision-
making process” (Cumming and Notgaard, 2004: 699). It also has the potential to 
mediate the immediate problems faced by a policy target group, and this can aid with 
policy design and thus increase chances of successful implementation. Civil society 
can also help with policy implementation by acting as a watchdog and thus providing 
independent monitoring to supplement the work of official regulatory and enforcement 
agencies.   
Meanwhile, focused civil movements that grow out of the wider civil society can 
increase political traction of an issue by educating the general public of the issue’s 
existence/importance and thus increasing the general public’s awareness. In turn, this 
could lead to greater public participation in regulatory activities or increased public 
pressure on politicians to pursue implementation of government policies. Civil 




official regulatory agencies fall short of performing their duties. For instance, members 
of civil movements can come in numbers to sue offenders in local and national courts 
in order to force compliance. The potential for the work of civil movements is quite high 
in states that formed upon the collapse of the USSR. This is because although such 
movements, and the more focused NGOs that may grow from them, might make very 
little impact on national politics in such states, they can command significant influence 
in regional affairs, where political parties are starting to be more receptive to public 
moods (Podyachev, 2014). 
However, despite such potential, evidence on the ground often leaves much to be 
desired. To fulfil the roles indicated above, civil movements and NGOs that form from 
them need to attract and recruit grassroot members, they need the trust of the public in 
order to claim to represent it and to gain political power, and they need access to 
political processes. Furthermore, although environmental movements were at one point 
strong at the national level in several FSU countries (Peterson and Bielke, 2001; 
Oldfield, 2002), it is difficult to ascertain how much of their work went beyond policy 
writing and towards improving policy implementation.  
In the first decade following the USSR’s collapse, there was little evidence of 
environmental movements at the local level in FSU states given the hardships and 
uncertainties of the turbulent economic and political transitions. The concept of 
’citizenship‘ had a very narrow definition for the general public outside capital cities 
(Crotty, 2003; Ahl, 1999). Environmental activism seemed alien to ordinary people in 
the regions (Crotty and Crane, 2004) and was perceived as work for experts rather 
than ordinary people (Avdonin et al.,1997; Tikhomirova, 2005). Even where 
environmental governance existed and successfully achieved changes, these were 
mostly symbolic rather than institutional (Henry, 2010). 
In large part, the issue was that of funding. Unlike in Western countries, donations to 
civil causes and volunteering are scarce in the FSU space and this limits activists’ 
budgets. NGOs in this part of the world therefore tend to depend on government 
grants, which in turn limits their independence and thus their ability to pursue functions 
that their organisations would need to perform in order to improve the EPI. At times 
and in some locations, government funding has been so inconsistent that local civil 
movements collapsed altogether, leaving a vacuum.  
International NGOs (INGOs) have the capacity to fill this vacuum where local civil 
society has failed, and take over the function of an independent watchdog. Where local 




funding, and access to international expertise, resources and assistance. INGOs can 
also offer training to fledgling civil movements on mobilising grassroots, planning and 
delivering strategies, campaigns and projects, and on ways to work constructively with 
other actors, such as those in the public and private sectors. At the same time, INGOs 
can assist with building the capacity of states as well as of the civil society (Lukaszczyk 
and Williamson, 2010). Furthermore, INGOs are able to represent local environmental 
issues on the global stage and mobilise international pressure on individual national 
governments to prioritise and address such issues (Madon, 1999). Among selected 
case studies, Russian and Azerbaijan appear to have become increasingly autocratic, 
and have actively sought to curb foreign involvement in their civil space. In contrast, 
Kazakhstan has seen a blossoming civil society comprising both domestic and 
international actors (at the time of writing this chapter), and can therefore be expected 
to have better EPI. The following causal relationship is therefore to be tested: 
Hypothesis 1: The greater the presence of international advocacy groups within a 
region, the smaller the implementation gap.  
 
Explanatory variable 1, Hypothesis 2 – Foreign Oil Firms 
There is a similar argument (although resting on different premises) in favour of the 
involvement of (often international) foreign oil firms (FOFs) in the post-Soviet states. 
Given their extensive research, resources and experience, FOFs can be expected to 
bring advanced and therefore less polluting technologies into FSU oil industries that 
are often marked by poor funding and aged technological capacities. FOFs can also 
introduce environmental codes of practice that are better at achieving compliance than 
those used by local firms (Soderholm, 1999). Furthermore, FOFs often tend to exhibit 
greater transparency and administrative efficiencies that are greater than those of 
domestic firms. This is turn makes them easier to regulate for implementers of 
environment policy.   
All of these factors can be expected to make for better regulatory compliance by FOFs 
than by local oil firms. We could therefore expect implementation gaps to be smaller 
where oil fields are developed by foreign rather than domestic oil extractors. In two of 
the selected case studies, FOFs dominate the oil sector. Following the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, the Azeri state lacked the necessary funds to develop the oil industry and 
make it profitable, or to find efficient ways of transporting crude oil via channels other 




time the only solution to these problems. The Atyrau region in Kazakhstan has similar 
circumstances – Italian and American oil firms are developing its giant oil fields on the 
Caspian Sea.  
These international, foreign firms only arrived in the 1990s, when the Soviet Union 
collapsed and foreign capital was no longer barred from these territories. This in turn 
means that the majority of the oil infrastructure in these locations is much younger than 
in most of the oil-extracting regions of Russia, where many oil facilities have already 
passed their use-by dates. As such, oil facilities in Baku and Atyrau can be expected to 
be more environmentally friendly, and thus environmentally compliant. In light of the 
above, the following causal relationship is tested: 
Hypothesis 2: The greater the presence of foreign oil firms within a region, the 
smaller the implementation gap. 
 
Explanatory variable 1, Hypothesis 3 – interaction with foreign entities 
The third component of the first explanatory variable plays on the difference between 
what goes on in the domestic and the international arenas. National governments are 
rarely tolerant of interventions in their domestic state affairs by governments of other 
countries. International interactions, however, provide channels for less direct types of 
intervention – for example, those produced by the perceived need of an individual 
government to uphold a certain international reputation. It is reasonable to hypothesise 
that engagement of the post-Soviet states with international actors and institutions 
might have some impact on these states’ domestic policies and implementation efforts. 
In other words, this factor may have a positive impact on the political will to pursue 
implementation within transitional states.  
This engagement may include being a signatory to international environmental treaties 
and trade standards agreements. It is worth acknowledging, however, that such 
treaties are more often than not non-binding and in practice rarely achieve the desired 
outcome. It is also worth mentioning that direct policy transfer resulting from interaction 
with interactional organisations has also had limited success. However, there have also 
been significant opportunities for transfer in culture resulting from the ever-increasing 
globalisation. The increasing ease of transnational movement of goods, people, and 




'transfer of cultural forms produces a redistribution of imaginative energies, [and] alters 
in some way pre-existent field of force' (O'Connor, 1986: 7). 
Apart from facilitating a cross-cultural awareness, globalisation has also brought forth 
an increasing emergence of such notions as global goals or norms, which include the 
protection of wildlife (Peterson, 1992), and even global business ethics (Husted et al., 
1996). Clean environment and sustainable development are evolving into such globally 
accepted (or at least theoretically so) norms (Dobson, 2004; Elliott, 2002; Litfin, 1994; 
Kellow, 2007). Academics argue that there is an impact from this transnational, 
universal level on the local, national level (Finnemore, 1993; Finnemore and Sikkink, 
1999), and that eventually, 'foreign' norms – as promoted by transnational movements, 
organisations and institutions – become borrowed and adapted by domestic agents in 
the process of their own identity-building, and thus become 'diffused' into local 
ideologies and processes (Acharya, 2004).  
The diffusion is helped along by the increasing popularity of overseas education, 
pursued by students from transitional countries in countries of the First World. The 
exposure and immersion in the new culture that these students undergo during their 
study abroad is said to have significant transformative potential (Brown, 2009; Gill, 
2010: 373; Lindsey, 2013). Furthermore, upon their return home, these students are 
said to become willing human bridges between the cultures of their former host and 
home countries (Brown, 2009; Bochner, 1981; Cushner and Karim, 2004). Tourism is 
likely to have a similar culture transfer effect, although to a lesser degree. Norm 
diffusion from all sources recounted above could be expected to impact on the will to 
pursue, enforce or comply with EP regulations and standards – all three components of 
the dependent variable – depending on the sector in which the individual experience 
such diffusion works. The following causal relationship can thus be expected: 
Hypothesis 3: The greater the exposure of local agents to transnational 
elements, the smaller the implementation gap. 
 
Explanatory variable 2, Hypotheses 4 and 5 – State capacity  
Explanatory variable 2 mostly deals with enforcement and compliance as components 
of the dependent variable (implementation gaps). To begin, enforcement of EP 
regulations pre-supposes the existence of such regulations, and institutions and 





State capacity can depend on a number of factors such as:  
• the coherence of the law the state produces,  
• the agencies the state sets up for enforcing the law,  
• the resources it allocates to those agencies, including legal power,  
• whether or not there are institutions for allowing the state to take into account 
the target groups’ ability to comply with the law,  
• whether there are ways for the state to ensure that the created enforcement 
agencies do indeed enforce rather than waste the public budget,  
• the degree to which these institutions of implementation are embedded (Evans, 
1995; Weiss, 1998; Hobson, 2000: 207) or autonomous (Skocpol, 1979; Evans 
et al., 1985; Leftwich, 2000) from the society in which they exist, and  
• the degree to which the implementers and the target groups of government 
regulation accept or reject these institutions.  
The above list of factors applies to managing the behaviour of domestic as well as 
foreign target groups or, in this instance, polluters operating within an economy.  
There is a good degree of variation between selected FSU states as to how well 
they’ve mastered the art of statecraft. Even before the formation of the Soviet Union, 
many of the (now) states were run and administered by Russia, which therefore 
continued to build its knowledge of statehood. In comparison, being dependent on 
Moscow to make decisions, write laws, create programmes and generally dictate how 
things ought to be done (Sabonis-Helf, 2004), did little to develop the individual 
territories' capacities to run their own affairs (Kolk and van der Weij, 1998; Lotspeich, 
1995). 
Unlike Russia at the time of independence in the 1990s, the Azeri state lacked a 
skilled, professional bureaucracy and significant elements of day-to-day financial, 
social and physical infrastructure. Azerbaijan’s state capacity was therefore at best 
partial (Kamrava, 2001). Although marginally more effective, the Kazakh state similarly 
failed to fulfil its key tasks at that time (Cummings and Norgaard, 2004), such as 
collecting taxation, building roads, paying wages or ensuring universal provision of 
basic public goods. Instead, the Kazakh state often arranged for foreign investors to 
take on these roles in lieu of paying taxes (Sabonis-Helf, 2004). 
As such, the states that emerged following the collapse of the USSR had very unequal 
experience of statehood with widely varying state capacities (Fortin, 2010). However, 




although new agencies, ministries and committees were set up to deal with these, they 
largely remained staffed with the old personnel that possessed little knowledge of how 
to deal with these new challenges (Wamukonya, 2003). New personnel have been 
difficult to attract due to low salaries (Millard, 1998), or have been purposefully turned 
down in favour of existing, 'loyal' employees (Trochev, 2012, 2014).  
For this and other reasons, the overall improvements in state capacity even in Russia 
have been described as modest, despite the plentiful opportunities brought on by 
relative economic and political stability  (Taylor, 2011). It is perhaps tautological to 
state that inadequate state capacity to pursue implementation of government policies 
likely leads to increased implementation gaps. In light of the above, it is taken as given 
that implementation of EP is likely to be low across case studies, but differences are 
nonetheless expected. To test reasons for these differences, if present as expected, 
the following hypotheses are tested: 
Hypothesis 4: The better the quality of environmental regulation for the oil 
industry, the smaller the implementation gap. 
Hypothesis 5: The greater the quality of environmental regulatory agency in 
the sphere of the oil industry, the smaller the implementation gap. 
 
Explanatory variable 3, Hypothesis 6 – Economic conditions 
Selected countries exhibit pronounced differences regarding the composition of their 
export and GDP and these can be taken as proxies for the relative differences in oil 
revenues enjoyed by each country ahead of closer analysis in the following empirical 
chapters. Russia, for example, exports a relatively wide range of products but the bulk 
of export income comes from the sale of crude oil and oil products – approx. 46% in 
January 2014 (Federal Customs Service, 2014). On average, trade has accounted for 
51% of the country's GDP between 2004 and 2014 (World Bank, nd., a). This makes 
the export of crude oil and oil products responsible for approx. 23% of Russia's GDP.  
This may seem relatively high, but not in comparison to Azerbaijan’s circumstance. 
Here, the volume of oil (crude and products) as percentage of total exports is almost 
double that of Russia. Export of crude oil and oil products constituted 90% of all 
exports in the first month of 2014 (The State Customs Committee of the Republic of 




2014 has been on average 82% (World Bank, nd., a), making the total oil exports 
accountable for approx. 74% of Azerbaijan's GDP.  
Kazakhstan's revenues from the export of mineral products are similar to those of 
Azerbaijan – 87% of total exports in January 2014 (Customs Control Committee of the 
Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2014). Trade has contributed on 
average 90% to Kazakhstan's GDP (World Bank, nd., a), making the export of mineral 
products accountable for approx. 78% of the GDP. Figure 1 below illustrates the above 
percentages based on cited sources. 
Figure 1 – Mineral exports as % contribution to GDP in 2014 
 
Source: based on figures referenced in the text above. 
Such heavy reliance on natural resources, especially in the two Central Asian states, is 
usually associated with the resource curse in academic literature. Although the strict 
relevance of these theories to selected countries has been refuted earlier in this 
chapter, the varying extent to which the case studies’ economies depend on their oil 
industry appears significant at this stage.  
The composition of economies, which may or may not be the result of oil dependence, 
also seems to differ. At the point of the USSR’s collapse Azerbaijan had a weak 
economy that was geared to the needs of the USSR. It mostly consisted of agriculture 
and oil extraction. Following independence and an influx of foreign direct investment 
primarily into its oil industry, Azerbaijan's GDP growth has been the strongest out of the 
three case studies. However, non-oil sectors have declined, apart from the oil-related 




of natural resources at the point of independence, and has since also developed a 
fairly coherent and efficient financial sector. Russia has traded in an even wider range 
of natural resources. Of the three, Russia relies on oil revenues the least and its 
economy is the most diversified.  
Another element worthy of mention is the access that governments enjoy to oil profits. 
In Azerbaijan, the President is involved in all oil-related deals despite having also 
appointed trusted supporters to lead and manage the state-owned oil industry. In 
Kazakhstan, members of the presidential family hold all key economic positions. In 
Russia, however, oil revenues are generated and collected via more official means, 
reflecting a somewhat different cleavage of interests in the struggle for control over oil 
revenues. Here, the focus has been on concentrating power (regulation, taxation and 
licensing) over the oil industry in the federal centre, in Moscow, by limiting the regions' 
powers. Meanwhile, the two biggest state-owned companies – Gazprom and Rosneft – 
have been steadily buying out independent oil firms to shift control over oil from the 
private back to the public sector.  
What all three states appear to have in common is the use of thus centralised oil 
revenues to ensure stability. Control over such a lucrative source of income removes 
these states’ reliance on taxation to fund the delivery of government policies. 
Concurrently, it allows states to keep income taxes and national insurance 
contributions at relatively low levels. In other words, such states can substitute a 
regular fiscal regime, observed in developed countries, with oil rents / revenues (Karl, 
1997). Such developments are not necessarily caused by the presence of oil. For 
example, it has been found that emerging states in general tend to concentrate on 
developing institutions for spending and delivering, but retain very poor capacity for 
collecting taxation from labour and regulating the private sector (Garaibeh 1987; 
Chaudhry 1994; Luciani, 1987), and that this is especially true of states that are 
undergoing state-building (Karl, 1997), as in the context of the post Soviet collapse. 
Whatever the reason for these developments, the presence of oil in such economies 
often provides the main or only source of government spending. This in turn means 
that should the oil money pause even temporarily, government spending could all but 
cease. This could reduce the states’ willingness to pursue any actions with potential 
negative impact on the profitability of their oil industries.  
Furthermore, oil-rich, transitional and developing countries have also been known to 
use their oil revenues to buy political stability. This is achieved by paying off political 




the general population through public spending that raises the standards of living 
despite the lack of political representation (Herb, 2003). A pause in oil revenues in 
such scenarios could therefore lead to unrest at all levels of society. This presents 
another reason for governments to avoid actions that may impact the consistency and 
volumes of oil revenues they receive. 
Environmental and other types of industrial regulation fall within the category of factors 
that could negatively affect the oil industry’s profitability. In general terms, although 
industry regulation could produce a significant positive impact on industrial productivity 
(Berman and Bui, 2001; Piot-Lepetit and Le Moing, 2007; Telle and Larsson, 2007; 
Yang, et al., 2012; Chu and Lai, 2014) and profitability, such benefits manifest in the 
long term. In the short term, the industry could face significant readjustment costs, thus 
affecting its profits and government revenues. When it comes to most-polluting 
industries, such as oil extraction, some academics argue that the effect of 
environmental regulation on productivity is either inconclusive (Fleishman et al., 2009), 
insignificant (Barbera and McConnell, 1990; Martin et al., 2014), or even conducive to 
a fall in competitiveness and productivity (Gray, 1987; Gray and Shadbegian, 1993; 
Baily et al., 1993; Jaffe et al., 1995: 132-6; Stewart, 1993; Hernandez-Sancho et al., 
2000; Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2003; Haskel and Sadun, 2011). 
The above discussion gives rise to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 6: The more advanced the economic conditions in a regional 
economy, the smaller the implementation gap. 
where “economic conditions” in this context are defined as economic diversification and 
the extent of a government’s dependence on oil revenues.  
 
Research Approach 
This section outlines the different approaches to data collection that were considered 
for this project and sets out reasons why each was turned down in favour of semi-
structured elite interviews. The selected interview approach is then explored further for 
potential setbacks and mitigation strategies for ensuring sufficiently high quality of data. 
This section and, consequently, this chapter conclude with some remarks on the 
direction of the text to follow and mention other instances where the discussion on 




Relatively little data has been previously collected pertaining to the narrow area of 
interest pursued by this research project; and given the sensitive nature of the topic, 
this researcher is sceptical of the usefulness of data that is already available. For 
instance, there are various accessible statistical data and analyses produced by 
domestic and international think tanks, NGOs and other monitoring organizations, 
including the World Bank, IMF, OECD, and EU. However, these are likely to be of 
limited utility for sub-national analysis: the data such bodies produce are often 
available only at the national, not regional level. Furthermore, such data are often 
presented as averages, unbroken by policy area, economic sector or geographic 
location. It is also often unclear what definitions or criteria are used for measurement or 
how data were collected or coded. Therefore, although such data would of course still 
be useful for triangulation, it cannot form the primary basis for proposed analysis. 
Meanwhile, collection of new data suitable for quantitative analysis is not possible due 
to time and physical constraints of this research project.   
In terms of documentary analysis, a good body of records and reports is likely to exist 
at national and regional levels within the country case studies. These might include the 
websites of oil firms, which often provide some environmental data. Similarly, 
government websites often provide some information regarding pollution-control 
standards, procedures and regulation. Furthermore, local governmental offices often 
have (and might be willing to grant access to) specific data on pollution control in their 
regions. At the same time, the law codices are available for general access and 
international trading organisations provide regular updates and analyses of new 
industry-related legislation. Even sufficiently granular statistical data might be found at 
these sources. 
However, oil extraction is often considered as an issue of national security and is 
therefore often politicised, and thus quite sensitive. Because of this, publicly accessible 
sources in oil-extracting countries are likely to provide data that is incomplete or 
intentionally augmented. Furthermore, compliance records of relevant law might be 
unavailable because not all laws or regulations require it. For example, some laws 
might exist for symbolic reasons without any intention of implementation. At the same 
time, compliance even in developed nations is at times achieved through shadow 
bargaining rather than through official channels (Kambhu, 1989; Hawkins, 1983). Such 





Indeed, Kalyuzhnova and Nygaard (2008: 1835) identify the Russian legal system as a 
tool for unofficial governance, used for state-building and regulating citizen and 
business activities. Ledeneva (2006) finds that this unofficial, informal governance 
actually works and Feldman and Blokov (2009) indicate that public trust in informal 
social networks is also on the rise. Similar patterns can be expected in Kazakhstan and 
Azerbaijan. Given the extent of regulatory work done behind the scenes (which is 
undocumented, but is business as usual), documentary analysis is likely to produce 
only a very superficial picture of policy performance, although it can complement the 
main data collection discussed further below. 
The use of questionnaires could produce statistically significant quantities of data. 
However, this method is unlikely to deliver the needed depth of information. Besides, 
this method is not a common means of data collection in the selected countries. More 
broadly, very few academic publications that this researcher has come across are 
based on this method in relation to elites, suggesting that it delivers negligible results. 
Observation is also unlikely to deliver the needed data given the time constraints and 
the magnitude of sources to be researched and analysed.  
By process of elimination, qualitative interviews appear to be the best approach. In 
addition, one of the great advantages of small-N study and of qualitative research in 
general is that it often forces the researcher to physically engage with contextual detail 
of the phenomenon, leading to ‘the most advanced form of understanding’ (Flyvbjerg, 
2006: 236). Given the aims of this research project, qualitative interviews are the most 
salient choice of method, and given the context, interviews would deliver the most 
relevant data if conducted with elites: those that command some influence over the 
dependent variable. However, it is recognised that such data can be highly subjective 
and thus produce questionable conclusions, or fail to deliver conclusions at all. 
To reduce the subjectivity of interview-based data, this research project has aimed to 
interview representatives of as many different groups of relevant actors as possible. 
These include those that have an interest, power over, or impact on the implementation 
(including compliance and enforcement) of EP regulations in the oil industry in the 
chosen sub-cases. It is important to differentiate between interest, power and impact 
because one does not necessarily entail the other. As such, interviews have been 
conducted with representatives of the following groups:  
• public sector, represented by sub-national governments, regulatory agencies 




• private sector, represented by oil firms, their subcontractors, and research 
institutions, and 
• not-for-profit sector, represented by international and domestic environmental 
NGOs / civil movements, academics, and the press.  
Up to five interviewees have been sought for each of these categories for each case 
study. Collected data has been triangulated to determine data validity. Additional 
interviews per stakeholder group / sector were no longer sought upon reaching the 
saturation point: lack of new data. 
This approach is not without problems. Elites represent a hard-to-reach population, 
access to which is usually protected by various gatekeepers. Gaining trust of these 
gatekeepers (if not of the targets themselves) has therefore been essential to gaining 
access. Various techniques assisted with this task, including snowballing (Vogt, 2005: 
300) and sampling / networking at conferences and meetings. Letters of 
recommendation / introductions from established academics in the field (with 
experience of interviewing relevant elites) have also helped towards gaining the 
'insider' status (Atkinson and Flint, 2001). Even then, it was expected that it would not 
always be possible to interview all desired candidate or groups.  
This is another reason for having identified such a wide range of stakeholder groups, 
as this can help secure a reasonable degree of triangulation despite setbacks. Even 
when it was not possible to access a particular stakeholder sub-group, such as 
regulators, interviews were secured with at least two other sub-groups per sector, 
ensuring good coverage of all sectors. Interviewing very similar, if not always entirely 
the same, groupings of stakeholders across case studies also ensured comparability of 
collected data. Meanwhile, inclusion of a broad range of stakeholders with quite 
different interests and loyalties from the not-for-profit sector produced a balance of 
reflections on data collected from and about public and private sectors, thus 
strengthening triangulation while also allowing for any gaps to be plugged. Thanks to 
this approach, collected data represent a balance across different types of 
stakeholders in each case study, while ensuring data comparability for final analysis. 
In terms of the actual conduct of interviews, it was expected that direct questions about 
unsuccessful EPI would be likely met with resistance, especially with interviewees from 
the public and private sectors. Interview questions therefore instead concentrated on 
establishing the extent and depth of interviewees’ knowledge of environmental 




their interactions. Examples were requested to illustrate each answer in order to check 
respondents’ understanding of questions asked and also to establish the comparability 
of concepts as understood by different individuals, groups and sectors. Questions of 
this type were intentionally vague, allowing an interviewee to lead the discussion, in 
order to establish trust and provide the basis for follow-up queries. Where discussion 
deviated from the framework of comparable concepts and processes relevant to the 
research project, several prompts were used to re-direct discourse back to the topic of 
interest and cover a number of balanced perspectives. Both the framework and the 
associated list of prompts were expanded as research progressed in order to reflect 
new findings while ensuring continued comparability.  
Interviewees’ willingness and capacity for compliance / enforcement, as well as the 
extent of their personal and their organisations’ impact on EPI were then inferred from 
their answers. As it was expected for non-implementation issues to be less of a 
sensitive topic for interviewees from the not-for-profit sector, especially NGOs, more 
direct questions were often used. Members of this sector were also asked relatively 
direct questions about the relevant performance of the private and public sectors, and 
vice versa. Where earlier interviewees offered examples to substantiate their answers, 
interviewer introduced additional questions in subsequent interviews about these (after 
allowing interviewees to contribute examples of their choice) in order to capture a 
range of perspectives on corresponding events / practices. Data from interviews were 
then triangulated to validate findings. This structure was successfully used to cover all 
variables analysed in this thesis; a full interview topic guide can be found in Appendix 
B. 
It was also recognised that collected data are likely to include political beliefs and 
potential information about illegitimate activities, making the data sensitive. Accidental 
disclosure of such data might pose significant risks to research respondents. To avoid 
such risks and to ensure that data is collected, stored and shared ethically, a detailed 
data management plan was prepared prior to research commencement and followed 
from then on. All research has been conducted in accordance with proper academic 
codes of practice. For the purposes of research analysis in this thesis, some of the 
respondents have been anonymised. For convenience of presenting references to 
such sources, all interviewees are referred to by individual numbers within in the thesis 
– for example ‘intrv.1’ for interviewee 1. A detailed table in Appendix A then matches 




Having set out the expectations for analysis in the empirical chapters, this discussion 
now moves on to the case studies. The Russian case studies will be discussed first, 
before moving south across the post-Soviet space to Kazakhstan, and then to 
Azerbaijan. The four chapters on case studies are then followed by a comparative 
chapter that pulls together and compares key findings. The concluding chapter returns 
to some of the questions on method and approach discussed in the present chapter, 
and retrospectively comments on their usefulness.	  




Chapter 4. Empirical analysis: Nenets Autonomous Okrug, the 
Russian Federation 
Introduction 
Nenets Autonomous Okrug3 (henceforth, Nenets or NAO) lies in the Russian Arctic. 
This region hosts some of the most fragile ecosystems in the world. It is also vastly 
abundant in natural resources and hosts Russia’s first and so far only offshore Arctic oil 
platform – Prirazlomnaya. Concurrently, Nenets is one of the youngest oil-producing 
regions in Russia and can therefore be expected to	   possess newer, greener oil 
technologies. Furthermore, Prirazlomnaya has	   attracted close international attention 
and considerable pressure for improved environmental control. However, monitoring 
and regulation of the Nenets oil industry is complicated by its remoteness and relatively 
little is known about the actual environmental impact of the sector. This chapter 
examines whether the proposed variables and their constituent hypotheses can help 
explain what is known about	  environmental performance in this federal subject (FS) of 
the Russian Federation. The next section provides context on Nenets’ political, 
economic and environmental circumstances. The following section analyses 
hypotheses and the final section concludes the chapter. It is shown that all variables at 
the very least have the potential to make tangible, positive impact on the 




Nenets falls under the administrative jurisdiction of the Arkhangelsk Oblast4 (see Figure 
2) and responsibilities for certain policies frequently move from one to the other. At the 
same time, taxes collected in Nenets are shared not only with the federal authorities 
but also with those of Arkhangelsk.	   The Scandinavian countries have shown strong 
interest	   in environmental protection in Russia’s north-western FSs, including Nenets, 
due to transboundary pollution.	  	  	  	  	   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  The Russian Federation consists of 7 regions, which in turn comprise several smaller territories, 
commonly referred to as federal subjects. The types of federal subjects include republics, oblasts, 
autonomous okrugs, krais and federal cities.	  




Figure 2 – Nenets Autonomous Okrug 
 
[Arkhangelsk – red; Nenets – pink] 
	  
Industrial development and environmental impact 
Nenets is relatively new administratively, lies beyond the Arctic Circle, comprises an 
area half the size of Germany and supports	  44,000 people (in 2019), 15% of whom are 
indigenous nomadic reindeer herders. Due to difficult	  geological conditions, there is no 
physical infrastructure within Nenets	   save a few kilometres of road. The only way to 
travel to and across Nenets is by air or boat (along rivers), or – in winter – by snow- 
and ice-going vehicles.  
Due to its remoteness and very low population density (the lowest in Russia), the 
Soviets judged Nenets appropriate for nuclear testing and dumping of space industry 
waste. The discovery of oil led to aggressive exploration for further deposits, with oil 
extraction beginning in the 1980s. At the same time, Nenets’ remoteness and small 
population are conducive to low political interest in addressing the environmental 
impact of these activities on its unique and very fragile ecosystems (Sosnovskaya and 
Orlov, 2017). 
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the oil industry – Nenets’ only 
economic activity – continued to grow and attracted international interest. By 2009, oil 
extraction volumes were 15 times higher compared to the 1990s (Ilina, 2013), 
indicating that the majority of industrial development in Nenets took place after 




foreign firms. One would therefore expect that the implementation of EP in the sector 
would be significantly better in this young oil-producing Russian FS. However, levels of 
environmental damage have been continuously high (AMAP, 1997).  
The Russian federal programme, Environmental Protection 2012-2020, seems to have 
brought some improvements, but data are equivocal. For example, according to a 
government report, airborne emissions have fallen by 65% in Nenets in 2010-2017, but 
the same report states that there is no monitoring of air quality in the FS (MNR, 
(2018a), meaning that whatever the source of the above figure, it cannot be validated 
by government services. An interviewee from WWF Russia also challenged this 
percentage based on the data their organisation collects in the region (intrv.22). 
However, WWF Russia does not collect comparable data across Nenets, only at 
individual sites. Other independent EP watchdogs, such as the Green Patrol (National 
Environmental Rating, 2018) and Interfax-Era (nd,a), assess Nenets’ environmental 
performance as average to poor, even though in absolute terms Nenets produces less 
pollution than neighbouring FSs because it is not as industrially developed. However, 
their assessments are based on similarly biased or incomplete information.  
As there are no other notable sources to either confirm or contradict official figures for 
Nenets, it is difficult to make conclusive observations about whether there are changes 
in environmental pollution, which could indicate the existence of changes in EP 
implementation. The following analysis is therefore unable to always offer concrete 
examples of impact on implementation gaps, since it is not clear whether or to what 
extent these gaps are changing in size.	  Instead, the analysis is carried out in relation to 
how likely an independent variable is to impact implementation.  
 
Current hydrocarbon industry 
Over 80 oil fields have been discovered in Nenets, the majority of which are on land. 
There are some 30 oil firms working these, varying in size, assets, composition, and 
ownership structure. Firms compete with each other and no one organisation appears 
to dominate. The majority are Russian, although many foreign oil firms have tried to 
enter the territory. Of these,	  only four succeeded. Total (France) and Equinor (formerly 
Statoil, Norway) have been working there since 1994, when they entered a Production 
Sharing Agreement (PSA) at Kharyaga – one of Nenets’ largest oil deposits. 
Petrovietnam (Vietnam) joined the PSA later. Until 2015, Total served as the PSA’s 




continuous failure to utilise Associated Petroleum Gas (APG) (Newberry and Matyl, 
2018). The rest of Nenets’ oil deposits are developed through licensing. ConocoPhillips 
(USA) had two Joint Ventures (JVs) with Russian firms and worked in Nenets for 23 
years, but left in 2015 due to western sanctions barring its future ambitions.  
The above relates to oil deposits on land, but Nenets also hosts Russia’s (so far) only 
offshore platform – Gazprom’s Prirazlomnaya, which started extracting oil in 2013 but 
whose development took 15 years and has been marred in scandals over operational 
safety (Galkina, 2013), despite being described by UK experts as “relatively simple to 
develop” (Pritchin, 2018). In 2015, Gazprom formed a JV with Petrovietnam to pursue 
other offshore deposits. They have already completed exploratory works at the 
Dolginskoe deposit, which is thrice the depth of Prirazlomnaya and further out in the 
Pechora Sea. The first oil extraction is expected in 2021 (Offshore Technology, nd., a).  
Nenets’ Arctic region also holds other substantial, untapped hydrocarbon reserves. 
Given Russia’s Arctic Policy for this zone to become Russia’s main base of strategic 
resources in the near future, the pace of hydrocarbon development in Nenets can only 
be expected	  to increase. 
 
Main environmental challenges 
Implementation of EP in the Nenets oil industry suffers in four main areas. Firstly, as 
with the rest of Russia, Nenets has struggled to achieve 95% APG utilisation. In 2012, 
most oil firms in Nenets were in violation of required standards (Prokuratura NAO, 
2012). Six firms were still non-compliant in 2016 (Prokuratura NAO cited in Naryana-
Vynder, 2016) and five in 2018 (Prokuratura NAO, 2018a), according to official data. 
Some of the largest projects are still non-compliant today. For example, WWF Russia’s 
research has shown that Kharyaga PSA utilises only 25% of its APG (intrv.22). 
Secondly, oil spills remain a major issue, and it is not uncommon for reindeer herders 
to find their livestock covered in oil (intrv.8,9,16,17,13,18). The main causes of such 
incidents, as cited by Nenets’ administrative and judicial structures, include problems 
with the	   aged oil infrastructure (indicative of poor maintenance), severe weather 
conditions (indicative of inadequate preventative measures) and mistakes by oil 
workers. Thirdly, oil firms frequently attempt to hide, misreport and downplay such 
incidents (Prokuratura NAO, 2018b), which, apart from preventing EP enforcement, is 
in itself illegal under Russian law. Fourthly, there are also frequent violations of 




measures, such as APG utilisation, as well as working without licenses, permits, 
environmental impact assessments or mitigation plans (Dallmann et al., 2010). (For 
recent history of the evolution of USSR-Russian EP legislation and implementation 
practices, see Appendix C). 
	  
Results 
Explanatory variable 1 - Foreign influence 
Hypothesis 1: The greater the presence of international advocacy groups within 
a region, the smaller the implementation gap.  
In regions such as Nenets, the scope of industrialisation and subsequent 
environmental issues that could stimulate the establishment of environmental non-
governmental organisations (ENGOs) did not pick up until well into the 2010s. As such, 
Nenets’ environmental issues missed the initial hype, which saw the birth of the 
longest-living and strongest ENGOs in the 1990s Russia. At the time of fieldwork for 
this research project (in 2014), there were no Russian ENGOs in Nenets that were both 
registered and active, apart from one that was established by a representative of a 
foreign ENGO (intrv.7). In this context, foreign and international NGOs (henceforth 
INGOs), which usually enjoy far greater organisational and financial stability as well as 
relative independence from public and private institutions, could fill the void left by the 
absence of domestic ENGOs. There are two environmental INGOs (EINGOs) that 
show the most active and consistent interest in Nenets: WWF Russia and Greenpeace 
Russia. This section focuses on whether they have had an impact on EP 
implementation there.  
These EINGOs are also the largest in Russia. They are registered as Russian NGOs 
and run by Russian staff despite their foreign roots and funding. Both oppose oil 
development in Russia’s Arctic, but due to different principles. While the opposition of 
Greenpeace Russia is final and inflexible (intrv.20) and therefore more campaign-
based, WWF Russia is “more pragmatic” (intrv.22): its opposition is to existing 
technologies and methods, which the organisation assesses as insufficiently advanced 
or environmentally friendly. WWF Russia therefore chooses to work with both 
government and industry stakeholders in order to improve these. The following text 
analyses each organisation’s motivations, methods and potential impact in turn before 




environmental policy goals. As such, the following discussion concludes that there is 
evidence to support the existence of the hypothesis relationship at least in principle,	  
although evidence of tangible impact is difficult to discern based on existing data. 
 
WWF Russia 
WWF Russia recognises Nenets’ (and Russia’s) economic dependence on oil 
revenues. In light of this, the organisation mostly pursues a cooperative relationship 
with both state and industry, aiming not to impede them but to stimulate	  and assist both 
to become more environmentally responsible. Such work spans a wide range of 
activities in Nenets, including:  
● proposing the establishment of natural reserve areas to keep out industrial 
works – which was supported by the Nenets government and subsequently 
approved at the federal level (intrv.3,7), demonstrating positive impact;  
● cooperating with and securing grants from international developmental and 
financial institutions (IDIs and IFIs) such as the UN Developmental Project 
(UNDP) / Global Environmental Fund (GEF) and Global Gas Flaring Reduction 
Partnership (GGFR, by World Bank) to pursue individual environmental 
projects, for example building a digital database of pollution, which was 
welcomed by the Nenets government; 
● cooperating with GGFR and foreign and domestic oil firms working in Nenets 
(Total and Lukoil) to pilot test remote (satellite) imaging as a tool to	  monitor	  	  	  	  	   
flaring (intrv.22; Kutepova et al., 2012) after state regulators showed interest in 
this method but questioned its validity. 
These examples demonstrate that WWF Russia can help improve EP implementation. 
The organisation is supporting official regulation by	  developing, funding and facilitating 
new tools for its delivery. Of course, there is no guarantee that the regulatory system 
will in the end make use of the fruits of such assistance, effectively or at all. However, 
WWF Russia’s initiatives may have indirect positive influence. For example, Lukoil 
most likely agreed to participate in the WWF Russia’s remote imaging pilot in Nenets 
because Lukoil’s facilities there are showing relatively high environmental performance 
there. Should the pilot confirm this, Lukoil will likely use this to improve its public image, 
which may encourage other oil firms in Russia to follow suit. Such outcomes have 
already been observed with another of WWF Russia’s initiatives: annual rankings of oil 




documents. The UNDP and a local interviewee credited this initiative with improving 
transparency and encouraging the development of environmental policies in the 
Russian oil industry (intrv.22; Sheynfeld, et al., 2018). 	  
This	  non-confrontational nature may help explain why the local stakeholders  welcome 
WWF Russia’s permanent office in Nenets. For example, an interviewee from the 
Nenets government (intrv.11) talked at length about the cooperation agreement with 
WWF Russia and an agreement on data sharing with UNDP/GEF (which appears to be 
funding WWF Russia in Nenets: both organisations are represented by the same 
person in Nenets). Furthermore, having physical presence in Nenets allows WWF 
Russia to register there, which in turn secures its	   participation in the Environmental 
Public Council within the government of Nenets and grants the organisation influence 
over	   local affairs and access to other stakeholders, including researchers and oil firms. 
According to another interviewee, WWF Russia had also signed a multilateral 
agreement with federal and FS-level structures and those in charge of nature 
conservation areas. In other words, the organisation has significant presence and 
cooperation capacity in Nenets, thus allowing it opportunities to exert relatively high	  
indirect influence even on those structures with which the WWF might not have direct 
contact in the region, such as the key oil regulatory bodies (the federal 
Rosprirodnadzor and Rostechnadzor)	   as well as the Prosecutor’s Office. (These 
agencies are explored in the H5 discussion). 	  
 
Greenpeace Russia 
Greenpeace Russia also often supports the work of official regulators and could 
therefore be considered cooperative. For example, significant waste (including oil 
pollution) has accumulated across Russia’s Arctic zone since before the USSR’s 
collapse. However, the lack of information on the locations of such waste has 
considerably slowed down its clean-up. In 2016, activists from Greenpeace Russia	  took 
it upon themselves to find and catalogue such sites, designed a digital map of these 
and passed it on to Minprirody5 and the Arctic FSs’ governments in 2017 (Greenpeace 
Russia, 2017). This stimulated action from official regulators: multi-stakeholder 
planning (TASS, 2017a) (including all levels of government) and allocation of the 
federal budget for a clean-up operation, including for a (non-oil-related) site in Nenets 
(TASS, 2017b). Greenpeace Russia also actively participates in conferences and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




forums on issues related to the Arctic, including those organised/hosted by the Nenets 
government. In these ways, Greenpeace Russia also has some influence on 
implementation by locally based actors, although arguably not as great as that of WWF 
Russia. 
With regards to the Arctic oil, however, Greenpeace Russia is mostly interested in 
changing federal EP legislation	   rather than improving implementation of existing EP 
law. For example, the organisation would like to see oil works outlawed altogether in 
the Arctic offshore. This kind of goal is best pursued at the federal level, where legal 
provisions for such activities are created. This concentrates Greenpeace Russia’s 
activity in Moscow. It could also explain why the ENGO chooses not to open local 
branch offices in the Arctic, which in turn releases it	   from needing to maintain good 
relationships at the local level, allowing it to use	  more confrontational methods.  
The “Arctic 30”6 is one of the most well known examples of this and has become linked 
to terrorism within Russia. It is worth noting that terrorism is becoming an 
internationally recognised issue in the Arctic (Elgsaas, 2018), and energy facilities 
elsewhere in the world have become common terrorist targets (Luft and Korin, 2003). 
These issues appear to have found traction with authorities and the population of 
Nenets. The likeliest reason for this is the region’s mono-economic nature, making the 
locals arguably over-sensitive towards any real or perceived dangers that may 
compromise the condition of oil facilities.  
It appears that such concerns in the present example were not necessarily linked to 
fears that Greenpeace could or would damage the platform, but to the potential 
presence of terrorist groups with such aims acting under the guise of the well-known 
IENGO. In either case, the incident appears to have significantly soured Nenets’ 
attitudes towards Greenpeace. Some interviewees (independent experts, oil firm staff, 
public associations) (intrv.1,15,16,17,18) referred to the organisation as “frauds”, 
“hooligans”, “children”, “vandals”, “reactive”, “radical”, untrustworthy, and as an 
organisation that acts illogically and has a negative impact on NGOs’ overall reputation 
in Russia. Interviewees from public sector structures refrained from voicing opinions. 	  
At the federal level, Greenpeace Russia continues to receive invitations to (and to 
actively participate in) large-scale EP events across the country, including those 
organised and hosted by different government levels. This included being invited, along 
with WWF Russia, to roundtable talks with Gazprom about Prirazlomnaya (intrv.4) – 
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the focus of the Arctic 30 incident. This implies that in spite, or perhaps because of, 
Greenpeace’s choice of methods, key stakeholders (regulators and polluters) continue 
to respect or at least take note of Greenpeace’s opinions, which implies that the 
organisation has some influence on EP implementation. 
 
Conclusion 
Although Greenpeace Russia might, unlike WWF Russia, provocatively disagree with 
individual EP laws or regulations, both IENGOs are nonetheless dedicated to 
improving the implementation of the broader EP policy and appear to be driving 
positive impact, at least by drawing public attention both within and outside Russia to 
issues requiring EP, especially in the Russian north. The former (federal level) Minister 
of Environment even assessed that without the WWF and Greenpeace, Russian 
environmental civil activity might disappear altogether, adding that radicalism 
witnessed from IENGOs such as Greenpeace	  might actually be essential for effective 
environmental protection, especially in a context like Russia where the concept of EP is 
not generally understood (intrv.19). Despite such assessment, it is very difficult to point 
to	  any tangible impact of these organisations on the implementation of EP in relation to 
the Nenets’ oil industry due to the absence of sufficiently comprehensive and 
trustworthy data. The above analysis strongly implies only that these IENGOs are in a 
position to make	  an impact, but has not shown conclusively	   that they do. Nonetheless, 
their significant potential and their successful work in stimulating	   continuous policy 
debate on this issue at the federal level are evidence in support of this hypothesis. 
. 
 
Hypothesis 2: The greater the presence of foreign oil firms within a region, the 
smaller the implementation gap. 
The 1991 dissolution of the USSR made it possible for foreign firms to enter Russia, 
while the country’s damaged	   economy made foreign direct investment (FDI) and 
partnership highly desirable. At the same time, the new Russian government saw great 
potential for the hydrocarbon industry to pull the country out of its economic turmoil. 
FDI was therefore especially welcome here. Consequently, many foreign oil firms 
entered into PSAs and JVs with their Russian equivalents to develop oil fields for which 




The 1990s were also characterised by a collapse in state capacity to monitor and 
regulate industry. However, even as the ability to do so developed and improved over 
the following decades, the federal government tended to prioritise hydrocarbon 
development over EP, so the latter	   arguably remained ineffective. In the resulting 
context of a minimal regulatory regime, could foreign firms, with experience of 
complying with higher international standards, be expected to hold the bar? The 
presence of a large number of Russian firms in Nenets essentially makes this a 
question of which firms – Russian or foreign – behave better. The discussion begins by 
describing foreign oil firms (FOFs), their interactions with Russian firms, and the 
contextual difficulties of	   analysing the Nenets situation. The main analytical section 
reveals that compliance can be better explained by factors other than firms’ origins. It 
also shows that notwithstanding FOFs having better initial capacity for compliance, 
contextual factors even out compliance records, making it difficult to determine EP 
leaders and followers.  
 
Local players 
Nenets hosts	  a wide range of oil players with varied histories and just as varied legal 
inter-relationships, allowing for far-reaching influence from FOFs. There are between 
13 and 307 oil-producing firms working in Nenets. They can be classified as	   FOFs, 
Russian State-Owned firms (RSOFs); FS-owned firms; Russian Private firms (RPFs); 
JVs between these types; and, firms that moved from one type to another,	   for example	  
by being taken over. Many are daughter companies	  of bigger entities: Norsk Hydro is a 
division of Equinor (formerly referred to as Statoil in Nenets) and Lukoil-Komi	  a division 
of Lukoil. For convenience, firms are referred to by their parent company’s	   names. 
Table 3 below summarises relationships that FOFs have had with different firm types in 
Nenets. (See Appendix D for the history of oil players, their interactions and impact on 
EP in Nenets). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Table 3 – FOFs / Russian firms relationships 
FOF Influence on Type of Russian 
company 
In what capacity? How long? 
ConocoPhillips 
(USA) 
Rosneft RSOF Polar Lights JV 1992 - 2015 






NAO-owned Kharyaga PSA Since 1994 
Zarubezhneft RSOF  Kharyaga PSA Since 2009 
Petrovietnam 
(Vietnam) 
Gazprom  RSOF Rusvietpetro JV Since 2002 
Zarubezhneft RSOF Vietgazprom JV Since 2008 
 
As agreed by international observers and confirmed by a member of Russia’s 
diplomatic services in London (intrv.23), RSOFs currently lack the knowledge, 
experience and technologies required to work on the Arctic shelf and offshore. 
Meanwhile, RSOFs refuse to partner with RPFs with relevant experience, and Western 
sanctions prevent partnerships with Western equivalents. RSOFs appear to have 
chosen another option: partnering with Eastern/Asian FOFs and buying technologies 
from China. However, Gazprom’s Vietnamese partner has been criticised,	  based on its 
activities in the Rusvietpetro JV, for being the least energy-efficient and 
environmentally friendly of all oil firms in Nenets (Interfaks-Era, nd,a). A FOF 
interviewee agreed that Vietnam might not be able to bring appropriate technologies	  or 
practices to the Arctic, since	   it has no relevant experience (intrv.6). This is also true of 
Chinese technology suppliers used by firms in Nenets. Involvement of these foreign 
entities, thus,	  might only exacerbate environmental impact, but it is too early to be sure. 
The following analysis therefore focuses on firms’ behaviour on land, rather than 
offshore, in recent decades. 
 
Barriers to analysis 
The impact of FOFs operating onshore in Nenets is difficult to assess for a number of 
reasons. Firstly, Russia’s circumstances make the country less susceptible to external 
influence. A WWF interviewee (intrv.7) indicated that this is because Russia has never 
been a Western colony,	   enjoys (relative) economic and political stability, and has 
developed its own capital, technologies, and	   socio-­‐environmental awareness. This, 
continued the interviewee, cannot be said of many of the oil-rich developing countries, 




Stakeholder groups within Russia are therefore better able to maintain independence 
from foreign investment and from each other, which reduces FOFs’ ability to directly 
impact local circumstances (intrv.3,6,9,12).  
Secondly, Nenets’ industry is relatively young and the okrug	  scores high in energy and 
environmental efficiency in comparison to FSs with longer industrial history (Interfaks-
Era, nd,a). All oil firms operating in Nenets use comparatively modern technology, 
reducing differences between them in this respect. Furthermore, all are affected by the 
age of infrastructure left over from Soviet times, which quickly corroded in extreme 
Arctic conditions but is rarely replaced	  since there are no explicit legal requirements to 
do so (intrv.10,11). This further evens out differences in capability between firms. 
Thirdly, internally, Russian firms are no longer so different from international ones. 
Most enjoy direct access to varied, international expertise through shareholders:	  
Rosneft, for instance, is nearly 40% owned by British, Chinese, Swiss and Qatar firms. 
At the local level, firms in Nenets either have foreign partners or many foreign experts 
(ibid.) and FOFs have Russian equivalents. This facilitates free transfer of culture and 
experience in both directions. Furthermore, Russian firms compete globally	   using 
methods	   including international accreditation on environmental performance (intrv.11), 
further closing the gap in between them and international firms. 
Fourthly, transparency of	   oil firms in Nenets is relatively low (Interfaks-Era, nd,a), 
resulting in a paucity of publicly available data on pollution and EP measures (Bellona, 
2014). This obscures true compliance by all firms and complicates assessment of their 
relative behaviour. And lastly, Russian and foreign oil firms in Nenets are reported	   to 
have equally active public relations teams that propagate powerful green messages 
(intrv.4) and act to foster certain societal perceptions. This influence may affect	  
interview data. In light of the above factors, objective analysis is very difficult. 
 
Who behaves? 
In terms of formal compliance with EP regulations, many interviewees were confident 
that FOFs are subject to the same rules as Russian oil firms (intrv.4,5,14,16,17) and 
that all firms in Nenets comply to the best of their ability (intrv.4,5,7,11,15). 
Concurrently, all firms are equally placed to conceal non-compliance, which is easy for 
polluters to achieve and hard for regulators to trace in the remote sub-Arctic. Several 
interviewees with regulatory functions observed that, in	   their experience, there is no 




example, an interviewed subcontractor confirmed that all firms are guilty of burying oil 
spills instead of properly treating and reporting them (intrv.9).	   A Rosprirodnadzor 
interviewee (intrv.12) agreed, observing that oil firms tend to report incidents only when 
information had already leaked out and, even then, might still deny it. In terms of 
overall green performance, a few interviewees believed that foreign firms are better, 
but significantly more interviewees believed that compliance is better predicted by 
factors other than a firm’s origin. These factors can be broadly broken into two 
categories:  
1. financial and technological resources 
a. budget 
b. technological capacity 
c. length of contract 
d. scope of work  
2. quality of personnel 
a. top management 
b. leadership 
c. internal firm culture 
d. rig supervisors 
e. bottom level employees 
f. sub-contractors. 
Some of these factors, such as budgets, technology	  and culture, are more prevalent in 
western FOFs, implying that they have better capacity, if not necessarily intention, to 
comply. However, Russian firms are catching up, meaning that these factors might lose 
their significance in the future. A RPF interviewee commented that Russian firms are 
already using the same technologies as FOFs (at least onshore) (intrv.5) and other 
interviewees said the same in	   regard	   to internal firm policies and standards, at least in 
relation to Lukoil (intrv.8,9,13). The issue, they advised, is with Russian firms failing to 
effectively implement their own policies (intrv.9), thus delaying	  modernisation (intrv.7). 
Furthermore, Western sanctions are said to be further slowing down this transition 
(intrv.7).  
Regarding the intention, rather than capacity, to comply, several interviewees pointed 
out that FOFs are likely to experience	  stronger incentives for compliance. For example, 
INGO and RPF interviewees suggested that FOFs plan longer-term, and are more 
interested in securing their place in the Russian markets than in immediate profits. 




noncompliance (intrv.5,7). However, Western sanctions dampen long-term 
opportunities in Russia and remove that incentive. Concurrently, the Russian 
government has demonstrated its leniency towards foreign violators in the Arctic, 
signalling official acceptance of non-compliance. For example, Total was accused of 
extensive flaring and was	   stripped of its Kharyaga PSA operatorship (losing half its 
shares) -	  but its contract to remain a part of the PSA was nonetheless extended until 
2031. These developments likely reduce incentives for compliance by FOFs. 
Other factors, including the quality of employees, rig supervisors, and subcontractors, 
affect all firms equally and thus even out their compliance records. These factors, and 
those that affect intentions, seem to outweigh technology- and practice-based capacity, 
and interviewees could not agree which firms are greener overall. For example, both 
federal regulators and a subcontractor spoke poorly of Rusvietpetro (intrv.9,12,13) and 
another subcontractor of Total (intrv.15). An interviewee from WWF Russia also 
commented on Total’s poor decisions over APG utilisation (intrv.22), which resulted in 
substantial difficulties with compliance to this day. Polar Lights was consistently 
mentioned as an environmental leader (intrv.4,7,9,11,12,13,14,16,17,18), but there 
was no consensus on what made it successful. An FS government official and a 
Rostechnadzor interviewee (intrv.4,13) credited Conoco’s presence for this but did not 
reflect on Naryanmarneftegaz, Conoco’s other JV (with Lukoil), which was not as 
popular across interviews.  Meanwhile, a Rosprirodnadzor interviewee pointed out that 
Rosneft continued to uphold the bar with Polar Lights even after Conoco left the JV 
(intrv.12). Additionally, FS and federal regulators implied that the success of both 
Conoco JVs might be due to Russian experts working there (intrv.13,14) rather than 
due to Conoco’s origin. 
Furthermore, Polar Lights did not perform well on all EP parameters. Interviewees’ 
praise of the firm related to its compliance with official paperwork requirements, quality 
of its policies (intrv.9), recultivation works (intrv.14,18) and superior operational safety 
measures, which allowed the FOF to escape causing significant incidents	   in contrast to 
Russian firms, which frequently experience	  major oil spills. However, official FS data on 
firms’ compliance with airborne emission targets – Nenets’ biggest environmental 
problem (UNEP, 2011) – tell a very different story. As per Figure 3, when 95% APG 
utilisation became not just a target but a legal requirement in 2012, FOFs and their 
JVs, including Polar Lights, performed significantly worse than Russian firms. A major 
investigation by Nenets Prosecutors’ Office two years later revealed continued 
noncompliance (Nenets Autonomous Okrug Prosecutor’s Office, 2014). 




volumes. The contradiction between these data and interview observations is 
unexpected. Nonetheless, their validity is at least partially	   confirmed by satellite data 
analysed by WWF and KPMG (Kutepova, et al., 2012), and during interviews with 
FOFs in Nenets, all of whom stated that emission control (95% utilisation of Associated 
Petroleum Gas) was “impossible” or “hopeless” (intrv. 6,16,17), despite Russian firms 
having seemingly found effective solutions.  
 






The heterogeneous nature of the data presented above makes it difficult to draw 
defensible conclusions regarding the performance of Russian firms against 
international ones. Nonetheless, the presence of FOFs	  has been credited with fostering 
healthy competition within the Nenets oil industry and allowing all firms to learn from 
each other’s mistakes (intrv. 6, 7, 14). Even so, the impact of this factor is complicated 
given that different firms show different levels of compliance on different parameters 
but without identifiable trends. The American JV Polar Lights and the Vietnamese JV	  
Rusvietpetro have been praised and criticised the most, respectively. The French Total 
was also criticised (for failing to deliver its PSA volumes, as well as to comply with EP 
commitments). Meanwhile, Russian firms experience the most oil spill incidents in 
Nenets, seemingly due to poorly implemented operational safety norms, but appear to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




have done well at	  cutting emissions. As such, the jury is still out on which firms can be 
called environmental leaders. The above analysis does, however, suggest that in terms 
of FOF presence, long-term (15 years+) JVs are better for EP implementation than 
shorter-term partnerships and PSAs. This	   is surprising given that under a PSA a host 
government commits to reimbursing firms’ spending, including on EP —	  unlike under a 
JV, which places the onus on the firms and thus theoretically provides less motivation. 
These observations are based on land-based oil development. In	   regard to offshore 
and the continental shelf, there are no FOFs working in the Russian Arctic today.	   It is 
highly likely that involvement by Western FOFs could be beneficial in this area, 
whereas non-Western FOFs might increase environmental risk. For now, however, 
evidence is inconclusive..  
	  
Hypothesis 3: The greater the exposure of local agents to transnational 
elements, the smaller the implementation gap  
This hypothesis concerns the effects of a country’s participation and interaction with 
foreign entities, including formal agreements, involvement with international 
developmental and financial institutions (IDIs and IFIs), and public participation in 
overseas education, international research, and tourism. Some of these, such as 
international agreements, are more relevant to the whole nation rather than specific 
regions. (For a short analysis of the impact of international agreements on Russia’s 
nationwide EP performance, see Appendix E). However, there are also some bi- and 
multi	   lateral arrangements between Russia’s Western Arctic and neighbouring 
countries that are not relevant to the rest of Russia. The latter examples are therefore 
included in the following analysis. What these and other aforementioned entities often 
have in common is their capacity, direct and indirect, to help Russia improve both EP 
quality and its implementation. This section explores whether such improvements 
materialise. It is shown that although the identified factors’ contributions may not be 








unusual environmental issues to all states that share this region9. Some of these issues 
still lack (effective) solutions: academics assess that adequate international or national 
regulatory regimes for preventing or eliminating oil pollution in the specific conditions of 
the Arctic do not yet exist (Gulas, et al., 2017). In part, this is due to the slow 
development of appropriate technologies (Wilkinson, et al., 2017) despite the growing 
commercial interest in the Arctic’s natural resources that are becoming increasingly 
accessible as the ice cap melts away. In this context, environmentally focused IDIs can 
utilise their considerable international resources, connections and influence to 
stimulate governments to search for solutions to this issue, as well as to assist them in 
developing and implementing appropriate regulatory legislation in view of available 
extractive methods and technology. Additionally, foreign donors and partners are said 
to have stricter reporting requirements that increase the likelihood of project completion 
and implementation by the governing structures of the host country (intrv.7). 
The GEF and the UNDP have already been mentioned in connection to Hypothesis 1; 
between them they have pursued a range of projects directly in Nenets and with wider 
application to the Russian Arctic.	   These	   appear to have positively impacted the 
behaviour of a range of implementation-related stakeholders. Arguably, their main 
contribution is in bringing together Russian actors and international expertise, and 
facilitating productive conversations between them. These conversations can lead to 
the involved stakeholders internalising the ideas that are developed during their 
course, as well as ensuring that those ideas are in line with internationally accepted 
standards. In turn, this tends to lead to regulation that is implementable rather than 
idealistic. Perhaps the best example of this is the UNDP/GEF promotion of biodiversity 
protection as a way to encourage the extractive sector to proactively	   incorporate 
policies on environmentally friendly approaches and technologies. In the 2010s, the 
two IDIs even helped develop these policies by	   arranging collaborative work groups 
between relevant government structures, the oil industry, academics, experts, the non-
profit sector and international experts (IUCN, nd).  
This project appears to have also stimulated the appearance of complementary 
measures: new EP regulations from the Russian government and the WWF’s annual 
ranking of Russian extractive firms (mentioned while discussing	  H1). The combination 
of these efforts is said to have led to twice as many firms adopting appropriate 
strategies within three years of the start of that UNDP/GEF project (Sheynfeld, et al., 
2018). The IDIs then tested the implementation of new norms by organising practical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




training for Lukoil. For this, the IDIs again drew on their international resources and 
invited a leading European NGO on the matter to deliver the training. The NGO’s 
general manager later voiced his surprise at the extent of interest the initiative 
stimulated within Lukoil, including at the top levels of management (Nijkamp, cited in 
Sheynfeld, et al., 2018). This interest, encouraged and supported by international 
actors, led to Lukoil developing and in 2019 patenting a range of new oil-spill-response 
technologies for Arctic conditions (Offshore Technology, 2019). In this way, IDI 
involvement contributed to the improvement of government regulations, complemented 
by guidelines on how to comply with them. It also secured willing cooperation from 
involved polluters, eventually leading to the development of new technologies. All of 
these outcomes work towards the closure of implementation gaps. 	  
 
IFIs 
Since 1991, Russia has received assistance for EP implementation from a wide range 
of IFIs including the World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development and the Nordic Environment Finance Corporation. The projects 
supported by such IFIs ranged from improving Russia’s state capacity to pursue EP to 
resolving specific problems, such as reduction of emissions (for examples, see 
NEFCO, 2013). However, most of these projects were implemented at the federal level 
and Nenets-based interviewees did not mention any of them. The interviewees’ 
ignorance of the impact of IFIs on processes in their FS suggests that it is minimal. 
Furthermore, many of the IFIs have stopped their EP investment or simply chosen not 
to prepare further projects following the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and consequent 
sanctions against Russia (Ministry of Environment, 2017). As such, there is insufficient 
evidence to make conclusive arguments about IFIs’ impact. 
However, the recent geopolitical conflict has not necessarily affected the financial aid 
for EP that Russia receives from Nordic countries, with which Russia enjoys long-term, 
productive relationships both on bi- and multilateral bases. Aid from these sources has 
been channelled through organisations such as the multilateral Barents Euro-Arctic 
Region Unit and the Norwegian Barents Secretariat. Apart from funding, these 
institutions also maintain several working groups together with Russia aiming to solve 
common and exclusively Russian environmental problems.	  The level of support ranges 
from addressing Russia’s challenges with reducing air emissions to delivering specific 
training for personnel at oil firms’ facilities, improving technologies and even supporting 




cooperation between national governments (Hønneland and Jørgensen, 2003) as well 
as fostering regional-level cooperation between local governments across borders 
(intrv. 4, 8, 11). Similarly to IDIs, these channels have been transferring knowledge,	  
skills and technology into Russia – albeit in different ways. Perhaps that is why their 
impact is more difficult to trace. 
However, most of the EP projects and funding from the Nordic partners do not reach 
Nenets (intrv.8). This is because industrial activity in Nenets is not as environmentally 
dangerous or as close to the borders as in other Russian FSs. Murmansk’s nickel 
plant, for example, emits over four times Norway’s annual air pollution (Antonova, 
2008), which travels across borders into Scandinavia. Since 1985, Scandinavian 
countries have continuously pledged to help modernise the plant (Hønneland and 
Jørgensen, 2003), yet failed to deliver significant improvements. This suggests that 
their impact on FSs such as Nenets (that are further away and where the largest 
producers are also state-owned or politically powerful) is likely to be minimal or may 
even serve purely diplomatic objectives.  
 
International research and academia 
There is little evidence of Nenets’ citizens being exposed to other cultures through 
education or travel abroad. Those who can afford to, tend to leave Nenets early on in 
their careers for better climates and job opportunities elsewhere. Those who work in 
the oil industry and in federal regulatory structures usually come from other Russian 
FSs, as Nenets does not have the educational institutions required to train personnel 
locally. Concurrently, staff turnover is high due to the extreme working conditions of the 
Arctic. As such, it makes little sense to talk of consequences of the Nenets actors 
leaving and returning to the FS.  
The Nenets government has been bringing international influence to its citizens 
instead. It hosts recurring as well as one-off conferences and similar platforms that 
gather interest and attendance from a wide range of stakeholders across all sectors 
within and outside Russia. This includes representatives of other Arctic nations, who 
share Russia’s challenges but are often closer to solving them. These events include 
the two-yearly EkoPechora conferences on environmental issues in Nenets, which 
alternated with EuroArktika conferences that focused on sustainable development. In 
2017 the two conferences were merged, bringing together debates on socio-economic 




Nenets started EkoPechora in 2008,	   a year after losing jurisdiction over EP in the oil 
industry to federal regulatory structures. This suggests that the government of Nenets 
might have envisaged the conference series as a way to exercise soft power over the 
industry given that such forums act to:  
● expose existing environmental problems (including those that lead to legal non-
compliance) to the public eye;  
● put pressure on firms and different government levels to address them;  
● present existing solutions from elsewhere in the world; and  
● provide a forum for productive, multi-stakeholder discussion of effective and 
contextually appropriate solutions for Nenets (and neighbouring FSs), thus 
improving the likelihood of effective implementation.  
Documentary data suggests that these conferences can indeed provide effective 
solutions (NAO Administration, 2014). This success may be why central-level Ministries 
chose to be involved in the organisation of EuroArktika, which started in 2011.  
The increasing range of participants and a high turnout of local stakeholders from 
across sectors appear also to have fostered cooperative relationships between them 
outside these forums. One such example was the collaboration between Gazprom and 
the Nenets Nature Conservation Area to monitor Prirazlomnaya’s environmental impact 
(intrv.2). The events also help boost environmental awareness among the population of 
Nenets, and this might be responsible for the increase in the number of EP-related 
appeals to the Nenets’ Prosecutors’ Office (intrv.10), suggesting tangible impact. 
The Arctic Council, established in 1996,	   also exists to stimulate research and 
consultation on how to solve environmental challenges in the Arctic through 
multinational cooperation. Even more so then the international conferences described 
above, the Arctic Council is an apolitical institution driven from the bottom up by Arctic 
experts, scholars, civil society and the indigenous peoples from all Arctic countries. 
This mix of participants tends to foster trust and cooperation rather than political or 
economic partisanship. It also allows the least powerful stakeholders from all Arctic 
countries to participate in the creation of a globally shared understanding of the Arctic’s 
problems (Koivurova, et al., 2015) and to contribute to the development of contextually 
appropriate strategies and norms that individual country governments are then asked 
to adopt.  
This approach has strong potential to create norms whose value can be easily 




between them. This inclusivity may, for example, explain the Nenets reindeer herders’ 
productive relationships, established in response to environmental incidents, with the 
Nenets government, the Prosecutor’s Office and even with oil firms (intrv.6,10). 
However, as with previous examples on this topic, there is insufficient data to show 
conclusively whether these outcomes have had real and consistent impact on 
implementation.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   
 
Conclusion 
There is considerable international interest in the Russian Arctic and in the level and 
effectiveness of EP that Russia can deliver there. The previous discussion shows that 
this interest has materialised through a range of international actors and approaches, 
while examples given in its course indicate that those methods that encourage 
interaction with and between Russian EP stakeholders appear to be the most effective 
at raising EP quality – in terms of both content and implementation. Despite the 
variance in effectiveness between these different manifestations of international norm 
diffusion, the impact is overall at least neutral, but often also tangible. As such, 
although weak, evidence nonetheless points in support of the hypothesis, at least in 
principle..  
	  
Explanatory variable 2 - State capacity 
Hypothesis 4: The better the quality of the environmental regulation for the oil 
industry, the smaller the implementation gap 
Russian environmental regulation has developed rapidly since the collapse of the 
USSR, but has also been criticised for being overly stringent, prescriptive and 
unimplementable (Elgsaas, 2018; Belkina and Sarkova, 2015). At the same time, rapid 
legislative change in Russia raises questions of legislative consistency and ability of 
both regulators and the regulated to keep up with ever-changing requirements. This 
section reviews EP legislation at different government levels in relation to oil extraction 
in the Russian Arctic and the tundra biome. The discussion reveals that those working 
with this legislation generally perceive it to be mostly sufficient, or at least agree that it 
is changing for the better. However, although the law is becoming increasingly 
sensitive to contextual differences, it is still not sufficiently tailored to protect particularly 





When first asked to assess the quality of the Russian EP legislation, interviewees 
described it as “very good”, “clear” and “adequate” and in many ways more stringent 
than the European EP law (intrv.4,5,7,9,10,15,16,17), which was seen as a positive 
factor. However, a more in-depth discussion almost always revealed underlying issues. 
The stringency of requirements was criticised the most. The issue here is that if fully 
enforced, Russian EP regulation could risk bankrupting Russian oil firms (intrv.7), 
which support most of the Russian economy. To prevent that outcome, “the stringency 
of Russian law has usually been compensated by non-enforcement” (intrv.4,14,19). 
The law therefore only appears to be stringent, concluded a former Environment 
Minister (intrv.19). Lawmakers have been working to reconcile the requirements of EP 
legislation with realistic plausibility of compliance. However, despite moving in the right 
direction (intrv.6,7,12), legislation seems to fall short of achieving timely and 
substantively better outcomes (intrv.12), necessitating further legislative improvements. 
This process perhaps helps explain the relentless legislative change in Russian EP.  
A lawyer for WWF Russia (intrv.21) indicated that the hierarchical nature of Russian 
legislation might be one of the main factors that produce this result. Federal provisions 
usually build a strong and effective framework in this hierarchy, but the bulk of 
implementation rests on sub-laws, which in turn rely on directives and other legislative 
tools. This is similar to legislative systems in more developed countries. The issue in 
Russia is that the development of the subsidiary legislation in such a legislative chain 
typically falls to different government bodies at different levels. These separate 
legislative projects tend to be uncoordinated and the bodies in charge of them might 
not share a single vision of what outcomes the legislative chain should strive to 
achieve. For example, one part of the law requires firms to compensate oil spills in full, 
whereas other legislative provisions give them options not to do so (intrv.11,20).  
At the same time, lawmakers working on parallel legislative chains of subsidiary 
legislation (for example, on water and on air pollution) do not necessarily interact with 
each other (intrv.14), which means that laws that should theoretically complement and 
strengthen each other can instead end up competing, contradicting (intrv.9,15) or 
cancelling each other out. In these instances, explained a member of the Nenets FS 
government, it is sometimes possible to pick the lesser evil, but at other times, the 
legislative contradictions are impossible to navigate without the courts’ involvement 
(intrv.14). However, even the courts tend to be inconsistent, assigning fault to different 




judgements and court rulings (intrv.18). For example, oil firms and their subcontractors 
frequently push responsibility onto each other with neither delivering the legislative 
requirements as a result (intrv.12,18).  
Furthermore, the lowest links of subsidiary legislation in a single legislative chain – 
without which the law as a whole often cannot be properly enforced – can take several 
years to develop after the top links have already been passed. During that time, the law 
essentially remains in limbo: it is difficult to assess whether a target group has 
complied with it or not, or whether any enforcement is necessary. For example, 
Russian firms successfully challenged a federal law that provided for environmental 
payments when the subsidiary legislation for calculating these was scrapped in the 
early 2000s (although the constitutional court later reversed the ruling).  
Another issue is that when lawmakers further down the chain attempt to catch up with 
upper legislative steps, they might skip important stages of law-making that could help 
improve legislative quality. For example, Ministries or committees might skip testing 
draft legislation with cross-sector stakeholder working groups (intrv.14). Moreover, 
each legislative chain can end up with different gaps and inconsistencies (intrv.10). 
The above factors create what the head of Greenpeace Russia’s Energy Unit termed 
as “grey areas” or “loopholes”, which oil firms use to escape legislative compliance 
(intrv.20).  
Fast legislative change in the above conditions is said to have produced a colossal, 
highly complex legislative framework (intrv.13) with too many EP laws, which are highly 
heterogeneous (intrv.7). Interviewees (intrv.2,6,7,9,11) described the resulting 
legislative framework as “incomprehensible”, “absurd”, “contradictory” and 
“dysfunctional”, with some parts of the same law being too vague and others too 
convoluted, leaving one guessing at intended meaning. Rectifying this could take 
decades, observed a Greenpeace interviewee, noting that the adoption of voluntary 
industrial standards and environmental insurance might be a more time-effective 
alternative (intrv.20). 
Notwithstanding the above evaluation, the majority of interviewees in 2014 agreed that, 
however slowly and painfully, Russian EP legislation at the federal level was 
nonetheless changing for the better and that many issues described above were due to 
be addressed by the adoption of a new law, which is already used in developed 
countries. This replaces outdated and ineffective practice of setting maximum 
permissible pollution volumes and relevant charges with the principle of best available 




transitional period until 2025. Evidence of its effects might not therefore be ready for 
academic analysis for yet some time. 
 
FS level 
One of the key remaining issues is that federal law is general and does not always take 
into account local contextual variation (intrv.1,14,15) between Russian regions. For 
example, the concept of recultivation under federal law requires polluted land to be 
returned to a fertile state suitable for agriculture, which is irrelevant to the tundra 
biome, marked by marshland and permafrost (intrv.15). The harsh, inhospitable 
climatic conditions and the absence of physical infrastructure also make it much harder 
for Nenets to adapt other parts of the federal law to its context than for other FSs 
(intrv.14). According to interviewees from both public and private sectors 
(intrv.14,16,17), federal legal requirements are in some cases physically unachievable 
given a) contextual circumstances and b) available resources of both regulators and 
polluters. Although provisions exist to allow FS legislatures to supplement federal laws 
with local legislation in order to make the former more suitable, it can be very difficult to 
write local laws that reflect local needs without contradicting federal laws (intrv.15).  
In light of the above, some believe it would be more appropriate for environmental laws 
to be developed at the FS level rather than the federal level, since regional 
stakeholders are better able to  render laws both useful and effective (intrv.3,4,7). Not 
only do they better understand local challenges through their own work in Nenets, they 
can also take advantage of the various conferences on Arctic issues (for example, see 
H3 discussion) that bring debates on appropriate solutions to Nenets, rather than 
Moscow. Furthermore, in line with a nationwide requirement, the government of Nenets 
has created formal forums for a range of local stakeholders and experts to transfer 
gained knowledge into FS legislation (intrv.4). The institutional infrastructure and 
motivations to deliver quality EP laws therefore appear to already exist here.  
However, any laws the Nenets legislature writes in the current budgetary system must 
be delivered from the smaller FS budget (intrv.7), which does not always stretch that 
far. This further intensifies calls for greater devolution of EP responsibility (intrv.1,15). 
However, not all FSs have similarly strong views and motivations on EP as Nenets. Full 
devolution of EP to the FS level in the 2000s only reduced its effectiveness (intrv.19). 




devolution – for example, only to northern FSs – might be seen as political favouritism 
and could therefore also be disagreeable.  
 
The Arctic 
Despite the conclusion to the previous subsection, region-specific regulation – at 
federal if not local level – is desirable in an extensive and difficult zone like the Arctic, 
and the government of Russia has been developing a range of regulatory tools to 
encourage sustainable development specific to this area. These include Russia’s 2008 
Arctic Policy, which holds EP as one of its priorities. Increasing contextual detail within 
Russian legislation on Oil Spill Response (OSR) in another example. Meanwhile, there 
is also industry and expert led development of such soft tools as the National Public 
Standard (NPS) on environmental safety in the Arctic. 
Each of these has its individual shortcomings. For instance, Elgsaas (2018) assessed 
some strategies in the Arctic Policy as ambitious but unrealistic. In relation to OSR 
legislation, various academics and practitioners assessed it as too prescriptive and 
(still) contextually insensitive (Belkina and Sarkova, 2015); inconsistent, vague and 
poorly defined (Bizhanova, 2018); as well as scattered and failing to fully regulate all 
relevant activities (Ivanchiv, 2014). Meanwhile, soft tools such as NPS are voluntary 
and do not necessarily reflect the EP needs of mono-industrial towns (Gutman and 
Teslya, 2018), which are so common in the Russian North (Chuprov, 2017). However, 
these legal and soft tools seem to work well in tandem with each other and their 
variety, dynamism and breadth of engagement help weave together a comprehensive 
regulatory regime with significant potential. For example, despite its non-obligatory 
nature, the NPS promotes leading international standards tailored for Arctic 
circumstances, which could plug gaps and offer alternatives to unachievable policy 
targets and legislative requirements. 
 
Conclusion 
The above discussion centred on issues with Russian EP laws that prevent effective 
implementation in the Arctic. This suggests that improvements in legislative quality are 
at least necessary, if not sufficient, for the improvement of implementation, and both 
Nenets and Moscow interviewees appear to hold to this view. Hypothesis 4 is therefore 
supported by collected data. However, what also emerges from this analysis is that 




fall short of facilitating effective environmental protection. At the same time, Russia 
seems to have begun to recognise the potential of non-legislative tools in 
complementing formal legislative requirements on the path towards effective EP 
implementation. This, however, lies outside the scope of the present analysis. 
	  
Hypothesis 5: The greater the quality of environmental regulatory agency in the 
sphere of the oil industry, the smaller the implementation gap. 
The regulatory regime that was adopted by Russia in the 1990s was based on the 
reactive principles of “find and fine”, and its effectiveness became measured by the 
volume of identified violations and subsequent fines. This fostered a conflictual 
relationship between the regulators and the regulated, constraining Russia’s significant 
potential economic growth without delivering policy objectives for which said regime 
was developed. Having realised this in the 2010s, the Russian government embarked 
on the 2016-2025 reform project to fundamentally transform the principles, methods 
and evaluation criteria of government regulation. The outdated system is to be 
replaced by “regulation as service”, based on cooperation between stakeholders aimed 
at proactive prevention of negative impact. Both systems have theoretical and practical 
advantages and drawbacks, resulting in varying quality of regulation, which does not 
necessarily address the atypical context of Nenets. This section explores the impact of 
this variation on the implementation capacity of key EP regulators for the oil industry – 
the Ministry of Natural Resources and the Environment (Minprirody), Rosprirodnadzor 
and Rostechnadzor. It is shown that better quality regulation could lead to better 
implementation, thus supporting H5. However, the following analysis also shows that 
although proposed improvements in Russia’s current reform could lead to significant 
improvements in EP in general, they might not do enough to improve EP in the specific 
conditions of the North.  
 
Transport  
One of the main problems with Russian EP regulation is that it is based on physical 
inspections of the sources of pollution. In Nenets, however, there is no transportation 
infrastructure between regulators’ offices and oil facilities, and the only way for 
environmental inspectors to reach them is usually by helicopter, which is expensive 




between regulators and oil firms for the latter to provide transport to environmental 
inspectors for scheduled inspections (inrv.13), but this type of inspection cannot deliver 
EP regulatory objectives, according to academics (for example, Danilova, 2015). This 
is because these inspections are agreed between regulators and firms in advance and 
relate to specific activities. This removes the possibility of catching violators red-
handed. Surprise inspections that could achieve this were not permitted until the most 
recent reforms. However, oil firms are unlikely to provide regulators with transport for 
such inspections; as a result, several months can pass between an environmental 
incident and a physical inspection, by which time firms may have already hidden all 
evidence of EP violation (intrv.7,9).  
A more meaningful aspect of the current reform, in terms of the Nenets context, is the 
change in frequency of scheduled inspections from triennial to annual at industrial 
facilities with the highest potential negative environmental impact, which includes oil 
facilities. Oil firms will likely continue to fund travel for these and the increased 
regulatory pressure may produce positive results. However, arrangements will still be 
made on the terms of the oil firms, which have been known to take advantage of this 
situation to conceal violations (Henry et al., 2013).  
A related problem is that (until recent reforms) evidence had to precede unscheduled 
visits by inspectors, but given Nenets’ large physical area, low population density and 
very limited transport infrastructure, violations at remote oil facilities and pipelines often 
go unnoticed. Recent developments in volunteer-based “public” environmental control 
– including the introduction of a 24/7 environmental hotline, an interactive online map 
of waste dumps, and free training for citizens to become public environmental 
inspectors – could help regulators identify sites in need of visits, but are ineffective in 
remote locations where volunteers are unlikely to venture. There is potential for these 
tools to be used by indigenous, nomadic reindeer herders, who do travel past 
hydrocarbon extraction sites, and Nenets interviewees confirmed that nomads already 
actively report incidents (intrv.6,10,13,18). However, there is also evidence (Belyaeva, 
2015; intrv.18) of oil firms making deals with nomads to stop them reporting violations 
and coercing them into silence (Dallmann et al., 2010).  
In light of the above, the risks for an oil firm of being caught violating EP regulations 
are sufficiently small to be negligible. Firms have therefore been known to forego their 
legal requirement to report environmental incidents to government structures. In fact, 
the bulk of regulation relies on firms self-reporting while regulators often have no 




of reports submitted by oil firms to the regulators downplay pollution levels (intrv.11). 
Combined with insufficient alternative sources of reporting, the interviewee estimated 




Incoherence within and among EP regulatory agencies can be linked to insufficiencies 
within EP legislation, which have already been discussed concerning H4. Such 
legislation, which is supposed to set out the powers and responsibilities of various 
regulatory bodies, does not do so unambiguously. Instead, environmental law has 
fragmented EP regulation into several areas, such as air, water and soil, and endowed 
several regulators with responsibility for each of these. Furthermore, each EP area 
follows its own rules and involves a different set of regulators (intrv.12), each of which 
in turn often comprises a different set of sub-structures. This can create considerable 
confusion over responsibilities even in such sectors as hydrocarbon extraction, which 
is today primarily overseen by a few federal regulators (Gamidullaeva, 2015). Table 4 
below provides a non-exhaustive list of environmental regulators and their indicative 





Table 4 – Key environmental regulators 
Regulators	   Subordination	   Powers	  /	  Responsibilities	  relevant	  to	  
the	  oil	  industry	  
Minprirody	  
Ministry	  of	  Natural	  Resources	  
and	  Environment	  of	  the	  Russian	  
Federation	  	  
Directly	  subordinate	  to	  the	  
Government	  of	  the	  Russian	  
Federation	  
The	  federal	  policy-­‐	  and	  regulation-­‐
maker	  for	  the	  use	  and	  protection	  of	  
natural	  resources,	  pollution	  control,	  
waste	  management	  and	  environmental	  
monitoring	  
Rosnedra	  
Federal	  Agency	  for	  Subsoil	  Use	  	  
Subordinate	  to	  Minprirody	   Administrates	  the	  regulation	  of	  oil	  and	  
gas	  extraction.	  This	  includes	  issuing,	  
suspending	  and	  revoking	  licences	  for	  
the	  use	  of	  subsoil	  
Rosprirodnadzor	  
Federal	  Service	  for	  Supervision	  
of	  Nature	  Use	  	  	  
Subordinate	  to	  Minprirody	  
but	  has	  a	  degree	  of	  
independence	  
Oversees	  compliance	  with	  regulations	  




Industrial	  and	  Nuclear	  
Supervision	  Service	  	  
Directly	  subordinate	  to	  the	  
Government	  of	  the	  Russian	  
Federation	  
The	  federal	  policy-­‐	  and	  regulation-­‐
maker	  for	  matters	  related	  to	  
technological,	  environmental	  and	  
nuclear	  supervision.	  Also	  issues	  safety	  
certificates	  and	  operating	  licences	  
Rosgidromet	  
The	  Federal	  Service	  for	  
Hydrometeorology	  and	  
Environmental	  Monitoring	  	  
Subordinate	  to	  Minprirody	   Monitors	  the	  environment	  and	  
environmental	  pollution	  
Environmental	  Public	  
Prosecutor’s	  Department	  	  
Subordinate	  to	  the	  
Prosecutor	  General’s	  Office	  
Enforces	  environmental	  law	  
Rospotrebnadzor	  
Federal	  Service	  for	  Supervision	  
of	  Consumer	  Rights	  and	  Human	  
Well-­‐Being	  	  
Directly	  subordinate	  to	  the	  
Government	  of	  the	  Russian	  
Federation	  
Formulates	  and	  enforces	  policy,	  
regulation	  and	  guidelines	  on	  sanitation	  
and	  epidemiological	  welfare.	  This	  can	  
include	  issuing	  of	  permissions	  for	  air	  
emissions.	  
Rosleshoz	  
The	  Federal	  Forestry	  Agency	  	  
Subordinate	  to	  Minprirody	   Oversees	  matters	  of	  forestry	  (and	  
carries	  some	  responsibility	  for	  oil	  
pollution	  from	  oil	  pipelines,	  majority	  of	  
which	  lie	  in	  forested	  areas)	  
Rosvodresursy	  
The	  Federal	  Water	  Resources	  
Agency	  	  
Subordinate	  to	  Minprirody	   Oversees	  protection	  of	  water	  bodies	  
(which	  can	  be	  affected	  by	  oil	  works	  and	  
oil	  pollution)	  
Rosrybolovstvo	  
Federal	  Service	  for	  Fishing,	  a	  
subdivision	  of	  the	  Ministry	  of	  
Agriculture	  of	  the	  Russian	  
Federation	  	  
Subordinate	  to	  the	  Ministry	  
of	  Agriculture	  
Responsible	  for	  the	  conservation	  and	  
protection	  of	  marine	  biological	  
resources	  (which	  can	  be	  affected	  by	  oil	  
pollution)	  
Rosselkhoznadzor	  
Federal	  Service	  for	  Veterinary	  
and	  Phytosanitary	  Surveillance	  	  
Subordinate	  to	  the	  Ministry	  
of	  Agriculture	  
Overseas	  the	  quality	  and	  safety	  of	  grain	  
and	  livestock	  (which	  can	  be	  affected	  by	  
oil	  pollution)	  
	  
As an example of confused responsibilities, the government of Nenets is responsible 
for regional environmental performance, but EP regulation is mostly carried out by 
federal structures there. Yet, similarly to oil firms, these regulatory structures are not 
obliged to share environmental data with the regional government. This means that the 
actor with overall responsibility for environmental performance in the region does not 
itself know the extent of environmental impact for which it is accountable (intrv.4,11). In 




but, without an obvious reason, is regulated by the Murmansk FS, which does not have 
a clear administrative tie with Nenets (intrv.13). 
There is a certain circumstance that makes EP regulation more confusing in Nenets 
than other FSs: in terms of FS-level EP regulation, Nenets falls under the jurisdiction of 
the neighbouring FS Arkhangelsk, and regulatory responsibilities frequently move back 
and forth between these two, and between them and the federal centre due to 
changing political and economic contexts. Interviewees explained that when powers 
pass from Nenets to Arkhangelsk, FS-level EP efforts in Nenets often stop, since 
Arkhangelsk concentrates on its own problems (intrv.7,14). In terms of federal 
regulators that oversee Nenets and the neighbouring Arctic FSs, each regulatory 
structure can consist of FS-specific, cross-FS, multi-FS (with jurisdictions over different 
groups of FSs) or regional 10  departments. For example, Rosprirodnadzor runs a 
Nenets-specific department, but Rostechnadzor’s operations in Nenets are overseen 
by its main decision-making office in Arkhangelsk. As a result, Rostechnadzor is less 
effective in Nenets compared to Rosprirodnadzor. Its response is slower – because it 
has to go through a longer chain of command. Its capacity is also lower: due to its 
lower status, it does not have necessary equipment, such as a laboratory, and other 
regulatory bodies in Nenets are not allowed to share theirs with Rostechnadzor 
(intrv.12).  
Such variation in structures also considerably complicates arrangements for joint 
environmental inspections, which have become increasingly common and can involve 
up to seven different regulatory agencies. Determining who should attend, coordinating 
their availability and securing financial means to fly the group to the inspection site can 
be no mean feat, according to an interviewee from the Prosecutor’s Office (intrv.10). 
Concurrently, involvement of so many actors with often competing perspectives makes 
it difficult to reach a joint agreement on next steps and post-inspection responsibilities 
(intrv.18).  
Ways of working nonetheless seem to emerge among regulators based on practice. 
However, this natural process can be easily jeopardised by the continuous policy and 
legislative change taking place in Russia. The current reform is planned to take effect 
over an 11-year span and other changes or new reforms are likely to materialise in that 
time. This prospect fosters a sense of constant transition towards an unknown goal, 
which is potentially confusing for both the bottom level EP implementers and for firms 
in terms of what is required of them. A new announcement has already been made in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




April 2019 on the creation of two additional regulatory bodies in the Arctic within the 
General Prosecutor’s Office, whose responsibilities will likely duplicate those of 
Rosprirodnadzor (intrv.22).  
	  
Human Resources  
Primary EP regulators responsible for the oil industry in Nenets face substantial 
problems with human resources. Back in 2014, when interviews were conducted, 
federal allocation allowed only a handful of staff in both Rostechnadzor and 
Rosprirodnadzor despite the intense workload. That year, Rosprirodnadzor carried out 
17 scheduled inspections (see Figure 4), each taking up to 20 days, as well as seeing 
to their other duties. Perhaps (at least partially) in recognition of such unrealistic 
regulatory workload across Russia, central government has been pushing for fewer 
inspections since the start of the decade. Figure 4 shows that in Nenets 
Rosprirodnadzor was managing to comply until 2017, when the number of scheduled 
inspections rocketed back up (Upravlenie Rosprirodnadzora po NAO, nd). This 
significant increase corresponds to the implementation of a new reform the same year, 
which saw a re-categorisation of entities subject to regulatory inspections based on 
their potential for negative environmental impact. This change was intended to make 
the regulatory system more realistic by matching regulatory pressure with the severity 
of EP risks. In 2018, scheduled inspections were for the first time planned in 










The reform was supposed to free up regulators’ time and resources by redirecting them 
towards entities most in need of regulation – those showing the highest risk of negative 
impact. Nationwide, this approach was effective, having cut the number of regulated 
entities from 79,000 in 2016 to 22,000 in 2017 (Rosprirodnadzor, 2017). However, in a 
mono-economic FS like Nenets, where economic activity almost exclusively poses high 
environmental risk, the reform instead led to an increase in both the number and 
frequency of scheduled inspections. Even the increasing automatisation of regulators’ 
other duties and the growing use of online communication are unlikely to adequately 
offset overall climbing workloads. At the same time, the range of Rosprirodnadzor’s 
responsibilities continues to grow. For example, in 2018 Minprirody asked 
Rosprirodnadzor to lead the reform of nationwide waste management systems as well 
as to regulate the three nature reserves and national parks created in Nenets in 2017 
and 2018 (MNR, 2018a: 437) until relevant government structures are created to take 
over (MNR, 2018b).  
While Rosprirodnadzor’s Nenets website suggests that new staff are being hired, the 
number of current staff is unclear and in 2014 interviewees indicated significant 
barriers to finding new personnel to staff the offices of federal regulators in the Artic. 
These problems include:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




● lack of local experts, since there are no institutions of higher education in 
Nenets (intrv.2);  
● low salaries relative to those in FS-level structures and to the high costs of 
living in extreme Arctic conditions, making federal service in areas like Nenets 
unattractive to qualified (or any) staff (intrv.2,12,14,18);  
● difficult working conditions (8-month continuous polar winters); and 
● the general incommensuration of regulators’ salaries with their workload and 
occupational risks (Skoryh and Perelygina, 2018).  
These factors were said to substantially reduce the pool of available candidates and to 
increase staff turnover (intrv.9,11,12,18). Although budgetary increases and the 
nationwide worker incentive scheme proposed by the central government might bolster 
the uptake of these jobs to a degree, they will not help resolve all of the above issues 
of the Russian North. Meanwhile, the high pressure and difficult conditions in which EP 
regulators work likely engender mistakes or unintentional clemency upon EP violators, 
and necessitate selective enforcement. 
	  
Conclusion 
This section explored the specific problems faced by Nenets as an example of the 
wide-ranging differences between Russian territories and how this variation affects the 
effectiveness of largely standardised, nationwide regulation. It is these contextual 
barriers that exacerbate existing shortfalls of formal government regulation. For 
instance, the consequences of the general institutional complexity and insufficient 
resources prevalent in regulatory structures become especially acute in the Russian 
North. Meanwhile, despite general improvements in the regulatory regime, the specific 
conditions of different territories may require far more tailored approaches to be 
effective. As such, the above discussion strongly implies that low quality of 
environmental regulation can have a significant negative effect on implementation. 
While it is not possible to conclude that better environmental regulation would 
necessarily lead to better implementation, the evidence reviewed nonetheless strongly 







Explanatory variable 3 - Economic conditions 
Hypothesis 6: The more advanced the economic conditions in a regional 
economy, the smaller the implementation gap. 
Nenets is mono-economic: its entire economy rests on oil extraction through royalties 
(at the Kharyaga PSA), taxation (on profit, property, and extraction), and payments for 
environmental impact. The distribution of these tax and non-tax payments continues to 
vary between budgets at different government levels (due to legislative changes), but 
Nenets’ dependence on oil remains constant. Academic theories focussing on the 
relationship between oil and government spending tend to predict that overdependence 
of government budgets on oil revenues often leads to regulatory capture (for example, 
Shaxson, 2007) with consequent negative impact on regulatory implementation. At first 
sight, it seems plausible to apply such theories to the present case study. Nenets is 
one of the richest Russian FSs and a major contributor to the federal budget. 
Reductions in oil profits in Nenets, due to oil firms’ increased production costs brought 
on by effective regulation, could therefore affect not only local but also nationwide 
spending. This section explores whether this logic applies to Nenets and what impact 
the situation has on EP. It is shown that the presence of oil indeed creates strong 
economic priorities above environmental concerns at all levels of government. 
However, this outcome has materialised more as a result of a clash between 
government policies rather than due to regulatory capture. The absence of other 
economic sectors in Nenets, which could take the place of government revenues 
collected from oil, leaves no alternative but to continue to prioritise economic policy 
goals. 
The mono-economic nature of Nenets might in itself be an issue for balancing between 
local government objectives, but the economy’s existence specifically around oil seems 
to exacerbate the situation. According to the head of the energy unit at Greenpeace 
(intrv.20), over 50% of federal-level government spending depends on oil taxes from 
oil-producing regions such as Nenets, and such spending is planned and divided 
between different policy areas before oil taxes are even collected. With this level of oil 
dependence at the national level, the central government has been curbing state power 
since the early 2000s. This has manifested in a number of ways; for example, the 
distribution of oil related taxes collected from the oil industry steadily changed in favour 
of the federal budget. Prior to 2002, oil-extracting FSs could retain 60% of tax on oil 
and gas extraction, with the other 40% going into the federal budget (Kurlyandskaya, 




88% and 92% of all payments collected from the oil industry to Moscow (Afanasev, 
2019).  
Furthermore, responsibility for environmental regulation of the oil industry has moved 
to federal agencies. Several interviewees from Moscow (intrv.19,20) commented that 
having thus removed the ability to enforce EP from local agencies, the central 
government then intentionally kept the number of EP regulators in federal agencies too 
low (and therefore their workload disproportionately high) so as to limit the enforcement 
of EP regulation. Moreover, the responsibilities for issuing licenses for the use of 
subsoil also moved to Moscow. This change made it more appropriate for oil firms to 
influence the central government if they hoped to reduce or avoid their legal 
obligations. Accordingly, these changes saw the oil firms’ head offices also moving out 
oil-producing FS such as Nenets to Moscow.  
As a result, the government of Nenets finds itself caught between powerful interests of 
the federal government and of the oil firms that support its public spending. The factors 
described above have effectively removed both the direct control and the indirect 
influence that Nenets-level government could exert on its major polluters in order to 
encourage them to comply with EP legislation (intrv.14,18). Yet despite these changes, 
the overall responsibility for environmental protection in Nenets has remained with the 
Nenets-level government even though it is in theory powerless to do much about it. 
The situation could be interpreted as the central government taking economic and 
financial control from the FS, leaving in place a political lever to control the FS’s 
reactions. In this situation, local environmental concerns of Nenets have become 
hostage to the national economic interest.  
Should an EP regulator exercise their full legal powers, they could suspend oil works 
until non-compliant practices were eliminated. According to a Greenpeace interviewee, 
were an oil firm to complain to central Ministries in such a scenario, the Ministries 
would likely take the company’s side and might pressure regulators to back off 
(inrv.20). A pause in oil extraction for any period of time could mean a substantial fall in 
federal spending, which could in turn have a significant impact on the delivery of 
government policies across the board. Each Ministry, including that responsible for 
delivering EP, might therefore be expected to have a strong interest in opposing EP 
regulators. In essence, national economic interests can be expected to prevail over 
local environmental concerns. At the same time, Russian oil firms tend to hold 
considerable assets across the country, granting them yet further political power with 




“…oil is the holy cow and the government will never help those poor regulators… There 
is an unvoiced governmental-commercial agreement whereby the [central] government 
says [to the oil firms]: ‘Give us export and taxes and what you do and pollute in a region 
is the region’s problem… So let the regions bite you, but consider us on your side.” 
(ibid.) 
Without an alternative source of finance (as there are no other economic sectors in 
Nenets) and in the face of these powerful interests, EP regulators and the government 
of Nenets have almost no cards to play. The one saving grace is perhaps the lack of 
unity within Nenets’ oil sector. There are a significant number of oil firms operating 
there in direct competition with each other and without any organisations representing 
their common interests against state structures at the Nenets level. Theoretically, this 
should give the FS government and locally-based federal EP regulators greater power 
to enforce EP against individual non-compliant polluters: if one left, production and 
taxes from others would continue and another firm would eventually take over freed oil 
deposits. In practice, however, Nenets’ budget is under considerable pressure to 
maintain an acceptable standard of living for its population in the extreme Arctic 
conditions. Furthermore, since 2006, when major oil projects began to operate, 17-27% 
of Nenets’ permanent population has been directly employed by the oil industry 
(Federal Service for Government Statistics, n.d.). In the absence of alternative 
economic sectors in Nenets, closing down oil works could mean job losses and 
therefore an increased strain on public services as well as a (however temporary) 
reduction in Nenets’ government budgets. All of these factors make it less likely that 
industry regulation that could have these outcomes would be enforced. 
Local and federal regulators in Nenets appear unwilling to test such a scenario, for 
even interviewees from oil firms working in Nenets admitted that the local government 
might give firms “a hard talking to” but that “the regulators cannot shut down a firm” 
(intrv.16,17). Instead all parties find a balance in which regulators “do not impose 
regulation too harshly as long as the firms don't behave too poorly” (intrv.16,17). The 
same interviewees indicated that this usually results in firms choosing to pay fines 
without much change to their environmental performance. In fact, unlike taxes on oil, 
the majority (95%) of environmental payments – collected by the federal 
Rosprirodnadzor – stays in the Nenets’ budget, thus constituting an additional source 
of income (Upravlenie Rosprirodnadzora po NAO, nd). It might therefore be in the 
Nenets government’s interest for oil firms to continue paying fines, although evidence 
to support such a claim is understandably hard to deliver.  
Oil firms also complement official public spending in Nenets through various corporate 




schools and recreation facilities (intrv.5). This gives Nenets’ governing structures 
another reason to stay on the oil industry’s good side, commented an interviewee from 
a Nenets research institution (intrv.9). In this context, structures at all levels of 
government with an interest in EP are constrained by the socio-economic priorities of 
jurisdictions directly above them.  
At the same time, those most affected by pollution also stand to lose most from 
improved EP. As already mentioned, a significant proportion of the local, permanent 
population works in oil and there are few alternative employment opportunities. Oil 
works are located inaccessibly far from main human settlements in Nenets and the 
effects of any pollution considerably outweigh the immediate perceived losses as a 
result from potential unemployment. Furthermore, the oil industry pays the highest 
wages in Nenets (Stammler and Peskov, 2008). As such, the local population also has 
a strong interest against any measures that could hurt the oil firms’ profits and in turn 
cause firms to lay off local workers. Such awareness likely limits public pressure on 
government structures to improve their EP implementation. Local political will to 
enforce EP is therefore likely to remain low.  
There is little data to conclusively prove or disprove the proposed arguments. However, 
the possibility of the hypothesised causal relationships in this subsection was 
supported by interview data. The presence of oil does not necessarily preclude the 
development of other economic sectors or other general improvements to the 
economic conditions in this locality. It is the geological, geographic and climatic 
conditions of the okrug that make economic activity here almost illogical. Had oil not 
been discovered in Nenets, there would have likely been little rationale for any 
economic activity here at all, and the region would have likely been left to the 
indigenous population. However, the presence of oil brought an increased human 
population to Nenets, whose socio-economic well-being is difficult to maintain and 
takes priority over EP concerns. In light of the present circumstances, both factors 
(presence of oil and the overall local economic conditions) combine to lower the 
likelihood of EP implementation. H6 is therefore supported. 
 
Conclusion 
Data discussed in this chapter supports all but one hypothesis: the remit of H2 could 
not concluded due to lack of conclusive evidence to support a  causal relationship in 




applicability of other types of foreign and international influence contained in variable 
one, including international NGOs, financial and developmental institutions and 
academic expertise. These actors were shown to have at least a strong potential for 
positive impact on implementation. As such, the above analysis implies that all three 
variables – foreign influence, state capacity and economic conditions – have 
substantive hypothesized impact on the implementation of environmental protection in 






Chapter 5. Empirical analysis: Republic of Tatarstan, the 
Russian Federation 
Introduction 
The Republic of Tatarstan (henceforth RT or Tatarstan) is one of the smaller Russian 
FSs12. It has a relatively high population density and is located in the southern part of 
European Russia as per Figure 5. RT is thus strategically well located between Europe 
and Asia, even though it does not share direct borders with other countries. In terms of 
environmental wealth, Tatarstan has a relatively large number of water bodies, 
including rivers, lakes, marshes and bogs, some of which have unique ecosystems.  
 
Figure 5 – Republic of Tatarstan  
	   	  
 
RT is in many ways an unusual Russian region. This applies both to its relationship 
with Russian federal government and to its internal characteristics compared to other 
oil-extracting Russian regions. Tatneft, RT’s main oil company, is also distinctive – its 
environmental performance has often been better than that of other Russian oil giants’, 
at times exceeding legal requirements. 
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This chapter explores reasons for RT’s relative success in complying with 
environmental protection (EP) regulation in the oil sector. As in other chapters, the 
independent variables of foreign influence, state capacity and economic conditions are 
tested, but the analysis reveals that they have low explanatory capacity. The effect of a 
particular combination of local factors is shown to be more important for 
implementation. These factors include strong political, societal and commercial 
interests in EP that developed against the backdrop of relatively high political and 
economic stability. Supporting this conclusion, the next section sets the context by 
outlining RT’s political and economic status, its sources of environmental problems, 
their impact, and the EP measures taken to resolve them. The following section 
discusses the relevance of proposed hypotheses; the final section concludes by 




Since before the Soviet era, and despite being a part of the Russian Empire, Tatarstan 
identified as an independent nation and had its own government, culture, language, 
religion, customs and traditions. Under communist rule, its governing institutions 
gained further experience and were only strengthened by the Communist Party’s 
decision to designate Tatarstan as a machinery-producing and oil-extracting region 
(Kalimullin, 2015). Assets such as labour, capital and equipment were redirected here 
from other regions and Tatarstan became a centre for technological and 
methodological innovation in the prescribed economic activities. This meant that by the 
time of the USSR’s collapse, Tatarstan’s economy resembled that of a fully-fledged 
nation. This fuelled existing separatist tendencies (Shakhray, 1997), leading to, among 
other things, Tatarstan proclaiming itself a Republic and refusing in the early 1990s to 
sign the Russia-wide agreement that would include it in Russia’s new, federal structure.  
To pacify RT’s pursuit of independence, Moscow compromised signing a contract-style 
(Lysenko, 1997) bilateral agreement with RT in 1994. This granted RT significantly 
more independence and influence than other federal subjects (FSs). The treaty also 
allowed for RT to endow itself with additional responsibilities and to pass laws that 
could contradict both Russian federal law and the Constitution of the Russian 
Federation. Under its special status, RT formed its own government (including an 




natural resources and even pursued its own foreign (economic) relations. However, 
many of these powers were withdrawn when the original treaty expired and a new 
version was put in place in 2007. Thereafter, RT was obliged to cooperate with the 
federal centre on decisions relating to natural resources and other policy areas. RT 
retained the power to set its own economic and environmental policies, as well as 
some others, but these also had to be approved by Moscow. 
Nonetheless, the relatively strong state capacity of RT’s governing institutions, RT’s 
success in further growing its economy, and its drive to protect its rights against the 
federal centre, have made RT one of the most influential of Russian FSs (Gallyamov, 
cited in Kozlov, 2017). Moscow appears to be continually trying to reduce RT’s political 
power: for example, when the above-mentioned 2007 power-sharing treaty expired in 
2017, Moscow decided not to develop or sign a new one, thus refusing to recognise 
RT’s special status any longer. Economically, RT presents one of the best investment 
climates in Russia and is a major donor towards the federal budget13. 
 
Industrial development and environmental impact 
Industry and pollution (Soviet era) 
Tatarstan suffered from extensive water, air and soil pollution during and after the 
Soviet era. Much of this results from the aggressive industrialisation that followed the 
Soviet decision to establish a special research-and-economic area in RT. As part of 
this, industrial production of oil began in the 1940s with production volumes being 
prioritised over efficiency. This often resulted in extensive pollution but was not 
perceived as problematic. Similar attitudes permeated RT’s other industrial sectors and 
RT rapidly became one of the leading industrial regions towards the end of the 1950s.  
During the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, RT produced almost a third of all oil extracted in 




Such turbulent economic development and the disregard of its impact led to severe 
environmental damage (Petrov, et al., 1997; Mirzagitova, 2015). By the 1970s, oil 
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pollution had already become common in all aquatic ecosystems (intrv.8) with water in 
many becoming unsuitable for bathing or drinking (Ivanov and Tafeeva, 2006).  By the 
1980s, RT was on the brink of an environmental catastrophe, as assessed by 
Mirzagitova (2014). Problems included extensive oil spills, including on riverbanks (due 
to close proximity of oil works) and flaring/venting of Associated Petroleum Gas (APG) 
due to the use of inadequate equipment, poor soldering, and missing latches and 
valves (Mirzagitova, 2015). Pollution was further exacerbated because oil workers 
often dealt with spilled oil by burning it - rather than cleaning it away, which is the 
standard practice today. By the end of the century, RT was emitting 22% of all air 
pollution in the Volga region14. RT’s total pollution levels of all types exceeded the 
Russian average by 3 to 5 times (Kalimullin, 2014). At the same time, there was a lack 
of emission control and water purification facilities at all stages of oil production	  
(Mirzagitova, 2015), adding to the significant pressures on human and animal 
wellbeing in this industry- and population-dense region. 
 
Improvements in environmental protection 
Despite the extensive issues just described, there were some early EP successes. 
Tatneft, at the time Tatarstan’s only, nationalised oil producer, could be described as a 
pioneer in this sense: already in the 1970s, it was the first industrial entity to start 
taking steps to reduce its impact. For example, although APG venting remained a big 
problem at sealed wells and along oil pipelines, by 1973 Tatneft pressurised 80% of 
operational oil wells so as to minimise the issue at least there. In the 1990s 
improvements in water pollution followed when Tatneft and the government of what 
was then already the Republic of Tatarstan together commissioned extensive research 
into (and subsequent implementation of) environmental safety in oil production and 
transportation (Ivanov and Tafeeva, 2006). As a result, by the early 2000s, surface 
water salinity levels returned close to the pre-oil-development average (Galeev, et al., 
1995). By 2010s, new oil-related pollution in RT became the exception rather than the 
norm.  
Tatneft had the financial resources to invest in clean technologies, unlike the majority 
of RT’s other less profitable and mostly non-oil-related, industries. This meant that 
while the oil industry became noticeably cleaner, overall pollution levels remained high 
relative to other, usually much larger oil-producing FSs in Russia due to the general 
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high concentration of dirty industries in RT. Better EP in the 2000s helped Tatarstan to 
reduce its overall air and water pollution by about 20%, although by volume RT was 
still one of the biggest polluters (Energoeffektivnost i energosberezhenie, 2009). 
Meanwhile, the 2010s brought new environmental problems: growing levels of traffic 
increased emissions from mobile sources by 21% in 2010-2017 (MNR, 2018a). 
However, there have also been improvements: water pollution, for instance, decreased 
by another 35% in the same time period (MNR, 2018a: 540-542).  
The trustworthiness of Russian official figures is questionable, but evaluation of RT’s 
environmental performance from other sources suggests positive overall results. For 
example, Iterfax-Era (n.d., b) – an independent observer of industrial energy-efficiency 
– ranked Tatarstan’s firms tenth of 84 Russian FSs in 2018, highlighting relatively high 
technological improvements. The National Environmental Rating, which utilises a 
broader set of indicators including EP and socio-environmental education, ranked RT 
39th out of all Russian FSs (2019), which is a relatively good result considering RT’s 
extensive environmental damage at the end of the Soviet era. (For recent history of the 




Since its creation in 1950, Tatneft has dominated RT’s oil industry and still does so 
now. It was owned by the government of Tatarstan until 1994, when Tatneft 
commenced a transition to a joint stock ownership. This process finished in 2008 
(Rukavishnikov, 2013), but the RT government has retained a controlling share and 
has the power to veto commercial decisions. Over the decades, Tatneft developed into 
a vertically integrated holding of firms capable of oil exploration, extraction, refining, 
petrochemical production (via a complex of plants named Taneko), fiberglass and tyre 
manufacturing15, high quality diesel and petrol production, petrol stations and other 
economic activities.  
Tatneft develops around 80% of all oil in Tatarstan and 32 almost entirely Russian 
Minor Oil Firms (MOFs) develop the other 20%. MOFs were created in accordance with 
a directive by the government of RT back in 1997, which makes RT quite unusual, 
given the trend of larger oil firms to aggressively absorb smaller ones in the rest of 
Russia. Observers of RT’s oil history explain this situation by pointing to the highly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




specific requirements at the 67 oil deposits that MOFs work with, which could only be 
developed by highly specialised firms and would not be of commercial interest to 
bigger ones (BusinessOnline, 2017).  
RT’s MOFs could be described as Tatneft’s extensions, implying that similar EP 
attitudes and norms are present across the piece. This is because RT’s MOFs are 
either directly connected to Tatneft or are to a large extent dependent on it for 
exploratory works, infrastructure and even personnel, according to industry observers 
(ibid.) and research interviewees. The following analysis therefore focuses on Tatneft 
as the key representative of RT’s oil sector. 
	  
Results 
Explanatory variable 1 – Foreign influence 
Hypothesis 1: The greater the presence of international advocacy groups within 
a region, the smaller the implementation gap. 
None of the international advocacy groups have chosen to actively engage with RT’s 
oil-related environmental issues either within RT, or at the federal level in Moscow. The 
largest non-governmental organisations (NGOs) with foreign roots – Greenpeace 
Russia and WWF Russia – do, however, keep an eye on RT. For example, 
Greenpeace Russia includes data on Tatarstan’s Tatneft in its reports on oil spills by 
Russian firms, but has spoken favourably of Tatneft (Solovyova, 2016) and does not 
appear to pursue any direct projects in RT. Similarly, WWF Russia includes Tatneft in 
its nationwide analyses of Russian hydrocarbon firms’ environmental responsibility and 
openness (which give Tatneft relatively high scores) but does not pursue any oil-
related projects in relation to RT or Tatneft. The above rankings were designed by 
these NGOs to stimulate environmentally friendly competition between Russian oil 
firms, but Tatneft’s interest in environmental responsibility predates these measures. 
There does not, therefore, appear to be any obvious causal link between these 
organisations’ actions and EP implementation in relation to Tatneft. 
Interviewees (1,4,6,7) did, however, speak at length about the strength of local civil 
society in RT, but none of the identified NGOs or individual environmental activists in 
Kazan, Tatarstan’s capital city, worked on oil-related environmental issues. Existing 
civil organisations in Kazan, where interviews were conducted, are concerned with 




works and is not therefore exposed to immediate oil pollution. Even then, neither these 
organisations nor the interviewed public officials were aware of any environmental civil 
movements or organisations with an interest in oil elsewhere in RT.  
This implies two most likely explanations. The first is that the absence of organised, 
civil interest in RT’s capital might hint at the “local” nature of environmental issues in 
Russia, which are perceived and pursued in the immediate physical location of the 
issue despite the local (municipal) government having the least power to address such 
problems. It would arguably make more sense for such movements to have some kind 
of contact with those state structures that have the power to influence the oil industry – 
federal regulators Rostechnadzor and Rosprirodnadzor, or the government of 
Tatarstan, whose offices are all situated in Kazan. Lack of knowledge of such 
movements in Kazan therefore suggests the second explanation: that civil 
environmental interests in oil pollution either did not materialise at all or have already 
dissolved. This explanation suggests that oil pollution is no longer an acute issue in 
RT, which may in turn explain the absence of foreign and international advocacy 
groups in RT as well, and their generally positive comments about RT and Tatneft 
elsewhere. As such, there is insufficient data to establish any causal relationships 
between real or potential foreign NGO presence and oil-related EP in RT. As such, 
there is insufficient evidence to support H1. 
	  
Hypothesis 2: The greater the presence of foreign oil firms within a region, the 
smaller the implementation gap. 
RT’s oil sector is dominated by Tatneft, controlled by the government of RT, and its 
daughter oil firms. The only traces of foreign involvement are a small Tatex joint 
venture (JV) between Tatneft and the American company Texneft, and Makoil, owned 
by Herculis Partners SA	   (a Swiss family-investment boutique) until 2016. However, 
industry observers advise that the presence and influence of the American partner in 
Tatex is negligible, whereas powerful Russian individuals with direct connections to 
Tatneft were partial owners of the companies of which Makoil is a subsidiary	  
(BusinessOnline, 2017). Additionally, Shell and Chevron showed interest in partnering 
with Tatneft in 2007 to develop RT’s bitumen, but negotiations fell through in 2008 
when deposits proved to have been overestimated. As such, it can be said that there is 




The reason this hypothesis concerns engagement by foreign oil firms is because it is 
commonly argued that leading, international firms implement better, more 
environmentally friendly technologies and practices, not least because they are 
constantly subject to international opinion and therefore need to maintain a good 
reputation. RT’s Tatneft was not subject to such international pressure and Russian 
federal regulation of the oil industry does not impose particularly high penalties for 
violations of environmental laws; however, Tatneft’s green development has 
nonetheless been significant and therefore deserves a brief analysis. This section 
outlines Tatneft’s key achievements compared to those of other Russian and foreign oil 
firms operating within Russia, and offers some reasons for this success before 
concluding that foreign investment, were it present, might have had a detrimental effect 
on the dependent variable. As such, there is no evidence to support H2 in relation to 
this case study.  
In terms of practice, Tatneft proclaims ‘respect for the environment’ as one of its main 
priorities championed by its top-level management (Tatneft, nd). The firm started 
developing environmental policies in 1990, when EP became an official policy of the 
RT government, and has been pursuing corporate environmental programs since then. 
As an indicator of the resulting programs’ effectiveness, Tatneft and its daughter 
companies have repeatedly won local and nationwide competitions in areas including 
environmental management, sustainability and transparency. Tatneft has also 
successfully secured various international certifications in environmental management 
and transparency, marking Tatneft’s compliance with international standards. 
Interviewees working closely with RT’s oil industry (intrv.2,6) confirmed that these are 
more than symbolic achievements, and that the firm has significantly reduced its 
environmental impact, maintained compliance with changing legislative requirements 
(intrv.2), and even exceeded formal obligations. This includes Tatneft’s investment into 
improved pipeline technologies despite not being obliged to replace outdated pipelines 
by the Russian legislation (Chuprov, 2016).  
Progress is also evident in terms of technological advancement. The firm has been 
well-placed in a range of international rankings and indices. For example, in 2016, 
Tatneft took first place among world innovators in the Thomson Reuters ranking. 
Developments that formed the basis for such awards allowed Tatneft to easily comply 
with Russian environmental regulations. For example, Tatneft easily met the 95% APG 
utilisation target in 2012, having already hovered close to the mark in the previous 
decade (Kutepova, et al., 2011). Given that Russia flares more than any other nation 




especially meaningful. Furthermore, Tatneft drives innovation throughout the Russian 
hydrocarbon industry, such as by working with Russian suppliers to develop 
alternatives to Western products (Maganov, Tatneft’s General Director, cited in 
Zavalishina, 2015) since these became too expensive or unattainable following 
Western sanctions and the devaluation of the Russian currency. 
The likeliest driver of Tatneft’s increasingly green credentials might be its size and 
therefore its relatively modest profits. Compared to larger oil firms, Tatneft is relatively 
sensitive to external shocks. To mitigate against these, Tatneft appears to have chosen 
to develop and implement energy-efficient technologies as a way of cutting costs and 
therefore securing both the stability of its market share and the growth of its profits. In 
this way, utilising APG has provided additional resources and therefore increased 
profits. Improvements in environmental performance, and thus EP compliance, can 
therefore be seen as by-products of mainly commercial interests.  
A related but reversed line of reasoning is commonly used to explain inadequate 
environmental performance among the rest of the Russian oil firms. The argument 
goes that the principles behind Russian EP regulation have failed to conceptualise 
investment in environmentally friendly technologies as advantageous to the industry 
(for example, OECD, 2006). Instead, EP requirements in Russia rest on the principles 
that frame EP compliance as a cost to firms. As such, EP regulation in Russia tends to 
provide insufficient incentives for firms to strive for compliance. This was the case at 
least until the recent regulatory reforms and the introduction of the law on best 
available technologies, which has started to reconceptualise the issue.  
In the case of Tatneft, conditions other than government regulations appear to have 
made the firm see economic advantages in becoming green. Were Tatneft to acquire a 
foreign partner with substantial capital and a technological base that could cushion it 
against market instability, it is highly likely that the pressures, which forced Tatneft to 
innovate and go green, would not have materialised. Tatneft’s potential for EP 
compliance could have thus been reduced. In light of this, there is no evidence to 






Hypothesis 3: The greater the exposure of local agents to transnational 
elements, the smaller the implementation gap. 
This hypothesis derives from academic theories which propose that institutional 
change can be achieved through exposure to other value systems, for example by 
cooperating with international institutions and organisations, signing up to international 
treaties, and international travel, including for educational purposes. However, this 
research project found no evidence of transnational environment-focused entities 
engaging with issues in Tatarstan. It is also difficult to trace any relationships between 
international environmental agreements and Tatarstan specifically, since such 
agreements are signed at the federal level, placing the ultimate responsibility for 
delivering commitments with the national government. Citizens of Tatarstan do, 
however, travel abroad for purposes of education and tourism, and, although not in 
great numbers, foreign experts also work in RT. The passive norm transfer, which may 
result from this type of exposure, is therefore the focus of this section. Since norm 
diffusion is difficult to measure empirically, analysis is based on interviewees’ 
assessments of whether norm diffusion of western values is taking place in Tatarstan 
and to what effect. 
Based on collected interview data, there does not appear to be a causal link between 
international norm diffusion and the implementation gap. Interviewees outright rejected 
or questioned both the existence of norm diffusion and whether it could have any 
positive effect. Regarding the former, interviewees commented that the Tatar society 
already has a high level of environmental awareness and rejected the usefulness of 
value systems in developed countries (intrv.1,4,8). One interviewee also expressed the 
view that values and principles are adopted during childhood (intrv.1), adding that by 
the time most people are exposed to foreign values – through education, travel or 
foreign colleagues – it is already too late for this interaction to provoke change.  
Although some interviewees accepted that travel abroad could lead to new 
experiences, if not to the internalisation of new values, they largely rejected that these 
could in turn be useful or applicable in Tatarstan (intrv.2,6). Interviewees explained that 
this is because any knowledge, skills or principles gained would be met with resistance 
(intrv.6,7). An interviewee (intrv. 4) from Tatneft explained that this is because the Tatar 
context is unique and specific, and can therefore only be understood by locals and 
addressed by locally-designed solutions. Applying approaches sourced from elsewhere 




Having said this, there is some limited evidence that effects can be achieved through 
greater exposure to the outside world, but not in the hypothesised way. This 
observation relates to Tatarstan’s participation in international events. For example, a 
series of EP improvements took place in the run-up to the XVI World Aquatic 
Championship hosted by Tatarstan in 2015. However, such improvements do not 
derive from newly learnt norms during the event; instead, they are proactive, 
suggesting that local actors already know what measures are needed but accord low 
value to them day-to-day. As such, there is no evidence of long-term change in 
attitudes as proposed by the theories of norm diffusion. In light of all of the above, there 
is insufficient evidence to support H3 in Tatarstan. 
	  
Explanatory variable 2 – State capacity 
Hypothesis 4: The better the quality of environmental regulation for the oil 
industry, the smaller the implementation gap. 
RT interviewees’ extensive comments about the quality of environmental legislation 
boiled down to one central issue: the content of the legislation fails to sufficiently 
incentivise compliance. However, these observations contradict Tatneft’s seeming 
environmental over-performance, which was discussed in relation to the previous 
hypotheses. This suggests that something other than EP regulation is driving Tatneft’s 
environmental conduct and this observation is supported by the fact that none of the 
interviewees’ comments about the quality of EP regulation at either governmental level 
were made in connection to Tatneft. Interviewees instead offered other explanations for 
Tatneft’s environmental conduct that have, perhaps inadvertently, assured its formal 
legal compliance. These observations resonate with the findings of Thurner and 
Proskuryakova (2014) – that Tatneft, among other industry leaders, “inform 
government regulation and thereby lift up the greening of production also in late 
followers” (ibid.) instead of falling in line with the rest of the industry actors. 
The question remains: what is driving Tatneft’s interest in EP? Factors identified by 
interviewees in relation to this question are best summarised by a former academic, 
project leader of a Rosprirodnadzor expert committee: “any firm chooses to behave 
environmentally responsibly due to pressures from the government, the public or due 
to [the firm’s] internal culture. In Tatarstan there are all three” (intrv.6). Interviewees did 
not refer to government regulations when speaking of such “pressure from the 




stimulate Tatneft’s environmental responsibility, if not through regulation? This section 
answers this question to show that, where governmental and commercial interests are 
close and aligned, formal regulation might play a less important role. 
In terms of political pressure, interviewees credited the severe environmental crisis 
Tatarstan experienced in the 1970s-80s with triggering strong interest in EP among the 
region’s political leadership at that time. This was said to lead to technological 
developments in the RT during the second half of the 1980s and the 1990s, which saw 
substantial improvements in the equipment and processes used across oil facilities and 
infrastructure (intrv.6). It is plausible that political interest could have produced these 
results without the help of formal government regulation for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, Russia was under a communist regime at the time, meaning that all economic 
activity was controlled directly by the state. This reduced the need for measures that 
act to steer an industry at arms length, such as government regulation. Furthermore, it 
was the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic16 that was directly responsible for 
Tatneft, rather than the central Soviet government. This minimised the chain of 
command over the firm as well as placing local stakeholders – those that were aware 
of and likely directly affected by Tatneft’s negative environmental impact – in control of 
the firm.  
This line of reasoning holds up after the collapse of the Soviet Union, since the 
connection between Tatneft and the government of Tatarstan arguably remained 
largely unchanged. Although Tatneft has transitioned from a state-owned to a joint 
stock firm, the RT government has retained the largest share (34%) within the firm as 
well as a special privilege (or “golden share”) to veto commercial decisions. Moreover, 
the President of RT is the Chair of the Tatneft’s Board of Directors. Thus, the 
government of RT could be said to have retained direct control over the firm.  
The government seems to have also retained a keen interest in EP, judging by the 
firm’s continuing green performance. Previous academic work seems to agree, having 
identified the ideals of Tatneft’s top management as being the main driving force 
behind the firm’s largely environmentally responsible behaviour (Thurner and 
Proskuryakova, 2014). International orientation was found to be a less important factor, 
which supports the findings of the analysis of H2 and H3. Government regulation, in 
turn, was found to be the least important factor influencing Tatneft’s behaviour (ibid.). 
At the same time, the interview data collected for the current project supports the 
assertion that Tatneft’s management has a deep interest in EP. For example, one 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




interviewee suggested that the main reason that Tatneft participates in EP-related 
competitions (see H2 discussion) is because it is important for Tatneft’s top 
management that their firm receives central government’s formal acknowledgement, 
“however nominal or symbolic”, of their firm’s green achievements (intrv.6).  
The alignment in EP interests between the RT government and other management 
levels within Tatneft can in turn be explained by factors already discussed in relation to 
H2. These are the limitations to Tatneft’s continued economic activity: the fields that 
Tatneft works in Tatarstan are some of the oldest in the Russian oil industry and up to 
80% of their reserves have already been depleted. Once these fields are exhausted, a 
significant proportion of Tatneft’s often highly contextualised and thus non-recyclable17 
capital investments might be irrevocably lost. This has likely been the driver behind 
Tatneft’s desire to recover every drop of oil at each RT oil deposit. Maximal 
hydrocarbon extraction in turn often requires advanced and highly specialised methods 
and equipment. Coincidentally, these also tend to be more environmentally friendly.  
At the same time and for the same reasons, Tatneft also pursued maximal 
hydrocarbon retention by cutting down on waste (Glazkova, 2012; Strelakova and 
Avilova, 2014; Solyashinova and Garrapova, 2012). This may, for example, help 
explain Tatneft’s achievements around APG utilisation. Furthermore, implementation of 
green technologies seems to have brought quick, tangible results, thus signalling their 
high value to the firm and likely helping to cement its EP values. For example, Tatneft’s 
2010 annual report boasted of how much more oil the firm extracted and how much 
money was saved thanks to green technology (cited in Thurner and Proskuryakova, 
2014).  
In these ways, a strong political interest in EP via direct influence over a firm appears 
to have combined with a strong commercial incentive within the firm to increase 
capacity. This has led to more environmentally friendly behaviour and subsequent legal 
compliance, and even over-compliance, with official EP regulation. Where the interests 
of public and private entities are so closely aligned, the need for formal regulation 
seems to largely fall away. Indeed, the relationship seems to be reversed: Tatneft’s 
achievements often inform nationwide regulations instead of being driven by them 
(Thurner and Proskuryakova, 2014). As such, formal regulation does not appear to be 
necessary in the specific context of Tatarstan, and H4 is therefore unsupported. 
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Hypothesis 5: The greater the quality of environmental regulatory agency in the 
sphere of the oil industry, the smaller the implementation gap. 
 
In comparison to many developing and transitional hydrocarbon-rich countries and 
Russian regions, RT possesses relatively experienced political leadership, embedded 
and well-developed political and economic institutions, and effective state capacity. 
Accordingly, during or after the communist regime Tatarstan, unlike many other FSU 
territories, did not need to engage in significant state-building, which has been linked to 
the exacerbation of oil-related challenges to state capacity (Karl, 1997) and, in turn, 
negative effects on regulation. Following the establishment of its special status within 
the structure of the Russian Federation, the Republic of Tatarstan retained its own 
president, ministries, and legislature and enjoyed a great degree of sovereignty over its 
own affairs. RT also enjoyed relative independence from Moscow in regulating its 
hydrocarbon industry between 2007 and 2017, when the treaty between Moscow and 
RT was re-signed without such privileges. The above factors gave RT the space to 
develop its fiscal and other institutions to a greater extent than other regions, thus 
allowing RT greater scope to ensure implementation of its policies. These include 
supporting the development of MOFs and incentivising them to employ new methods 
and develop new technologies. 
 
RT has also maintained some EP regulatory agencies that have been dropped 
elsewhere in Russia over the decades, and even set up some of its own. The RT 
government’s freedom has therefore led to a further increase and fragmentation of the 
regulatory apparatus that oversees Tatarstan’s economic activity. In the academic 
literature, multiplicity and fragmentation of the regulatory framework are theorised to 
reduce the effectiveness of implementation, and this section analyses whether this has 
been the case in Tatarstan. The discussion begins by reviewing the political will to 
enforce EP in Tatarstan and its impact on regulatory capacity and Tatneft’s behaviour. 
The discussion then takes a broader look at how different regulatory structures 
operate, separately and together, before concluding that although their individual 
effectiveness might be low, the aggregated uncertainty they create for the private 
sector has had an unexpectedly positive impact on Tatneft’s compliance. Although in 
this context quantity appears to have more impact than quality, the hypothesis is 








In contrast to many other Russian regions, Tatarstan placed unusually high 
significance on its environmental policy following the break-up of the Soviet Union. 
Taking advantage of its concentrated industrial expertise, of its relatively high state 
capacity and later of its special federal status, Tatarstan set its own EP goals and 
implementation strategies. The former Russian (Federal) Minister of Environment and 
an RT academic explained this as being due to strong, personal interest in EP among 
RT’s political leadership (intrv.19, Nenets chapter; intrv.2, present chapter). For 
example, the first Tatar Minister of Environment (1992-2001) was an environmental 
scientist by profession. Both of RT’s Presidents 18  are also said to have good 
understanding of the industry’s impact on the environment.  
Further reasons concern the region’s high population density, higher than usual 
proportion of locally hired oil labour force and close physical proximity of industrial 
works to human settlements. These factors allow for environmental damage to be 
directly observed and its negative consequences directly experienced by the local 
population, and Tatarstan is unusual also in this respect. Typically, oil-extracting 
Russian territories tend to be sparsely populated or their oil works take place in remote 
and often inaccessible locations, and their operations thus remain largely unobserved. 
Moreover, it is usual for non-locals to be employed to work oil deposits in Russia. In 
contrast, Tatarstan was developed by the Soviets as a special oil-extracting/scientific 
centre that allowed for the labour force to be trained and hired locally. These factors 
were said to make Tatars generally more environmentally aware than other segments 
of the Soviet and then Russian population (intrv.3,6). In turn, high employment of local 
citizens in the oil industry acts to further increase the population’s awareness of its 
environmental impact, as well as increasing the chances that non-compliance is 
spotted and addressed.  
At the same time, given its history, the government of Tatarstan enjoys a far greater 
degree of internal cohesion, capacity, and understanding of local needs than those of 
other territories. This is what, for example, allowed RT to seize the initiative over a 
number of policies in the decade immediately after the USSR’s collapse, at a time 
when central government was struggling to find its feet (Stoner-Weiss, 1999). This 
factor, combined with high societal environmental awareness, is said to have made the 
RT government highly accountable to its people (Chuprov, cited in Solovyova, 2016) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




compared to other territories either under the Soviet regime or, later, in federal Russia. 
Although, such accountability does not necessarily take place through what is 
recognised as formal democratic channels in Western traditions. 
 
Combined, the above factors cultivated a strong political will for EP pursuit and 
implementation. For instance, in 1992, Tatarstan set up and has since retained a 
Ministry of Environment (henceforth “Ministry”), whereas the federal government lost its 
equivalent in 1996. Similarly, while most FSs started to cut down on EP spending in the 
1990s, Tatarstan managed to find resources to establish new, additional structures, 
such as sub-regional regulatory offices. This allowed for targeted, context-specific 
implementation of EP. In yet another example, when federal Environmental Funds 
were abolished in 2000, Tatarstan chose to independently continue funding those that 
existed on its territory through its regional budget. 	  
Although RT’s political power has since decreased (in favour of that of the federal 
authorities), local political interest in EP appears to have remained. The reduction in 
formal powers seems to have motivated new, unofficial approaches in an attempt to 
retain some control over EP policy. For instance, RT has developed several new EP 
methods that utilise the relatively high density and digital literacy of RT’s population. 
These methods invite the public to become unofficial regulators of official regulatory 
agencies (federal Rosprirodnadzor and Rostechnadzor, and the RT Ministry of 
Environment) and to supplement their work. Some of the more obvious examples 
include the establishment of volunteer EP inspectors and of Ministry-funded and issue- 
and location-specific NGOs (intrv.11). (See Appendix F for broader examples). 
Hypothetically, this allows RT to keep an eye on areas that it can no longer regulate 
directly, including oil-related pollution. Take-up within Tatarstan has been relatively 
high and other FSs have started adopting methods developed in RT.  
Federal-level EP regulators also fare better in RT than in many other FSs. 
Rosprirodnadzor and Rostechnadzor, for instance, have access to state-of-the-art 
laboratories (intrv.10), enjoy well-staffed central and sub-FS offices, and have access 
to experts from local HEIs, many of whom specialise in oil and environmental 
protection disciplines. In these ways, high political will for EP implementation in 
Tatarstan has resulted in an unusually high concentration of relatively good quality 
official and unofficial regulators. Furthermore, the Ministry holds frequent seminars for 
industry representatives with the aim of explaining legal environmental requirements, 




cooperation with regulatory structures. These measures are also aimed at reducing 
corruption and improving compliance (intrv.11).  
 
Impact on Tatneft 
In regard specifically to Tatneft, the benefits of local ownership have already been 
discussed in the preceding section. A previously unmentioned element worth pointing 
out in this section is the physical presence of Tatneft’s headquarters in Tatarstan. This 
leads to closer connections between federal and local regulators, other EP 
stakeholders, EP interests of the RT government, and polluters. In contrast, many 
other oil firms moved their headquarters to Moscow once the responsibility for issuing 
licenses for subsoil use was stripped from FS-level governments and reserved for the 
federal centre.  
According to an interviewee from a Russian region where this took place, the shift in 
responsibility over licencing decreased the FS-level governments’ ability to cooperate 
or put pressure on firms to comply (intrv.18, Nenets Chapter). The former Russian 
Minister of Environment advised that this meant that in order to achieve government 
action on EP, EP proponents also needed representation in Moscow in order to be 
heard (intrv.19, Nenets Chapter). The situation extended the range of stakeholders and 
the chain of communication between them, which is necessary for a government 
reaction to materialise in response to legal violation. In Tatarstan, however, the 




Despite the positive potential identified in the above discussion, RT interviewees 
observed that some of the same elements present significant challenges to EP 
implementation. The first identified issue was the number of regulators and the 
complex rules of their relationships with each other and with regulated polluters. How 
responsibilities are divided between them is not always clear, leading to situations 
where, for example, the power to collect data that are relevant to the work of a 
particular regulatory agency might lie with a different regulatory agency. What the latter 




Furthermore, cooperation between different regulatory agencies is often maintained 
through interpersonal relations rather than through formal processes. This means that 
when an individual regulator moves to a different job, cooperation between EP 
regulatory agencies may lapse. This also affects institutional memory regarding 
promises made and subsequently broken between relevant structures and is said to 
have provoked competition instead of cooperation between regulatory agencies in RT. 
This can lead to individual agencies and organisations feeling that their work is 
irrelevant, thus sapping their morale to pursue implementation (intrv.8).  
High staff turnover across regulatory structures and perceived shortcomings of the 
new, younger staff, educated differently to the older generation, have also been linked 
to “the horrible, terrifying de-professionalisation of all spheres of government" (intrv.6) 
conducive to failed implementation and unintended policy outcomes. However, 
agencies that choose to retain older staff also face problems, but of a different nature: 
corruption and incompetence (intrv.8), which can in turn lead to incomplete, selective 
or overly discretionary implementation.  
A different problem derives from the effectiveness of Russia’s regulatory regime, until 
recent reforms, being measured by the volume of paperwork. This practice meant 
complications for both regulators and the regulated, tying down the former in a battle 
with ‘paper dragons’ and taking time from meaningful enforcement (intrv.6). For the 
latter, it made compliance unnecessarily complicated, leading to a juridical interviewee 
calling for its “maximal simplification” (intv.7). The presence of so many regulators, 
each with their own methodology and subject to different motivations, further 
exacerbates this issue.  
At the same time, individual fines tend to be too small to necessarily motivate change. 
The tendency of different stakeholders to produce widely varying environmental 
assessments of the same situation (intrv.5) creates opportunities for polluters to 
question what they are asked to do / pay. According to an interviewee from a 
prosecutor’s office, this has fostered a “what if” attitude in RT, whereby polluters 
gamble on a chance of getting away with non-compliance (intrv.7); this increases the 
incidence of non-compliant behaviour. 
In light of the above and when considered individually, regulatory agencies could be 
described as ineffective; but together, they create significant uncertainty for those they 
regulate, which interviewees said has had a positive impact on Tatneft’s compliance. 
Firstly, the sheer number of regulators was said to intimidate the firm into compliance 




duplication of responsibility that accompanies RT’s extensive regulatory fragmentation 
can result in multiple penalties for the same violation (intrv.5) instead of opportunities to 
play regulators off against each other in hopes of avoiding such penalties.  
While, on their own, penalties might not be that significant to a well-performing oil firm, 
they can combine to become “respectably large” (ibid.). Furthermore, few polluters in 
RT other than Tatneft can afford to pay EP fines, meaning that regulators often blame 
Tatneft for any identified pollution without necessarily first establishing the true source 
(ibid.). This was said to have contributed to Tatneft’s decisions, relatively early on, to 
invest into minimising its environmental impact and into better understanding that of 
other pollution sources in RT in relation to its own impact (ibid.) – all in order to secure 
legal grounds to fight against frequent, unfair environmental fines and to concentrate 
own EP efforts for the future (ibid.).  
This situation appears to have also motivated Tatneft to become a watchdog of the 
regulatory agencies’ performance. Mistrust towards the regulators’ calculation of 
penalties seems to have created precedent for Tatneft to challenge them in the courts. 
As a result, fines tend to reduce “from tens of millions to tens of thousands of RUB… 
because there are different methodologies for calculation and many numbers entered 
[into the equations] are made up” (intrv.5). The ability to successfully disprove unfair 
penalties was said in turn to provide further motivation to Tatneft to reduce its own 
impact, including by taking pre-emptive measures. These elements have likely played 
part in helping Tatneft become, in 2011, the Russian industry leader in environmental 
transparency (Agenstvo neftegazovoj informacii, 2011). WWF Russia’s Environmental 
Responsibility Rating has also marked Tatneft as a consistently good performer since 
2014, when the index first appeared.  
In these ways, regulatory complexity appears to have stimulated significant positive 
results despite shortcomings of individual regulatory structures. Although the impact of 
regulatory quality has not been illustrated, similar compliance results might have been 
harder to achieve without regulatory presence and activity. H5 can therefore be 
considered supported, although it is recognised that regulatory presence, if not quality, 
is a necessary but insufficient condition in relation to the dependent variable. Other 
factors need also be present for regulation to have effect. These include but are not 
limited to political interest in EP (leading to political will to pursue its enforcement), a 
high level of overall institutional capacity (including functioning courts, educational and 




the preceding analysis, the presence of unusually many regulators, which is in many 
ways unique to Tatarstan in the context of the post-Soviet space. 
	  
Explanatory variable 3 – Economic conditions 
Hypothesis 6: The more advanced the economic conditions in a regional 
economy, the smaller the implementation gap. 
It should be mentioned at the outset that RT’s economy is far more advanced than that 
of a typical Russian (or, before that, Soviet) oil-extracting region. Given its geographic 
location, RT has a rich variety of natural resources, which promoted the development 
of many different economic sectors even before the formation of the USSR (intrv. 8). 
The Soviets diversified RT’s economy further, adding such sectors as defence (aircraft 
and ship-building), manufacture of civilian and commercial machinery, and oil 
extraction and refining. Preference for economic diversification also remained after the 
communist regime ended, with the RT government adding further economic sectors 
over the decades, including alcohol production, tourism, information technology (IT) 
services and development of frontier technologies. Unlike other FSs, RT also has 
made effective use of its special economic zone (SEZ), whose activity has become so 
extensive that it pays the majority of taxes generated from all SEZs across Russia (for 
example, 42% in 2016) (Procenko, 2018).  
The RT government’s willingness to pursue and support such developments appears 
to have created a perception among interviewees that Tatarstan does not depend on 
oil. Even some environmental activists were of this opinion (Intrv.8). In reality, however, 
some of RT’s larger economic sectors do not contribute much in taxation, whereas 
others, such as IT and frontier technologies, are being developed at a loss (likely for 
their prestige value). As such, the hydrocarbon industry continues to make the most 
significant contributions to RT’s economy and could not be substituted by other 
economic sectors, despite their great number and variety (relative to most other FSs’ 
economies). For instance, despite increasing economic diversification during the 
2010s, RT’s hydrocarbon industry made up nearly 60% of RT’s total industrial 
production (RT Ministry of Industry and Trade, nd.) and contributed around 60% of all 
tax and non-tax payments collected in RT (Inform Devon, 2014). Tatneft alone 
generated up to 50% of RT-level budgets depending on methodology for estimation 




In light of the above, it could be reasonably said that the RT’s economy is over-reliant 
on the oil industry. In accordance with academic theories (for example, on resource 
curse), we could expect this factor to make RT’s economy highly vulnerable, including 
to external shocks such as variation in global oil prices or international agreements that 
limit oil extraction (as in 2017 with OPEC). According to Shafer (1994), the 
dependence between the government and the industry in such scenarios can become 
mutual and lead to a lack of regulatory enforcement. This usually applies to regulations 
that damage the key industry’s profitability, such as strict EP requirements.  
Similar academic theories connect hydrocarbon money to political (in)stability (Bjorvatn 
and Farzanegan, 2015) whereby resource rents become a tool for buying peace 
(Fjelde, 2009) often from other influential individuals or groups, meaning that only small 
segments of society benefit. In other words, oil profits are used to ensure political 
support, and often by resorting to corrupt practices (Kendall-Taylor, 2011), instead of 
being used as intended in a political system based on the rule of law: to support state 
capacity in delivering the government’s policy commitments, such as EP. As such, oil 
money could become ‘misused’, which could further destabilise a political system, in 
turn perpetuating the government’s reliance on oil rents in order to remain in power and 
fund its inability to pursue its own policies. 
However, analysis in the previous sections indicates that, in spite of such expectations, 
Tatarstan has a) shown relatively strong internal political stability before and during the 
development of the hydrocarbon industry on its territory, and b) achieved relatively high 
EP implementation specifically in relation to its oil industry. Indeed, RT government 
showed a perhaps surprising level of foresight and long-term planning at the start of 
the 1990s in choosing not to reap immediate rewards – by protecting the industry 
against regulations or maximally extracting rents. Instead, similarly to the findings of 
the developmental state literature, the RT government aimed to ensure continuation of 
future profits by motivating the industry to innovate, which inadvertently made it more 
EP-compliant. This was encouraged despite the high initial costs of investment by the 
industry and associated reduced short-term profits for the government. The 
government lost further tax revenues due to targeted tax breaks and other financial 
incentives aimed at encouraging innovation. 
This section is therefore concerned with the question of whether the structure of RT’s 
economy can contribute towards explaining this unexpected outcome. Subsequent 
analysis shows that diversification within an industrial sector might be more important 




government budgets in an economy as a whole. It is also shown that, under certain 
circumstances, the presence of many sectors can nonetheless create unexpected 
motivation for compliance in individual sectors. Evidence therefore indicates that this 
hypothesis is supported, but not strictly in the expected ways. 
 
Diversification within the oil sector 
Interviewees’ perceptions of economic independence from oil could be explained and 
perhaps even justified by the relatively high degree of development within RT’s oil 
industry. This acts to reduce the sensitivity of RT’s economy as a whole to external 
shocks, and has secured relative economic stability despite continued reliance on 
taxation from the hydrocarbon sector. For example, RT had its own refinery facilities 
and, importantly, good access to export infrastructure before the USSR’s collapse, 
which allowed RT’s economy to recover faster than many other oil-extracting regions 
(and post-Soviet countries). It has also meant that instead of depending entirely on the 
export of crude oil, RT has had the capacity to produce oil goods and, seeing the 
advantage in this, has aggressively pursued an expansion of such capabilities, 
increasing both the range and volume of produced oil goods. For instance, RT has 
recently entered the global leadership in the supply of synthetic rubber, and Tatneft’s 
developments in petrol and diesel production have allowed it to meet 100% of RT’s fuel 
needs.  
Such achievements have made RT’s economy more self-reliant in the sense of being 
able to collect enough taxes to pursue its own agenda on public expenditure, instead of 
relying on transfers from the federal budget aimed at federally approved public policies. 
This has in turn reinforced RT’s greater economic stability relative to other oil-extracting 
Russian regions. It has also provided greater space and freedom for the RT 
government to address its social issues and environmental problems than can be seen 
in other Russian FSs. It must be noted that corruption and rentierism, which often 
materialises in similar situations, have not emerged in RT to the same degree as they 
have elsewhere. As such, the RT government cannot be said to have become less 
accountable because of the oil profits; at least not to the extent of most other post-
Soviet oil-rich regions. 
The reason why oil products, rather than crude oil, have been able to deliver the above 
is to a large degree due to the high proportion of added value in the oil products’ cost 




compared to taxes on extraction and sale of crude oil. This gives an FS government 
greater control over its own affairs, including the ability to pursue environmental goals. 
Secondly, as explained by a member of the RT Academy of Sciences (Khomenko, V. 
cited in Procenko, 2018), this means that external factors, such as changes in global oil 
prices, often find minor reflections in Tatneft’s profits. In other words, the diversification 
of the hydrocarbon sector has lowered both the industry’s and RT economies’ 
exposure to the economically sensitive upstream oil, dampening the need for RT 
government to protect this industry, including from regulation. 
For example, the recent series of external and internal economic shocks could have 
been expected to cripple a typical economy that relies on oil-extraction. These shocks 
include the onslaught of Western sanctions, a sales-limiting agreement on crude oil 
with OPEC, plummeting global oil prices and the general turndown of the Russian 
economy in 2015-2018. In the former-USSR republic of Azerbaijan, the fall in global oil 
prices alone caused a devaluation of the national currency and the start of a recession. 
It might not be appropriate to compare national and regional economies, since the 
latter has the buffer of the national economy; nonetheless, given that RT is a major 
contributor to the Russian economy, the above comparison is perhaps not so 
misplaced. A look inside Russia reveals a similar picture: economies of more than a 
third of Russian FSs began to shrink relative to RT, whose economy remained stable 
and then quickly resumed growth (Ekspert Tatarstan, 2018). In turn, this has meant 
that RT could maintain its EP programmes – a policy area which is often among the 
first to be deprioritised and scaled down during challenging economic periods.  
 
Other sectors 
Although the above discussion may have implied otherwise, the presence of non-oil 
economic sectors in RT remains relevant to this hypothesis. Firstly, the presence of 
many different economic sectors significantly increased volumes and sources of 
pollution in RT. Perhaps ironically, the intense, aggregated environmental damage they 
created over a short period of time brought a proportionate increase in public 
awareness and subsequent government response (as discussed in H4 section). Oil-
sector and juridical interviewees indicated their agreement with such an observation, 
commenting on a positive correlation between economic diversification and 
environmental awareness (intrv.3), and between severe environmental damage and 




Secondly, as already mentioned in the discussion of H5, the existence of many 
different sectors in RT has not necessarily meant that all have been equivalently 
profitable. As such, few have been capable of paying environmental fines and EP 
regulators have therefore often accused Tatneft of EP violations, even if knowingly 
unjustly, as Tatneft is often the only entity capable of paying for the clean-up of 
environmental damage that can result from such violations (intrv.5). Concurrently, 
indemnification for damage caused by oil-related pollution is of particular interest to 
poorer industry sectors, such as agriculture, as it can supplement farmers’ income and 
thus provides an incentive to slander the oil industry.  
Economic diversification is said to have therefore drawn a disproportionately high 
amount of regulatory attention towards Tatneft, giving the firm a strong motivation to 
reduce its environmental impact so as to have grounds to challenge EP penalties 
(intrv.5), which it is able to do successfully thanks to the generally high degree of 
institutional capacity in RT. The existence of one profitable sector and many relatively 
unprofitable sectors in this context seems to have created a perverse drive on the part 
of the latter to pass environmental responsibility on to the former, thus (in addition to 
other already identified factors) motivating the sole profitable sector to improve its EP 
performance and, thus, compliance.  
Thirdly, economic diversification appears to be able to catalyse improvements in 
specific types of pollution abatement; that is, those types where waste can be re-
utilised by the economy. For instance, the varied and rapidly growing economic activity 
during the Soviet era created significant need for energy, which was not met by 
Tatarstan’s existing power supply or by imported energy. This appears to have 
incentivised the government of Tatarstan to direct Tatneft to utilise APG (Mirzagitova, 
2014, 2015), for it presented a free energy source. This may be why improvements in 
air quality came first in RT – already in 1973 (Galeev, et.al., 1995). In comparison, 
water in RT has been abundant; accordingly, water pollution did not see equivalent 
improvements until the 1990s (ibid.). 
In these ways, economic diversification within and alongside the hydrocarbon industry 
has allowed RT’s economy to maintain a relatively high degree of stability and even 
growth, despite its reliance on the hydrocarbon industry as the main source of income. 
In turn, this situation appears to have limited the extent to which economic and 
environmental interests clash in RT, and the region has been able to pursue both 






During the course of research, it became apparent that the above relationships 
between hypothesised variables could in turn be explained or supported by a set of 
other factors. Such factors could, for example, help answer the following questions: 
1. Severe environmental damage was not unique to Tatarstan under the Soviet 
rule or after. Why then did similar political interest in EP and subsequent 
government action materialise in Tatarstan when they failed to do so in most 
other post-Soviet oil-rich territories? 
2. How and why was Tatarstan’s government able to pursue EP policies despite 
the severe economic crisis of the 1990s, when many other FSs struggled to 
provide basic public services? 
 
Political interest in EP in the 1990s 
Some factors that help answer these questions have already been mentioned. They 
include the close proximity of oil facilities to inhabited areas and the high proportion of 
locally hired oil workers at all company levels, both of which result in higher societal 
awareness of environmental risks, and of the presence and consequences of EP non-
compliance, which can translate into political pressure on the government to act, even 
if not necessarily through standard democratic channels as conceptualised by Western 
models of governance. Personal interests in the environment within the political 
leadership have also been mentioned. It is, however, questionable whether these 
factors were enough to stimulate implementation of government objectives that were 
deprioritised seemingly everywhere else in Russia at that time. 
A yet unmentioned but arguably more significant factor was the sharp fall in Tatarstan’s 
oil output in the early 1990s. This occurrence was not entirely a consequence of the 
general economic downturn in Russia. The main cause was that Tatarstan’s deposits 
of relatively easy oil had neared depletion. Tatneft already achieved its maximum rate 
of extraction in 1976, and by 1991 its extraction rate had fallen by almost 70% - from 
101.5 million barrels to just 32.5 million, with a forecast of only 14.5 million by 2000 
(Malikov, 2018). This forecast was based on the use of existing oil extraction methods 
and technologies, which could not extract the more difficult oil, of which there was still a 




government to evolve its oil industry rather than to let it stagnate. In turn, innovation 
inadvertently led to cleaner methods.  
 
State capacity in the 1990s 
Tatarstan had for a long time enjoyed a far better-developed fiscal system than most 
other regions in Russian. Combined with factors mentioned at the outset of the H5 
discussion, this has meant that in the 1990s, RT did not face desperate economic 
conditions on par with those experienced by most other oil regions in the FSU space – 
the kind that often ‘forced’ their governments to sacrifice future growth (and 
environmental wellbeing) to ensure a semblance of public good provision in the 
present. At the same time, the Tatarstan government’s prior successful experience of 
economic management under the Soviet regime had likely cultivated a positive 
perception of the economic crisis among RT’s political leadership in the 1990s. This 
likely made the crisis seem ephemeral and thus less of a reason to deter long-term 
planning.  
Furthermore, RT’s often boisterous, and in many ways self-sustaining, economy was 
designed by the communists to favour innovation and was endowed with the means 
(multiple, specialised HEIs) for doing so (Kalimullin, 2015). It therefore had readily 
available capacity to evolve, as well as the experience of having already done so. 
These factors arguably help explain why, despite its dependence on oil profits, RT has 
seemingly escaped some of the expected resource-rent-driven economic stagnation 
(Auty, 1993) and institutional degradation that was observed in many of the post-Soviet 
regions following the USSR’s collapse (Pomfret, 2011b). At the same time, the capacity 
and willingness of the RT government and Tatneft to continuously modernise the 
industry appears to have further strengthened official and unofficial economic and 




Of the six hypotheses, presented data supported only H5 and H6. The impact of 
foreign influence as an independent variable was not substantiated. In large part, this is 
due to the RT’s lack of exposure to international factors: there are no advocacy groups, 




significantly collaborating with RT-based stakeholders. The self-reliance that this has 
likely cultivated may also explain interviewees’ rejection of the possibility that norm 
diffusion could produce positive effects. With regard to state capacity, one of the 
hypotheses that composed this variable was supported, and one was not. The 
presence of regulatory agencies was shown to have a positive effect, although not in 
the hypothesised way. However, the quality of environmental legislation in relation to 
Tatneft’s behaviour proved largely unimportant because of the close ties between 
Tatneft and the RT government, which allows the latter to effectively influence Tatneft 
in other ways. The final variable concerns economic conditions. Here, financial over-
reliance on the oil industry did not appear to have reduced EP implementation; the 
presence of economic sectors other than oil did appear to have a positive impact, 
although again not in the hypothesised way.  
What then can explain Tatneft’s relatively strong environmental performance? The 
analysis revealed several factors with stronger explanatory power than the proposed 
independent variables. They included political accountability of the RT government to 
its population; relatively strong commercial interests in technological and 
methodological innovation, which coincided with the objectives of EP policy; and 
certain economic circumstances. The last factor is arguably the most important, as it 
has a complex relationship with the first two. For example, economic decisions 
regarding the design of RT’s economy eventually resulted in heightened public 
awareness of environmental problems (due to high density of both population and 
industry). They also created commercial and political incentives not to pollute in order 
to secure additional energy and increase commercial output. They also endowed RT 
with the scientific capability, required to solve the issue, in the form of RT’s many HEIs 
and research institutions.  
Lastly, state capacity proved important in ways other than those hypothesised. RT had 
better developed political and economic institutions than most other Russian FSs when 
transition commenced in 1991. It was also more (internally) politically stable and 
economically self-reliant than most post-Soviet territories. These factors appear to have 
liberated the RT government from needing to worry as much about immediate 
economic well-being, instead allowing a greater degree of foresight and long-term 
policy planning. As a result, the RT government encouraged and supported 









This chapter analyses the explanatory capacity of selected hypotheses in the example 
of Kazakhstan, the second largest USSR republic before independence. Endowed with 
a variety of natural resources, vast agricultural potential conducive to economic self-
sufficiency (Pomfret, 2005), popularity with foreign donors and willingness to adopt 
international norms and standards, there were big expectation of fast development in 
this country, including in governance and state capacity. In exploring whether this was 
the case in relation to the implementation of the governmental environmental policy, 
analysis focusses on the western Atyrau oblast19 as seen in the figure below. 
 
Figure 6 – Atyrau Region, Kazakhstan 
	  
 
The chapter explores the role of environmental regulation in this power play by 
approaching selected hypotheses with the ultimate goal of showing what holds back 
policy implementation. Analysis focusses on Kazakhstan’s oil capital, Atyrau, and 
begins by outlining the oblast’s contextual background before analysing selected 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




factors’ impact on the dependent variable. The chapter concludes that environmental 
regulation has become a political tool for achieving aims not related to the 
environment. As such, the political will to deliver the intended EP outcomes is shown to 
remain low, meaning that hypotheses related to this element of “implementation gaps” 
(those included in variable 1) do not have expected explanatory power. In contrast, 
variables that deal with the internal situation of Kazakhstan (state capacity and 





Driven by rising world oil prices, economic development followed as could be expected. 
Already in the 2000s annual real GDP growth averaged at 9% and although the 2010s 
were hit by falling oil prices, GDP still grew at an enviable average of 5% (World Bank, 
nd., b). Subsequent improvements in public service provision and other factors of state 
effectiveness (Bhuiyan and Amagoh, 2011) led to the general public accepting the 
development and solidification of a soft authoritarian regime in the country (Schatz, 
2009; Kendall-Taylor, 2012; Dave, 2005). With strengthening GDP and political 
stability, the politically powerful clans that make up the Kazakh elites became 
increasingly resentful of what they increasingly came to see as undue revenues they 
gave to outsiders in the original oil Production Sharing Agreements (PSAs). This 
appears to have provoked a power struggle among the Kazakh clans and between 
them and international interests present in the country. In this context, institutions of 
public administration emerged and developed to support the Kazakh state in its 
struggle for control over its natural resources (Palazuelos and Fernández, 2012).  
	  
Industrial development and environmental impact 
Atyrau - natural resources and conditions 
Kazakhstan is within the top 15 oil-producing countries, with the largest of its oil fields 
located in the Atyrau oblast; they are Tengiz and Kashagan (see Figure 7). These are 
commonly considered the world’s largest oil discovery in the last 35 years; further 
discoveries are expected. This makes Atyrau politically and economically important, 




institutions. Both Tengiz and Kashagan are contracted out on 40-year agreement to a 
mixture of foreign firms with the Kazakh national KazMunaiGas (KMG) representing the 
interests of Kazakhstan.  
The type of agreements is different for the two fields. Tengiz is under a joint venture – 
TengizChevroil (TCO), operated by the USA’s Chevron, which holds a 50% stake. This 
makes Chevron the largest private oil producer in the country. Kashagan is under a 
production sharing agreements (PSAs). The Italian Eni’s Agip KCO operated 
Kashagan on behalf of the Offshore Kazakhstan International Operating Company 
(OKIOC) until the North Caspian Operating Company (NCOC) took over operatorship 
in 2009.  
Supporting oil infrastructure surrounds the city of Atyrau, making it an environmentally 
sensitive location. Substantial oil facilities and infrastructure across Atyrau oblast also 
place great strain on its biodiversity, which includes hundreds of unique species 
(Morteza Aminmansour, nd.; CASPINFO, nd.). 
Figure 7 - Giant oil fields in the North Caspian
 
  Source: (Pravettoni, 2012) 
 
Overview of the hydrocarbon industry 
Commercial quantities of oil were extracted in Atyrau as early as the 1910s. In 1945 an 




However, volumes of crude and refined oil in Atyrau remained relatively small, and thus 
of low economic value, throughout much of the twentieth century. Meaningful 
hydrocarbon development commenced only after independence from the Soviet Union, 
with the start of oil production at the massive Tengiz field in 1993 (discovered in 1979) 
and the subsequent construction of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium pipeline 
(operational from 2001) exporting western Kazakh oil from Tengiz and other fields. The 
discovery in 2000 of the gigantic Kashagan deposit field – Kazakhstan’s only offshore 
field – secured Atyrau’s reputation as a national oil capital. Development of Kashagan 
began a year later, although oil production did not commence until 2016. 
 
The Soviet legacy 	  
The Soviets believed that Kazakhstan was too big for pollution to make an impact 
(Alimbaiev, 2000) and Kazakhstan became “the junk heap where Russia threw its 
garbage” (Feshbach and Friendly, 1992: 22). This damage combined with that wrought 
by the Soviets within the country, including in Atyrau, where the discovery and 
subsequent exploitation of oil subjected the oblast to treatment as dire as underground 
nuclear explosions (employed for oil exploration) for most of the 20th century. Poor 
environmental consciousness during that time and the subsequent economic hardships 
of the 1990s resulted in many hydrocarbon facilities, built and exploited during the 
Soviet era, being abandoned without proper treatment, and often leading to 
uncontrolled oil leaks and spills. In the 2010s, the Kazakh Government admitted to not 
knowing the total number nor the locations of potentially leaking oil wells (Azernews, 
2012) and to not having the means for locating and rectifying the resulting 
environmental damage (Neftegaz.RU, 2001). Consequently, the Caspian Sea 
continued to deteriorate (International Science and Technology Center, nd.) at an 
increasing rate (Tehran Bureau, 2015), parts of it having already become dead zones 
by 2000 (CASPINFO, nd.).  
 
On-going risks	  
Hydrocarbon development carries substantial environmental risks in the north Caspian 
for a number of reasons. Firstly, Caspian oil’s Associated Petroleum Gas (APG) 
contains uncharacteristically high volume of highly corrosive, toxic hydrogen sulphite 
(H2S). At Tengiz, oil purification from H2S resulted in the accumulation of 9 million 




information on its impacts (ibid.) but local health data for 2006-2011 showed an 
associated 21% rise in lung diseases (Head of Regional Department for Environment, 
cited in Shilov, 2011), making it the most common health problem in the region 
(D’Have and Ulens, 2014). In the nearby oil village Kulsary, sickness rates rose tenfold 
(Shilov, 2011) between 1993 and 2011; another nearby oil village, Sarykamys was 
officially closed in 2002 for similar reasons and its residents relocated. At Kashagan, 
the lethal concentration of H2S is the highest ever witnessed in offshore oil (Urbaniak, 
et al., 2007) and is highly over-pressured, making Kashagan one of the costliest and 
most challenging (North Caspian Operation Company, nd.) oil projects in the world. 
Continuous miscalculations have resulted in a string of environmental incidents (intrv. 
1) delaying oil extraction by 11 years – until 2016 (Chazan, 2014). For example, a 95-
kilometer pipeline that connects the offshore field to the land-based facilities leaked 
immediately upon exposure to the first oil flowing through it, taking 3 years to replace 
(Williams, et al., 2014); all H2S in the pipeline had to be flared, causing substantial 
environmental damage.  
Secondly, Caspian conditions increase the likelihood of environmental incidents, 
necessitating the strictest environmental regulation to ensure that oil firms take 
appropriate preventive measures. These conditions include a sea depth of only 3-5 
metres, meaning: a) very high pollution to seawater ratio in the event of a spill or leak; 
b) unsuitability of standard oil pollution clean-up technologies (Neftegaz.RU, 2001); 
and c) increased risks of oil cargo ships capsizing. These make every incident a 
potential environmental disaster (Pravettoni, 2012), with potential costs as high as 
US$2 trillion (Kosolapova, 2014). Furthermore, the Caspian Sea freezes for up to 5 
months a year, slowing down maintenance works. Dramatic fluctuations in water level 
(Sheppard Software, nd.) further exacerbate offshore risks at extreme low tides and 
risk inundation of shore-based oil facilities at extreme high tides. Moreover, offshore 
drilling and APG re-injection have increased earthquakes in the area (Urbaniak, et al., 
2007), further increasing the risk of incidents.  
 
History of environmental regulation 
Legislation	  
The Kazakh government has worked hard to bring national environmental legislation in 
line with international standards. Public access to environmental information became 




awareness became a policy objective in 1992 (Zhunusova, 1996). Many independent 
laws followed since and, in 2007, were synchronised in the Environmental Code, along 
with conditions of key international environmental agreements, such as compulsory 
Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA). The Code unified scattered legislation into a 
comprehensive framework. In the oil industry, the Environmental Code permits firms to 
work only after receiving environmental permits, applications for which must include 
plans for incident prevention and mitigation, and the organisation of public hearings 




In sharp contrast to the above legislative developments, the implementation structures 
that could bring them to life have been struggling ever since independence, with 
insufficient data presenting the biggest problem. By the early 2000s the majority of air 
and water quality monitoring facilities were closed, and the remaining ones struggled to 
fulfil their functions (Ballance and Pant, 2003). Scarce staffing, lack of expertise, and 
insufficient top-level data also made it difficult to keep up with annual inspections. 
These challenges made regulation reliant on firms’ self-reporting; however, the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) and an interviewed regulator revealed that few firms have 
capacity for self-monitoring (intrv. 8), and they therefore submit only estimates 
(Ballance and Pant, 2003) with frequent under-reporting (Carbon Limits, 2013) making 
this approach a poor proxy. Such data cannot support sound environmental policy 
(Ballance and Pant, 2003), making updated legislation unenforceable (Ballance and 
Bishnu, 2003). This has been further exacerbated by frequent changes in the 
regulatory landscape, resulting in a structure described as incoherent and “surprisingly 
complex”, marked by a fragmented and often “unrealistic division of labour” and subject 
to frequent overlaps of responsibility by bodies that do not necessarily process or share 
data (ibid.). In 2014, the environment ministry was unexpectedly abolished and key 
environmental functions passed to a Ministry of Energy, which is now simultaneously 
responsible for advancing and obstructing energy development. The purpose behind 
this reorganisation is not clear, but the resultant conflict of interests may counteract any 





Explanatory variable 1 - Foreign influence 
Hypothesis 1: The greater the presence of international advocacy groups within 
a region, the smaller the implementation gap.  
Kazakhstan was unusual among the core post-Soviet states in terms of its tolerance 
towards, and the consequent extensive proliferation of, domestic non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) in essentially an authoritarian regime in the 1990s and 2000s. 
This boom was largely driven by foreign funding from international NGOs (INGOs), and 
apart of this type of assistance, INGOs often chose not to act within Kazakhstan 
directly. Atyrau was no exception: the key environmental INGOs (EINGOs), such as 
Greenpeace or WWF, have not directly intervened here. However, unlike in other major 
cities, the local environmental NGOs (ENGOs), of which there are a great number in 
Atyrau, do not appear to have any permanent or long-term links to INGOs either. 
A WWF interviewee (intrv. 2) explained this absence by commenting that stopping 
Kashagan’s development was probably the only sufficiently big cause that could have 
drawn and united international interest (and organisations) in Atyrau. However, 
perhaps because said development was seen as inevitable, that action did not 
materialise. Another likely reason for EINGOs’ absence in Atyrau may be the relative 
youth of Atyrau’s oil facilities and infrastructure, meaning that environmental damage 
has not yet accumulated sufficiently to attract the attention of such organisations. For 
instance, Crude Accountability has been working on oil-related environmental and 
social issues in Kazakhstan since 2003, but has focused its efforts on a neighbouring 
region of West Kazakhstan where oil extraction started in the 1980s. Nonetheless, 
EINGOs do make occasional appearances in Atyrau. Their actions in 2007 are 
arguably the most notable and are therefore taken as a case study for this section.  
Essentially, Hypothesis 1 takes as premise the popular academic theories that hold 
NGOs as key players in successful policy administration. As such, this hypothesis tests 
whether INGOs improve local NGOs’ capacity to fulfil their functions in this process. 
The following analysis indicates that although EINGOs have a great potential to 
improve enforcement and compliance, they do not necessarily affect the political will 
that motivates these processes. Without the political will to pursue environmental aims, 
the Government appears to be using EINGOs/ENGOs as a “raiding tool” (intrv. 15) in 




The case study at hand concerns a group of international institutions and 
organisations, including Friends of the Earth, working with local Atyrau activists to 
assess the environmental impact of the Kashagan project. This work culminated in a 
comprehensive report with, at the time, the only up-to-date, independent, and 
statistically accurate data in the first seven years of Kashagan’s development 
(Urbaniak, et al., 2007). On the one hand, this exercise had great potential to aid the 
work of the government regulators, whose enforcement usually relies on subjective 
data reported by the oil firms. The 2007 EINGO/ENGO project therefore provided said 
regulators with otherwise inaccessible data. It should be noted that without funding and 
expertise from the international actors, the project would not have been able to collect 
said data. The positive impact of international actors is therefore clear. On the other 
hand, the exercise did not produce meaningful environmental outcomes. The 
government used findings in the report to stop operations at Kashagan until 
environmental violations were rectified. However, this ban was lifted after the OKIOC 
agreed to give more shares to the Kazakh government’s firm. No tangible 
environmental improvements were made as a result, suggesting that the true purpose 
behind the Government’s actions was economic rather than environmental. 
This observation is, however, unsurprising when one looks closer at the relationship 
between the public and non-profit sectors within Kazakhstan. While the Kazakh 
authoritarian government might have been tolerant of the non-profit sector, at least in 
the first two decades of its rule, it has not afforded this sector any political influence. 
Theoretically, conditions for allowing civil society to influence government policy and 
implementation are laid down through Kazakhstan’s membership of the Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and the Aarhus Convention, which supersede 
national legislation. In practice, however, the State engages in mock compliance 
(Walter, 2008) without substantially altering existing policies (Tilcsik, 2010). Those 
changes that are made, such as mandatory public hearings on new oil projects’ 
environmental and social impact, are designed in ways that prevent substantive 
outcomes (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). For instance, a hearing’s final vote is not binding 
on oil firms’ activities and a local NGO representative spoke of loyal voters being 
brought in or others being bought off to tip the vote in the oil firms’ favour (intrv. 1). A 
representative of Aarhus noted that apart from public hearings, there are no other 
channels for civil society to exert formal influence (intrv. 17) on the oil works in Atyrau. 
Thus, although Kazakhstan might appear to have a healthy non-profit sector, its 




This begs the question of the purpose of the non-profit sector in Kazakhstan, and 
answering this question will help explain the government’s seemingly contradictory 
behaviour towards the sector. The Kazakh government appears to see NGOs as 
entirely collaborative ‘extension[s] of government structures’ (Axyonova and Bossuyt, 
2016), fulfilling non-political roles (Ziegler, 2015; Kreiser and Lachmann, 2003) such as 
providing education. Some academics assess that foreign funding, which brought 
about the NGO boom in Kazakhstan in the 1990s, may have only served to encourage 
local ENGOs to comply with this vision of their role, causing all but one Kazakh ENGO 
(Green Salvation) to abandon political activism (Luong and Weinthal, 1999). NGOs as 
service providers can be seen as convenient for the Kazakh government in a number 
of ways. Firstly, the sector provides services the state cannot or does not want to 
provide. Secondly, it limits political opposition. In so doing, it reduces the demand for 
change: the output of non-confrontational kinds of NGO work can be reframed away 
from actual implementation. As an example, public hearings on the proposed oil 
projects mentioned above have been reframed in such a way: instead of providing a 
productive platform for public scrutiny, the government is said to be using them to 
monitor public mood (Nurmakov, 2017). 
Given this context in which local ENGOs operate, there is arguably very little that 
EINGOs can hope to achieve either by funding local ENGOs, by working with them in 
other ways, or by entering the country and pursuing campaigns directly. The 
government’s positive disposition towards the 2007 EINGO/ENGO report could be 
most likely explained by other, relevant events that took place that year: Kashagan’s 
operator OKIOC announced yet further delays and costs to the project (Reuters, 2007), 
thus further delaying the government’s access to much needed revenue. The 
government was already looking for ways to motivate OKIOC to increase their 
contractual commitments and the EINGO/ENGO environmental report offered a 
convenient and timely lever (Gorst, 2008), but one far removed from environmental 
aims.  
Indeed, this sort of cooperation is common in Atyrau, according to interviewees from 
the non-profit sector. The government is known to ask ENGOs to “cause commotion” 
“only when [it] needs something against foreign oil firms” (intrv. 2). Here, by 
“something”, the interviewee implied economic rather than environmental goals. The 
end result, the interviewee continued, is successful negotiations between the 
government and the oil firms, where the former usually secures the result it sought; and 
the ENGOs are officially credited with saving the environment, but in practice nothing 




government’s treatment of ENGOs in Atyrau is quite different: persecutions of civil 
society are common; all environmental activists in Atyrau are said to have been 
detained or threatened at one time or another (intrvs. 1, 20).  
In the mid-2010s, the Kazakh government started to crack down on civil society, at first 
by limiting domestic NGOs’ access to foreign funding and thus forcing them to switch to 
state funding, and then by closing down several big INGOs and NGOs with foreign 
connections on the pretext that they were working to undermine political stability 
(Amnesty International, 2017). These events have created substantive barriers for 
INGO’s future involvement in Kazakhstan’s affairs, thus reducing the applicability of 
this hypothesis. 
In light of the above, it cannot be said that the intervention of INGOs necessarily leads 
to better implementation. INGOs may substantially improve local ENGOs’ ability to act 
as watchdogs, but this does not necessarily improve the latters’ ability to hold either the 
government or the oil firms accountable. Both the government and the oil firms appear 
able to ignore or to forcibly suppress the non-profit sector and its work. In the few 
instances that the government positively acknowledges the non-profit sector’s output 
(whether with or without INGO input), it seems to do so with the aim of pursuing non-
environmental objectives. In other words, the government’s reaction to ENGOs would 
probably be the same whether INGOs were involved or not. As such, INGOs do not 
seem to have impact either on enforcement, compliance or political will to pursue EP. 
There is therefore no substantive evidence to support this hypothesis.  
 
Hypothesis 2: The greater the presence of foreign oil firms within a region, the 
smaller the implementation gap. 
Foreign oil firms tend to have more advanced technologies and practices than 
domestic oil firms in transitional countries. It is therefore likely that international firms 
would be better able to comply with local and international EP requirements. Many 
Atyrau interviewees, however, argued this has little bearing on actual compliance. In 
the words of one NGO interviewee, “it would be very naïve to believe that such firms, 
when working in a highly corrupted country, would support legal compliance… if that is 
disadvantageous to them” (intrv. 1). Indeed, in Atyrau, foreign firms have strong 
incentives to cut corners. This is because of the high environmental costs associated 
with the peculiar qualities of Caspian oil and because Kazakh legislation is much 




compliance (World Bank, 2013). At the same time, firms know that they are unlikely to 
get caught cheating, since the state relies on oil firms’ self-reported pollution data. 
Given the above, this hypothesis tests whether foreign oil firms comply with 
Kazakhstan’s EP laws in Atyrau by virtue of being able to do so, or whether they 
choose to ignore the law given the lack of effective incentives for compliance. The 
largest Atyrau oil projects, TCO and Kashagan, are used as examples to explore the 
true nature of foreign firms’ impact on the dependent variable, the implementation gap. 
It is shown that although oil firms have poor compliance records, this has nonetheless 
led to marginally better implementation outcomes. 
 
Superior technologies 
It is worth testing two distinct assumptions about technologies – whether foreign firms 
in actual fact have better technologies, and if they do, whether they use them. The 
example of Kashagan sheds light on the first question. As stated by a local ecologist, 
technologies suitable for Caspian offshore oil did not exist before the discovery of 
Kashagan necessitated their development (Kosolapova, 2014). As such, any firm – 
Kazakh or foreign – would have faced unprecedented challenges. Granted, Kashagan 
probably would not have been developed without foreign investment, but Agip’s 8-year 
delays, mistakes and scandals caused even its foreign partners to doubt whether it 
was up to the task (Callus and Jewkes, 2014). In 2009, Agip’s partners took over the 
operatorship as a committee called the North Caspian Operating Company (NCOC), 
but also struggled to make progress for another 7 years, raising similar questions about 
their ability to develop appropriate technologies. 
At first sight, TCO seems to present a success story in stark contrast to the Kashagan 
example. In 2012, Chevron (as part of TCO) was internationally celebrated for 
achieving a 94% reduction in routine flaring at Tengiz between 2000 and 2012 (Trend 
News Agency, 2012). However, local EP regulators tell a different story of 700 flaring 
violations between 2006 and 2011, amounting to over 70% of all such violations in the 
oblast (Shilov, 2011). Independent observers have also reported that frequent, illegal 
flaring continued after 2012 (Interfax Global Energy, 2015; Inform Bureau, 2017). 
These occurrences could be written off as due to the inflexibility of the Kazakh law, 
which banned all flaring between 2006 and 2010, without allowances for emergencies 
(Carbon Limits, 2013). Usually, fewer infringements would be expected when 
regulations are relaxed, because fewer behaviours become illegal. However, legislative 




sufficiently relaxed in 2012 (ibid.), or why Chevron was found guilty of hiding incidents 
from authorities (Panorama, 2007), which in itself is illegal in Kazakhstan. Furthermore, 
the frequency of reported incidents, as confirmed by interviewees from all sectors, 
further implies that Chevron might not be using its flaring utilisation technologies or 
practices to their full capacity.  
 
Superior practices 
As noted in the previous subsection, having practices on paper does not guarantee 
their implementation. The main regulator in Atyrau (intrv. 13) stated that “both Agip and 
Chevron have beautifully written environmental policies... But in practice, 90% [of their 
actions] are the opposite of what they promise”. Collected data presents numerous 
cases that support this view. For example, foreign oil firms could have been expected 
to use EIA in accordance with international norms even before Kazakhstan formally 
legislated for this requirement in 2007. However, ENGO interviewees asserted that 
Chevron frequently tried to “wash their hands” (intrv. 1) of environmental-protection 
commitments by rejecting the existence of environmental risks (intrvs. 1, 18). During 
project design in 1993, for instance, Chevron tried to justify skipping sulphur mitigation 
measures because winds would allegedly blow it around or away from human 
settlements, recalled ENGO interviewees (intrvs. 1, 16), despite academic (intrv. 18) 
and common knowledge to the contrary (intrvs. 1, 16). Notwithstanding the regulators’ 
corrections at the time, TCO proceeded with storing sulphur in the open air, defending 
its actions by denying their environmental impact – even after local environmentalists 
proved their negative impact (intrvs. 1, 18, 19) and after the State officially closed down 
and relocated 3,500 nearby Sarykamys villagers due to severely worsening 
environmental conditions in the area.  
The history of the Kashagan project is also laden with poor practices and frequent 
misconduct, uncharacteristic of the typically positive reputations accorded to Western 
oil firms. For example, Agip KCO was caught grossly underestimating environmental 
impact in their EIA in order to obtain production permits (Tasbulatova, 2012) under 
Kazakh law, and of illegally dumping toxic wastewater (Martynyuk, 2012). Furthermore, 
project delays caused by frequent technological miscalculations, which have led to 
substantial environmental damage on several occasions, could have been avoided had 
Agip KCO hired local oil experts with greater understanding of the make-up of the 
Kashagan oil and the environmental conditions described in the Background section. 




own subsidiaries and affiliates outside Kazakhstan (Crude Accountability, 2017); this 
affair was later investigated by Milan prosecutors as part of a broader corruption and 
bribery investigation of Agip’s work in Kazakhstan. Such practices led an Atyrau 
journalist (intrv. 15) to attribute “Kashagan failure” directly to Agip, commenting that 
“even easily corruptible Kazakhs could take lessons from the Italians on stealing”. The 
above examples indicate that foreign oil firms’ practices should not be expected to be 
in compliance with local or international regulations. 
 
Impact on regulation 
International institutions (Carbon Limits, 2013; OECD, 2017) have described early 
Kazakh environmental legislation as overly strict, to the point of being impossible to 
comply with, and an interviewed lawyer working for an oil firm (intrv. 7) advised that 
foreign companies continuously lobby the Kazakh government with the aim of changing 
laws. However, it is worth questioning whether such lobbying goes too far. Foreign oil 
firms, after all, are politically powerful in transitional countries whose economies 
depend on oil sales. An environmental activist agreed that this is the case in 
Kazakhstan, describing such firms as the “Shadow Cabinet of the Government of 
Kazakhstan” (intrv. 1), in the sense that they are actively competing for political power 
over the country, and in that the official government often needs their consent in 
running its own country.  
Their power to demand legislative relaxation therefore could just as easily lead to 
worse environmental outcomes, and in Atyrau this appears to have been the case on 
several occasions. For example, environmental activists (intrvs. 1, 18) asserted that in 
the 1990s foreign firms exploited the host government’s desperation for investment - 
and inexperience in international negotiations - to mostly exclude mention of 
environmental responsibility in their contracts. This complicates EP implementation 
today by shielding firms from many of the improvements to legislative requirements 
that took place since those contracts were signed. Other examples also exist, such as 
NCOC missing its deadline after failing an EIA and trying to pressure the Government 
to give it more time before the winter ice set in by altering legislation that suspends 
construction in the Caspian Sea between certain dates in order to protect the 
reproduction of fauna (Suleimenova, 2015). Such pressure for legislative relaxation, 
driven by vested interests rather than environmental conscience, would indeed make 




but would further reduce the effectiveness of EP, and therefore is not the type of 
implementation gap closure tested for here. 
Ironically, foreign firms’ poor behaviour appears to be the main indirect driver for 
environmental legislative innovations in Kazakhstan. According to interviewees across 
sectors, long-term contracts signed with foreign oil firms gave Kazakhstan unfairly low 
stakes in profits compared to foreign partners’, although exact shares are unclear. The 
host Government seems to have instead envisaged environmental fines as a way to 
recover more revenue (OECD, 2017), and went on the offensive. At times it seemed 
that the Kazakh government was improving EP legislation and increasing EP fines in 
order to fill up the Treasury rather than to prevent environmental damage. This 
conclusion is supported by the observation made in other literature focusing on the 
implementation of environmental policies in Kazakhstan, including the OECD (2009), 
Crude Accountability (Shaternikova, 2010 cited in Solyanik, 2012), and the OSCE. The 
international consultancy firm Deloitte (2018: 4) assessed such penalties as having “a 
significant impact on [subsoil users’] business”. Meanwhile, UNECE (2008: 49) 
observed that environmental fines do not lead to environmental impact being 
addressed “in most cases” (UNECE, 2008).  
Legislative changes therefore did not necessarily lead to better compliance. Foreign 
firms started rebelling against fines they perceived to be too high, and instead of 
making efforts to improve their compliance took the Government to court (Golovnina, 
2007), sold shares in projects, or left Kazakhstan altogether (The Economist, 2007). 
Regulatory enforcement remained ineffective (OECD, 2017) and EP essentially 
became a proxy battlefield for the growing power struggle between the Kazakh 
government and international commercial interests. The resulting tension did, however, 
appear to draw shareholders’ attention to the firms’ environmental performance 
(Carbon Limits, 2013) and some improvements appear to have followed: TCO, for 
example, finally removed its sulphur mountains (Guzikov, 2015; Shilov, 2012).	  
 
Conclusion 
The above analysis implies the equivocal nature of foreign oil firms’ influence in 
Kazakhstan. While they might not always comply with EP regulations, their presence 
seems to have delivered some positive outcomes, such as improvements in EP 
legislation - although the value of this is questionable, given that firms do not 




appear to have the wrong motivations and have facilitated the development of a 
regulatory regime that “impedes energy efficiency and pollution control”, according to 
the OECD (2017). As such, it is difficult to conclusively state whether this hypothesis is 
supported, but further refinement of future analysis could help distil the causal 
relationship. For example, rather than looking at ‘foreign’ firms, analysis could 
concentrate on a more specific origin, as this seems to make a difference. For 
example, local journalists assessed that north European and Russian firms behave 
better than southern European ones (intrvs. 14, 15). Furthermore, the Kazakh state 
appears to react to foreign firms differently depending on their origin: whereas it 
hounds Western firms for the smallest violations, it failed to notice for three years that a 
Chinese firm disappeared from the country, having abandoned open and leaking oil 
wells (NurKz, 2016).  
	  
Hypothesis 3: The greater the exposure of local agents to transnational 
elements, the smaller the implementation gap. 
This hypothesis concerns academic theories on institutional change through elites’ and 
individuals’ exposure to international (often “Western” or “First World”) ideas – through 
international treaties, cooperation with international institutions and organisations, and 
education and travel abroad (Kellow, 2007; Elliott, 2002; Acharya, 2004). Such change 
may include improvements to institutions’ and individuals’ skills, methods and 
expectations, which may in turn drive improvement in implementation efforts. In relation 
to the public sector, this could manifest as improved willingness and ability to enforce 
legislation. This does not include paper-based improvements – such as international 
actors’ help with drafting EP legislation (which will be discussed separately in relation 
to H4), since this does not necessarily produce behaviour change. In the private sector, 
it could manifest as changes to employees’ attitudes towards legal compliance, which 
may also drive changes in firms’ culture. It has already been mentioned that in 
Kazakhstan voluntary self-regulatory agreements (such as EITI) and ratification of 
international obligations (such as the Aarhus Convention) have been mostly 
unsuccessful. This section will further discuss reasons for these and other sources of 
international norm diffusion having achieved limited effect, before concluding that this 







Since the 1990s, Kazakhstan has signed up to a number of legally binding and 
voluntary international agreements on EP. However, its persistent failure to honour its 
subsequent commitments calls into question whether it ought to remain a signatory 
(Tairova, 2014a). For example, at the end of Kazakhstan’s chairmanship of OSCE, 
which Kazakhstan promised to dedicate to EP, the organisation concluded that 
Kazakhstan failed to make any improvements and has instead shown “open disrespect 
for its international obligations” under a range of agreements (OSCE, 2012). This 
implies that Kazakh elites are now no closer to internalising, and thus implementing, 
international values than they were before initial exposure. 
An Atyrau-based journalist confirmed that the oblast is not complying any better than 
the rest of the country (intrv. 14). In fact, of all signed international agreements, Atyrau 
interviewees only mentioned the Aarhus Convention, ratified by Kazakhstan in 2000. In 
2009, Aarhus established a resource centre in Atyrau, and has been actively working 
with local stakeholders to promote environmental rights there ever since. This explains 
interviewees’ knowledge of the Convention; yet all interviewees who mentioned it 
indicated non-implementation of its principles in Atyrau. Interviews conducted in 2018 
confirmed continued noncompliance (intrv. 4, 5). Kazakh civil society has approached 
the Aarhus Compliance Committee on several occasions; out of 47 signatory countries, 
citizens of Kazakhstan send 10% of all the complaints received by the Committee. In 
response, the Committee has issued several warnings and recommendations to the 
Kazakh government, but it does not have the power to issue any sanctions, as 
explained by an interviewee from the Atyrau Aarhus Centre (intrv. 17). Other 
international agreements appear to have suffered similar fates. This confirms Öge’s 
(2014) findings that in the absence of strong incentives to comply, elites’ opinions of 
international values likely remain unchanged.  
 
International financial institutions 
There are several international financial institutions (IFIs) that invest in infrastructural 
developments in Kazakhstan. Such developments include building or improving roads, 
train tracks, ports, power plants and factories, and employ large numbers of local staff. 
These institutions include the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Financial Corporation 




adhere to strict health-and-safety and environmental impact criteria for subcontractors 
and staff they hire, and their projects are usually labour-intensive. Kazakh legislation 
requires foreign projects to hire a high proportion of employees locally, and IFIs’ work is 
therefore a convenient space to diffuse norms to large numbers of local stakeholders.  
Research findings, however, imply that IFIs do not necessarily have positive impact. 
For example, interviewees from Crude Accountability, who have done extensive 
research into this question, found that IFIs’ EIAs often intentionally obscure their 
projects’ true impact (intrvs. 3, 21; Crude Accountability, 2012). They also found that 
obligatory public hearings for IFIs’ projects are often organised to intentionally prevent 
proper scrutiny (Crude Accountability, 2012). Once projects commence, they usually 
run with many violations of environmental laws and cause significant, negative 
environmental impact (intrv. 17), noted an interviewee from the Atyrau Aarhus Centre. 
Such behaviour makes IFIs bad role models. While they help to reduce environmental 
impact by replacing the current, outdated infrastructure, their behaviour in doing so is 
likely to reinforce current attitudes and modes of behaviour. For example, when 
Kazakh civil society reported IFIs’ violations, the environmental ministry indicated that 
economic interests, which IFIs fulfil, trump environmental concerns (Crude 
Accountability, 2012). 
 
International developmental institutions (IDIs)	  
The IFIs discussed above, as well as the EU, the OSCE and such IDIs as the UN 
Developmental and Environmental Programs (UNDP and UNEP), often run a variety of 
programmes aimed at improving social, political and economic development in 
transitional countries. Apart from financial and technological assistance, such 
programmes may include staff training, recommendations to the Government or 
awareness-raising campaigns – all good candidates for norm diffusion. However, these 
programmes are often offered only at federal government level or only in central cities. 
As such, explained a former oil firm employee (intrv. 11), attendance at IDI events is 
usually dominated by “all the same faces”, and these elite players do not seem to be 
influenced by the experience. In terms of physical distance, a local government 
interviewee in Atyrau commented that IDI projects usually take place in Astana or 
Almaty and that local government can rarely send any staff to these locations (intrv. 8). 
An interviewee from the Aarhus Centre (ibid.) explained that even if such benefits were 
directly available in Atyrau, they would be unlikely to make a significant impact, 




otherwise try to influence the local population, there are insufficient opportunities for 
newly learnt norms to be exercised.  
 
Norm diffusion and individuals	  
The above discussion indicates that international entities, especially IFIs, do not always 
diffuse good values and that their behaviour can contradict the official liberal and 
ethical values promoted by international organisations and institutions. This 
inconsistency might be responsible for Kazakh elites and institutions not accepting, nor 
internalising international values in general. It may also be negatively affecting elites’ 
trust in international organisations’ motivation to promote those values. Elites may also 
resist because international norm implementation could reduce their ability to self-
profiteer. Either account could help explain the elites’ resistance and their actions to 
prevent norm diffusion affecting the broader population, as argued by Vanderhill 
(2017).  
There is, however, also a different type of norm diffusion taking place - one which 
affects individuals rather than institutions or groups. This is driven by increased 
opportunities for international travel, especially for educational purposes. In 2017 more 
Kazakhs were studying outside Kazakhstan (UIS, nd.) than was the case for students 
from any neighbouring post-Soviet country. Furthermore, the Kazakh government has 
been sponsoring its employees to study abroad, and was in 1994 the first FSU 
government to do this. The programme obliges such students to remain in public sector 
employment for a period of time upon return, thus providing a perfect opportunity for 
norms to diffuse directly into governing structures. Academics (Brown, 2009; Husted, et 
al., 1996; Gill, 2010) propose that this process could eventually transform patrimonial 
hierarchies into something more ethical. 
Interview data collected for this project suggest that such norm diffusion is not having 
the desired effect and offer a number of explanations. Firstly, interviewees questioned 
whether individuals actually internalise norms. An Atyrau journalist, for example, 
observed that although individuals may learn new methods abroad, the experience 
does not necessarily affect their mentality (intrv. 15); a local activist agreed, observing 
that those changes that do occur tend to be temporary, reverting after 3 to 4 years as 
returnees are re-assimilated by the local system (intrv. 20). Secondly, those 
interviewees who agreed that individuals could change instead questioned their ability 




creative, analytical way of thinking taught in the West is incompatible with conservative, 
change-resistant Kazakh institutions (intrv. 6). Elaborating further, interviewees from 
the oil sector, activists, and journalists all observed that the widespread corruption that 
permeates all government institutions in Kazakhstan (Kazday, 2016) has rendered 
good jobs in government structures accessible only through bribery or personal 
connections rather than through merit (intrvs. 1, 11, 22, 14, 15).  
In this context, observed an interviewed journalist, governing structures have become a 
“psychologically unhealthy” and “dishonest” environment that requires people to 
sacrifice their principles (intrv. 14). Interviewees from across sectors (intrvs. 1, 11, 14, 
19) observed that being forced to work in this environment motivates reformed 
individuals either to permanently move to the private sector or to leave Kazakhstan. 
Foreign education, explained an oil industry interviewee, makes Kazakhs 
internationally competitive, and more likely to seek out contexts where they can apply 
their new skills instead of “stagnating back at home” (intrv. 11). The limited, obligatory 
time that they spend in the civil service might bring some positive change, but, as 
noted by an interviewed academic (intrv. 19), such individuals are rarely allocated to 
environmental regulatory structures or placed in high enough positions to effect 
meaningful change.  
Some interviewees (intrvs. 11, 14, 17) were hopeful that the situation would change for 
the better when the older generation, which still remembers conditions under Soviet 
repression and favours material well-being over ideological principles, retires. Others, 
however, are pessimistic that any positive regime change is possible either now or in 
the future (intrvs. 9, 21). For example, one environmental activist observed that upon 
return, some Kazakhs start behaving exactly the same as established senior Kazakh 
public officials (intrv. 1), implying that the current regime’s values are sufficiently 
entrenched to repel new behaviours. Collected data do not indicate which assessment 
is closer to the truth, but the above discussion does appear to strongly suggest that if 
norm diffusion exists at the level of an individual, it has at best minimal impact. 
 
Conclusion 
The above analysis did not find support for effective norm diffusion at the institutional 
level, but it did imply that exposure to international formal and informal international 
processes can have positive effects at least on the level of individuals, who could in 




important and eventually impacting the political will to pursue EP implementation. 
However, interview data did not support the idea that this is having a sufficiently 
tangible effect on executive government structures or, therefore, on enforcement of 
environmental regulation. Some interviewees hope that the situation will improve once 
the older generation leaves power. Meanwhile, hypothesis 3 is unsupported. 
	  
Explanatory variable 2 - State capacity 
Hypothesis 4: The greater the coherence of environmental regulation of the oil 
industry, the smaller the implementation gap. 
Upon independence from the USSR, Kazakhstan’s limited environmental legislation for 
some time remained based on Soviet conceptualisations of the environment, in terms 
of its utility, and notions of means for protecting it. These were already unsuitable for 
regulating the emerging environmental and economic challenges. Kazakh 
environmental legislation has come a long way since then, but changes implemented 
at great speed and characterised by a lack of law-making experience risk being 
unimplementable.  This section analyses the relative effectiveness of developments in 
Kazakh environmental law aimed at achieving sound regulation of the oil industry. It is 
shown that, although issues exist, legislation is robust enough in quality; yet, without 
the political will to support relevant application, the question of legislative quality can 
lose relevance. 
Kazakhstan’s first attempts at new environmental legislation have been described as 
too bureaucratic and suffering from “a low level of ecological and juridical knowledge 
by state functionaries” (Soltys and Orynbassarova, 2013: 106). However, in 1995, the 
government made a pivotal change in its approach to drafting environmental law. It 
requested assistance from key international actors, engaged some 2,000 Kazakh 
specialists from across sectors and held a series of nationwide seminars to identify key 
environmental issues in the country. This inclusive, frank review of real problems 
provided a more solid foundation for developing an appropriate regulatory regime than 
what could have been hoped for with the more theoretical Soviet approach20, or from 
direct, untailored policy transfer from more developed countries. Although 
environmental goals that emerged as a result were at the time described as 
“oversimplified” and “short-term” (Kuratov, et al., 2000), the legislative reforms that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Environmental norms under the Soviet regime were often set in line with scientists’ opinions of permissible levels 




followed produced “good laws” and were followed by some effective implementation, 
according to the main Kazakh ENGO (Krylov and Kuratov, 2017), perhaps precisely 
because the provisions set out in those laws were simple, short-term, and thus 
deliverable. Such laws included bans on flaring and outdoor sulphur storage in 2004 
(Orazgaliyev, 2018), and in 2007 the first Environmental Code of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan attempted to systematise all relevant domestic legislation with standards 
from 22 international environmental agreements already adopted by Kazakhstan 
(Soltys and Orynbassarova, 2013). The Code also set the roles and powers of 
government bodies responsible for monitoring and enforcement, and was commended 
as a significant achievement by international organisations such as the Asian 
Development Bank (nd.).  
	  
Intent over quality	  
The introduction of the Environmental Code did not prevent the emergence or 
frequency of legislative contradictions and unforeseen side effects, but this can only be 
expected in transitional countries, explained interviewees from academia and the 
judiciary (intrvs. 9, 10). Economic, political and social changes continuously reveal new 
issues that need to be reflected in law, but contradictions with existing provisions may 
not become apparent until the law is applied or challenged (intrv. 10). A juridical 
interviewee further indicated that frequent changes are partly explained by the need to 
allow an adaptation period for affected parties as domestic law is gradually brought in 
line with international legal standards. Accordingly, in the first 10 years of its existence, 
the Code was amended 52 times (Krylov and Kuratov, 2017).  
The main problem with this, as the same lawyer explained, is that legislative 
improvements do not apply to key polluters – the big oil firms, who are instead 
regulated by their contracts and permits, based on laws that existed when these 
documents were finalised. This bureaucratises and reduces the effectiveness of 
environmental control, since environmental inspectors do not have a uniform set of 
standards against which to judge performance. It also problematises any attempt at a 
broad measurement of legislative effectiveness for the same reason. Although firms 
might over time become increasingly environmentally unfriendly relative to new 
standards, they might not be breaking any laws as different stationary assets (if they 
are located in different cities / regions) even belonging to the same firm can end up 




having frozen some rules in place, interviewees assessed that the oil firms’ 
environmental and social responsibilities were not comprehensively covered (intrv. 1, 
4, 6). In other words, the language is vague enough to allow for different interpretations 
of the extent of commitments. This, they advised, is what allows the Kazakh 
government to press oil firms on the environmental responsibilities. Furthermore, 
contracts might prevent the Government from changing pollution standards, but not 
from increasing fines for non-compliance with those standards. 
Overall, many interviewees agreed that Kazakh environmental legislation is relatively 
sound, robust, well-written and coherent (intrvs. 1, 9, 10, 14, 17) or at least conceded 
that it is changing for the better; but there is merit in the local ENGO’s (intrv. 1) advice 
to instead focus on how legislation is interpreted, used and enforced. Irrespective of 
changes in quality, environmental laws do not appear to be solving the issues they are 
supposed to address in Kazakhstan (Krylov and Kuratov, 2017: 78.). Responsible 
factors include poor enforcement, mainly due to corruption and limited economic 
mechanisms to motivate target groups to innovate in ways that could help achieve 
compliance (Asian Development Bank, nd.; Krylov and Kuratov, 2017). The following 
discussion examines why this is the case, showing that the political context in which 
Kazakh environmental legislation developed has affected the purpose of its 
implementation.  
 
Environmental protection as a fiscal tool 
Modern environmental legislation began developing in Kazakhstan in a context of low 
oil prices, shrinking economy, and weak national identity, which, among other things, 
contributed towards the weakness of governmental structures. The government’s 
priority was in preserving political stability, which it chose to do by securing foreign 
direct investment (Kennedy and Nurmakov, 2010; intrv. 1).  Endowed with very weak 
bargaining power, Kazakh government signed contracts with large foreign oil firms on 
poor terms for Kazakhstan. For example, as recalled by a local ENGO, out of 200 
amendments proposed by Kazakh negotiators in the early 1990s, Chevron accepted 
only 5-10% and the government did not push for more (intrv. 1). Political lenience 
continued after contracts were signed. The right to a favourable environment was 
excluded from the national constitution in 1995, followed by the relaxation of legal 
standards and the condoning of continuous gross violations of already weakened legal 




At the same time, the entry of foreign investors facilitated formation of domestic elites 
along the hydrocarbon / environment axes. Poor economic conditions kept the clans 
that constituted these elites aligned, but once oil prices rose and the economy picked 
up in the 2000s, some chose to follow their own interests (Junisbai and Junisbai, 2005) 
and the governing clan started to lose control over other clans. Meanwhile, an 
unexpected resilience in both the national economy and the political regime begun to 
shift the balance of power between foreign investors and Kazakh elites, who now 
sought to compensate for poor contracts signed in the 1990s. Against this backdrop, 
environmental legislation became a tool used by domestic elites in their struggle for 
power with each other (Tairova, 2014b) and in their collective opposition to foreign oil 
firms. Environmental legislation, or at least the State’s willingness to use it, revitalised 
once more, but with the purpose of forcing foreign oil firms to re-distribute their profits 
(ibid.) and rents (Orazgaliyev, 2018).  
As governing elites became bolder in the early 2000s, they introduced more 
burdensome taxation and environmental regulation regimes. These were applied 
aggressively against foreign oil firms compared to domestic enterprises, reflected a 
local journalist (intrv. 14); however, the state usually agreed to substantially decrease 
fines against foreign entities when challenged. These traces of former leniency eroded 
in 2007, when Kashagan’s operator announced further delays. Under the original PSA 
conditions, the new delay would have cut expected Kazakh state revenues by almost 
US$20 billion (Muttitt, 2007) up until 2017, while allowing foreign partners to continue 
collecting higher returns than the average rate (Kennedy and Nurmakov, 2010). 
Kashagan’s oil was already sorely needed by Kazakhstan to sustain economic 
development and the government took this news as an insult, announcing that it was a 
breach of contract (The Economist, 2007) and passing new laws that allowed 
amendments to or even annulment of contracts with foreign investors.  
The oldest contracts (Tengiz and Kashagan), however, remained to an extent immune, 
protecting foreign partners from many of the costs incurred due to legislative change, 
save for those to do with the environment, health and safety of local citizens. With the 
latter two fitting neatly into the former, environmental regulations with a stress on 
national strategic security proved the most effective lever for the state’s retribution. The 
government demanded increasing large environmental payments and levied 
increasingly hefty and eventually “extremely large” (OECD, 2017: 177) environmental 
fines that “create unreasonably high administrative barriers to business and have a 
high propensity for corruption” (Khamidullina and Hu, 2014). In this sense, nothing has 




remained not to improve the environment, but to fill the ruling elites’ coffers. Collected 
fines went straight to the Treasury rather than to government structures tasked with 
EP. This encouraged perceptions of corruption and non-environmental goals among 
non-public sector stakeholders (Kuratov, et al., 2000; Tairova, 2014a; Krylov and 
Kuratov, 2017) and demotivated compliance more generally.  
Currently, tactics of strict control are again being relaxed and a local interviewee 
explained that this is because tighter measures were doomed to fail: the government 
overestimated its own power, forgetting that its own experts were aging, that 
replacements were far from ready, and that it had to rely on foreign expertise in the 
meantime (intrv. 15). This has created for a new phase in Kazakh environmental 
legislation, where it is still used as a fiscal instrument (ibid.), while simultaneously 
maintaining old and passing new legal provisions that again increasingly play to firms’ 
interests and reduce the potential for regulatory implementation. This may be because 
a reduction in pollution is not in the government’s interests, since this would also 
reduce pretexts for environmental fines. A lawyer involved with the industry agreed that 
this design better secures foreign oil firms’ cooperation with the wishes of the Kazakh 
government (intrv. 7), while a local regulator confirmed that some of the new legal 
provisions do not make sense (intrv. 8) and could disincentivise firms from innovating. 
As a result of these political motivations, and mixed messages to the industry, the 
latest phase of Kazakhstan’s EP regulatory regime has been assessed as not leading 
to “actual environmental improvements” (OECD, 2017: 181) and even of “imped[ing] 
energy efficiency and pollution control” (OECD, 2017: 161). 
	  
Conclusion	  
The quality of environmental legislation in Kazakhstan continues to oscillate, but this 
does not appear significant in terms of impact of actual EP, since those responsible for 
EP implementation in the hydrocarbon industry seem uninterested in environmental 
goals. Instead, the current system of public administration is aimed at driving economic 
growth, with environmental legislation being just one of the tools to that end. As such, 
the enforcement of EP, manifested through continuous environmental fines, does not 
seek environmental aims (intrv. 11) and sends mixed incentives in regard to 
compliance, essentially confusing target groups of the policy about what they are being 




legislation is “super; it is very good, but it is impossible to apply it [as intended 
because] it constantly comes into conflict with other State interests” (intrv. 14).  
Pursuant to the above, it is possible to conclude that while sound laws are an 
indubitable prerequisite to good implementation, they does not necessarily deliver 
implementation in the ‘right’ policy area. Legislative improvements have better enabled 
the Kazakh government to enforce environmental regulation, but with the aim of fiscal 
gains. Were the state to change its underlying agenda towards environmental 
outcomes and continue enforcement with the same zest, it is highly probably that better 
compliance with EP would materialise and that implementation gaps in EP could shrink 
significantly as a result. This outcome is, however, difficult to imagine as long as the 
political agenda remains misdirected. In other words, the political will to pursue 
environmental goals needs to align the growing capacity of EP as a policy tool with the 
‘right’ (i.e. environmental) goals towards which it is directed.  
As such, while legislative quality might be necessarily to improve enforcement and 
incentivise compliance, it is insufficient in affecting the political will to pursue intended 
outcomes. Political will must materialise independently and work in combination with 
legislative improvements. In its absence, the evidence to support this hypothesis is 
weaker than expected. 
 
Hypothesis 5: The greater the quality of environmental regulatory agency in the 
sphere of the oil industry, the smaller the implementation gap. 
Legal provisions such as those discussed above are but one resource that is 
necessary for regulatory bodies to be able to effectively and efficiently implement the 
policy goals under their jurisdiction. Factors such as access to a sufficient supply of 
well-trained staff, relevant equipment, independence of action, and clear lines of 
responsibility also play important roles in enforcing regulations. This hypothesis 
concerns the question of whether these conditions are fulfilled in the Kazakh EP 
regulatory structures, especially given their frequent re-organisation. In exploring this, 
this section reviews major structural developments at the Ministerial and local levels 
and analyses their impact. It is shown that poor quality of regulatory agency has had a 
detrimental effect on implementation gaps, but that improvements in the former might 
not necessarily lead to the proportional improvements in the latter. In parallel with 
findings in the previous section, regulatory quality is shown to be necessary, but 





The history of Kazakhstan’s public administration is one of continuous change, and the 
EP ministry, established in 1992, has been no exception. Its reach, scope and status 
fluctuated continuously, but in general they increased over time: in 1997 the Ministry 
absorbed the abolished Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources; in 2007 it took over 
responsibility for structures that were previously run by regional authorities (Tairova, 
2014b); in 2012 its budget increased by 80% despite the economic crisis (Elkin, 2015); 
and it even took over some responsibilities from the Ministry of Industry and New 
Technologies (Tengri, 2013) in 2013. This positive trend made the Ministry’s 
dissolution in 2014 both “surprising” and “unexpected” (Ospanova, 2014). Key EP 
responsibilities in the area of natural resources passed to the Committee for 
Environmental Regulation and Control within the re-established Ministry of Energy. The 
latter swelled into a mega-Ministry by also absorbing other responsibilities related to 
energy resources. 
The then President of Kazakhstan, Nazarbayev, explained the move by claiming it was 
illogical to split the responsibility for natural resources into several ministries and that it 
should instead be controlled by one entity. This statement indicates that the Soviet 
mentality of the governing elite seems to have survived the country’s political and 
economic transition. Within this mentality, the environment is still perceived as 
important only insofar as it can be utilised for delivering immediate human needs (such 
as shelter, food and heating), rather than for securing broader human needs over a 
longer time horizon (such as preserving drinking water, clean air and arable land for 
future generations).  
This reversal in the official political approach to EP can be explained by the economic 
context of the 2014. Kazakhstan’s economy had been growing up to that year, not least 
stimulated by the promise of long-delayed Kashagan oil, which was expected to 
emerge at any moment. However, 2014 brought news of further project delays at 
Kashagan and a collapse of Kazakh exports to Kazakhstan’s main trading partners: the 
revolution-hit Ukraine and the Western-sanctions-affected Russia. This had severe 
consequences for the Kazakh economy and seems to have triggered a re-prioritisation 
of government objectives away from non-essential policies such EP. With energy as 
the main pillar of the Kazakh economy, the government shifted focus to developing this 
sector seemingly at all costs. An interviewed Atyrau journalist confirmed these 
assumptions, commenting that the system of checks and balances was intentionally 




As such, implied the interviewee, the Ministerial abolition was a signal of good faith 
towards the oil firms: a desperate attempt to secure existing investment and attract 
more in a context of international – or, at least, central Asian – crisis. 
Interviewees from the public sector gave evasive comments on the impact of this latest 
re-organisation on EP (intrvs. 8, 12, 13), but those from other sectors expressed 
unfavourable views, with journalists commenting that they lacked logic (intrv. 14, 15). 
The Aarhus Centre interviewee assessed that, in practice, this has led to the 
destruction of the regulatory system, commenting: 
“Within the new Ministry, the body responsible for environmental control answers to the 
body responsible for overseeing oil. How can a subordinate not give a permit to its 
superior?” 
In addition to problems created by this top-down consolidation, there are problems at 
lower government levels. Here one can see the continuation of the Soviet practice of 
creating posts in accordance to the number of important people who need them rather 
than the tasks that need completing (intrv. 15). As a result, estimated one interviewee, 
some 128 regulatory bodies still exist in the hydrocarbon industry at lower government 
levels despite top structures getting streamlined. At the same time, all levels are often 
staffed with people who know or care little for the environment (intrv. 1, 15). Combined, 
these issues have led to a situation where "no one knows who holds what data” or 
responsibilities, leading to duplication, counterproductive implementation (intrv. 17) and 
sometimes lack of any implementation – because agencies that share responsibilities 
expect the others to have already done the job (intrv. 15). Interviewees summarised 
this system as a “manual economy” with “absurdly stringent” regulatory control (intrv. 
20) that is “entirely ineffective” (intrv. 15). Its unpredictable nature makes it very difficult 
to understand (intrv. 20) for implementers and target groups alike. By hindering 
enforcement, this leads to growing implementation gaps. The situation also has high 
potential to disincentivise compliance by polluters, who come to expect being fined by 
one regulator or another no matter their effort to comply with all regulations. 
 
Central / regional divide 	  
Whereas responsibility for monitoring and regulating lesser environmentally damaging 
economic sectors has been passed to akimat (local government), environmental 
regulation of the hydrocarbon industry has never been delegated and remains reserved 
for the central government, which delivers its mandate through its territorial Department 




regions. However, the practical split in responsibilities between central and regional 
governments in these regions is not straightforward. A Crude Accountability 
interviewee (intrv. 3) explained that all major infrastructure that the local government 
now answers for is of vital importance to the oil industry. In other words, by enforcing 
regulations regarding such infrastructure, the local government could essentially be 
opposing the central government, whose priorities were discussed above. In a system 
where public appointments are politically driven, this course of action would be ill-
advised for local regulators and politicians. As such, although in theory the 
reorganisation brings control closer to affected citizens (intrv. 4), in practice it changes 
little. This is especially so in the absence of formal processes via which citizens could 
hold different government levels to account (intrvs. 14, 16, 17).  
At the same time, akimat budgets are small and salaries unattractive, whereas 
responsibilities have increased while capacity has diminished (intrvs. 8, 14). According 
to interviewees from the Atyrau akimat, the substantial increase in the workload, 
marked by shortening deadlines (as a result of structural reorganisations), was not 
compensated by an equivalent increase in human resource or salaries (intrvs. 8, 12). 
This seems to apply not only to EP, but to other policy areas as well, putting 
considerable pressure on akimats to deliver public services. In such contexts, akims 
(governors) tend to prioritise their regions’ economic development (intrv. 16, 14) and 
can turn a blind eye to transgressions by economically important industries, such as oil 
in Atyrau. As such, observed a local journalist (intrv. 14), the structural changes in 
government act to simplify the development of the whole oil industry by reducing 
scope, capacity, and will to pursue environmental protection. 
The TDEP suffers from its own issues. Firstly, individuals appointed to lead these 
departments are said to be selected by the central government for their political loyalty 
rather than their merit. Post holders therefore rarely have appropriate skills and too 
often concentrate on extracting short-term personal benefits (intrvs. 1, 6, 9, 11,  22, 14, 
15, 16). Those that concentrate on their formal duties and prove too effective are kept 
on a “short leash” (intrv. 6) or get transferred (intrvs. 1, 6, 9, 11, 22, 14 , 15, 16). This is 
what seems to have happened to Atyrau’s former head regulator, who was widely 
respected for his work (intrvs. 1, 4, 5, 6). 
One of the key issues with frequent changes in appointments is that senior civil 
servants often move with their whole team. This means that a whole office could be left 








Despite the proliferation of regulatory bodies noted above, some vital functions remain 
missing. The most important example is the inadequate system for environmental (and 
resource) data collection in the country. For example, at the time of interviews, there 
was no national-level monitoring of extracted or transported oil, affecting the State’s 
capacity to effectively spot and react to oil leaks, spills or theft (intrv. 4). At the regional 
level, it was impossible to know the true extent of environmental impact caused by the 
extractive industry (Svetlana, 2010) because all regulators were forced to rely on 
questionable self-reporting by the industry without having the means to validate 
submitted data. In 2008 all large enterprises installed a series of monitoring stations 
whose data is shared with government regulators and therefore assists them in fulfilling 
their duties (Guzikov, 2015). However, such equipment is privately maintained and is 
known to under-report emissions (Morozova, 2015) and fail during substantive illegal 
emissions (Ovozi, 2014). It is also impossible for regulators to know which pollutants 
monitors are equipped to measure at any one time (intrv. 22). 	  
One of the interviewees, a foreign firm’s specialist, holds that their company’s emission 
monitoring stations have shown “absolutely no impact” following “any of our big 
incidents at all” (intrv. 11). Despite such statements, neither firms nor the State allow 
public access to data collected from these stations and there are significant 
discrepancies between reported figures and estimations calculated from satellite 
images (for examples, see Carbon Limits, 2013). Despite the limited number of 
suspects the above problems make it difficult for regulators to identify culprits in Atyrau, 
especially with air emissions rather than solid or water-based pollutants, because 
strong, constantly changing winds easily confuse the source of pollution if data are not 
immediately collected at source (for example, because monitoring equipment was out 
of order) (NurKz, 2015). This appears to endorse a slack attitude towards compliance 
from polluters and an Atyrau regulator commented that illegal pollution has become a 
gambling game for firms (intrv. 13). It does not, however, seem that the state is willing 
to rectify the situation – it rejected emissions data supplied free of charge by capable, 
local actors (intrv. 19) and closed down the specialised environmental protection 
prosecutor’s office. What remains of the system of checks and balances appears to 





This section has highlighted several barriers that prevent all levels of Kazakhstan’s EP 
regulators from meaningful implementation. In this context, regulators have few 
incentives to continue to attempt delivering their formal objectives. This is because the 
barriers they face are not only poor staffing, resources or organisational structures, but 
also political opposition to EP implementation. The Kazakh government appears to 
have prioritised the development of energy resources far above environmental 
protection and as a result, pursuing EP implementation at the regional level could 
effectively be equated to acting against the central government, leading to the loss of 
one’s job as a result of such political disloyalty.  
Against this background, improvements in structural organisation, human resources or 
equipment could be described as only cosmetic because they would not necessarily 
translate into better regulation. A more fundamental change might be required to make 
regulation effective and close implementation gaps, starting with the re-introduction of 
the system of checks and balances. However, as long as the central government sees 
EP as a fiscal tool, this is unlikely to happen. As such, regulatory capacity is 
undoubtedly a necessary factor for successful implementation, as it could impact on 
enforcement and compliance; however, it cannot affect political will. A reverse 
relationship - political will to allow regulatory capacity to pursue its intended course – is 
required for regulators to close implementation gaps. Given that, similarly to H4, H5 
can affect at least two of the three elements of the dependent variable (enforcement 
and compliance, but not political will), , this hypothesis is supported, although evidence 
is not as strong as expected. 
 
Explanatory variable 3 - Economic diversification 
Hypothesis 6: The more advanced the economic conditions in a regional 
economy, the smaller the implementation gap. 
After the difficult decade following independence, economic growth in Kazakhstan 
stabilised and quickly picked up in the 2000s. However, economic growth based mostly 
on a single industry is fragile, and Kazakhstan has been no exception. The global 
economic crisis of 2008, for example, brought Kazakh economic growth from 
approximately 9% (between 2000-2007) to 1.2% by 2008. Although it recovered the 
following year, economic problems in Russia and Ukraine in 2014 adversely affected 




6% in the previous five years. This may be what prompted the central government to 
abolish its Ministry for EP that year and may have exacerbated the subsequent EP 
implementation issues, as discussed in relation to H5. The present discussion takes a 
closer look at the relationship between poor economic diversification, the economic 
fragility it has fostered across Kazakhstan, and EP implementation in Atyrau. The 
section concludes in support of H6. 
Before focusing on Atyrau it is worth pointing out nationwide economic issues in 
Kazakhstan than stem from poor economic diversification, for these also have a knock-
on effect on the regions. Instead of experiencing incremental economic development, 
Kazakhstan saw almost no economic activity in the 1990s before a substantial boom in 
the 2000s: economic growth jumped from -1.9% in 1998 to 13.5% in 2001. At the same 
time, prospects for continued growth were strong and the anticipation of Kashagan oil 
by the end of the 2000s allowed that hope to continue into the late 2000s despite the 
temporary economic downturn. Positive expectations were also maintained despite 
further delays at Kashagan throughout most of the 2010s. Throughout this time, growth 
translated into government budgets via oil revenues. 
The structure of contracts in the key oil projects in the country meant that the 
government collected its share of oil profits through royalties or shares more than 
through industry taxation. Concurrently, these revenues were substantial enough as for 
the state not to need other forms of taxation to support its spending. This gave the 
state independence from its population, and a functional taxation system was slow to 
develop in Kazakhstan as a result. This led to two important issues for EP 
implementation. Firstly, it made the economy sensitive to external shocks. Fluctuations 
in the global oil markets could easily impact oil profits in Kazakhstan. Meanwhile, the 
government could not easily draw on other sources of revenue. To address this, a 
National Fund was established in 2000 to collect surplus oil revenues, which could help 
stabilise the economy, but government revenue was still inconsistent. Not only has this 
made the government even more dependent on its foreign oil partners and more willing 
to compromise on EP (as seen in discussions of previous hypotheses), but also the 
state’s independence from its population seems to have reduced state accountability. 
Issues that may be of importance to the general populace – such as environmental 
conditions – therefore do not necessarily filter up into political agendas. 
In the case of Atyrau, the economy appears entirely dependent on oil-related industry. 
Although the oblast’s akimat boasts one of the most economically diversified regions in 




For example, the petrochemical industry processes oil extracted in Atyrau; the 
engineering and construction industries have expanded to cater mostly for oil-related 
construction; and the farming sector has grown to feed the influx of workers from within 
and outside Kazakhstan attracted by developments in formerly mentioned industries 
(intrvs. 16, 17; An, et al., 2017). Between 2008 (Zakon, 2008) and 2017 (Malik, 2017), 
the population of Atyrau Oblast swelled by 24%. Because the majority of the population 
work directly in oil or cater for it (intrvs. 9, 10, 17), should the oil industry falter, the local 
economy would likely collapse. Individuals already live from oil project to oil project, 
with high intermittent unemployment (for both skilled and unskilled labour), and high 
sensitivity to external shocks such as fluctuations in global oil prices, explained a local 
journalist (intrv. 14). As a result, local government decisions regarding the oil sector are 
significantly influenced by the sector itself, as confirmed by a former foreign oil firm 
employee (intrv. 16). Consequently, the hydrocarbon sector has grown much faster 
than other sectors (ibid.). The undue political power that the situation lends to the oil 
industry could explain its easy dismissal of legal requirements for environmental 
protection measures as being economically disadvantageous. Perhaps tellingly, Atyrau 
was the worst performing region in terms of environmental compliance in the early 
2010s (Erbol Kuanov, cited in Shilov, 2011) while simultaneously having the second 
largest regional GDP in the country (after the region hosting the capital). 
The combination of government policies and the economic effects makes oil both a 
curse and a blessing to local citizens’ livelihood and inadvertently further increases the 
oil industry’s power. Despite the high GDP, Atyrau Oblast is obliged to send the lion’s 
share to the central level of government, which is said to do a inadequate job of re-
distribute accumulated wealth (Kennedy and Nurmakov, 2010; Sakal, 2014). At the 
same time, foreign oil firms tend to mostly hire unskilled workers in Kazakhstan with 
best-paid jobs being filled by foreign experts. Foreigners are usually paid at 
international rates, unlike local workers. This acts not only to increase inequality, but 
also to reduce circulation of money in the local economy (intrv. 9). Atyrau’s per capita 
GDP is by far the highest in the country (see Figure 8), but as a result of the above, 
this means little to the local population: oil-producing regions have in practice become 







Figure 8 – Regional GDP per capita 
 
Source: based on data from the Ministry for Economics of the Republic of Kazakhstan 
(Ministerstvo Nacionalnoj ekonomiki, nd.) [Atyrau is the top line, outlined in red] 
 
In this context, it is arguably unsurprising that regulators struggle to enforce 
environmental and other regulations that could adversely affect local jobs and salaries. 
As a result of the often unpersecuted environmental violations by the industry, life in 
towns and villages closest to the deposit fields had often become unbearable; the high 
sickness rates in Kulsary village and the closure of Sarykamys village have already 
been mentioned. In another example, in 2011, protests broke out against intolerable 
working conditions in the city of Zhanaozen, resulting in numerous fatalities (BBC, 
2012). Similar examples have occurred in other oil producing regions in Kazakhstan. 
The above discussion indicates that the slow advance of economic conditions in Atyrau 
appears to indeed have strong negative impact on the political will to implement EP 
regulation. The impact of the absence of the political will on EP enforcement and 
compliance has already been discussed in relation to H4 and H5 and shown to be 
detrimental to effective implementation of environmental objectives. Discussed 
evidence can therefore be said to support H6.. 
 
Conclusion 
A key observation of the above analysis is that the Kazakh central government lacks 




hypotheses with potential impact on political will (as one of the three elements of the 
dependent variable) proved the most difficult to substantiate. INGOs, for instance, were 
shown to have little impact on the government’s tolerance of the general non-profit 
sector as an environmental watchdog. More generally, there was insufficient evidence 
to suggest that civil society had any effect on the government’s behaviour vis-à-vis 
environmental goals. Similarly, international organisations, institutions and agreements 
could not be conclusively shown to have positive impact on the Kazakh government’s 
perception of the importance of the environment. As such, they do not appear to be 
able to affect political will in this sphere either. Kazakh elites remain resistant to 
international environmental values and maintain economic, political and social 
structures that prevent the application of international norms on the level of the 
individual.  
The remaining hypothesis concerning Variable 1 (foreign influence), relating to the 
impact of foreign oil firms, proved weak for different reasons: these firms were not 
found to be particularly compliant or environmentally conscious. Interestingly, a 2017 
report by WWF Russia rated the Kazakh national KazMuniaGas as the most 
environmentally responsible extractive firm in Kazakhstan, with TCO coming seventh 
(Knizhnikov, et al., 2017). NCOC was excluded, probably because it does not share its 
data (Urbaniak, et al., 2007). Nonetheless, the political tension between foreign oil 
firms and the Kazakh central government appears to have led to some positive 
developments, such as improvements to EP legislation. Its fervent use appears to have 
in turn attracted the attention of the firms’ shareholders and on occasion led to some 
tangible environmental improvements. However, evidence is too inconsistent and 
therefore unsuitable for building generalisations. 
Without political will, the factors tested by the two hypotheses on state capacity (H4 
and H5) were found necessary but insufficient in closing implementation gaps. In 
recent decades, political will at the highest level of government appears to have been 
aimed at sustaining economic growth by all means possible. The system of public 
administration that emerged around this central goal appears to use other policy areas, 
such as EP, as tools to support this central aim. This means that although 
environmental policy has been pursued quite aggressively, although unevenly, this 
exercise does not appear to aim for environmental goals. EP regulation has instead 
been used extortionately against foreign oil firms, failing to promote environmental 
compliance among them. In real terms, despite its many shortcomings (touched upon 
in preceding sections), Kazakh state capacity has been relatively high compared to 




intended purpose – to pursue EP – even higher state capacity could be hard-pressed 
to deliver meaningful environmental outcomes in Kazakhstan. 
Underlying the above findings is the central government’s pursuit of economic growth 
as its main aim. This factor dominates in what can be seen as a clash of economic and 
environmental policy priorities. Analysis of the last hypothesis, which deals directly with 
this issue by investigating economic conditions, supported the strongest relationship of 
all reviewed hypotheses. The de facto poverty in (almost mono-economic) oil-
producing regions appears to motivate leniency in regulatory enforcement, with 
environmental conditions and overall quality of life continuing their degradation, 
testifying to the growing implementation gaps in environmental protection. However, 
the opposite relation cannot be proven: there is no guarantee that better local 
economic conditions would necessarily lead to better local implementation, since local 
implementation and enforcement stakeholders compete against national interests. A 
wider view of the H6 relationship might, however, be more instructive: economic 
conditions at the national level paint a picture of an unstable economic regime sensitive 
to external shocks and lacking a secure and consistent source of funding for 
government spending. This is likely the reason for low political will to pursue post-
material policy objectives such as EP, which in turn drains meaning from state capacity 
despite its improvements, as discussed in relation to H4 and H5. Once profit oil from 
the slow Kashagan project begins to flow in earnest, and the state starts to feel more 





Chapter 7. Empirical analysis: Baku-Absheron, Republic of 
Azerbaijan 
Introduction 
This chapter examines the case of Azerbaijan – a small, oil-rich state on the Western 
coast of the Caspian Sea, and in many ways a country of extremes. Azerbaijan's real 
GDP has shot up from -23% in 1993, during a recession following the collapse of the 
USSR, to a peak of 34.5% in 2006. Gross National Income per capita also rose 
substantively, before falling again into negative figures in 2011 and 2016 (World Bank, 
nd., c). Despite these fluctuations, in the same period of time the country made strong 
progress in reducing poverty and inequality, and raising human capital and general 
public service provision (UNDP, nd.). The economic and welfare objectives of the Azeri 
government have also been supplemented by some post-materialist goals, including 
the pursuit of environmental protection (EP). Azerbaijan’s EP legislation has improved 
over the decades and the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources (MENR) was 
formed in 2001, and has grown in size and scope since. However, despite these formal 
developments, there has been limited success with environmental policy 
implementation (EPI).  
In solving the puzzle as to why this is the case, this chapter begins by presenting 
relevant background details before moving on to the analysis of the hypotheses in the 
results section in relation to the Azeri oil industry, most of which is located on- and off-
shore of Baku-Absheron region as indicated in blue in Figure 9 below. Here, analysis 
reveals that the political will to pursue EP implementation remains low in the country 
and that, accordingly, those factors (pursued in variable one) that could influence this 
part of the dependent variable have not shown the expected impact. In turn, factors 
that focus on state capacity (variable two) to enforce EP and incentivise compliance by 
oil firms are indicated to be necessary, but insufficient in closing implementation gaps 
(dependent variable). Only variable three, on the relationship between economic 
conditions and implementation gaps, is fully supported, although it has been difficult to 
make conclusive observations given the paucity of data that is available on the 
environmental damage in Azerbaijan. The last section concludes by summarising 










The inconsistency in economic performance mentioned above is to an extent reflected 
in the political settings in Azerbaijan, but in the sense that there appears to be a 
significant disparity between official discourse and reality. Officially, Azerbaijan is a 
presidential democracy based on the rule of law, although most international observers 
class it as corrupt and authoritarian. A closer look at this seeming paradox highlights 
the gap between formal and informal processes in the country, and reveals that formal 
institutions do not necessarily convey the power structures within the society. Instead, 
power lies in informal organisations and politics centred around powerful families, or 
clans, that defy and transform formal institutions as perceived and conceptualised by 
First World principles and processes (Collins, 2004). Consequently, although 
Azerbaijan has many of the formal institutions one would expect to be present in a 
democratic state, there is often little observable Western-style democracy in practice. 
A brief glance at Azerbaijan’s experience in the early 1990s, immediately following its 
independence, reveals some of the roots to the harsh regime currently in place. With 
the USSR’s collapse, the ethno-territorial conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh region 
that escalated between Armenia and Azerbaijan towards the end of the USSR was no 
longer suppressed and spilled into violence. 20% of Azeri territory (UN, 2018) became 
occupied by Armenia and 10% of the ethnic Azeri population was displaced as a result 




performance led to the termination of four presidencies in short succession, making the 
post of the President of Azerbaijan both unappealing and uncontested. In the 
aftermath, the Aliyev family took over presidency without opposition in 1993 and has 
since intensified autocratic practices in the country in order to ward off risks of repeat 
political events of the early 1990s (Kendall-Taylor, 2011). A series of constitutional 
amendments over the last three decades have continuously increased the powers of 
the president, essentially granting the post holder unchallengeable tenure.  
These political developments seem to have become tied ever closer to economic 
conditions in the country and this, in turn, can help explain the most recent political 
events. On the one hand, the strong, highly centralised political decision-making in 
Azerbaijan allowed the state to single-mindedly (and largely successfully) pursue 
economic development in the country. On the other hand, increasing authoritarianism 
has inadvertently made the political regime more sensitive to economic events. 
Economic shocks seem to be increasingly likely to be followed by political repression 
so as to suppress real and imaginary risks of unrest. For example, the latest 
devaluation of manat, the Azeri currency, and the start of economic recession in 2016 
(Luntumbue, 2017) were followed by repressions against Government critics (Human 
Rights Watch, 2017; Kavkaz-Uzel, nd.; Genin, et al., 2017). The severity of these led to 
the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) suspending Azerbaijan’s 
membership in 2017 and CIVICUS (2018) downgrading Azerbaijan to a “closed” 
regime in 2018. 
	  
Industrial development and environmental impact 
Azerbaijan has numerous environmental problems. As the cradle of oil extraction and a 
key oil supplier to the USSR (UNDP, nd.), Azerbaijan has accumulated some of the 
world’s oldest and dirtiest oil facilities and infrastructure as well as severe associated 
environmental damage (Bektashi and Cherp, 2002; ADB, 2005). Apart from the 
extraction of hydrocarbons, the USSR also developed various light and heavy 
industries in Azerbaijan, including machine building, oil refining, petrochemistry and 
metallurgy, and these contributed extensive pollution of their own. Aside from the 
Soviet legacy, there are other on-going environmental problems. For instance, severely 
polluted rivers flowing into Azerbaijan are its only source of freshwater (Suleymanov, et 
al., 2010), yet water purification facilities are still insufficient. As a result of such 




country’s industry and population, is one of the most polluted locations in the former 
Soviet space (CRTC, 2003 cited in UNEP/GRID-Arendal, 2007).  
Most of the industry mentioned above was, however, created and geared to the needs 
of USSR republics other than Azerbaijan. Although this was not uncommon in the 
Soviet Union, the Azeri economy was affected more than most other regions. This 
meant that once the USSR was no more, and the demand for goods produced in 
Azerbaijan disappeared almost overnight in 1991, the economy came to a standstill. 
Independence, therefore, necessitated a large degree of economic re-invention, but the 
country had no means to pursue this alone and was therefore in need of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) (ADB, 2005). Once welcomed, FDI flooded into Azerbaijan in the 
1990s. However, foreign donors were primarily interested in Azerbaijan’s oil and most 
of the investment was directed into this industrial sector. This sector therefore 
developed far quicker than others. 
The key oil milestones included: the Contract of the Century (see next section) in 1994; 
the start of production at Azeri–Chirag–Gunashli (ACG), Azerbaijan’s richest oil fields, 
in 1997; and the commission of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline in 2006, taking 
Azeri oil to the Mediterranean sea and European markets. Thanks to these 
developments, the Azeri economy recovered quickly and GDP remained consistently 
high between the late 1990s and early 2010s (UNDP, nd.). This fuelled extensive 
developments in physical and social infrastructure and gave rise to construction and 
services as relatively strong economic sectors in the country.   
	  
Current hydrocarbon industry	  
Oil and gas are the main industries of Azerbaijan. The smallest of five littoral states 
sharing the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan controls over 30% of all offshore Caspian oil 
deposits (Gasimov, 2018). Most of Azerbaijan's oil wealth lies within the ACG offshore 
fields, operated by BP on behalf of the Azerbaijan International Operating Company 
(AIOC) consortium. AIOC has the oldest Production Sharing Agreement (PSA) in 
Azerbaijan – signed in 1994 and termed the Deal or Contract of the Century. Under its 
terms, BP (AIOC’s operator) extracts 75% of all Azeri oil (EIA, 2016) and the State Oil 
Company of Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) – 20% (the remaining 5% is extracted by 
other foreign firms). In 2017, AIOC signed a 25-year contract extension.   
Oil exports from Azerbaijan increased sevenfold during the 2000s (ibid.) thanks to the 




Europe, making Azerbaijan the EU’s 7th largest supplier in 2006 (Eurostat, nd.). These 
developments increased Azerbaijan’s geopolitical importance as a gateway between 
Europe and Central Asia, and as a competitor to Russia. Neighbouring countries also 
use Azerbaijan’s BTC terminal to transit their hydrocarbons to Europe. A potential BTC 
extension (Putz, 2018) to Turkmenistan would also increase Europe’s supply of natural 




Despite Azerbaijan’s economic development, the country’s progress in solving its 
environmental problems has been modest. Azeri health statistics are telling as to the 
consequences of such limited improvement: populations in oil producing regions 
continue to suffer from abnormally high rates of cancer (IHME, nd.) and other serious 
illnesses (Zilberman, 2018), commonly associated with oil contamination (EPC, nd.). In 
terms of flora and fauna, Azerbaijan is one of the global environmental hotspots21, 
which places international (if non-binding) obligations upon the country to protect its 
environment.  
There is a striking paucity of primary and secondary data as to the existence of 
environmental issues, especially as a result of oil extraction, and their change over 
time. As a result, it can be difficult to ascertain whether EP exists and whether it has 
been improving or deteriorating.  The impact of oil works on human health as outlined 
above are, however, a useful proxy and a clear indication that severe issues continue 
to exist. A few other pieces of data are also available from reports published by 
international financial and developmental institutions (IFIs and IDIs) on the results of 
any environmental projects they have funded in the country. However, these tend to be 
very specific and cannot be pulled together into a coherent representation of the state 
of Azerbaijan’s environment at any one time or over a period of time. Although these 
data are utilised in the following, given their inconsistency, the analysis in this chapter 
is to a great extent guided by the perceptions and interpretations of the state of affairs 
as offered by interviewees. In some instances where data on actual impact are 
particularly scares, analysis focusses instead on the likelihood of such impact. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




History of environmental regulation 
Legislation  
Much of Azerbaijan’s environmental legislation has been replaced or updated since 
independence, often by directly incorporating commitments from international 
agreements or recommendations from international advisers, including IFIs and IDIs. 
However, domestic legislation has not always been either harmonised or synchronised 
with borrowed legislation. As a result, the sphere of environmental law remains 
incomplete, internally inconsistent and poorly formulated in many spheres (ADB, 2005). 
For example, two methodologically incompatible frameworks for assessing 
environmental impact are simultaneously in use in Azerbaijan: the Soviet State 
Environmental Expertise (SEE) and the internationally recognised Environmental 
Impact Assessment (EIA) (see H4 discussion for details). Meanwhile, some important 
areas remain unregulated. Azerbaijan’s inconsistent approach to its environmental 
policy failed to provide a clear strategy or exhibit understanding of the institutions, 
processes or order of tasks required to deliver effective environmental protection. This 
perpetuated significant barriers to policy implementation. Consequently, in 2005, the 
Asian Development Bank (ADB, 2005: xv) observed that “Despite the flurry of strategic 
output” on EP, not much has been actually achieved, and the same appears to be true 
of the 2010s.  
 
Implementation 	  
In 2001, the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources22 (MENR) was pulled 
together from pre-existing structures mostly left over from Soviet times. Over 
subsequent years MENR’s scope and powers extended as it worked with other 
Ministries and government agencies in protecting the environment. Yet, coordination 
between them remains low (Aliyev, et al., 2011; UNECE, 2011), marked by duplication 
of responsibilities (see Appendix G), conflicts of interest and low capacity for monitoring 
environmental impact (ADB, 2005: xiv). Enforcement of regulation still rests on self-
reporting by polluters, despite inadequate legislative guidance to polluters on how to 
measure their environmental impact (UNECE, 2011; intrv. 15). As a result, data 
submitted to the regulators are likely biased and non-comparable. Improvements to 
MENR’s capacity have been slow (Aliyev et al., 2011: 16; UNEP, 2015), partially due to 
the rampant corruption across all branches of government (Zilberman, 2019), which 
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appear to favour suppression of public knowledge about environmental transgressions 
over their resolution.   
	  
Results 
Explanatory variable 1 - Foreign influence 
Hypothesis 1: The greater the presence of international advocacy groups within 
a region, the smaller the implementation gap.  
The western format of NGOs – with grassroots membership, society-wide donations 
and engagement in political campaigning – is still fairly foreign to Azerbaijan, according 
to an INGO interviewee (intrv. 14). Public trust in the non-profit sector is limited to what 
could be better described as “social associations” or funds, which tend to function as 
an extension of the State, in a sense that their purpose lies in the provision of social 
services that the state cannot provide or does not wish to be seen providing (ibid.). 
These associations have been traditionally funded by the state, but are not perceived 
as part of the state by the general public or by government structures. Many of the non-
profit organisations that exist today still function within this framework. In the 
environmental sphere, these bodies usually focus on informing the public of the natural 
beauty in their country and promoting individual responsibility, such as not littering, 
preventing poaching, and other non-politicised issues. This was the picture in 
Azerbaijan and other communist Republics of the Soviet Union. Whereas a number of 
FSU countries have moved on from these conceptualisations of ‘civil society’ towards 
Western models since independence, Azerbaijan had at first followed a similar 
trajectory, but appears to have almost entirely reverted to the pre-independence 
conceptualisations in recent years.  
The brief period of civil society renaissance – approximately between the late 1980s 
and mid-to-late 2010s – is the focus of this section. More specifically, Azerbaijan saw 
the birth of a civil environmental movement in the late 1980s, which, unlike non-profit 
structures in other spheres, openly criticised the government. As such, the Azeri 
environmental movement, established and led by Azeri citizens, was the first instance 
of the Azeri civil society to approximate the traditional western NGO concept. This 
movement eventually solidified into the Green Movement – established in 1988 and 
fully registered (with the Ministry of Justice of Azerbaijan) as an environmental NGO 




also established in that time, but most did not survive the 1990s. At that time all 
organisations formed by the civil society remained state-funded. 
The fall of the Iron Curtain in 1991 brought seemingly endless foreign funding for non-
profit organisations. Existing ENGOs saw this as a pathway towards political 
independence. Foreign donors also brought about a surge of new ENGOs and this 
paralleled a proliferation of new NGOs also in other spheres, such as on civil rights. 
Many international NGOs (INGOs) also opened branch offices in Azerbaijan to work 
directly with local target groups. However, the government crackdown on civil liberties 
and organisation in the second half of the 2010s saw many of the INGOs exiled from 
the country and INGO funding to local ENGOs was also disrupted, thus largely bringing 
an end to INGO influence in Azerbaijan. The following discussion examines what 
impact INGOs had on EP implementation gaps in this short window of time that they 
had access to the Azeri society. 
 
INGO funding and existing ENGOs 
Before INGOs’ arrival in Azerbaijan, local ENGOs like the Green Movement by 
necessity had cooperative relationships with the state (since the latter was their only 
source of funding). Interviewees indicated that this arrangement produced incremental 
but tangible improvements in EP in the country, even though ENGOs would have 
preferred faster progress. They hoped that switching from state to INGO funding would 
allow them to become more independent from the state. On the one hand, INGO 
funding made this possible – it gave Azeri ENGOs opportunities to pursue some of 
their own projects, which the state would not (or could not) fund. On the other hand, the 
state appears to have interpreted ENGO-INGO cooperation as treason (intrv. 4): 
information sharing that naturally took place between ENGOs and INGOs is said to 
have been perceived by the state as a leak of state secrets pertaining to the 
seriousness of environmental problems in the country. As a result of these perceptions, 
ENGOs found themselves in active opposition to the state, which, according to an 
interviewee from one such old-school ENGO (intrv. 4), reduced what little influence 
ENGOs enjoyed over EP under the previous more cooperative arrangement. 
The interviewee implied that these perceptions, harboured by the state, were also (at 
least partly) responsible for motivating the eventual state crackdown on the civil society 
in Azerbaijan. This began with the introduction of new regulations that forced 




Government used to veto such applications. This move was said to be aimed at forcing 
ENGOs to return to state funding and, therefore, influence or to snuff them out. The 
state then became increasingly less tolerant of criticism. The re-established 
relationship between the state and the remaining ENGOs was therefore even less 
productive than that prior to the INGOs’ involvement. INGO interaction with Azeri 
ENGOs therefore seems to have inadvertently reduced the latter’s already limited 
capacity to affect EP implementation.  
At the same time, the ENGO-INGO relationships were not always productive even 
before the state hardened its approach to INGOs and their perceived agendas. For 
example, one old-school ENGO member recalled submitting an application to WWF, 
which was turned down but later presented as WWF’s own idea and taken forward 
without the interviewee’s involvement (intrv. 12). The interviewee stated that this 
experience demotivated them from putting forward further projects. Such examples can 
have serious detrimental impact on potential EP improvements because locally 
sourced ideas, that are often based on extensive local knowledge, are often most 
suited for resolving local and nation-wide policy issues. 
 
INGO funding and new ENGOs 
A multitude of new, small ENGOs were established with foreign funding as soon as it 
became available. In fact, foreign funding was often only available for new NGOs, thus 
encouraging their formation. However, in line with Hamilton’s (2000) and Henderson’s 
(2002) findings in the broader post-Soviet space, most of these were ephemeral. They 
often consisted of a single individual and were entirely dependent on foreign funding 
and foreign ideas for projects. Eventually but inevitably this type of ENGOs withered 
away (intrv. 1). Interviewees with current and former strong ties to the Azeri 
environmental movements (intrvs. 4, 7) explained that this was because the founders 
of such ENGOs often used foreign grants to “realise own ambitions, for additional work, 
as a way to travel abroad, [and] some as a source of additional income”. These 
ENGOs’ true contribution to the pursuit of environmental goals is therefore 






The end of INGO-ENGO cooperation 
Returning to the present day, similarly to the situation in other post-Soviet countries 
(Herd, 2005; Horvath, 2011), the Azeri Government’s increasing distrust of INGO-
ENGO ties eventually led to the Government labelling “virtually all [domestic] NGOs 
supported by foreign donors as enemies of the state” (Genin et al., 2017). Many 
INGOs’ offices were closed down, even those not ordinarily involved in political issues, 
such as Oxfam (intrv. 11), and an extensive “campaign of repression” (Genin et al., 
2017) began against Azeri civil society as a whole, including against anyone in the 
media with an active interest in oil-related corruption (Aslanli, 2018). Laws were 
introduced to channel all foreign grants and their allocation through a Government-
controlled fund (see Appendix G for all restrictions).  
This severely damaged the civil society’s capacity for positive influence on the 
implementation of environmental goals as they again became dependent on 
Government’s mercy. Criticising the state in Azerbaijan became equivalent to “a nail in 
the coffin”, commented a former MENR employee (intrv. 2). When asked about 
currently active, effective ENGOs, interviewees across sectors were hard pressed to 
name any, at most only naming a handful of individuals, rather than organisations 
(intrvs. 1, 2, 7, 8, 9, 13, 15). A former MENR adviser, who continues to keep a close 
eye on the situation, commented that the remaining activists and their organisations 
are now “entirely under the Minister’s [of Environment] influence”: 
“They are housebroken. They reveal only those superficial, factual violations that the 
Minister himself allows.... They have now for a long time not played the role they are 
supposed to fulfil” (intrv. 2).	  
Interviewees in other research were of a similar opinion (intrvs. 2, 11, 13; interviewees 
cited in Öge, 2014). 
 
INGOs and the Azeri state 
The impact on the civil society is clear: the civil society has become fearful of talking of 
oil-related environmental issues and can no longer be expected to take a lead in this 
sphere. During research, all but one approached interviewees from international 
organisations with offices in the country avoided research questions or outright refused 
to answer them. None have any projects on oil-related pollution or would say anything 
about oil. All interviewees from other sectors who voiced any criticism of the 




interviewee from Crude Accountability (CA) (intrv. 21) experienced similar behaviour 
during their research in Azerbaijan in 2015, commenting: “to me, that speaks of fear”. 
Recognising the impact of INGO-ENGO relationships on members of Azeri ENGOs, 
CA and other INGOs appear to have chosen to refrain from visiting the country and/or 
now staff their Azeri offices only with locals.  
With regard to the latter approach, one INGO interviewee (intrv. 14) explained that it 
can make the state less suspicious of foreign political influence and improves 
cooperation between parties. However, this choice limits INGOs to strictly cooperative 
relationships with the host government. Doing otherwise could risk the safety of their 
Azeri staff, who, being local, have much to lose. For the same reason, INGOs with 
locally staffed branch offices in Azerbaijan might choose to play along with the Azeri 
government’s wishes, in contradiction to their top management’s objectives. An ENGO 
interviewee (intrv. 4) even accused the latest head of local WWF of being a yes-man. 
Similar sentiments were voiced by other interviewees (intrvs. 2, 5) about current and 
previous heads of multinational organisations’ offices in the country. As such, it seems 
that INGOs have lost leverage to work on Azerbaijan’s environmental issues within and 
outside the country.   
	  
Conclusion	  
What is perhaps most striking about the above discussion is a lack of positive 
examples of what INGOs were able to achieve before the change in the state’s 
attitudes. This is because interviewees did not offer such examples, which may 
indicate that such examples were few and far in-between. Considering other sources’ 
assessment (see Background section) that little progress has been made on EP in 
Azerbaijan, this conclusion is arguably plausible. In turn, the inability to make 
conclusive observations on INGOs’ impact signals another issue, which has been 
touched upon in the introduction and continues to crop up in the following sections of 
this chapter. This issue is the lack of data on the oil industry’s environmental impact. As 
already indicated earlier in this section, the Azeri government does not like such 
information being publicly available and seems to have done well in hiding it.  
Returning to H1, interviewees’ contributions were dominated by accounts of the 
government’s negative treatment of domestic ENGOs as a result of foreign 
involvement. This implies that INGOs have very limited opportunities to have a positive 




consequences of negative impact appear to be very high. This relates to both the 
domestic civil society in its pursuit to hold its Government accountable and to the goals 
of the INGOs themselves in doing the same.  
It is not, however, possible to conclusively ascertain what would have happened to EP 
implementation gaps should INGOs and their funding never enter Azerbaijan. The 
state’s increasing fearfulness of outsiders and the general public finding out the true 
extent of environmental problems within the country signals that the regime is 
becoming fragile and this reflects observations being made elsewhere in the literature 
(for example, Meissner, 2018). The ruling elite appears to have become increasingly 
worried about losing power and therefore increasingly intolerant of anyone trying to 
bring its skeletons out of the closet. This context arguably precludes meaningful 
positive impact by entities whose purpose is to expose problems – whether in a 
cooperative or confrontational manner. In light of this, there is insufficient evidence to 
support Hypothesis 1.  
 
Hypothesis 2: The greater the presence of foreign oil firms within a region, the 
smaller the implementation gap. 
It is commonly argued that domestic oil firms in developing and transitional countries 
are inferior in their technologies, practices and organisational cultures to the world 
leading foreign oil firms (FOFs). On the basis of having access to better resources, 
FOFs are said to be more capable of complying with international and local 
environmental (and other) regulations. In practice, foreign firms have shown that they 
certainly have more money to pursue big projects that are unattainable for local oil 
firms. This was the case with the large ACG oil field complex in the Azeri offshore, 
developed by BP on behalf of the AIOC.  
Overall, interviewees’ assessment of BP’s activities in Azerbaijan is that it could be 
better at complying with local and international standards, but that BP is better than 
SOCAR for the environment (intrvs. 2, 4, 7, 8, 11, 12, 13, 17). An ENGO interviewee 
assessed that “of all foreign firms that have worked in Azerbaijan, BP has been the 
cleanest” (intrv. 4) and an interviewee from within the industry commented: “foreign oil 
firms do far more than what is expected of them” (intrv. 8), including the use of 
Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA) despite Azeri law not requiring it (intrv. 13). 
BP has also been credited with encouraging the government of Azerbaijan to apply for 




However, wider evidence shows that although FOFs like BP contribute towards the 
closure of EP implementation gaps, they do not necessarily comply with EP regulations 
in all instances. This section uses the case of BP and ACG to explore incidents of 
intentional non-compliance with Azeri and international environmental standards. It is 
shown that although BP has superior capabilities that might better minimise 
environmental risks, their corporate decisions can intentionally circumvent the host 
state’s efforts to implement EP regulation. 
 
Practices	  
BP has brought several new practices to Azerbaijan, which made it an obvious leader 
in EP compliance there. Furthermore, although BP does not directly share its policies 
with SOCAR, the latter has been successfully copying BP’s behaviour. According to 
interviewees, watching BP encouraged SOCAR to adopt risk management and ISO23 
certification (intrvs. 7, 8), to create an environmental department tasked with 
environmental impact reduction (intrv. 4), and to start paying more attention to 
industrial safety (intrv. 17). Interviewees from the oil industry described this as “blind” 
copying, commenting that SOCAR adopted these practices because they seemed 
prestigious, but without understanding their purpose (intrvs. 7, 8). However, with time 
SOCAR is said to have started to understand what the assimilated practices are and 
why they are useful (ibid.). It might be too ambitious to say that SOCAR is already as 
advanced as BP, as interviewees close to the government have done (intrvs. 12, 20), 
but interviewees from SOCAR’s partner firms admit that SOCAR is improving with time 
(intrvs. 7, 8). An ENGO interviewee (intrv. 4) went so far as to indicate that SOCAR’s 
worse environmental record today might be better explained by the old facilities and 
infrastructure it inherited from the Soviets, rather than by differences in practices 
between SOCAR and BP. 
Some of BP’s practices, however, cannot be adopted by SOCAR due to their cost and 
therefore continue to benefit only BP with indirect negative effects for EP 
implementation in terms of SOCAR’s capacity for EP compliance. This includes, for 
example, BP paying their staff higher wages (intrvs. 17, 18, 19), in order to attract and 
retain the best talent in the country. Consequently, many MENR and SOCAR 
employees, especially younger staff that speak other languages, have moved across to 
BP (intrv. 4). This has an indirect but an important consequence on the firms’ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




respective ability to comply with EP laws. The brain drain is transferring the best skills 
and knowledge of the local conditions into BP, raising its already high capacity for 
compliance. In terms of infrastructure, BP manages only 8 platforms, the oldest of 
which is approx. 20 years old (Offshore Technology, nd., b). By comparison, SOCAR 
manages smaller 193 platforms, the majority of which are at least 20 years older than 
those of BP (Bagirova, 2016). Facilities at many of these are said to be literally falling 
apart under age (critics cited in Marex, 2016), harsh weather conditions and the 
aggressive qualities of the Caspian hydrocarbons. These are the conditions mentioned 
by the ENGO interviewee (intrv.4) in the previous paragraph. SOCAR therefore faces 
much tougher barriers to compliance and is in much greater need of good staff to help 
bring about and deliver the environmentally-friendly innovations it is adopting from BP. 
Although SOCAR’s capacity for compliance has been growing, it can be said that BP is 
slowing down that process. 
 
Image	  
Arguably, the most important practice that BP has passed to SOCAR, if indirectly, is 
the realisation of the importance to look after one’s international image / reputation. As 
explained by a local researcher (intrv.13), the government of Azerbaijan desires for 
everything about the country to be seen as “an expensive international brand”, 
comparable to the USA. SOCAR is said to have started realising that to be 
internationally competitive in that way and to cultivate a positive international image of 
Azerbaijan, SOCAR must look the part (intrv. 11). This desire – to appear equally 
modern to its international oil firm competitors – is what seems to be driving SOCAR’s 
indiscriminate copying of BP’s practices described above. 
Such behaviour usually relates to positive practices, and SOCAR’s copying of these 
therefore tends to have a positive impact on EP compliance in the Azerbaijan’s oil 
industry as a whole. However, BP has also displayed some less admirable behaviour, 
with potentially very high negative impact on EP in the country, as well as some 
potential to reinforce SOCAR’s poor practices. The example in question is of whistle-
blowers coming forward to reveal that BP did not develop legally required accident 
prevention measures, that it suppressed its staff from reporting problems to regulators 
and that the BP’s top management broke its legal and contractual obligation to report 
on-going problems to regulators, shareholders and partners alike (The Guardian, cited 




In 2008, the situation culminated in a blowout, halving Azerbaijan's oil exports and 
damaging revenues for several months (Azerbaijan Green Party leader, cited in 
Khalilova, 2010). After the incident BP, in collusion with Azeri and American 
governments and oil partners, was said to continue to illegally conceal the true causes 
of the incident. BP’s misconduct came to light two years later, when whistle-blowers 
started to come forward to explain what “really” led to the Deepwater Horizon 
catastrophe and drew parallels in BP’s behaviour at the Caspian and the Gulf of 
Mexico platforms (Palast, 2012a, b). An ENGO interviewee explained that the only 
reason Azerbaijan avoided a similar spill is because, at the design stage (back when 
the original ENGOs and the Azeri state were still on good terms and worked together) 
ENGOs insisted that BP should include manual as well as automatic controls, which 
was not done in the Gulf (intrv. 4).  
The above implies that FOFs are not averse to intentionally avoiding compliance and 
concealing the deed. Perhaps more worrying is the collusion between BP and Azeri 
and US governments in the concealment, given the high negative impact of such 
behaviour on EP implementation. At the same time, such behaviour by reputed 
international actors could be easily perceived by SOCAR as validation of its own non-
compliance as acceptable in the international oil community, with potentially severe 
consequences for EP compliance within the industry.  
 
Changes over time	  
Whereas domestic oil firms in Azerbaijan are subject to the latest environmental 
legislation in the country, FOF are often subject to the more relaxed rules that were 
agreed when their PSAs were first signed. The terms of the PSAs can therefore serve 
as a barrier to successful implementation of improving requirements. For example, as 
cited by a local NGO, BP’s PSA with Azerbaijan limits official monitoring of BP’s 
operations and obstructs public access to environmental data (Khalilova, 2010). This in 
turn also contradicts Azeri government’s commitments under the Aarhus Convention, 
and reveals another reason for Azerbaijan’s poor record in meeting its international 
commitments.  
Interviewees from the industry confirmed that for decades FOFs hid behind their PSAs, 
“thinking they can do anything they wanted and did not bothering to learn national 
legislation” (intrvs. 7, 8). An interviewee that was among the first to work with FOFs in 




“behaved disgustingly with local staff and with Azeri government and law. They believed 
they could do anything they wanted... They tried to dictate their own conditions to the 
Government... BP was marginally less bad than the American firms [who] behaved 
monstrously” (intrv.14). 
Interviewed researchers explained that the FOFs were able to secure the PSA terms 
that allowed such behaviour on their part as a result of a race to the bottom among 
resource-rich post-Soviet states in the aftermath of the USSR’s disintegration. Suffering 
from collapsed economies, the newly formed states competed with each other for 
desperately-needed foreign investment by lowering environmental and other 
requirements (intrvs. 11, 13). The FOFs could therefore be said to have taken 
advantage of the host countries in this context, insulating themselves against 
necessary compliance with developing EP. 
However, it should be noted that there is a difference between environmental 
performance of a firm and its compliance with environmental regulations. For instance, 
environmental performance might be high even though compliance with official 
regulations is low. This is because ‘performance’ is a more encompassing term, which 
could reflect far more practices and behaviours that, perhaps inadvertently, have 
positive indirect effects for the environment. For instance, some better health and 
safety practices and better maintenance requirements can help prevent accidental oil 
spills, but might not necessarily be reflected as requirements in EP legislation. At the 
same time, not all practices that are directly relevant to EP are adequately reflected in 
the Azeri law. The Environmental Impact Assessment, which is a common legal 
requirement in most developed countries, is one such example. 
Whereas a significant number of interviewees had strong opinions regarding BP’s 
unsatisfactory compliance with EP legislation, the majority had positive overall views 
on BP’s environmental performance. However, several interviewees indicated fears 
that the aforementioned brain-drain of Azeri staff into BP might decrease BP’s EP 
performance (Intrv. 7,8,11,14,21). They explained that foreign staff were able to think 
‘outside the box’ to a greater extent than local equivalents. Accordingly, when BP was 
mostly staffed with foreigners, the firm was said to at least have the capacity, if not 
necessarily the motivation, to comply with EP regulations. However, the assimilation of 
local values that accompanies a large intake of local staff is said to be “SOCAR-ising”  






While FOFs like BP might have had superior technologies and practices at the point of 
entering Azerbaijan, SOCAR is fast catching up to international standards. In 
comparison, BP is seen as having shown strong environmental performance, if not 
necessarily legal compliance, but is now feared to be losing its leadership on EP 
performance. As such, the difference between FOF’s and SOCAR’s capacity for 
regulatory compliance appears to be closing. The greater official rhetoric on the part of 
BP about the importance of EP could suggests that BP has a stronger will to comply 
with regulations than SOCAR, although the above discussion does not necessarily 
indicate that this is necessarily the case in practice. As such, the example of BP in 
Azerbaijan suggests that there is insufficient evidence to support the view that FOFs 
are necessarily and unequivocally more legally compliant than domestic oil firms in 
transitional contexts or that they therefore have a necessarily positive effect on the 
implementation of EP regulations. On this basis, there is weak evidence to support H2.    
 
Hypothesis 3: The greater the exposure of local agents to transnational 
elements, the smaller the implementation gap. 
Testing for changes in public pressure on the government is arguably unproductive in 
resource-rich countries, where governments can remain independent of their people by 
surviving on resource profits instead of taxation. This hypothesis therefore instead tests 
for the potential changes within Azeri elites and individuals – that work within EPI 
structures or in oil firms – as a result of greater exposure to new ideas. The following 
discussion explores whether such exposure fosters a greater understanding of the 
need for EP, leads to the internalisation of green behaviours (Kendall-Taylor, 2011), 
and fuels a willingness to step up implementation. To do so, this section analyses the 
effects of Azerbaijan's commitment to uphold binding and voluntary international 
environmental norms, its engagement with foreign donors and the potential impact of 
western Higher Education (HE). The following discussion indicates that the Azeri 
society has little appetite for change and that its institutions limit the opportunities for – 








As observed by Xiaoyu (2012), emerging states wish ‘to be accepted as a normal 
country in the international society’ and often perceive the absorption of international 
norms as a pathway towards this. In line with this view, transitional countries often 
commit themselves to a multitude of legally binding international agreements. This also 
happened in Azerbaijan, and the country reflected many of its new commitments as 
domestic legislation. However, according to an Azeri environmental law specialist 
(intrv. 15) and literature (Markedonov, 2009), this was mostly a ‘copy and paste’ 
exercise, pursued not because the government of Azerbaijan understood or valued 
proposed standards, but due to a perception that it was prestigious to formally adopt 
them. The exercise was therefore done without forethought or, likely, intention for 
implementation. For example, Azerbaijan acceded to both 1969 and 1992 International 
Conventions on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (CLC), but by 2018 had not yet 
updated all domestic standards in line with even the 1969 CLC, nor signed up to the 
1992 Fund Convention, which plugs gaps in 1992 CLC (Gasimov, 2018). A series of 
other legally binding conventions met a similar end (European Commission, 2008; 
Gasimov, 2018), including the Aarhus Convention24 with the Aarhus Centre being 
placed within MENR. According to an ENGO interviewee, this placed the Centre under 
MENR’s control, contradicting the Convention’s purpose (intrv. 4).  
Voluntary obligations did not fare better. For instance, Azerbaijan avoided realising any 
meaningful reform under its EITI25 commitments (Benner, et al., 2010; Cornell, 2011; 
Sovacool and Andrews, 2015) despite achieving full formal compliance. For example, a 
multi-stakeholder group (MSG) between the government, firms and the civil society 
was established, as required under EITI in order to make decision-making in the 
hydrocarbon sector more transparent and accountable. Yet, the MSG was dominated 
by the two former groups and met too rarely to serve its function (Wescott, et al., 2014). 
The increasing deterioration of Azerbaijan’s civil society in recent years further 
diminished the role of the civil society within the MSG, making the exercise 
meaningless. In 2017, Azerbaijan chose to withdraw from the EITI altogether instead of 
improving compliance (EITI, 2017).  
Exposure to values, therefore, does not appear to have led to their adoption at the level 
of elites. This may be due to the Azeri government and elites coming to doubt that the 
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international community itself takes these values seriously, especially given the lack of 
progress in the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict despite extensive foreign involvement. This 
particular issue is of great importance to the Azeri political leadership and may even be 
responsible for the lack of progress in other areas that are subject to norm diffusion, 
including EP. The example relates to a UN resolution calling on Armenia to withdraw 
from occupied Azeri territory. Although this resolution has existed for 26 years, 
Armenia’s compliance has not been secured and no meaningful sanctions have been 
levied by the international community against it (Barber, 2015). In stark contrast, a 
range of substantive sanctions was quickly imposed on Russia for annexing a part of 
Ukraine in the 2010s. This situation can be described as hypocritical, and observers 
have indicated that Azeri leadership has felt betrayed by the international community 
as a result (ibid.). These developments appear to have stimulated a general public 
mistrust towards any agendas pursued by international institutions, including on EP, 
and this manifested sharply in interviews with ENGOs.  
Furthermore, by failing to adequately penalise Azeri political leadership’s non-
compliance with its international obligations over the years, the international community 
has arguably shown Azerbaijan that compliance is not necessary. For example, the UN 
Human Rights Council protects the right to a clean environment. The most the Council 
can do in the event of non-compliance by a signatory state is request “the President of 
the Council to take all appropriate steps and measures, in accordance with his 
mandate, to urge the State... to resume its cooperation” (UN Human Rights Council, 
2013: 2). As such, the organisations charged with enforcing international obligations 
lack the means for enforcement. Similar language can be found in other international 
agreements, leading to similar problems with securing compliance by signatories. 
Although these approaches have worked in stimulating compliance elsewhere, 
Azerbaijan appears to see the world differently and the events mentioned in the 
previous paragraph are likely to be the cause. 
Furthermore, Azerbaijan does not appear to believe that any meaningful punishment 
ever could result from its noncompliance. According to an INGO interviewee, this is 
primarily because Azerbaijan believes that Europe needs Azeri oil for its energy 
security (intrv. 14). Europe is therefore perceived to fear that should it push Azerbaijan 
too hard, Azerbaijan could (re)turn to Russia (intrv. 14). The government of Azerbaijan 
arguably has firm grounds for believing this: despite continued non-compliance by 
Azerbaijan (UNECE, 2004: 50; UNECE, 2011: 19-20), representatives of 
transgovernmental and international developmental and financial institutions continue 




Rights Watch, 2017; Huseynov, et al., 2016). This inadvertently supports Azeri 
government’s behaviour. 
	  
Foreign financial and developmental assistance	  
Various international financial and developmental institutions (IFIs and IDIs) showed 
great interest in Azerbaijan as soon as they could access the country at the start of the 
1990s. These included such organisations as the World Bank, the ADB and UN 
missions, as well as direct aid from individual countries, with several interviewees 
specifically mentioning aid and projects from the Scandinavian region. For its part, the 
Azeri government welcomed this financial assistance and was happy at the very least 
to give pretences of going ahead with conditions that were often attached to such aid 
and investment. However, once oil money became available and the Azeri government 
became largely self-sufficient, its attitudes towards the above donors began to change. 
In line with other academics’ observations (Goldsmith, 2008; Nanda, 2006; Oge, 2014), 
a local researcher assessed (intrv. 13) that the government no longer had the 
motivation to fulfil others’ conditions nor believed that it needed their assistance.  
Realising this, donors increasingly chose to work with Azeri stakeholders other than the 
central government, such as SOCAR, local government, civil movements and research 
institutes. Together they often pursued one-off, non-politicised projects that shied away 
from either intentionally or accidentally portraying the Azeri state in a negative light, 
unlike the INGO-ENGO activity covered in the H1 section. For example, in 2012 the 
Global Gas Flaring Reduction (GGFR) initiative by the World Bank provided 
technologies, training, monitoring and other assistance to SOCAR to cut its APG flaring 
by 45% (World Bank, 2012). Such projects irrefutably brought substantial benefits to 
Azerbaijan’s EPI.  
However, international institutions’ efforts appear to have had limited impact on the 
overall state of EP implementation in the country. For example, despite much effort to 
solve Azerbaijan’s waste management with the help from numerous IFIs and IDIs, 
overall official statistics of successfully managed waste remained low. Toxic, solid 
waste continued to be buried (Aliyev et al., 2011: 21), dumped into lakes (Sim, 2017) or 
into the sea instead of being deposited at a specially created facility by MENR (intrv. 
2). IFIs’ and IDIs’ other environmental projects show similar, often unsatisfactory 
results (UNECE, 2011; UNEP, 2015; World Bank, 2018). The reason for this – before 




with IFIs and IDIs – has been attributed to the IFIs’ and IDIs’ fastidiousness in selecting 
which projects to fund and poor coordination between them. These factors are said to 
have led to piecemeal, incomplete or even counterproductive pollution alleviation, 
which could not bring meaningful and long-term results (Dreher, et al., 2011; ADB, 
2005).  
Another reason could be that IFIs and IDIs, much like the international agreements 
discussed above, lack the power to change the Azeri government’s perception of the 
importance of EP. International institutions can help create or improve the means for 
improving EP implementation, but they seem powerless to influence the political will in 
the country to make use of these. For instance, UNECE’s Shared Environmental 
Information System initiative (UNECE, 2015) required production and sharing of 
national pollution statistics, but the main polluters in Azerbaijan remain unmonitored 
and the severe problems they are causing in their proximity remain unaddressed 
(Zilberman, 2018).	  
	  
Individuals as norm diffusers	  	  
In light of the indicated failures by external actors, the source of reform in resource-rich 
countries should perhaps be sought internally (Goldsmith, 2008), as many interviewees 
themselves suggested. Some (intrvs. 3, 13, 17, 18) expect this would come with time, 
as a natural consequence of economic development and a subsequent rise in the 
general population’s expectations. An oil specialist (intrv. 19) nominated capitalism as 
the main driver of such change for its ability to incentivise environmental 
consciousness as a means to avoid the costs of potential incidents. A few interviewees 
denied that interaction with international actors can have any positive influence and 
others attributed visible change in cities to government policies (intrvs. 3, 5, 6, 10 and 
12) aimed at raising environmental awareness, especially among children, and 
promoting individual responsibility about, for example, littering. However, by framing 
environmental issues as deriving from common, everyday actions of individuals, the 
government is likely intentionally drawing attention away from the much more 
significant environmental impact made by industries and corporations, such as oil 
pollution. At the same time, there is little education available for individuals about what 
role they could play in improving the environmental behaviour of these larger entities. A 




exposure to the world outside Azerbaijan plays a positive role (intrvs. 1, 4, 5, 9, 11, 13, 
14, 15, 18).  
Interviewees identified the emergence of a young, liberal-minded generation, which 
has undergone fundamental changes in attitudes as a result of greater internet access 
(intrv. 14) and HE opportunities in the First World. An Azeri researcher explained that 
these individuals “start to think about more details, including environment, than about 
their immediate, basic or self-centred needs… These people [can] become agents of 
change” (intrv. 11). Interviewees from INGO and legal profession agreed (intrvs. 1, 15). 
However, the question remains: “does knowing translate into acting?” (intrv. 13) and 
interviewees’ answers imply that this is not necessarily the case. In the words of an 
INGO interviewee, when the reformed youth encounters the political realities of working 
back in Azerbaijan, they cannot put up with the “absence of initiative and suppression 
of creativity” (intrv. 14) and seek to escape. They either remain in the West, are 
snatched up by other developing nations for their Western education (intrv. 18) or, if 
returning to Azerbaijan, seek employment in private foreign firms (intrvs. 7, 8). In all of 
these examples, the reformed individuals take themselves out of the contexts that need 
changing.  
Those that go into the public sector collide with the status quo, which rejects the 
change they bring (intrv. 11) and limits their opportunities to exercise learned norms. 
Lack of practice precludes complete norm internalisation and therefore an individual’s 
ability to transfer them to others. At best, commented an ENGO interviewee (intrv. 4), 
these individuals reconcile own standards with contextual reality by remaining law 
abiding but refusing to rock the boat, leading to what an Azeri researcher described as 
“very incremental and perhaps inconsequential” societal change (intrv. 13). At worst, 
suggested interviewees from the oil industry (intrvs. 7, 8), reformed individuals come to 
accept the predominant culture of the public sector and revert to original Azeri values. 
 
Conclusion	  
The logic of norm internalisation by the target rests on the diffuser’s ability, at least in 
principle, to offer strong incentives for the target to complete their adjustment (March 
and Olsen, 1984). Norm internalisation also depends on the target’s acceptance that 
the proposed adjustment is morally right and should be pursued (Börzel and Risse, 
2003; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). The above discussion suggests that elites are 




by the First World, whereas foreign and international institutions appear to have lost 
their ability, or at least their real or perceived (Gahramanova, 2009) will to provide 
strong incentives to stimulate change. Some successes have been identified, such as 
the reduction of APG flaring. However, although these are important accomplishment, 
they appear isolated, and not necessarily motivated by direct environmental concerns. 
GGFR initiative was arguably successful not because it was premised on the need to 
protect the environment, but because it stressed the uses of APG as free fuel if 
captured instead of flared. Such examples cannot support the argument that Azeri 
institutions are internalising a fundamental interest in the environment and its 
protection. At lower societal levels, reformed individuals have no power to influence the 
system around them to transform and either leave or (re)assimilate. On these bases, 
H3 is not supported. 
	  
Explanatory variable 2 - State capacity 
Hypothesis 4: The better the quality of the environmental regulation for the oil 
industry, the smaller the implementation gap. 
Interviewees from various sectors (intrvs. 7, 11, 18) explained that after independence, 
Azeri legislators attempted to improve Azeri environmental laws by replicating best 
practices from other countries. At the same time, this exercise was accompanied by a 
desire “to do everything at once and to do it well” (intrv. 15). In practice, this meant 
mixing everything together and legislating at great speed. This was done without the 
proper deliberation about imported laws (intrv. 7) or engagement with stakeholders 
(before or during implementation), who could have flagged to legislators potential and 
emerging issues with implementation (intrvs. 13, 14, 15, 17).  
In the words of an INGO interviewee, the Azeri decision-making closely resembles a 
military system, in which the “generals work out the plan and it would be unthinkable to 
consult the captains” (intrv. 14). This approach has led to uninformed and incomplete 
(Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000) legislative transfer, producing a “short version” of other 
countries’ laws, which are peppered with Western terms and concepts, such as 
“condominium”, that often do not apply to Azerbaijan or whose meaning has not been 
explained either to implementers or the groups most affected by these laws (such as 




Overall, the exercise has successfully plugged many holes in Azeri EP legislation and 
many interviewees (intrvs. 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 17 and 18) agree that a passable, if not 
good, legislative base emerged on paper. Despite this, the capacity of EP law to 
change old practices has remained low due to its unimplementability (Aliyev, et al., 
2011). The following discussion explores this relationship between quality and capacity 
to affect change before concluding that legislative quality is a necessary but insufficient 
condition for successful implementation.   
 
Legislative integrity	  
It should not be surprising that the Azeri EP law uses legal terminology specific to the 
field of EP. What is surprising is that the law and its supporting documents often fail to 
explain what the terminology means, and therefore what the law entails. This applies 
even to sub-laws, whose function includes the clarification of terms, concepts and 
targets that are mentioned in primary legislation. Not only do the sub-laws often fail to 
fulfil this function, they are often absent altogether (UNECE, 2011). This strongly 
suggests that those involved in drafting the EP legislation do not themselves fully 
understand the meaning of the terms they are using. This could be a result of copying 
and pasting the EP legislation of other countries, whose contexts are different from that 
of Azerbaijan. If accurate, the above deduction could explain why primary laws’ main 
purpose often comprises the allocation of responsibilities between subordinate 
structures, effectively pushing the task of clarifying the aims of the law down the 
governmental levels (intrv. 15).  
The head of one ENGO explained that as a result, the public sector is overloaded, with 
implementers at all levels delaying implementation because they do not understand the 
reasoning (and therefore the goals) of the new laws (intrv. 16). In line with Sabonis-
Helf’s (2004) findings, the governing structures in Azerbaijan, as in the rest of the post-
Soviet space, have a certain habit of waiting for clear instructions from the top before 
acting, instead of taking the initiative (intrv. 14). With the top itself seemingly unable to 
offer such instructions, the bottom levels continue to stall their implementation 
functions and are said to feel justified in doing so (ibid.). As an example of the 
consequences caused by the above approach, the 2001 Law on Protection of 
Atmospheric Air still had undefined standards and thresholds in 2014 (EaP GREEN, 
2018). In a different example, although polluters are legally obliged to self-monitor and 
report their pollution to MENR, MENR does not set a methodology for polluters to 




submissions or to aggregate them into national statistics, as they could be entirely 
incomparable. Similarly, the law providing for compensation from oil spills during the 
transportation of hydrocarbons fails to define application or set time limits during which 
compensation can be sought (Gasimov, 2018). As a result of such gaps, most 
behaviour could be shown as legitimate, making the concept of regulation 
meaningless.  
A specialist in environmental legislation (intrv. 15) noted that “some glimpses of 
definitions” started appearing, thanks to Cabinet of Ministers’ orders (CMOs) starting to 
introduce further international and social standards to address gaps. However, 
according to interviewees from the industry, no efforts were made to “reconcile different 
requirements” (intrvs. 7, 8), or to harmonise them with existing, national legislation. 
National legislation, international standards and social standards therefore coexist 
parallel to each other (intrv. 15). Subsidiary legislation, when it exists, often references 
standards from all three but without indicating which are the most suitable. In turn, this 
necessitates further, often fruitless, search for relevant legislative provisions (ibid.). The 
interviewee reflected: “[w]hat we have is some kind of legislative bureaucracy even 
within a sub-law… you go back and forth in a vicious circle”, before summarising that 
“the very language of regulation is... very much in the way [of implementation]”. An 
INGO interviewee similarly described subsidiary legislation as nonsensical (intrv. 14). 
As a result, the overall legislative quality is said to suffer greatly and has been labelled 
as “unfinished” (intrv. 7), “vague” (ibid.), “on-the-spot job” (intrv. 8), “ad-hoc” (ibid.) and 
even “dead” (intrv. 14).  
Interviewees explained that this situation is a result of the legislators’ lack of vision of 
what environmental goals they would like their regulatory framework to achieve. A local 
researcher explained that such a vision could be achieved only by people “that can 
think outside the box and have overseas experience” instead of by those usually 
tasked with the job in Azerbaijan: people who have “only Soviet vision, experience and 
education” (intrv. 11). As such, Azeri legislators appear to be copying Western laws 
without forethought of their purpose or where they would fit in the wider framework of 
the Azeri EP policy. This is probably why Azeri laws do not set targets (intrv. 15). As a 
result, new laws (and their objectives) do not integrate with the existing framework and 
are instead overshadowed by it (intrv. 15). Those that work with environmental 
legislation in the oil industry agreed that due to this approach, the effectiveness of the 






What unites most interviewees’ complaints about Azeri environmental law is that its 
progress is continuously delayed by the Cabinet of Ministers and Milli Majlis26. As a 
result, this legislative sphere is seen as perpetually stuck in a “transitional form” (intrv. 
15). The delays with finalising EP legislation could be due to the absence of bottom-up 
feedback channels (intrv. 14), and therefore delayed realisation that laws transferred 
from elsewhere do not necessarily apply to Azerbaijan (intrv. 11), or that they do, but 
fail to cover all eventualities (intrv. 5). In yet other instances, there are still no laws to 
regulate particular practices because competing interests among the elites prevent 
legislative documents from getting finalised. An interviewee from the Ministry of 
Emergency Situations explained that, as a result, new standards have yet to emerge, 
whereas the current Soviet standards have already become obsolete, creating a 
vacuum in useful EP regulation (intrv. 20). An ENGO interviewee (intrv. 4) offered the 
following example to illustrate this. The BP-operated Shah Deniz hydrocarbon field was 
discovered at the end of 1990s and, in accordance with its PSA obligations, BP created 
a Monitoring and Research Group comprising representatives from BP, SOCAR, 
MENR and Azeri Academy of Sciences. The group quickly fulfilled its purpose in 
developing a set of sound standards to cover all stages of Shah Deniz development 
but as of 2015, these had yet to be legislated.  
The law on Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) has been similarly delayed. If 
passed, it would replace the technocratic, Soviet-style State Environmental Expertise 
(SEE) and pave the way for the internationally recognised Strategic Environmental 
Assessment. If this happens, key stakeholders’ influence on the hydrocarbon industries 
would become diluted, explained an ENGO interviewee (intrv. 4), suggesting that this 
may be why the transition was never completed. Drafted at the start of the 2010s, the 
EIA law is still under consideration (UNECE, nd.). Meanwhile, voluntary EIA has 
existed within the SEE framework despite their incompatibility, undermining the EIA’s 
effectiveness (intrv. 15). Whereas the purpose of the EIA is to predict and prevent 
potential environmental damage in a transparent way, the SEE instead aims to test 
whether a project, as planned and projected, complies with environmental standards at 
a specific point in time, and bars public engagement. In other words, EIA is dynamic 
and open, whereas SEE is static and closed in nature; subordinating EIA to SEE 
undermines the goals of the former. Reflecting on this situation, a legal specialist 
commented that “when there is confusion like this, it is easier for everyone to escape 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




responsibility and do things their own way” (ibid.). Such confusion might therefore be 
intentional.   
 
Conclusion	  
The discussion in this section indicates that despite much work on Azeri environmental 
legislation, its quality remains insufficient and in instances unenforceable. There 
appears to be a direct link between poor legislative quality and poor implementation. 
However, it would not be prudent to deduce the existence of a strong opposite 
relationship. Were environmental regulations of higher quality, there is no guarantee 
they would lead to better implementation results if unsupported by a strong political will 
to see this happen. However, were better quality laws introduced, this in itself might 
have signalled improvements in the political will to pursue EPI. On the basis of 
available evidence and deductions, legislative quality could be said to be necessary for 
closing implementation gaps. However, it is recognised that the tested factor is not a 
sufficient, and that political will needs to improve in order for this legislative quality to 
produce a meaningful impact. At present, evidence in support of H4 is weak.	  
	  
Hypothesis 5: The greater the quality of the environmental regulatory agency in 
the sphere of the oil industry, the smaller the implementation gap. 
Despite the tone of the previous section, the most critical interviewees nonetheless 
insisted that Azeri environmental regulation could function “if only it were enforced” 
(intrvs. 9, 11, 12, 13). At the same time, MENR has made some notable achievements 
that could bring one to expect successful enforcement. For instance, since its creation, 
MENR’s internal structure experienced surprising stability for a country in transition. 
Furthermore, while the biggest neighbouring countries abolished their environmental 
Ministries, the Azeri equivalent grew, created new agencies and got stronger: 
MENR “has started demanding implementation... BP is fighting against it and the very 
fact that BP has started paying fines is an indicator that the Ministry has gotten 
stronger. They are starting to realise their strength as a regulator” (intrv. 8). 	  
There are a number of interpretations as to why this might be happening. For instance, 
industry interviewees (intrvs. 7, 8) ascribed this shift to general learning by the 
government. They noted that it can be intimidating for a new government, not entirely 




international firms. With time and experience, such a government starts to realise that 
this relationship is not equal, and that it is “the client and that the big oil firm is just a 
subcontractor… The government starts to self-realise (intrv.8)”. 
Other interviewees were more sceptical and questioned whether MENR had any real 
power or influence outside what other stakeholders allow it to achieve (intrv. 7, 8, 13) 
and whether MENR’s growth and supposed self-realisation has fully translated into 
improved capacity (intrv. 5). The following discussion explores factors involved in these 
processes in order to identify barriers that continue to hold back sufficient 
improvements in state capacity. To do that, this section considers contextual, 
institutional and individual barriers. The following discussion indicates that current 
institutional and organisational priorities continue to negatively affect implementation 
capacity and that it is hard to predict how or when this is likely to improve and whether, 




Interviewees noted several background factors that prevent environmental issues from 
receiving public and government attention they deserve, which in turn likely limit 
MENR’s access to resources. Research and INGO interviewees (intrvs. 1, 13), for 
instance, indicated that the constant threat of open war with Armenia over the occupied 
territory directs resources towards more relevant bodies, such as the Ministry of 
Emergency Situations (intrvs. 1, 20). Meanwhile, researchers implied that 
environmental concerns are for a developed, post-material society, whereas Azerbaijan 
still needs to sort out the basic needs of its population (intrvs. 11, 13). Looking at 
figures, Azeri government has achieved much in reducing absolute poverty from 46.7% 
in 2002 (UNDP, nd.) to 5.9% in 2016 (ADB, 2018), but interviewees believe that much 
work still remains before the government’s focus can shift to environmental issues, 
which are perceived as less immediate or significant in comparison. 
Other interviewees, however, pointed to rampant corruption (intrvs. 11, 12, 14), 
dependent judiciary (intrv. 12) and the general dysfunctional system of checks and 
balances as reasons for slow developments in state capacity. “The entire state 
apparatus” is said to be answerable directly to the Aliyev clan (Luntumbue, 2017) with 
the best jobs being staffed with relatives of the top management rather than with 




and enforcement (intrv. 12). This precludes autonomy that executive agencies need to 
function properly, as has been argued by numerous academics across country 
contexts (Evans, et al., 1985; Leftwich, 2000; Skocpol, 1979). The resultant self-
interested, self-perpetuating networks seem to have found ways to benefit from non-
implementation. This might explain why voices offering solutions are shut out: 
Ministries still haven’t learnt effective stakeholder engagement and are said to turn 
down advice offered by HEIs (intrvs. 15, 16, 17).  
Furthermore, because Ministers and their teams retain active interests in the private 
sector at the same time as being politicians / civil servants, competition between 
Ministries is said to be attributable to personal vested interests (intrv. 4). The courts are 
also part of this system, completing the “vicious circle” in the words of an ENGO 
interviewee (intrv. 12). The interviewee added that lower government levels are 
likewise affected: regional inspectors tend to “read between the lines of the law and 
interpret the law in ways that are beneficial to them” or fight against other local 
government structures, including the local police, who do the same. As a result, 
commented an INGO interviewee, a Presidential or Ministerial order can mutate on the 
way down to the bottom level implementers to such an extent that:  
“[w]hat gets implemented, if at all, is something very different...The [local communities] 
that are supposed to benefit from the order might not see any difference at all”.	  
 
 
Institutional barriers: Coordination between Ministries 
In practice MENR shares duties pertaining to the oil industry with other structures, yet 
formal coordination between them is weak (Aliyev, et al., 2011; UNECE, 2011; intrv. 8). 
Each body collects its own data, based on own methodologies, and shares some but 
not all data with others. Combined, these issues result in duplication of responsibilities 
(see Appendix H) and unnecessary institutional complexity, leading to fragmentation in 
both monitoring and reporting (ADB, 2005: xiv). Responsibility for improving 
coordination has fallen to MENR, which has been charged with creating a national, 
cross-departmental database and distributing its data. However, MENR does not have 
legal power to organise or coordinate how or what data other bodies collect. As a 
result, it is not uncommon for different government sources to continue offering 
different figures for the same variables (Aliyev et al., 2011), obstructing comprehensive 
environmental assessment of any one area and the design of an integrated approach 




related pollution from cargo ships and two of them monitor pollution and impose 
administrative penalties on the same group of potential polluters (Gasimov, 2018). With 
each body producing differing assessments of the same incidents and levying own 
fines, a polluter might face disproportionately large fines that it is unable to pay. 
Instead, a polluter might challenge differences between assessments. This slows down 
and potentially even prevents the enforcement of EP standards.  
MENR’s low status and power relative to other powerful stakeholders, including other 
Ministries, SOCAR, BP and the top political leadership, is also an issue. Firstly, despite 
MENR’s recent expansion, an INGO interviewee indicated that MENR’s budget 
remained disproportionately low relative to the scope of MENR’s responsibilities (intrv. 
1). In turn, the small budget was said to limit MENR’s influence in instances where 
Ministries’ interests come into conflict (intrv. 13). Secondly, the power dynamic 
between MENR, SOCAR and BP is unclear. Sometimes MENR pressures BP through 
SOCAR, sometime the opposite (intrv. 7). In this triad, it is unclear who, in practice, 
holds SOCAR accountable for its pollution. Central government can also use SOCAR 
in contradiction to both MENR’s and BP’s norms. For example, an oil industry 
interviewee spoke of instances when the Azeri government worked through SOCAR to 
compel BP to work below international standards in order to increase output (and 
therefore revenue) (intrv. 8). The continuous struggle for power that these observations 
indicate cannot be expected to deliver consistent EP implementation.  
 
Institutional barriers: MENR organisational issues	  
The question of why MENR’s internal growth has not proportionately translated into 
improved capacity for implementation could be answered by taking a closer look at 
MENR’s spending. Figure 10 shows that despite significant increases in MENR’s 
budget, the vast majority (purple line) was spent on capital investment, although the 
MENR website does not specify what this investment includes. This type of spending 
suffers from very low transparency in Azerbaijan and often “results in a large amount of 
money becoming unaccounted for” (Breban and Mukhtarov, 2017: 11). Such 
expenditure is prone to “higher likelihood of corruption and ineffective spending” 
(Breban, et al., 2018: 10), which could explain MENR’s very slow results with, for 
example, ensuring that environmental monitoring is improved. A budget for this was 




being set up (UNEP, 2015). Meanwhile, Haqqin’s27 (2018) findings suggest that the 
former Minister was investing MENR’s budget not into EP, but into personal projects 
abroad for the 17 years that he was in the post. 
 
Figure 10 - Expenditure on Environmental protection and its components 
 
Source: based on data from Azerbaijan’s State Statistical Committee (2018)  
There appear to be significant inefficiencies and potential corruption in current 
spending as well, further reducing capacity for the pursuit of environmental objectives. 
For example, an INGO interviewee that works with EP structures in central government 
(at the level of Ministries) noted that there are too many staff and no shortage of 
equipment or technologies (intrv. 5). In contrast, bottom-level implementing structures 
for EP are said to experience significant shortages of funding and human resource 
(intrv. 1). An excess of higher paid staff at the centre and a shortage of bottom-level 
implementers on the periphery suggest issues with internal budgetary allocation. 
However, this issue is not unique to Azerbaijan or developing contexts, nor does it 
necessarily signal wrongdoing.	  
The organisation of MENR’s departments and their responsibilities might, however, 
seem questionable for its high potential of subverting MENR’s purpose of EP 
implementation. Firstly, the structure of MENR departments arguably obstructs 
effective policy design and scrutiny, which may explain the poor quality of subsidiary 
legislation discussed previously. The reason, explains a former Ministry employee 
(intrv. 2), is that MENR writes and also approves its own secondary legislation without 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




significant external scrutiny. The situation disincentivises Ministry staff from producing 
quality products, because they can be certain that they will be approved (ibid.) either 
way.  
Secondly, decision-making is over-centralised, meaning that even the lowest 
implementation levels are often controlled directly from the top (intrv. 1). The need to 
directly oversee such volume of work acts to slow down MENR’s reaction to problems 
and reduces its effectiveness (intrv. 15). It also removes responsibility from bottom 
level implementers, who learn to follow orders without questioning their intention or 
appropriateness, commented an INGO interviewee (intrv. 14). Lacking a wider 
understanding as to what is being implemented, implementers might be unable to offer 
constructive feedback to policy-makers even if asked.  
As a result of the above, citizens seem to find it more effective to complain about every 
manner of environmental transgression in letters and petitions addressed directly to the 
Minister, observed an environmental law specialist, who had personally successfully 
achieved a resolution to some (non-oil related) issues in this way (intrv. 9). Such 
practices, however, further overload the top levels of MENR, which in turn further slows 
down the Ministry’s overall pace of work. 
 
Individual barriers: Personnel quality	  
As has already been mentioned, top Ministerial levels do not seem to suffer from 
equipment shortages; whereas INGOs offer some IT support (intrvs. 1, 5, 14) to lower 
level implementers. The main barriers to implementation from the resource perspective 
are therefore less technological and have more to do with human resources. Ministerial 
jobs are prestigious and serve as a stepping-stone to a future career, which makes 
them attractive with university graduates despite low salaries. Demand for these jobs 
therefore far outstrips supply, according to INGO and HEI interviewees (intrvs. 9, 14, 
17, 18). However, despite good career prospects (intrvs.  7, 8, 9, 11, 13, 14), staff 
retention is low as young employees leave for the private sector. Data suggest this is 
most likely due to ideological and cultural clashes between a) ambitious, young and 
often overseas-educated staff (intrvs. 13, 14) and b) the older bureaucrats (Trochev, 
2012) in higher management, who, in line with Wamukonya’s (2003) findings, do not 





The resulting supply saturation and high turnover are said to contribute to the 
government’s perception that staff are replaceable and that investing into their training 
is unnecessary (intrv. 14). Apart from further reducing staff retention and repelling 
skilled experts at the upper levels, this trend appears to have significant repercussions 
for lower levels of implementer. It drives wages down across the piece and reduces 
training opportunities for those who need them the most (intrvs. 1, 5). This makes 
already non-prestigious, bottom-level implementation jobs wholly unattractive to 
capable cadres. Consequently, noted industry and former MENR interviewees (intrvs. 
2, 7, 8), those that do end in the role of environmental inspectors in the oil industry do 
not have sufficient knowledge about oil facilities to know how or where to look for 
environmental violations, especially at upgraded facilities that employ new / foreign 
technologies. The resulting accumulated frustration tends to lead to a culture of power 
abuse and bribe-taking, instead of willingness to pursue enforcement, among 
inspectors (intrv. 2).   
 
Conclusion	  
In light of the above analysis, it seems there can be little discussion of implementation 
of environmental policies if those who are responsible for delivering this do not 
necessarily understand what they are implementing or are abusing their powers for 
self-gain. The existence of multiple opportunities for unpunished self-benefitting 
behaviours across government structures makes it unlikely that improved resources or 
structural enhancements would necessarily lead to better or more effective outcomes. 
These shortcomings are in turn likely to be symptoms of much larger issues, such as 
those concerning the political system and the nature of the regime. These factors place 
doubt over whether state capacity as a whole is a sufficient factor in closing 
implementation gaps. Nonetheless, it would be difficult to argue that state capacity is 
not necessary in effective EPI. As such, the quality of EP implementing structures is 
undoubtedly important, but it would seem that wider and deeper issues need to be 
addressed first before these structures can function properly in Azerbaijan. In the 





Explanatory variable 3 - Economic diversification 
Hypothesis 6: The more advanced the economic conditions in a regional 
economy, the smaller the implementation gap. 
In academic literature, abundance of natural resources is often treated as a precursor 
to the resource curse and although that field of research is not directly connected to 
environmental protection, some of its symptoms have materialised in Azerbaijan and 
affected the dependent variable (implementation gaps). Azerbaijan is not a standard 
resource curse case (Venables, 2016) for it has experienced: relative political stability; 
high economic growth; national savings following the creation the State Oil Fund of the 
Republic of Azerbaijan (SOFAZ); rapid reductions in both poverty (UNDP, nd) and 
inequality; and the pursuit and attainment of relatively high human development 
(UNDP, 2018; World Bank, 2019). At first glance, these factors provide the Azeri state 
with a good rather than poor base for developing an interest in environmental 
protection and, therefore, state capacity for pursuing it. Closer inspection, however, 
reveals some resource curse symptoms, including widespread corruption and 
economic vulnerability, which negatively affect the political will to pursue regulatory 
enforcement.  
Hydrocarbons comprise over 90% of all exports (UNDP, nd) and over one half of the 
government’s overall budget revenues (Breban and Mukhtarov, 2017). The majority of 
public expenditure is therefore also financed by hydrocarbons. A significant proportion 
of this is allocated to non-transparent, corruption-prone, fixed capital investments 
(Breban and Mukhtarov, 2017; Breban et al., 2018). According to Kendall-Taylor 
(2011), this type of spending in Azerbaijan is a facade for distributing oil rents from the 
ruling clan to the rest of the elites and acts to buy their political support, and as such 
maintains their unity of purpose. At the same time, this practice increases spending 
within the economy, which in turn artificially bolsters economic growth and raises living 
standards. This process inadvertently acts to legitimise the political regime with the rest 
of the population, thus ensuring its stability (Herb, 2005; Karl, 1997). There are no 
other developed economic sectors capable - on their own or in unison - of supporting 
this political arrangement for the country. 
To restate the above, both economic stability and political stability appear to rest 
entirely on oil profits, which makes both highly sensitive to external shocks. For 
example, shocks in global oil prices caused the manat to devalue by 32% in 2015, 
starting a national recession (The Guardian, 2015). Having dug into SOFAZ, its rainy-




low, a sharp fall in living standards was only a few years away (Levy, 2015). With both 
economic and political stability thus resting on the productivity of the oil industry, the 
elites are unlikely to have the appetite for enforcing practices that could decrease oil 
profits, even in the short term. This includes efficient enforcement of environmental 
regulation, since compliance by the oil industry could require significant (initial) 
investment, thus slashing immediate profits (Jaffe, et al., 1995; Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 
2003). Although such investment could generate economic activity in its own right, it is 
highly unlikely that this could offset the fall in oil profits. 
The extent of Azeri government’s dependence on oil, as a result of poor economic 
diversification, appears to also produce a significant social impact, which can be traced 
to poor EP implementation. As per the above, events in the country appear to follow a 
predictable route: external shocks produce negative effects on the economy, which 
destabilises the political status quo. This in turn causes the state to become more 
repressive, so as to hold on to power, and this dampens people’s ability to say 
anything that could be seen as critical of the government. Reflecting on the impact of 
this on the civil society, a member of Crude Accountability had the following to say: 
“…there has been a very severe crackdown in Azerbaijan on civil society... 
there are record numbers of journalists and independent civil society activists 
who have been put in jail, who have been beaten, who have been killed and so 
I think it’s a natural fear in the civil society and particularly those that are 
impacted by industry that is… the driving engine of Azerbaijani economy... And 
also the international oil companies that have come into the country, …they 
have very powerful allies, strong economic interests and agreements. And 
that’s a frightening thing to take on.” (Intrv. 21)	  
The most obvious observation that can be made from this is that the extent of Azeri 
government’s dependence on oil has led the state to suppress any independent 
watchdog that could signal when policy implementation is going wrong and offer help to 
improve it. However, there are also less obvious effects. The above comments were 
made in relation to the civil society and also the academic community, but the 
implications likely also extend to the public sector. The Azeri political system favours 
loyalty and, given the extent of recent persecutions, civil servants and politicians will 
likely become increasingly averse to proposing or supporting calls for change and 
innovation, since this could be taken as criticism of the status quo. Public sector 
reforms, which are necessary to improve EPI in Azerbaijan, are therefore increasingly 
unlikely. Were the political system less dependent on oil, and therefore less vulnerable, 
the role that fear plays in the halls of power might have been smaller, and reform and 





The absence of sufficiently developed economic sectors that could function 
independently from oil has perpetuated high dependence of the political leadership on 
its hydrocarbon sector. This dependence appears to apply to economic stability within 
the country, but also to political stability. Furthermore, oil and economic and political 
stability appear to be closely intertwined with the latter two being highly sensitive to 
changes in the others. This close inter-relationship is in turn highly sensitive to external 
shocks that affect oil profits. Although SOFAZ has been successfully created to act as 
a temporary shock absorber, the Azeri government has already tested its effectiveness 
and concluded that it cannot hold for long. Meanwhile, the consolidation of power has 
resulted in an increasingly authoritarian regime, in which changes necessary for 
improving EPI are becoming increasingly unlikely. Were the economy better 
developed, and both economic and political regimes therefore less dependent on oil, 
the government might have been more willing to implement longer-term objectives, 
such as EP. On the basis of this,  there is strong evidence to support H6. 
	  
Conclusion 
This chapter set out to test possible factors that affect the implementation of 
environmental protection in Azerbaijan. Analysis did not support the hypothesised 
ability of external factors (H1, H2 and H3) to influence internal processes in Azerbaijan 
with respect to EPI. This suggests that implementation efforts can be improved only 
from within.  
Accordingly, hypotheses that touched on internal processes (H4, H5 and H6) were 
found to hold. However, analysis strongly indicated that factors pertaining to state 
capacity (quality of EP legislation and of EPI structures) were necessary, but 
insufficient for improving EPI. This seems to be due to high levels of corruption that 
prevent formal government institutions from fulfilling their intended purposes.  
Corruption appears to have a very strong influence on the political will to pursue policy 
implementation, and without the political will the other elements that were identified as 
components of implementation gaps (dependent variable) become increasingly difficult 
to achieve. This includes the ability to enforce policy goals and the related ability to 




It should, however, be emphasised that the analysis of H4 and H5 focused on formal 
institutions and processes, whereas Azerbaijan is known for the prevalence of clan 
politics and the preference of the powerful elites for informal processes. What may look 
like corruption through a lens that assumes that formal institutions should behave in 
certain ways, may instead be explained in different ways in future research if examined 
through lenses that are more sensitive of informal styles of government.  
Lastly, analysis indicated that the high dependence of the Azeri economy and of the 
political regime on oil profits, in the absence of other suitably developed and profitable 
economic sectors, has been making both increasingly vulnerable. Given this strong 
link, it is unlikely that the government would pursue any measures (including EPI) that 
could damage the productivity of the oil industry and thus its own power over the 
country. Were the link broken through better economic development independent of 
the oil sector, the government might become more willing to pursue EPI and other 




Chapter 8.  Comparative Analysis: Russian Federation and the 
Republics of Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan 
Introduction 
The previous chapters have reviewed four case studies aimed to test the explanatory 
power of foreign influence, state capacity, and economic conditions in relation to 
implementation gaps (dependent variable) in government policies. The purpose of this 
chapter is to compare observations on these variables’ applicability across contexts in 
order to determine their suitability for generalisation. Key to the analysis is the 
exploration of two questions: do the selected independent variables successfully 
explain implementation gaps in all or only in specific contexts, and have these 
variables proven to be the most relevant to the selected contexts? The aim of this 
chapter is to propose, evaluate and discuss ways to improve the selected variables’ 
explanatory power and generalisability.  
To do so, the following analysis first summarises the applicability of the selected 
variables across case studies (Table 5). It then explores the suitability of each variable 
in turn, highlighting notable findings and offering possible reasons for the extent of their 
explanatory power. Where appropriate, the discussion of each variable aims to offer 
improvements to theorised relationships. Ultimately, this chapter concludes that 
Variable 1 (foreign influence) has explanatory power only in very narrow contexts but is 
unsuitable for generalisations, given that this variable was supported only in one of the 
four case studies. Variables 2 (state capacity) and 3 (economic diversification) that 
were derived from the mainstream literature on implementation were found to be 
applicable in all case studies, but the comparative nature of analysis, combined with 
the particularities of case selection, revealed them to be insufficiently nuanced and/or 
laden with Western-centric assumptions about the studied mechanisms, reducing the 
relevance of the hypotheses they formed to contexts outside the First World. 
While exposing such weaknesses in these variables’ explanatory power, analysis was 
also able  to contributes to future research by proposing adaptations capable of 
increasing these variables’ and their hypotheses’ applicability. It is suggested that 
Variable 2 should be used in tandem with other, more generalisable factors – such as 
political and economic stability – in order to increase its predictive power. It is also 
proposed that Variable 3 should perhaps  focus more on the developments in fiscal 





Summary of examined variables and case studies 
The central question that this research project aims to address is the cause for 
difference between intended and actual policy implementation, also known as the 
implementation gap. For the purposes of the subsequent analysis, implementation 
gaps are defined by three elements: 
• the level of compliance by the polluters, which is in turn shaped by polluters’ 
expectations of government action;  
• the ability and will of the regulatory agencies to enforce regulations that make 
up the government policy; and  
• the political will across government levels to pursue a policy goal and thus 
develop methods and strategies, create legal provisions and set government 
priorities that would facilitate implementation. 
The choice of explanatory variables was driven by the choice of case studies. Russia, 
Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan were selected due to their position as the most prominent 
oil producers in the transitional post-Soviet space. All of these countries are as similar 
as possible in ways supported by literature of the key disciplines in the intersection of 
which this research project rests. However, no two towns, let alone countries, are ever 
entirely identical. The few literature-supported differences between them were taken as 
explanatory variables. 
It was apparent that there was also significant variation in factors between, and even 
within, case countries that lie outside the selected social academic sphere, including 
their geography, climate, distant history, and geopolitical relevance. It was recognised 
that there may exist underlying causal links between such factors and literature 
supported variables that were selected for the project. Incorporating such background 
variation into an analysis of cases, that are otherwise very similar in terms of the key 
investigated social behaviours, is consistent with Most Similar Systems Most Different 
Outcomes research design. Indeed, the ability to include background factors in 
academic enquiry without damaging its overall robustness is one of the main 
advantages of this comparative method.  
Pursuant to the above, this research project undertook to reflect the background 
variation, as well as the relative autonomy, of different territories within Russia by 




and humanitarian differences unsupported by social scientific literature. In comparison 
to Russia, regional autonomy is much lower in Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan and 
therefore, although the analyses in these chapters also focus on the oil-producing 
regions, the analytical framework is essentially national. This brings the total number of 
case studies to four.  
In terms of explanatory variables, the first is concerned with foreign influence and 
hypothesises that its increase could lead to better implementation. For example, 
engaging international NGOs (H1) could improve the accountability of the regulatory 
agencies. Involvement of foreign oil firms (H2) could mean that oil resources are 
developed using more advanced technologies and methods which are more likely to 
achieve compliance with environmental protection (EP) regulations. Finally, exposure 
to international norms (H3) that place value on EP could lead governments, regulators 
and oil firms in individual countries to adopt and internalise them. This could in turn 
improve all three elements of the dependent variable. 
The second explanatory variable is primarily concerned with internal factors that 
influence the effectiveness of EP enforcement and its ability to secure compliance. For 
example, the quality of EP legislation (H4) endows regulatory agencies with sufficient 
guidance and power to pursue their intended goals. At the same time, the amount and 
quality of personnel and equipment, as well as of relationships with other government 
agencies (H5) can either help or hinder regulatory implementation.  
The third and final variable is concerned with the extent to which an economy relies on 
a single economic sector (H6). This situation is particularly significant in contexts with 
dominant oil industries because over-reliance on oil has, in many transitional and 
developing countries, led to negative and destabilising effects on all elements of the 
dependent variable. 
Table 5 below illustrates the subsequent architecture of analysis. Chosen explanatory 
variables are set out in rows against case studies that are presented in columns. Fields 
titled ‘variable manifestation’ give a brief contextual description of each variable with 
respect to each of the case studies. Rows against ‘Predicted impact’ ascertains the 
strength of predicted relationship between the relevant variable and the presence of 
implementation gaps. ‘Yes’ denotes strong to moderate evidence having been found 
during research and analysis in support of a hypothesis, whereas ‘No’ indicates that 









While the table may at first suggest that this research project generated poor results, 
this would be misleading as here lay the premium contributions of this work. As per the 
following analysis, this project has been able to identify when and why variables, drawn 
from mainstream literature, do not apply either at all or in expected ways outside the 
contexts in which they were developed. This has been possible by drawing on the 
observed variation in both background and literature supported factors, and on the 
detected underlying mechanisms between them, afforded by the comparative analysis. 
Meanwhile, these observations have also made it possible to hypothesise on how best 
to improve weak variables in order to increase their usefulness for future research and 
the following analysis does so wherever possible. This includes adding greater nuance 
to variables to strengthen hypotheses based on them, or increasing their vagueness in 
order to remove inherent context-based assumptions and thus improve their 
generalisability, or proposing when a variable should be used in a dependent or 
explanatory capacity. 
	  
Explanatory variable 1 – Foreign influence 
Out of the three variables, foreign influence was shown to have the least explanatory 
power. While all factors that compose this variable showed potential to have a positive 
impact on EP implementation, the analysis of the four case studies suggested these 
promises of tangible improvements in implementation are rarely fulfilled. In some 
cases, foreign influence could have a negative impact.  
The factors that constitute this variable – NGOs, commercial international firms, and 
norm diffusion – are sufficiently different to merit separate discussions. The motivations 
to investigate each of these factors were driven by different academic disciplines and 
the application of contrasting paradigms. Accordingly, it would not be appropriate to 
speak of findings from dissimilar hypotheses in aggregate terms. Each of the 
hypotheses belonging to Variable 1 are therefore considered separately below. 
	  
Hypothesis 1: The greater the presence of international advocacy groups within 
a region, the smaller the implementation gap.  
International non-governmental organisations (INGOs) showed potential to improve EP 




over the oil firms’ compliance. However, the official regulators did not always employ 
such assistance for the purposes of environmental protection, as in Atyrau, where 
domestic and international NGOs appear to be used by the state as a tool in its 
struggle over oil profits with foreign oil firms.  
It also seems that by offering funding, INGOs can create dependence among local civil 
movements. This seems to have reduced local NGOs’ drive to secure grassroots’ 
support, thus slowing down the development of civil organisations. As such, when 
foreign funding disappeared, the local civil movements and NGOs deteriorated without 
it. This appears to be true of both Atyrau and Baku; In contrast, in Tatarstan, no INGOs 
actively engage with local actors, either from within or outside the region. Neither does 
Tatarstan seem to have any civil society of its own with an interest in oil-related EP 
(although other environmental issues have attracted civil attention). Yet, out of the four 
case studies, Tatarstan has performed the best in terms of the implementation gaps. In 
light of this, empirical analysis did not support the presence of a causal link between 
international advocacy groups and the dependent variable. 
Possible explanation: the only case study that showed positive impact of INGOs was 
Nenets, which did not have its own, consistently active environmental NGOs or broader 
civil movements. This suggests that INGOs can have consistently positive impact only 
when they fill an absolute vacuum in the civil space, and are allowed by the state to do 
so. Even so, while the Nenets analysis showed that INGO activity has great potential to 
improve implementation, research did not find concrete evidence that it necessarily 
does so in practice.  
 
Hypothesis 2: The greater the presence of foreign oil firms within a region, the 
smaller the implementation gap. 
As in the case of H1, findings provided no concrete evidence to support the hypothesis 
that foreign oil firms are more compliant with EP laws and regulations in the host 
countries than the local oil firms. It was instead found that international firms often have 
more capacity than local firms to comply with local and international regulations due to 
their often significantly superior technologies, practices, R&D capabilities and other 
resources. However, this does not necessarily appear to translate into actual legal 
compliance.  
On the one hand, this may be a sign of the local EP legislation being unrealistically 




in emergencies, despite this being necessary to prevent serious incidents. In such 
instances, consistent legal compliance risks an environmental catastrophe and can 
become impossible.  
On the other hand, the analysis of the case studies showed that foreign oil firms at 
times fall short of matching even local firms’ compliance records. For example, Russian 
oil firms appear to have worked out how to utilise APG in the Arctic, whereas 
interviewed representatives of non-Russian firms still appear to think that this is 
‘impossible’ (intrv. 6,16,17, Nenets case study).  
In Kazakhstan, foreign oil firms have been known to misreport and deny their 
environmental impact despite scientific evidence to the contrary. In Azerbaijan, BP 
appears to have caused a major environmental incident due to its disregard of 
mechanisms put in place to prevent such situations, notably its legal and contractual 
responsibilities to alert other stakeholders including the host government of their 
infringements (prior to the incident) as well as partner firms, shareholders and 
international regulators (after the incident).  
The following offers some possible explanations as to why international firms do not 
behave as well as might be expected. It is notable that environmental performance 
over the last three decades seems to be at its worst at oil fields that still held 
substantial reserves at the start of the three countries’ transition in 1991. This includes 
the Kharyaga oil field in Nenets, both Tengiz and Kashagan in Atyrau and the offshore 
oil fields in Azerbaijan. In contrast to this first group, environmental performance 
appears to have been better at the oil fields that were already nearing depletion at the 
start of transition, in other words all fields of conventional oil in Tatarstan. Contrasting 
background factors in the case studies, and their latent impact on selected variables, 
provided a number of explanations for variations in performance between these 
groups. They are reviewed below. 
Oil deposit limitations. The governments controlling both groups of oil fields had 
similar motivations but very different capabilities. Oil revenues were required to 
revitalise collapsed economies and fund public goods in the immediate aftermath of the 
USSR’s collapse. For the governments of the first group, this meant getting untapped 
oil out of the ground as soon as possible; how this was done did not matter as much. 
The government of Tatarstan, however, faced a different challenge: oil was already 
being pumped and was already in decline. Its supply and commercial value therefore 
needed to be maintained for as long as possible. This required a) reducing wastage of 




extracting and processing the more difficult hydrocarbons. Both objectives required 
new methods and technologies, which coincidentally produced more environmentally 
friendly performance. As such, Tatarstan’s oil industry appears to have been driven by 
commercial interests, which then allowed for relatively easy compliance with Russia’s 
developing and improving EP legislation. In contrast, the oil industries operating the 
first group of fields did not have similar incentives. As such, variation of the dependent 
variable might have less to do with oil firms’ origin and more with the challenges and 
motivations that drive them. 
Foreign Investment and PSAs. The government of Tatarstan had the capacity to 
pursue its oil industry strategy autonomously, whereas governments in the first group 
did not. By 1991, Tatarstan already possessed a developed oil industry that had 
already started innovating and therefore was already prepared to generate and 
increase oil revenues. More importantly, Tatarstan had access to exporting 
infrastructure to make those revenues reality.  
In comparison, pipelines from Kazakh and Azeri oil fields or refineries were also built 
during the Soviet era, but led only to Russia. Once the USSR collapsed, oil 
transportation to international markets became an issue for Kazakhstan and 
Azerbaijan. Opening up new, more lucrative fields without building new infrastructure 
could not solve this issue. At the same time, the necessary capital to sustain 
Kazakhstan’s and Azerbaijan’s vastly inefficient oil industries ceased to flow in from 
Russia, which focussed more on its own industry. Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan therefore 
had no means to collect revenues from their oil industry, nor to make it profitable.  
In the Russian Arctic, the situation was similar: the Kharyaga oil field was discovered in 
the 1980s, but its location beyond the Arctic Circle and far away from any 
transportation options necessitated substantial investment in infrastructure and 
extraction facilities. No local actors had access to such substantial financial means at 
the time.  
For these reasons, oil operations in Nenets, Atyrau and Baku needed substantial 
foreign investment at the start of their transitional periods in order to become profitable 
and support their governments’ economic objectives. However, the transitional period 
that all studied countries were entering in 1991 was expected to be difficult, taking 
them from a command to a market economy and from communism to democracy. 
Furthermore, unlike Russia, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan were facing certain state-
building challenges such as rediscovering their national identities and uniting 




In view of these challenges, instability within the newly formed countries was expected, 
and foreign oil firms that secured contracts at their oil fields sought to protect their 
investments. To do so, many entered 30- to 40-year Production Sharing Agreements 
(PSAs) with the host governments (usually represented by nationalised oil firms), which 
froze the environmental norms and other constraints which applied to their work for the 
duration of the agreement. This is what happened to the oil fields in the first group, and 
over the following decades, PSAs became part of the problem in regulating 
environmental performance.  
Because of the PSAs’ rule-freezing effect, EP laws that were passed later either did not 
affect the PSA projects or led to a conflict of perspectives. For example, PSA clauses 
about oil firms minimising their environmental impact can be open for interpretation if 
their language is sufficiently vague. Government regulators could argue that new EP 
laws fall under such clauses, while oil firms could argue the opposite. Non-compliance 
therefore depends on one’s vantage point, making EP implementation with regards to 
PSAs difficult and at times equivocal.  
Lack of political interest in EP.  PSAs allow oil firms to recover all their investments, 
including on environmentally friendly measures, from future revenues and before 
paying royalties to host governments. Theoretically, this makes it easier for firms within 
PSAs to make investments that could ensure their legal compliance with EP 
regulations. This begs the question as to why they don’t take advantage of this 
situation.  
There are numerous reasons for this, but previous chapters suggest that a lack of 
political interest in EP is the most significant. For example, the Kazakh government 
perceived its share of revenues from PSAs as unreasonably low, and was frustrated by 
continuous delays in production. This appears to have disinclined the government to 
encourage any spending, such as on EP measures, that could cause more delays or 
further reduce revenues. Instead, the Kazakh government sought to increase its 
returns, choosing environmental fines as one of its key tools (Tairova, 2014; 
Orazgaliyev, 2018). As such, EP non-compliance appears to be in this government’s 
interest.  
In Azerbaijan, the government does not seem to hold any interest in EP in the oil 
industry. The situation was somewhat different in Nenets, although the result was 
similar. For example, Total was set to improve its APG utilisation in the Kharyaga PSA, 
but the equipment purchased for this was embargoed by Western sanctions following 




continues to flare up to 75% of its APG (intrv. 22, Nenets case study), whereas the 
legal allowance is 5%.  
 
Conclusion 
In light of the above, it could be argued that imminent depletion of oil fields could 
motivate technological and methodological improvements, which in turn could lead to 
inadvertent EP compliance. However, this causal relationship was observed in only 
one case study, making it ungeneralisable without further research to test it.  
It could also be argued that it is the PSAs entered into with international firms, rather 
than the fact that the firms are international, that produce a negative impact on the 
dependent variable. For example, foreign, Western firms have performed better in 
Nenets when working in joint ventures than in a PSA, although still not as well as 
Russian firms on some indicators – if official figures, which are largely based on firms’ 
self-reporting, are to be believed. It should also be noted that there seems to be a 
significant difference in EP compliance between Western and non-Western 
international firms: North American and North European oil firms tend to perform better 
than South European and East Asian ones. 
 
Hypothesis 3: The more the relevant stakeholders of the host region are exposed 
to transnational elements, the smaller the implementation gap. 
The third hypothesis concerns norm diffusion in relation to elites and individuals, 
including the ability of binding and voluntary international obligations to improve host 
countries’ implementation efforts. However, analysis did not suggest a significant 
correlation. Similarly to Variable 1 itself, this hypothesis also comprises a number of 




With regard to formal measures, such as international agreements, results were 
especially poor in Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. These countries have unitary style 




This meant that analyses of these case studies were to a great degree national, 
despite the focus on particular regions within the two countries. For similar reasons it 
makes sense to refer to the Central Asian case studies by the name of the whole 
country, whereas the Russian case studies are distinctive enough to identify them as 
separate from the Russian nationwide context. What became apparent during the 
analyses of Atyrau and Baku was that their national governments are simply not 
interested in fulfilling their international environmental commitments. For example, both 
have been assessed as failing to deliver their international commitments under the 
Aarhus Convention, which requires free public access to environmental information; 
the governments of Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, however, do not seem to perceive this 
as problematic and do not appear to have plans for improving compliance. 
Possible explanation: analysis in previous chapters suggested that the weakness in 
the enforcement of such international measures may be responsible for individual 
governments not taking such commitments seriously. At the same time, the occasional 
variation in the international community’s response to similar instances of non-
compliance appear to further reduce signatory countries’ perception that 
implementation (of either international or domestic standards) is compulsory or even 
necessary.  
In the Russian case studies, unlike for the two unitary countries, it was harder to 
analyse the impact of international agreements because the system of government is 
much more fragmented and devolved due to its federal structure. The decision to enter 
international treaties is taken at the national level; consequently, the responsibility for 
delivering international commitments lies with the central government in Russia, 
whereas EP implementation tends to be very local. This split in responsibility restricts 
the relevance of international commitments when looking at regional contexts in 
Russia. This became increasingly apparent during data collection for this research 
project: data for the Russian case studies did not reveal a meaningful link between 
international agreements and local-level implementation. 
Drawing on observations relevant to the present research project across all four case 
studies, analysis did not indicate a clear link between a) binding and non-binding 
international commitments and b) attitudes towards EP among the ruling elites or 
structures. Meanwhile, observations specific to the Russian context question the 
relevance of international agreements to federal governments, which may invite 






International financial and developmental institutions often pursue large, labour-
intensive infrastructure projects, employing workers from the local population, or offer 
training to raise skills among groups of local stakeholders. At the same time, 
international institutions can be expected to follow international environmental norms, 
which are often more advanced than those of the host country. Given these factors, 
international institutions were hypothesised to represent effective channels for the 
diffusion of superior EP norms and attitudes to the local population. However, analysis 
showed positive effects of norm diffusion by international institutions in only one of the 
four case studies.  
Possible explanations: the work of international financial and developmental 
institutions in individual countries is often delivered locally or through particular actors 
such as NGOs, subcontractors, and government departments. As such, these 
institutions were found to be likely to change individual practices, but their impact on 
wider EP values can at times be (perceived as) negligible or even counterproductive 
due to the lack of project coordination between these institutions. Furthermore, projects 
pursued by such institutions vary in terms of their own attitudes toward EP and 
compliance with local EP regulations. For these reasons, it was found that international 
institutions are unlikely to deliver a consistent message about EP, which local actors 
perceive as valuable enough to accept and internalise. 
Baku is a good example of this: there, the World Bank’s Global Gas Flaring Reduction 
(GGFR) unit offered training and equipment to the national oil firm SOCAR in order to 
reduce APG flaring, a major environmental problem subject to international norms. As 
a result, venting and flaring were significantly reduced, helping Azerbaijan to meet its 
international commitment. However, instead of framing APG flaring as an 
environmental protection issue, GGFR instead pitched it to the Azeri government as an 
energy issue using the fact that APG can be used as fuel. While this was a successful 
tactic, it did not seem to substantially improve EP attitudes either within SOCAR (for 
instance, in relation to non-air-based pollution) or the Azeri state more generally. 
The only case study in which international institutions appear to have had a 
consistently positive impact is that of Nenets. The region’s mono-economic 
characteristics and a low level of overall industrialisation may explain this. These 
factors provide for a relatively narrow set of environmental problems for international 
institutions to focus on, which improves their potential to deliver a consistent message. 




messages particularly noticeable, increasing their diffusion across local actors. 
Furthermore, international institutions’ projects tend to appear in a positive light against 
the background of the local formal regulation effort, which is especially limited due to 
the region’s difficult geography and lack of infrastructure. This further improves the 
potential for norm diffusion.  
The greater support for H3 found in Nenets than in other case studies may also be due 
to Nenets’ increased receptivity to foreign assistance. This is linked to its long-term 
positive trade relationships and EP cooperation with neighbouring Nordic countries. 
Furthermore, issues around oil development in the Arctic are highly specific and enjoy 
a strong international profile. As such, they are more likely to attract intense, united and 
coherent intervention from the international community. In contrast, the impact of poor 
environmental protection at Caspian oil fields in Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan is limited 
to the immediate areas: there are no First World countries sharing the Caspian Sea 
with these states. Incidents at these oil deposits therefore pose a much smaller risk to 
the international community, which could explain why they have received less 
international attention compared to those in the Russian Arctic. 
It is likely that all of these reasons contribute to international institutions’ positive impact 
in Nenets, but this case study is too specific to allow findings relating to it to be easily 
generalised. This suggests that analysis of international institutions can show 
consistently positive impact in such unconventional contexts. However, actual impact 
on implementation remains difficult to measure. Findings supported the existence of 




International travel, including for educational purposes, did not appear to produce 
significant impact in any of the case studies. A possible explanation for this finding, and 
one which emerged by consensus from interview data, is that even if individuals prove 
receptive to the new norms they encounter abroad it is unlikely that they would have 
opportunities to put these values and behaviours into practice at home. Instead, such 
individuals are more likely to either revert to their original behaviour or to remove 
themselves from contexts that need changing by seeking out contexts that already 




level of an individual, and the subsequent influence of reformed individuals on 
institutional cultures (Bochner, 1981; Brown, 2009), could not be supported. 
 
Variable 1 conclusion 
The Tatarstan case study showed the least involvement with or exposure to 
international NGOs, firms or developmental/financial institutions. Considering that the 
best environmental performance was observed there, it could be argued that concepts 
of environment and environmental protection need to develop internally in order to find 
successful implementation.  
However, although Tatarstan’s involvement may be limited, it would not be correct to 
describe the region as isolated. On the contrary, it has oriented itself externally since 
the start of transition in 1991, if not before. Its oil company, research institutions, and 
relevant government departments have actively sought to gain knowledge of 
alternative methods and practices outside Russia, and aimed to compete in domestic 
and international markets. It is therefore, perhaps, not norms that should develop 
internally; internal development of strategies and of capacity for their implementation is 
likely of greater importance. This would imply that the host government understood the 
value of the norms it had actively chosen to implement, implying that implementation 
might have been less successful in Tatarstan were it to receive external financial and 
strategic assistance. In other words, if the host government is not necessarily spending 
its own money, it may consider intended outcomes and strategies less carefully.  
In this context, the origins of international assistance would include all international 
actors discussed in relation to Variable 1. For example, assistance with developing 
implementation strategies could come from international NGOs, as part of international 
treaties, or through consultation offered by international developmental and financial 
institutions. These actors and institutions, as well as foreign oil firms, could also provide 
financial assistance for implementation, albeit in different ways. For example, foreign 
oil firms often bring advanced technology with them, which tends to be more 
environmentally friendly. This reduces the burden on the host government to stimulate 
or support domestic firms to develop or acquire such technology. 
At the same time, it would be unwise to overlook Tatarstan’s significant political and 
economic stability relative to Atyrau and Baku or its significant independence relative to 
Nenets. Without these, Tatarstan’s government might not have had the luxury of being 




priority that governments in the other case studies give to EP: while they might 
understand the EP norms they have taken on, in the context of political and economic 
instability they might not be able to prioritise the resolution of such issues. In the case 
of Nenets, the local government did not have the financial freedom before oil extraction 
commenced, nor the political scope once oil made Nenets one of the key contributors 
to the federal budget, to set its policy agenda. 
This implies that without foreign and international assistance, EP implementation could 
have found even less success in countries such as Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, or in 
remote regions such as the Arctic. However, analyses also highlighted the risk of 
foreign involvement potentially contributing to negative attitudes towards EP’s value in 
the host countries. As such, there is at best insufficient evidence to confirm the 
explanatory value of Variable 1. 
 
Explanatory variable 2 – State capacity 
Hypothesis 4: The better the quality of the environmental regulation for the oil 
industry, the smaller the implementation gap; and  
Hypothesis 5: The greater the quality of environmental regulatory agency in the 
sphere of the oil industry, the smaller the implementation gap. 
These hypotheses tested the impact of state capacity, narrowly defined as regulatory 
quality in terms of legislation and of enforcement structures. Given that this definition is 
tighter than the spread of hypotheses under Variable 1, the two hypotheses under 
Variable 2 are analysed together. It became apparent early on during the analysis of 
these factors that although state capacity is important in the delivery of EP, it does not 
necessarily have significant impact on actual implementation. This is because EP 
regulation could be used to achieve ends unrelated to EP. Improvements in regulatory 
legislation or quality could therefore be superficial, in the sense that without the political 
will to use them for their intended purpose, they might not necessarily lead to better EP 
outcomes. This kind of implementation would therefore also be superficial. 
For example, in the case of Kazakhstan, EP legislation has improved in quality while 
also becoming one of the national government’s main fiscal tools. In this situation, oil 
companies appear to believe that they will be fined whether or not they meet legal 
requirements, which likely reduced their willingness to achieve compliance. This could, 




environmental issue with open-air sulphur storage outside the Tengiz oil deposit, and 
why Eni made so many mistakes at the Kashagan oil deposit: both had insufficient 
incentives to perform better.  
Although a similar situation has existed in Tatarstan, the outcome has been very 
different. Interviewees also talked of Tatneft facing the type of regulation that could 
disincentivise compliance (intrv. 3,5,7, Tatarstan case study), yet this has not taken 
place. On the contrary, the situation was said to increase Tatneft’s drive both to 
become compliant and to challenge unjust penalties (intrv. 3,5, Tatarstan case study). 
It is noteworthy that none of the Tatarstan’s interviewees assessed Tatneft as non-
compliant with EP legislation or otherwise spoke poorly of its environmental 
performance. One could argue that there might be an element of partisanship at play 
here, given that Tatneft is a local firm (although it is technically no longer owned by 
Tatarstan’s government), whereas EP regulations are administered by federal 
structures. This could drive polarisation between the local and the federal identities. 
However, international environmental NGOs (IENGOs), which do not have offices or 
any other identifiable personal investment in Tatarstan, also assess Tatneft in a 
positive light. In comparison, while Chevron and Eni also challenge EP penalties in 
Kazakhstan, a significant number of Atyrau interviewees including IENGOs did not 
seem to think such penalties were unjust.  
 
Possible explanations 
This difference of outcomes in EP implementation, despite arguably equivalent quality 
of state capacity in Kazakhstan and Tatarstan, suggests that other factors, such as the 
degree of both political and economic stability enjoyed by a state, might influence 
whether improvements in state capacity lead to better, intended implementation. 
Analysis in previous chapters suggests that these factors influence the political will of 
governments and regulators to implement arguably non-essential policy areas, such as 
EP. Results strongly suggest that political and economic stability might lead to better 
implementation even when the quality of legislation or of the implementing agencies 
might be considered insufficient. Since none of the case studies could be described as 
politically or economically stable in conventional terms, their stability can instead be 
defined relatively to each other. The following analysis explores the case studies in 




Azerbaijan could be described as the most economically unstable at the start of the 
transitional period. It was also the most politically unstable due to conflict with Armenia, 
the government’s handling of which caused widespread public discontent. Political 
instability remained an issue in the 2000s: Heydar Aliyev, Azerbaijan’s first president, 
died in 2003 and left the presidency to his son, Ilham Aliyev. Before his death, Heydar 
had built a highly centralised, autocratic state in which “he placed only his most loyal 
followers in important positions” (Kendall-Taylor, 2011). These followers were not 
necessarily loyal to his son, Ilham, who upon his ascent to power had to ensure other 
politically powerful families’ support anew.  
The process of securing such support was rocky, initially working through oil-funded 
hand-outs and then by distributing oil profits via often unnecessary and inefficient 
government tenders (Kendall-Taylor, 2011). The autocratic nature of the regime 
continued to intensify throughout the 2010s and the cost of maintaining it has likely 
increased, further tying political stability to economic performance. This has arguably 
rendered Azerbaijan’s political situation increasingly fragile despite improved economic 
performance.  
These issues have made a lasting impact on the central government by drawing 
attention (if not necessarily resources) away from non-essential state functions such as 
delivering EP. The political will to pursue EP therefore remained low. Accordingly, out 
of the countries studied, the quality of EP legislation was found to be the lowest in 
Azerbaijan. A number of different sources of legislation exist in parallel, for example 
domestic law and international agreements. The objectives of these laws do not 
necessarily align, nor feed into a broader framework of EP policy goals. The quality of 
EP regulatory agencies was also found to be the lowest of the four case studies. 
Research revealed insufficient funding or understanding of primary implementation 
objectives at different governmental levels, combined with particularly low levels of 
initiative and a strong propensity for corruption. Unsurprisingly, research data collected 
during this project suggested that implementation success was the lowest in 
Azerbaijan.  
Kazakhstan, in comparison to Azerbaijan, enjoyed relatively high political stability from 
the outset of the transitional period. Politically important clans tended to unite rather 
than compete (Junisbai and Junisbai, 2005). However, the long-term contracts that the 
Kazakh government signed with Chevron and Eni appear to have led to 
disproportionately low or significantly delayed oil revenues for the Kazakh state. 




As a result, the Kazakh government appears to be more interested in recovering what 
it perceives to be its fair share of oil profits, including through the use of EP regulation, 
than in implementing its formal EP objectives. This has meant the development of a 
relatively comprehensive and sophisticated framework of environmental legislation, but 
which has been misused to achieve goals that come across as more fiscal than 
environmental.  
This is reflected in shortfalls in the quality of the regulatory regime. Aside from the 
significant fragmentation of regulatory responsibilities and a series of other issues that 
could be expected in a transitional state, the main EP body – the Ministry of 
Environment – was abolished in 2014 and its functions passed to the Ministry of 
Energy and Natural Resources. This key incident signalled the re-prioritisation of 
government goals with economic objectives trumping environmental ones. Although 
enforcement of EP legislation has remained consistently active, broader EP 
implementation from then onwards seems to have lost the last pretence of seeking to 
achieve improvements in EP. On the contrary, in 2017 the OECD assessed 
Kazakhstan’s EP regulatory regime as impeding environmental improvements. 
As such, it could be that EP implementation has been marginally better in Kazakhstan 
than in Azerbaijan, since there is a lot more evidence of enforcement of environmental 
law. However, political will appears to be inappropriately targeted, as the enforcement 
of EP legislation does not seem to lead to improved EP as often as could be expected. 
Implementation therefore cannot be described as successful. Once the economic 
stability in the country improves, as delayed Kashagan oil moves into profit, the Kazakh 
government could be expected to re-prioritise its political agenda towards post-material 
objectives, such as EP. 
The political and economic stability of Nenets is not directly comparable to the other 
case studies. The situation in this region is most similar to that of Kazakhstan and 
Tatarstan, but still quite different. It has never enjoyed political autonomy on par with 
that of Tatarstan, including in terms of regulating oil, its sole industrial sector. This 
makes political stability somewhat less relevant as a factor in Nenets. Nonetheless, it 
could not be described as politically unstable at any point during the last 30 years. Its 
small population has also enjoyed relatively high economic stability, thanks to 
disproportionately high royalties from the Kharyaga PSA.  
In terms of state capacity, EP legislation across Russia has been improving and was 
consistently described by interviewees in Nenets as capable of achieving meaningful 




new principles, such as requiring firms to use best available technologies instead of 
setting arguably arbitrary limits on allowed pollution – the effectiveness of which was 
for decades measured by the number of fines rather than by improvements to EP 
indicators. Furthermore, the Russian government has been paying particular attention 
to the Arctic and has developed a range of policies and laws specific to environmental 
protection in this difficult climate. Meanwhile, the oil industry itself has been developing 
soft, voluntary tools for self-regulation on EP performance, including in the Arctic, which 
have significant potential to supplement official EP laws.  
Regulatory agencies’ effectiveness is similarly improving. New measures are set to be 
introduced to allow distance monitoring of firms’ compliance with legal EP standards. 
Once introduced, this will help alleviate existing problems with enforcement efforts 
(including insufficient personnel, equipment and data) which currently complicate not 
only the work of individual regulatory agencies but also their inter-relations with each 
other. The political will to pursue EP implementation therefore appears to be high. 
These improvements, however, have taken place at the central level, whereas 
implementation happens locally. Therefore, they tell us little about the extent of the 
political will to see these improvements through where arguably it matters most. It is 
notable in the case of Nenets that the regional government has been able to exert 
almost no control over its oil industry. In Nenets, the bulk of regulation, including on 
EP, has resided outside the region for much of the recent history – either in the 
neighbouring Arkhangelsk or with federal structures.  
Nenets could therefore be described as remote both physically and in terms of its place 
in the government’s chain of executive structures. This appears to also affect the 
political will to pursue EP at the country’s periphery; since the main structures 
responsible for implementing EP have been so far removed from the physical context, 
they appear to have cared less about the environmental impact of the oil industry as 
long as there are oil revenues coming into the federal budget (intrv. 20, Nenets case 
study). Here, however, political will applies more to central government structures. It 
would be meaningless to talk of political will in the local context, where local actors, 
including the government structures and the regulators with ultimate responsibility for 
delivering EP implementation, have little political power. In the context of Nenets, it 
might therefore be more useful to treat the political will of the central government as an 
explanatory variable rather than a component of the dependent variable. 
Until the recent federal-level improvements are successfully implemented and deliver 




implementation, the success of implementation efforts in Nenets will remain difficult to 
judge. Having said that, EP performance in Nenets nonetheless appears better than in 
Kazakhstan or Azerbaijan, even if only by virtue of Nenets’ oil industry’s relative youth 
and much smaller volumes of extraction.  
Tatarstan, in contrast to both Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, and to some degree to 
Nenets, enjoyed both relatively high economic and politically stability before and after it 
entered transition. Its governing structures have a long history and show a relatively 
high degree of statesmanship, and its economy has also developed in recent centuries 
and has become increasingly diversified and successful since 1991. This differentiates 
it from the other case studies, appearing to have allowed the state to meet its 
immediate functions and then to concentrate on nonessential issues, such as EP.  
As such, there was a relatively low level of conflict between Tatarstan’s economic and 
environmental policies, meaning that the government could pursue both without 
economic concerns supressing the political will to pursue environmental goals. 
Furthermore, the route to economic goals seemed to lie through environmental 
improvements. As shown in the case of Tatarstan, where governmental and industrial 
goals are so closely aligned, the need for EP legislation can fall away when there are 
other factors that drive compliance.  
Strong political will for EP also manifested as greater attention to the regulatory 
agencies in Tatarstan, which increased in number and obtained better equipment, 
personnel and working relationships than in other case studies. Although numerous 
regulatory agencies can create their own problems, this was nonetheless shown to 
have a positive outcome on EP implementation in the oil sector, which in Tatarstan has 
been the most successful of the four case studies.  
 
Variable 2 conclusion 
This analysis indicates a strong correlation between a) political and economic stability 
and b) the political will to pursue EP implementation, which can in turn lead to better 
implementation even if the more conventional aspects of state capacity (such as high 
quality legislation and unambiguously effective regulatory agencies) may be missing. 
This also suggests that the concept of state capacity, as defined in First World 
academic literature, might be too laden with assumptions of Western-style instituions. 
As such, this concept might be too narrow to be useful in non First World contexts 




and institutions, many of them informal or even contradictory to First World 
conceptualisations, and thus not captured by the term. Consideration of stability could 
help analysis capture a level above such subjective definitions by implicitly 
encompassing the non-conventional components of effective statecraft that could be 
expected to follow in a favourable context. 
In turn the relationship, between political / economic stability and political will, and by 
extension – intended implementation, appears to hold only if EP regulatory functions 
are present at the relevant level of government and in the relevant physical location. 
For example, the local government and the key EP regulatory structures for the oil 
industry were both based in Tatarstan rather than Moscow between the early 1990s 
and 2007. This correlates with relatively high EP implementation. In contrast, the 
government and EP structures that oversaw the oil industry in Nenets were based 
either in Arkhangelsk or in Moscow for much of the transitional period. Accordingly, 
judging from the limited available data, implementation outcomes have been not as 
good here.  
Given the apparent importance of these factors, the explanatory power of state 
capacity could be increased by testing it in tandem with political and economic stability, 
and with distance between policymakers and implementers. Furthermore, analysis 
suggests that political will could be more useful as a dependent variable in contexts 
where the immediate governmental and regulatory structures have some kind of 
tangible, direct control over the policy target group (as in Tatarstan, Atyrau and Baku). 
In opposing contexts such as Nenets, where these structures have little real control 
over policy delivery, the political will of the more powerful levels of government is more 
useful as an independent variable. 
 
Explanatory variable 3 – Economic conditions 
Hypothesis 6: The more advanced the economic conditions in a regional 
economy, the smaller the implementation gap. 
This hypothesis tested for the impact of regional economic conditions, defined as a) the 
presence of economic sectors unrelated to oil and b) the contribution of the oil sector to 
government budgets relative to that of other sectors. These factors were selected at 
the outset of this research project because they appeared to vary significantly across 




• the mono-economy of Nenets seemed entirely dependent on oil; 
• Atyrau’s economy appeared to have some other economic activity, but was 
clearly dominated by oil;  
• the economy of Tatarstan was unmistakably well diversified;  
• Baku is the capital of Azerbaijan and therefore the centre of all economic 
activity in the country. 
However, a closer analysis revealed that oil dependence could mean many different 
things, even within the same case studies. This observation indicated that despite the 
appearance of variation, oil dependence is in many ways consistently high across the 
cases studied. This is because, in oil-extracting regions, economic sectors that may 
appear to be unrelated to oil were shown to be in fact often associated with it in one 
way or another. For example, the petrochemical industries in Tatarstan and Atyrau use 
locally extracted oil as raw material. Without the oil-extracting sector, the petrochemical 
sector would collapse, at least in the short to medium term, until oil can be redirected to 
these facilities from other extraction sites.  
Similarly, the construction sector, which is often very strong in such regions, was 
revealed to correlate directly with oil extraction, which it enables. For example, facilities 
need to be built to extract oil, accommodation is required to house seasonal oil 
workers, and infrastructure is necessary to transport workers to extraction sites and 
then extracted oil to markets. Furthermore, workers (especially those coming from 
abroad) often bring their families, which may also necessitate the construction of 
schools and leisure facilities. Without an oil project starting up in the local area, none of 
these construction projects would likely materialise.  
There are also other types of construction, especially so in Azerbaijan, that are funded 
by revenues from already-extracted oil instead of facilitating extraction. Their purpose 
is said to be the distribution of oil revenues from the political leadership to other groups 
within the ruling elite so as to secure political stability in the country and maintain 
power (Kendall-Taylor, 2011). Azerbaijan is known for extravagantly expensive projects 
that would fit this category, such as the world’s biggest flagpole and most expensive 
road (14km between Baku and the international airport cost US$18 million per 
kilometre, compared to the average of US$6M in USA and US$7M in the EU (CESD, 





Even the agricultural, catering and services sectors were shown to be related to oil, as 
in Kazakhstan, where these industries appear to be growing mostly to accommodate 
the needs of the oil industry. When an oil project pauses or closes, seasonal workers 
depart and local workers in these sectors find themselves unemployed (intrv. 14, 
Kazakhstan case study). Even sectors without a discernable connection to oil, such as 
IT and frontier technologies in Tatarstan or Finance in Azerbaijan, are unlikely to 
contribute as much to government budgets as the oil sectors. Even in Tatarstan, whose 
economy is in some ways the most diversified of all those studied, tax and non-tax 
payments from the hydrocarbon industry still constitute more than a half of the 
government’s budget.  
As such, non-oil-related activity in oil-rich regions is unlikely to sufficiently supplement 
government spending should the oil sector suddenly become unprofitable. 
Subsequently, over-dependence on oil was indicated in all case studies. What 
particular economic conditions then explain the variation in the dependent variable? 
 
Possible explanation 
What proved significant, in terms of the impact on implementation, was which 
economic sectors are present rather than their presence per se or their relative 
contribution to the budget. For example, Tatarstan’s petrochemical sector is far more 
advanced than those of the other case studies, and revenues that the government 
collects in taxes from the wider hydrocarbon industry therefore include a high 
proportion of added value due to the production and exportation of oil goods rather 
than simple sales of crude oil. At the same time, the proportion of sales in oil products 
has been growing, while sales of crude – shrinking. 
This decreasing exposure to upstream oil has made Tatarstan’s economy relatively 
resilient compared to those of the other case studies. By doing so, it provides the 
political leadership with greater financial stability: external shocks, such as fluctuations 
in global oil prices, do not necessarily affect short-term government revenues and 
spending. In turn, this reduces the government’s reliance on its key industry and thus 
also reduces risks of regulatory capture, thus improving the potential for successful 
implementation of government regulations.  
Furthermore, economic sectors in Tatarstan can, and have even been intentionally 
developed to, utilise waste and by-products from the oil industry. This appears to 




that Russia has a more developed fiscal regime, or ability to collect taxes, than other 
case studies. This acts to further stabilise governmental budgets and subsequent 
expenditure, reducing the risk of state capture and associated issues with 
implementation.  
In light of this, it might be more productive to test not for economic diversification, which 
looks at the general level of development within an economy, but instead to test for the 
level of development within the hydrocarbon industry, proportions of upstream and 
downstream oil sales, and the functionality of a government’s fiscal regime. 
 
Other considerations 
A range of factors were considered at the outset of this research project, including 
democratisation, the potential presence of a resource curse, and corruption. This 
section summarises what was inadvertently discovered in relation to these factors and 
their ability to explain the dependent variable in the course of data collection and 
analysis in this research project.  
Regarding democratisation, a significant difference was observed between the case 
studies. Although none could probably be described as democratic in accordance with 
international definitions, far greater freedoms were detected in the Russian regions, 
where civil society was relatively strong, or at least relatively free to pursue its 
objectives. In comparison, the situations in Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan were much 
more restrictive, and interviewees spoke of fear when referring to the public and private 
sectors and cited frequent occasions of harassment, coercion and detention as a result 
of pursuing their goals. However, this factor is more relevant to the actors discussed in 
the first hypothesis, and variation on that causal relationship did not show significant 
influence on implementation gaps. While it could be argued that democratisation could 
improve the impact of such actors on the dependent variable, this would be 
hypothetical and does not explain the currently observed variation on the dependent 
variable between case studies.  
Similarly weak support was found for to the presence and consequences of a resource 
curse, at least in the Russian and Kazakh case studies. In Azerbaijan, the symptoms of 
this condition were more pronounced, but arguably still not as significant as those 
predicted by key theories in this discipline. For example, despite its significant 




standards of living across all levels of society and is actively investing in the 
development of human capital within the country. Other elements, such as poor income 
distribution and issues with civil liberties, are reminiscent of the resource curse; but 
such issues are also often present in transitional and developing countries without 
hydrocarbons. As such, findings were inconclusive on this factor. Furthermore, 
although Variable 3 tested some aspects of the resource curse, it was not dependence 
on oil that was shown to have a defining effect on the dependent variable.  
Another variable that was considered at the outset of this research project was 
corruption. This issue was not pursued because, given the pervasiveness of corruption 
across the identified case studies, there appeared to be little variation in this factor 
between cases. However, in the course of research, it became apparent that the nature 
and extent of corruption do vary between the case studies. At the same time, this 
variation was not entirely independent from that of the selected variables. As such, in 
Azerbaijan, where state capacity and economic conditions were both found to be the 
weakest, corruption was more prominent and of a different kind to that found in the 
other locations. In Kazakhstan and Russia, corruption came across as, in a sense, 
more predictable and organised: orchestrated from the top down and cultivated to 
achieve specific state goals. In comparison, corruption in Azerbaijan appeared more 
rampant, opportunistic and chaotic, at times bordering on lawlessness. 
At the same time, whereas corruption in relation to EP in the Russian and Kazakh oil 
industries appeared to be largely driven by oil, corruption in EP structures in Azerbaijan 
seems to be greatly exacerbated by oil. However, it would arguably persist to a great 
extent in Azerbaijan were oil resources to disappear. In essence, corruption is deeply 
entrenched in Azeri legislative, political, judicial and administrative institutions and is 
arguably the main barrier to breaking oil dependence (Oge, 2014), in turn contributing 
to poor EP implementation results.  
Accordingly, corruption appears to be one of the causes of poor EP implementation in 
Azerbaijan, whereas in other case studies it could be better described as a symptom of 
other effects. In Kazakhstan, for instance, corruption could be interpreted as one of the 
mechanisms of the power struggle between the state and the foreign oil firms. In 
Nenets and Tatarstan, corruption is allegedly present, as suggested by interviewees. 
However, it was not given as much weight as other factors. In contrast, the majority of 
interviewees across all sectors in Azerbaijan cited some form of corruption as a key 




to pose a far greater barrier to EP implementation in Azerbaijan than in the other case 
studies.  
However, the extent of differences in behaviours that can be classed as ‘corruption’ 
between the case studies gives rise to doubt as to whether they are comparable. It 
should also be noted that these behaviours were observed as ‘corruption’ in the 
context of selected variables that derive from theories of Western-style institutions 
prevalent in democracies. Pursued through a different analytic lens – one more suited 
to non-Western styles of governance – observed behaviours in some case studies, 
most likely Azerbaijan, might not turn out to be ‘corruption’ in the classic sense. 
Instead, they may be revealed as components of clan politics commonly encountered 
in autocracies. As such, it might not be appropriate to compare this phenomenon in 
Azerbaijan with the type of corruption in Russia and Kazakhstan: it would not be 
comparing like for like. 
	  
Conclusion 
In relative terms, Variables 2 and 3 proved more resilient and more applicable across 
contexts, whereas the explanatory power of Variable 1 proved to be the weakest, or 
functional only in very narrowly-defined contexts. . Drawing on the observed variation 
in background factors and the underlying relationships between these and the 
variables in focus, this chapter has also outlined the possible reasons for the variables’ 
relative success. These observations have also made it possible to identified significant 
aspects of the variables’ overall relevance and propose ways to improve their 
explanatory power. Specifically, the analysis suggests that state capacity should not be 
so narrowly defined, which risks making it overly Western-centric, and could benefit 
from incorporating the extent of political and economic stability in the country in order 
to better predict implementation. In relation to economic conditions, testing for the 
existence of non-oil sectors or their relative contribution to government revenues 
proved of limited utility. Testing for the types of economic sectors and their internal 
development, in parallel with the associated degree of exposure of upstream as 





Chapter 9. Conclusion and further research 
Main findings 
This thesis concerns the puzzle of inadequate implementation of governmental 
environmental policies despite the growing national and international discourse on their 
importance and the continuous institutional improvements aimed to delivering them. 
The research presented here focusses on environmental regulation in the oil industry, 
an area which brings into conflict two distinct government policies (economic and 
environmental) and as a result better reveals the issues in play. At the same time, such 
conflict between government policies is particularly visible in transitional countries, or 
those that are moving from one political, economic or social regime to another. 
Accordingly, the project selected the biggest oil producers in the post-Soviet space – 
Russia, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan – as the loci for its empirical analysis.  
Having reviewed available literature on implementation in general, as well as 
implementation of environmental policies and in developing / transitional contexts, the 
selected theoretical framework distilled these implementation approaches into the 
dependent variable: implementation gaps, or the distance between government policy 
aims and actions. The existence of extensive implementation gaps was then taken as a 
given at the outset of analysis and the project aimed to explore whether cases of 
relatively successful implementation existed and what contributed to their 
manifestation.  
To assess whether cases of successful implementation exist, a range of case studies 
were analysed within the Most Similar Systems Most Different Outcome research 
design. To inquire why implementation has been successful, in terms of differences in 
the dependent variable, selected case studies were analysed in regard to three 
explanatory variables. While these were grounded in academic theory across several 
disciplines, including political science, international relations and economics, their 
selection was based on observable variation between cases; the selection of 
explanatory variables was therefore research-driven. 
During the analysis, significant variation was found in the success of transitional 
countries’ implementation of pollution control regulations; this was discussed in 
Chapter 8. Analysis indicated that regulation was the most successful in the Republic 
of Tatarstan in Russian and least successful in the Baku region of Azerbaijan. The 
selected variables were involved in 6 hypotheses applied across 4 regions. Out of 




variance half the time. In order to better understand this outcome, the comparative 
chapter reviewed the applicability and explanatory power of each variable across the 
case studies. As part of this exercise, some factors contained in the pre-selected 
variables were confirmed as suitable for generalisation, although subject to some 
proposed changes to improve their explanatory power. Other factors, however, showed 
limited predictive utility or were suitable only for analysis in highly specific contexts. 
The presence of foreign oil firms – a component of the foreign influence variable – 
proved to have the least explanatory power. Its hypothesised relationship with the 
dependent variable could not be either proven or disproven in Nenets, the first case 
study; neither was it supported in the other three. By way of explanation for this 
outcome, analysis indicated that while foreign oil firms had the means to be more 
compliant with local and international EP regulations, this did not necessarily translate 
into actual compliance. The reasons for this were varied and often context-dependent, 
including:  
• intentionally stringent and more aggressive application of EP regulations by the 
host government to foreign oil firms than to domestic firms, often for political 
and economic reasons;  
• the existence of loopholes in the EP legislation in the host countries, available 
for exploitation to all firms, including international ones; and 
• the fact that foreign oil firms often work in Production Sharing Agreements, 
which complicate the judgement of which EP regulations are applicable to 
foreign oil firms and which are not.  
The extent of variation in these reasons precludes the deduction of a generalizable 
causal relationship between the presence of foreign oil firms and implementation gaps. 
Overall, the majority of interviewees indicated that foreign oil firms probably have better 
overall environmental performance, but in terms of legal compliance most interviewees 
believed that all firms, irrespective of their origin, likely behave the same. Having said 
that, compliance by foreign oil firms was worse than that of Russian oil firms on some 
indicators in the Nenets case study. Overall, this variable did not prove useful in 
explaining variation in implementation gaps. 
Other components of the foreign influence variable showed marginally better utility. 
Both the presence of international NGOs and norm diffusion proved applicable only to 
the narrow context of Nenets but held negligible explanatory power for other case 




otherwise complete civil activity vacuum in oil-related EP. In contrast, two other case 
studies highlighted the presence of domestic environmental NGOs, but both their 
efforts and the efforts of international NGOs in the same area did not appear to 
produce significant impact. Similarly to international NGOs, the factor of norm diffusion, 
either through binding/voluntary international instruments, interaction with international 
institutions or other exposure to internationally accepted values, proved tangibly 
meaningful only in the very narrow context of Nenets. 
Curiously, Tatarstan, the case study with both the least exposure to international NGOs 
and norm diffusion and the fewest NGOs with an environmental interest in oil works in 
general, performed the best in terms of the dependent variable. This suggests that the 
presence of a civil vacuum is not the main condition that lends international NGOs 
significance as a factor in policy implementation. A likelier explanation of why these 
factors proved significant in Nenets but nowhere else could be that oil development in 
the Arctic has global and especially First World consequences due to shared borders 
and maritime links, whereas the other case studies do not28.  
At the same time, environmental issues are more specific in the Arctic case study, 
which portrays a mono-economic context in comparison to the more varied challenges 
faced by the other reviewed locations. Consequently, the Artic appears to attract much 
more active and focussed global attention, which could translate into stronger and 
more consistent international pressure. This may explain why the variable of foreign 
influence proved applicable here but held no explanatory power in the contexts of 
Tatarstan, Atyrau or Baku. However, even in Nenets, international NGOs and norm 
diffusion were shown to have a significant potential to improve implementation of EP 
regulations, but due to a lack of meaningful data on the dependent variable it could not 
be conclusively shown that they have an actual tangible impact on implementation.  
The variables of state capacity and economic diversification proved more robust in 
explaining variations in implementation gaps, although not necessarily to the expected 
degree. For example, state capacity (defined as the quality of the EP legislation and 
the quality of the regulatory agencies) was shown to be necessary, but not sufficient, 
for successful implementation of intended EP objectives. This was shown to be the 
case because improvements in these factors do not appear to have meaningful impact 
on political will, which proved necessary for state capacity to be utilised in ways that 
could lead to improved EP implementation. Furthermore, analysis suggested that 
political will might be both necessary and sufficient for relatively high EP 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




implementation even in the absence of sufficiently developed formal state capacity, as 
in the case of Tatarstan.  
Tatarstan proved somewhat of an anomaly in a number of respects. Its EP 
implementation appeared to be influenced by very different factors than those affecting 
the other case studies, including the presence of the mostly depleted oil reserves at the 
start of transition; the relatively high level of development of political, societal and 
economic institutions; and the unusually close relationship and alignment of interests 
between the government and the oil sector that reduced the need for formal regulation. 
Given these characteristics, as well as Tatarstan’s successes not just with EP 
implementation but also its overall economic performance, this case study showed 
behaviour indicative of a developmental state (Leftwich, 1995). This could not be said 
of the other case studies. 
Even the final selected variable, economic conditions – the only variable shown to hold 
explanatory power across all case studies and thus the most generalizable – proved 
applicable to Tatarstan in a very nuanced way. Despite proving important, the 
existence of other developed economic sectors in Tatarstan was not shown to reduce 
the dependence of government budgets on the oil industry as hypothesised. This 
dependence, however, did not seem to affect the political will to pursue EP 
implementation as it appeared to do in the other case studies. In contrast to Tatarstan, 
locally based actors with responsibility over EP implementation in Nenets appeared 
powerless in the face of Russian national political and economic interests. Similar 
conditions and outcomes were also observed in the cases of Kazakhstan and 
Azerbaijan. What has perhaps made Tatarstan more successful at implementing EP 
than the other regions studied is Tatarstan’s greater economic stability. Overall, 
economic conditions proved, across all case studies, to have the most significant 
influence of all the selected variables. 
As previously indicated, empirical analysis supported 12 out of the 24 predicted causal 
relationships between pre-selected factors and the dependent variable, although few of 
these hypothesised relationships were found to work in predicted ways. Meanwhile, 
analysis indicated why some variables had higher explanatory power than others, 






The main contribution of this research project lies in its attempt to close gaps in 
academic literature on environmental policy implementation in transitional contexts. For 
example, recent literature on either EP policy or implementation is particularly scarce 
concerning Azerbaijan. Furthermore, its oil industry appears to be somewhat of a 
mystery and there is very limited academic analysis of the sector’s environmental 
impact or the effectiveness of its regulation. At present, much of the relevant literature 
on Azerbaijan instead focusses on corruption and geopolitical themes. When analysis 
does focus on the Azeri environmental policy, implementation and policy outcomes are 
seldom mentioned. Policy development tends to be discussed instead.  
Similarly, there is a lack of research applying political analysis to environmental policy 
in relation to the Arctic Russian regions. The literature often concerns either natural 
sciences or international processes for tackling environmental challenges in the Arctic 
(and recently on the interaction between indigenous Arctic peoples and the oil 
industry), and thus sheds little light on political processes. Implementation of national 
and regional government policies, and especially the pursuit of environmental 
objectives, therefore appears to have been largely overlooked. This research project 
helps to expand and focus academic analysis in these areas.  
Furthermore, the comparative element of this thesis has made a significant contribution 
to the implementation scholarship. Having extensively reviewed research in both 
English and Russian languages, no other texts were encountered that either attempted 
to compare the three selected countries on the implementation of their environmental 
policies, or that attempted to make comparisons at the regional level in more than one 
country. Moreover, this is probably the first project to compare Arctic and Asian regions 
while also comparing mono-economic, remote regions and capital city regions with 
their bustling economies.  
When working with such contrasts, research in the field of implementation studies often 
compares two case studies at most, and usually in a Most Different Systems Most 
Similar Outcomes design. Engaging with four such locations using the Most Similar 
Systems Most Different Outcomes approach has helped this project to test some of the 
most prominent academic theories with greater rigour than what is usually attempted. 
At the very least, a great deal about how contextual factors interact with key social 
scientific theories has been revealed. Bringing these factors into the analysis rather 




implementation and the underlying mechanisms of change that are often overlooked by 
mainstream literature of the disciplines that guide this thesis. 
For these reasons, analysis was able to reveal a number of changes that could 
improve the applicability and utility of pre-selected variables in future research and to 
also increase their potential for generalisation. For example, state capacity was found 
to be necessary for effective implementation, but insufficient in resource-rich contexts 
marked by political instability or economies that are vulnerable to external shocks. In 
contrast, in the more stable regions (both politically and economically), the formal 
institutions that make up what is traditionally defined as state capacity may even be 
unnecessary. Additionally, analysis suggested that political will could be most 
successfully used as part of a dependent variable when operationalising 
implementation success in centralised political systems and as an independent 
variable in decentralised ones.   
Furthermore, by locating itself at the intersection of a number of academic disciplines, 
this thesis has been able to offer an analysis of their relative usefulness in explaining 
implementation, as well as suggesting how they could be combined to improve future 
interdisciplinary research. For example, factors such as international norm diffusion, 
based in the discipline of international relations, have been shown to be the most 
context-dependent, whereas factors derived from the discipline of economics appeared 
to be the most generalizable. 
 
Limitations  
This section discusses the limitations of this research project and suggests ways to 
improve them in future scholarship. Potential solutions for further research, as well as 
further research topics that derive from these are then offered in the following section. 
Availability of data and access to interviewees are discussed. 
 
Paucity of available data on the dependent variable 
Potentially the most significant limitation was an expected one: the lack of available 
data. This was especially significant in relation to the dependent variable, the 




• regulatory activity, such as the number and size of environmental fines against 
oil firms for non-compliance and the frequency of court compliance orders for 
polluters; and 
• improvements in pollution indicators (such as reductions in emissions or water 
pollution, or reduction in court cases), or a noticeable reduction over a period of 
time in the number of fines levied against oil firms for EP non-compliance.  
Given the transitional context of the case studies, often marked by poor monitoring and 
reporting capabilities, this approach to operationalisation of the dependent variable was 
expected to pose some issues. It was also expected that available data might be 
politicised or lack objectivity, but the extent of this was not foreseen. In all cases 
studied, governments rely on a self-reporting approach to collecting data on instances 
of pollution. In Tatarstan, where oil facilities are located relatively close to both the 
regulatory agencies’ offices and to inhabited areas, it is easier for regulators to validate 
data submitted to them by polluters; thus, this case study did not present particular 
problems for data collection.  
However, in the remote region of Nenets, ascertaining the true environmental 
performance of oil firms has been close to impossible, and will remain so until methods 
for accurate remote monitoring are implemented. Even in the more easily accessible 
Atyrau in Kazakhstan, data validation by regulators has been difficult due to the 
physical barriers inherent in its climate and geography. As such, most of the available 
data on oil pollution at this location are also highly subjective. The associated data on 
non-compliance with EP regulations by oil firms and subsequent fines levied against 
them are therefore also a poor proxy. In Azerbaijan, however, even data of such low 
quality are exceptionally sparse, since media censorship greatly restricts publically 
available information.  
All in all, it has proven difficult to judge whether there have been changes in the 
dependent variable and therefore whether pre-selected explanatory variables can 
influence implementation. In some cases, as in Atyrau, interview data was able to 
complete the picture and provide an indication of the status and changes in 
implementation gaps. Interview data also provided an insight into the situation in Baku, 
but interviewee accounts were insufficiently consistent to allow robust observations. In 
Nenets, the data were the least clear, and analysis in this case (and to an extent in that 
of Baku) was therefore based on the variables’ potential rather than their proven ability 




more subjective. The difference in approaches also risks reducing the comparability of 
results across case studies.   
However, a significant trade-off between flexibility of approach and consistency in 
study design is commonplace in applied research in the social sciences. 
Operationalisation in qualitative research can be counterproductive, for it has the 
potential to stifle analysis by imposing unrealistic constraints. To avoid this, it is 
necessary to keep variable conceptualisation necessarily broad in qualitative research. 
Selecting a narrow definition that may have been better supported by data would have 
limited the scope of this project, its ability to draw on different disciplines, and to select 
such varied case studies for its theoretical framework. Accordingly, this and similar 
limitations can help highlight the original contribution of this research in creating data 
and in analysing and comparing contexts for which little prior comprehensive analysis 
is available. 
 
Access to interviewees 
Given the politicised nature of the research question and the decision to collect data 
through interviews with political (and other) elites, it was expected at the outset that 
access to interviewees might have posed an issue. In the course of data collection, 
these concerns proved to be mostly unjustified. Nonetheless, it was not always 
possible to secure the participation of representatives from desired target groups. For 
example, interviews were conducted with representatives of the main EP regulatory 
agencies for the oil industry in Nenets and Atyrau. However, their equivalents in 
Tatarstan and Baku turned down invitations to participate. Nonetheless, it was possible 
to interview a significant number of other individuals in various sectors in these 
locations who have experience of working with regulators, and could therefore indicate 
how regulators might have answered interview questions. However, such inferential 




Collected data and subsequent analysis led to further, interesting questions that were 
outside the scope or beyond the available resources of this research project, but 




Firstly, data collection was necessarily limited to very few government levels, usually 
those lowest in the implementation chain. Further work with greater resources could 
secure data from central government levels, revealing useful perspectives or 
alternative explanations for observed effects. This could, in turn, offer further evidence 
on the applicability and explanatory power of each variable and its hypotheses. 
Secondly, it became clear in the course of data collection and interpretation that policy 
implementation is subject not only to social barriers, but also to physical conditions and 
restraints deriving from geographic, climatic and geological contexts, which can defy 
the implementation of policy even by advanced institutional structures. Research in the 
social sciences seldom focusses on such factors. Given the extent to which these 
factors appear to impact implementation efforts, this exclusion likely limits the 
effectiveness of such research. Conveniently, there are plans in the current Russian 
regulatory reforms to allow for automatized and even remote EP regulation, including 
through the use of telemetry29, Internet of Things (IoT)30 and remote sensing31. These 
methods could to a large extent resolve the key barriers to EP implementation 
presented by the physical conditions in Russian regions such as Nenets, as well as 
finding global applicability in unusual contexts – although there will likely be strong 
commercial and political interests that could stand in the way of the effective use of 
such technology. 
This clear intersection between the very different realms of the natural sciences and 
the social sciences strongly motivates future efforts to bring them together. This 
research project has already attempted to synthesise physical conditions and policy 
analysis in explaining the persistent nature of implementation gaps concerning 
environmental regulation in the oil industry. However, there is still plenty of scope to 
pursue further research work drawing on both of these strands. 
 
	    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Remote monitoring via wireless, automated transmission of measurements. 
30 A system of interrelated objects embedded with computing devices, which allows remote communication, 
monitoring and control. 
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Appendix A - Research interviewees 
 
The information and views of interviewees set out in this thesis are those of the individual 
interviewees only and can in no way be taken to reflect the official opinions of the organisations 
with which they are affiliated. Neither this researcher not the University of Sussex guarantee the 
accuracy of the interview data included in this thesis and they may not be held responsible for 
the use, which may be made of the information contained herein. 
Table 6 - Research Interviewees 
Refere
nce 
Organisation / other 
details 





Nenets Autonomous Okrug, Russia 
Intrv. 1 Director of the Public Fund 
for the Support of 
Environmental Programs of 
the Pechora Sea Basin. 
Non-profit, NGO 1 Naryan-Mar, 
Russia 
2014 







Intrv.3 Employee Local press Naryan-Mar, 
Russia 
2014 





Intrv. 5 Employee Russian oil firm, ROF1 Naryan-Mar, 
Russia 
2014 
Intrv. 6 Employee Foreign oil firm, FOF1 Naryan-Mar, 
Russia 
2014 
Intrv. 7 Representative of WWF; 
coordinator for UNDP / GEF 
programmes in the region 
Non-profit, INGO 1 Naryan-Mar, 
Russia 
2014 
Intrv. 8 Employee Non-profit, INGO 2 Naryan-Mar, 
Russia 
2014 
Intrv. 9 Director of a research-
technical organisation 
(recultivation works) 
Subcontractor 1 Naryan-Mar, 
Russia 
2014 
Intrv. 10 Employee Prosecutor Office Naryan-Mar, 
Russia 
2014 
Intrv. 11 Employee in the Nenets FS 




























Intrv. 15 General Direct of Econord 
(engineering R&D); involved 
with GEF projects 
Subcontractor 2 Naryan-Mar, 
Russia 
2014 
Intrv. 16 Employee Foreign oil firm, FOF2 Naryan-Mar, 
Russia 
2014 
Intrv. 17 Employee Foreign oil firm, FOF2 Naryan-Mar, 
Russia 
2014 
Intrv. 18 Representative of Yasavey 
(organisation to represent 
the interests of the native 
Nenets people) 
Public / non-profit Naryan-Mar, 
Russia 
2014 
Intrv. 19 Victor Danilov-Danilyan, 
former Minister (of 




Intrv. 20 Vladimir Chuprov, Head of 
Energy Unit, Greenpeace 
Russia 
Non-profit, INGO 3 Moscow 2014 
Intrv. 21 Ekaterina Khmeleva, 
Director of Environmental 
Governance Program, 
WWF Russia 
Non-profit, INGO 1 Moscow 2014 
Intrv. 22 Alexey Knizhnikov, Oil & 
Gas Programme Leader, 
WWF Russia 




Intrv. 23 Member of Russian 
diplomatic services 
Public London 2015 
Republic of Tatarstan, Russia 
Intrv. 1 Head of Department for 
Environmental Education & 
Cooperation with NGOs 
Public, FS Government Kazan, Tatarstan, 
Russia 
2014 
Intrv. 2 Head of Department for 
Industrial and 







Intrv. 3 Deputy of General Director; 











Intrv. 5 Professor at the Institute for 








Intrv. 6 Former academic in 
environmental sciences; (25 
year experience), deputy 






	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32	  This	  federal	  entity	  changed	  its	  name	  and	  status	  several	  times	  in	  that	  period:	  the	  Ministry	  of	  the	  
Environment	  and	  Natural	  Resources	  1991-­‐1992;	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Environmental	  Protection	  and	  Natural	  
Resources	  1992-­‐1996;	  the	  State	  Committee	  for	  Environmental	  Protection	  1996-­‐2000.	  In	  2000	  the	  structure	  
was	  abolished.	  
33 Coordination and expert centre, determining the development strategy of the petrochemical complex of the 





leader in expert committee 
for Rosprirodnadzor  
Intrv. 7 Senior advisor; Tatarstan’s 
Environmental Interdistrict 
Prosecutor's Office 
Judiciary Kazan, Tatarstan, 
Russia 
2014 
Intrv. 8 Member of an NGO 
Council, lecturer, 
environmental activist 









Intrv. 9 Head of Department for 
ecology, environmental 
protection and technical 
safety at Povolzhskaya 
Ecological Company  
Private (subcontractor) Kazan, Tatarstan, 
Russia 
2014 
Intrv. 10 Expert for environmental 
expertise assessment  
Judiciary Kazan, Tatarstan, 
Russia 
2014 
Intrv. 11 Legal Adviser at the Ministry 
for Environment and Natural 
Resources 





Aturay Oblast, Republic of Kazakhstan 
Intrv. 1 Activist Non-profit, NGO 1 Atyrau 2015 
Intrv. 2 Specialist on Kazakhstan, 
WWF 
Non-profit, INGO 1 (online interview) 2018 
Intrv. 3 Crude Accountability Non-profit, INGO 2 (online interview) 2018 
Intrv. 4 Activist Non-profit, NGO 2 Atyrau 2015 
Intrv. 5 Corporate responsibility 
project organiser for a 
foreign oil firm 
Private (online interview) 2018 
Intrv. 6 EPA subcontractor Private Atyrau 2015 
Intrv. 7 Lawyer  Private, oil firm 1 Atyrau 2015 
Intrv. 8 Regulator, akimat Public Atyrau 2015 
Intrv. 9 Academic Higher Education 
Institution, HEI 1 
Atyrau 2015 
Intrv. 10 Lawyer Judiciary Atyrau 2015 
Intrv. 11 Environmental specialist Private, oil firm 2 Atyrau 2015 
Intrv. 12 Regulator, akimat Public Atyrau 2015 
Intrv. 13 Head Regulator, republican 
level 
Public Atyrau 2015 
Intrv. 14 Journalist Local press 1 Atyrau 2015 
Intrv. 15 Journalist Local press 2 Atyrau 2015 
Intrv. 16 Former employee Private, oil firm 2 Atyrau 2015 
Intrv. 17 Employee at Aarhus Centre International 





Intrv. 18 Activist Non-profit, NGO 3 Atyrau 2015 
Intrv. 19 Academic Higher Education 
Institution, HEI 2 
Atyrau 2015 
Intrv. 20 Activist Non-profit, NGO 4 Atyrau 2015 
Intrv. 21 Crude Accountability Non-profit, INGO 2 (online interview) 2018 
Intrv. 22 Activist Non-profit, NGO 5 Atyrau 2015 
Baku-Absheron, Republic of Azerbaijan 
Intrv. 1 Environmental INGO Non-profit, INGO 1 Baku, Azerbaijan 2015 
Intrv. 2 Former MENR employee Public, Ministry Baku, Azerbaijan 2015 




Baku, Azerbaijan 2015 
Intrv.4 Environmental NGO Non-profit, NGO 1 Baku, Azerbaijan 2015 
Intrv. 5 Environmental INGO Non-profit, INGO2 Baku, Azerbaijan 2015 
Intrv. 6 Environmental Journalist Local press Baku, Azerbaijan 2015 
Intrv. 7 Employee Private, BP Baku, Azerbaijan 2015 
Intrv. 8 Employee Private, Total Baku, Azerbaijan 2015 
Intrv. 9 Environmental Law 
specialist 
Higher Education 
Institution, HEI 1 
Baku, Azerbaijan 2015 
Intrv.10 MENR employee Public, Ministry Baku, Azerbaijan 2015 
Intrv. 11 Employee Research & training 
institution, RTI 1 
Baku, Azerbaijan 2015 
Intrv. 12 Environmental NGO Non-profit, NGO 2 Baku, Azerbaijan 2015 
Intrv. 13 Environmental policy 
specialist 
Higher Education 
Institution, HEI 2 
Baku, Azerbaijan 2015 
Intrv. 14 INGO Non-profit, INGO3 Baku, Azerbaijan 2015 
Intrv. 15 Environmental Law 
specialist 
Higher Education 
Institution, HEI 2 
Baku, Azerbaijan 2015 
Intrv. 16 Environmental NGO Non-profit, NGO 3 Baku, Azerbaijan 2015 
Intrv. 17 Oil works specialist Higher Education 
Institution, HEI 3 
Baku, Azerbaijan 2015 
Intrv. 18 Oil works specialist Higher Education 
Institution, HEI 3 
Baku, Azerbaijan 2015 
Intrv. 19 Oil works specialist Higher Education 
Institution, HEI 3 
Baku, Azerbaijan 2015 
Intrv. 20 MoES employee Public, Research & 
training institution, RTI 
2 
Baku, Azerbaijan 2015 






Appendix B – Interview topic guide 
	  
Introduction	  
Aim:	  To	  introduce	  research	  and	  set	  context	  for	  the	  discussion.	  
	  
Introduce	  self	  and	  the	  University	  of	  Sussex	  
Introduce	  the	  study:	  who	  it	  is	  for,	  ESRC,	  what	  it	  is	  about	  
Talk	  through	  the	  key	  points:	  	  
-­‐	  purpose	  and	  length	  of	  the	  interview	  
-­‐	  voluntary	  nature	  of	  participation	  
-­‐	  reasons	  for	  recording	  the	  interview	  
• Confidentiality	  and	  how	  findings	  will	  be	  reported	  (degrees	  of	  anonymity)	  
• Data	  use	  –	  PhD	  thesis,	  future	  publications,	  Data	  UK	  Archive	  
• Check	  for	  signed	  Consent	  form	  and	  agree	  level	  of	  disclosure	  
• Any	  questions	  
Start	  recording.	  Take	  verbal	  consent	  if	  written	  consent	  refused.	  
	  
1.	  Background	  and	  circumstances	  
Aim:	  To	  introduce	  respondent	  and	  highlight	  any	  background	  issues	  that	  might	  
influence	  their	  understanding	  of	  and	  attitude	  towards	  pollution	  control	  regulations	  
and	  their	  implementation.	  
	  
• Interviewee’s	  role	  
-­‐	  organisation	  /	  affiliation	  
-­‐	  professional	  responsibilities	  
-­‐	  interaction	  with	  other	  organisations	  	  	  
	  
• Main	  activities	  
-­‐	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  tasks	  
	  
• Other	  interests	  (professional	  or	  personal)	  
-­‐	  political	  party	  membership	  	  
-­‐	  involvement	  with	  social	  groups	  
-­‐	  golf	  
	  
2.	  Defining	  and	  identifying	  'pollution	  control	  regulation'	  
Aim:	  To	  establish	  how	  the	  respondent	  decides	  what	  constitutes	  a	  pollution	  control	  
regulation,	  to	  identify	  their	  knowledge	  of	  existing	  regulations,	  and	  to	  explore	  their	  
views,	  attitudes	  and	  experiences	  of	  pollution-­‐control	  regulations.	  
	  
• What	  does	  the	  term	  'pollution	  control'	  mean	  to	  them	  
Ø Western	  propaganda	  
Ø OECD	  (or	  other	  international	  organisation)	  project	  
Ø Western	  dream	  (unattainable;	  time	  waste)	  
Ø political	  stance/belief	  	  




Ø legal	  law	  
Ø company	  policy	  	  
Ø type	  of	  behaviour	  	  
Ø environmental	  necessity	  	  
Ø bureaucratic	  hurdle	  	  
Ø any	  other	  
	  
• How	  would	  they	  describe	  different	  types	  of	  pollution-­‐control	  	  
Ø end	  of	  pipe	  /	  preventative	  
Ø clean	  technologies	  
Ø new	  equipment	  
Ø tax	  incentives	  	  
Ø funding	  incentives	  	  
Ø fines	  /	  sanctions	  
Ø international	  standards	  
Ø international	  tariffs	  	  
Ø any	  other	  
	  
3.	  Implementation	  of	  Pollution-­‐control	  Regulations	  
Aim:	  To	  establish	  specific	  regulations	  the	  participant	  has	  experience	  of,	  to	  explore	  the	  
nature	  of	  the	  regulation	  (purpose,	  plausibility,	  internal	  effectiveness,	  procedures	  and	  
impact),	  and	  to	  explore	  participant's	  motivations	  and	  ability	  for	  complying	  
with/enforcing	  it.	  
	  
• What	  pollution-­‐control	  regulations	  they	  have	  experience	  with	  	  
Ø type	  of	  regulation	  (name,	  jurisdiction,	  purpose)	  
Ø at	  work	  /	  outside	  work	  
Ø enforcing	  /	  complying	  /	  monitoring	  
Ø official	  law	  /	  organisational	  internal	  policy	  	  
Ø any	  other	  
	  
• Awareness	  and	  experience	  of	  those	  regulations	  
Ø internal	  design	  –	  comprehensive	  /	  confused	  
Ø procedures	  for	  complying	  
Ø how	  is	  it	  enforced	  
Ø who	  monitors	  compliance/enforcement	  
Ø general	  performance	  
	  
• Motivations	  for	  complying	  	  
Ø reasons	  for	  compliance	  
Ø ease	  of	  complying	  	  
Ø reasons	  of	  non-­‐compliance	  
Ø what	  happens	  after	  non-­‐compliance	  
	  
4.	  Explanatory	  variables	  
Aim:	  To	  test	  theses	  hypotheses	  that	  explanatory	  variables	  have	  an	  impact	  on	  the	  
participant's	  ability	  and/or	  willingness	  to	  comply	  /	  enforce	  pollution-­‐control	  





• Economic	  diversification	  
Ø other	  industries	  in	  the	  area	  
Ø employment	  share	  of	  different	  industries	  
Ø stringency	  of	  pollution-­‐controls	  (compare	  industries)	  
Ø compliance	  (compare	  industries)	  	  
Ø interaction	  with	  other	  industries	  
Ø impact	  of	  interaction	  on	  compliance	  
	  
• Contact	  with	  foreign	  business	  entities	  	  




Ø share	  holder	  
Ø joint-­‐venture	  
Ø international	  trade	  body	  
Ø type	  of	  relationship	  
Ø positive	  /	  negative	  
Ø close	  /	  probational	  	  	  
Ø trusting	  /	  suspicious	  	  
Ø extent	  of	  impact	  on	  participant's	  actions	  
Ø entity's	  disposition	  towards	  pollution-­‐control	  
Ø contribution/hindrance	  towards	  compliance/enforcement	  
	  
• Contact	  with	  foreign	  NGOs	  
Ø type	  of	  NGO	  
Ø Environmental	  (e.g.	  Greenpeace)	  
Ø Human	  Rights	  
Ø Developmental	  
Ø other	  




Ø disposition	  towards	  pollution	  control	  
Ø extent	  of	  impact	  on	  participant's	  actions	  
Ø contribution/hindrance	  towards	  compliance/enforcement	  
	  
• Which	  of	  these	  affects	  them	  the	  most	  
	  
5.	  Implementation	  Experience	  
Aim:	  To	  map	  the	  respondent's	  implementation	  experience	  and	  any	  problems	  they've	  
encountered.	  
	  
• Extent	  to	  which	  they	  are	  involved	  in	  the	  implementation	  process	  of	  
pollution-­‐controls	  in	  their	  organisation	  	  
Ø examples	  of	  different	  ways	  of	  involvement	  




Ø extent	  of	  personal	  impact	  
	  
• Views	  about	  implementation	  process	  
Ø success/failure	  
Ø any	  problems	  
Ø source	  of	  problems	  
Ø involved	  stakeholders	  
Ø was	  problem	  reported	  
Ø attempt	  to	  solve?	  
Ø proposed	  solutions	  




Aim:	  to	  get	  respondent's	  thoughts	  on	  how	  to	  improve	  the	  implementation	  process	  
and	  leave	  interview	  on	  a	  neutral	  note.	  To	  end	  the	  interview.	  
	  
• What	  would	  encourage	  compliance	  /	  aid	  enforcement	  	  
Ask	  the	  respondent	  to	  reflect	  on	  the	  barriers	  they	  have	  discussed,	  prompt	  if	  
necessary:	  
Ø type	  of	  regulation	  	  
Ø better	  (fairer)	  regulation	  	  
Ø stricter	  /	  smaller	  penalties	  
Ø better	  institutions	  
Ø greater	  institutional	  power	  
Ø independent	  courts	  of	  law	  
Ø more	  transparency	  (corruption)	  
Ø more	  personnel	  
Ø assurance	  of	  personal	  safety	  
Ø access	  to	  better	  technology	  	  
Ø access	  to	  (international)	  financial	  resources	  
Ø improved	  equipment	  (for	  firms)	  
Ø increased	  personnel	  (for	  enforcer)	  
Ø international	  technical	  expertise	  	  
Ø any	  other	  
	  
	  
• Explore	  how	  problems	  flagged	  in	  section	  5	  could	  be	  overcome	  
Link	  to	  answers	  from	  the	  previous	  point.	  
	  
• Anything	  else	  they	  would	  like	  to	  add.	  
	  
	  
Thank	  the	  participant.	  Check	  whether	  they	  have	  any	  remaining	  questions	  about	  
research.	  
Reassure	  them	  about	  confidentiality	  and	  anonymity.	  
Check	  if	  there	  are	  any	  sections	  they	  want	  left	  out	  of	  the	  research	  analysis.	  
Ask	  if	  they	  would	  like	  to	  be	  informed	  of	  the	  outcome	  of	  research	  (take	  details	  of	  their	  




Appendix C – Evolution of environmental legislation and 
implementation in Russia 
Legislation 
USSR, with Russia as its leader, officially recognised environmental protection (EP) as 
one of state functions around the same time as Western countries – in the 1960s. 
Relevant laws were developed but remained basic and largely nominal34. However, the 
increasingly obvious environmental impact of Soviet overproduction over the next few 
decades as well as the Chernobyl disaster spurred significant developments. Relatively 
comprehensive nationwide environmental standards were introduced, EP demands 
upon polluters increased, and fines for non-compliance rose. The last few years of the 
USSR’s existence also saw the introduction of state environmental expertise (SEE) 
assessment and polluter-pays economic instruments, and their integration into the 
wider political and economic systems. A few days before the USSR’s disintegration in 
1991, the formal Law on Environmental Protection was finally passed. It set out 
previously missing principles and served as the backbone to all environmental 
legislation for the next nine years, itself being amended only twice in that period. The 
principles upheld by this Law included concomitance of environmental and economic 
objectives, rational use of resources, and cooperation with non-governmental and 
international organisations.  
Notwithstanding these achievements, implementation suffered in the absence of an 
official environmental policy that could give EP institutions clearly defined, measurable 
objectives, set common goals, and provide evaluation criteria for outcomes 35 . 
Furthermore, division of responsibilities between different levels of government were 
not formally set out, nor were appropriate responsibilities given to appropriate levels. 
As such, there was little to guide or coordinate efforts of different implementation 
structures and each set its own standards and objectives. EP was therefore piecemeal 
with duplication of responsibilities by different governmental levels. Its success was 
consequently difficult to measure. Regulation of that time was also criticised for being 
excessively stringent, idealistic, aiming to control too much at once, and for 
consequently deterring voluntary compliance and raising the costs of enforcement36.  
Despite these criticisms, the 1991 Law provided some much needed continuity and 
clarity in the environmental sphere throughout the turbulent 1990s and served as a 
skeleton for further regulatory developments. In 1993, environmental protection 
became an integral part of the new constitution of the Russian Federation. In 1994, the 
first official EP policy was produced. 1997 revisions to the Criminal Code partially 
addressed the overly lenient punishment for environmental crimes. In total, over 30 
federal environmental laws were passed by 2001 37 , accompanied by cultural 
developments in awareness of the important of environmental responsibility and 
transparency. Later major developments include the 2002 Environmental Protection 
Act, the 2002 Environmental Doctrine, the 2006 Water Code and the 2007 Forest 
Code. By the 2010s, Russian environmental legislation became a voluminous, complex 
body of legal literature, which addressed most of the environmental problems faced by 
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a modern economy38 and in some cases even exceeded internationally recognised and 
endorsed requirements39. In that time Russia also signed and ratified most of the key 
international EP agreements and continued to update its legislation in line with 
international developments. For example, in 2012 flaring above 5% of the Associated 
Petroleum Gas (APG) was banned, in line with international standards, and penalties 
for non-compliance were increased in 2014 following a two-year transition period. 
 
Implementation – federal level 
Developments outlined above were not reflected in the state capacity to the same 
degree, and implementation of EP regulations was arguably never complete, nor 
effective. The institutional base for EP enforcement under the USSR in the 1960s-
1980s was built on the principle that EP was relevant only in the framework of 
economic activity. EP agencies therefore lacked independence and existed only as 
part of Ministries which oversaw such activities. Effectively, the regulators and the 
regulated were one and the same, and production was prioritised over efficiency40. As 
a result, EP was largely neglected41.  
This ideology changed acutely after the 1986 Chernobyl disaster and the revelations of 
glasnost, which lent high political significance to EP. Radical reorganisation of the 
governmental EP structures followed with the creation of Goskomprirody (State 
Committee) in 1988. This was the first autonomous USSR-wide entity tasked solely 
with enforcing EP in all spheres and with the consolidated powers to do so42. This 
Committee was able to carry out the first comprehensive, simultaneous analysis of 
causes across environmental problems, and to develop a coherent, systemic approach 
to solving them43.  
As USSR collapsed in 1991, Goskomprirody was absorbed by its immediate sub-
structure in Russia – the EP Ministry, which also swallowed a series of other EP 
structures overseeing various natural resources. Following these events, the Ministry 
became the first EP entity of state significance44. This streamlined implementation 
efforts and marked the strongest period of EP in the Russian history. The period of 
1988-1991, which achieved so much in institutional and legislative developments, can 
therefore be called the Russian environmental renaissance. 
Despite the extent of Russia’s environmental problems, it was estimated that the 
Ministry could deliver all it promised within 15 years, if under a stable regime45. 
However, the prolonged period of turbulent change and anxiety over economic and 
political stability following the USSR’s collapse crowded out environmental concerns. 
The Ministry started getting dismantled almost as soon as it came together.  
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For the rest of the decade, its regulatory structures were continually downsized46 and 
downgraded 47 , its powers reduced 48 , funding cut 49 , and qualified environmental 
personnel were lost to better paid jobs elsewhere50. The explosion in responsibilities 
combined with diminishing resources might explain why it took so long to develop an 
official EP policy51 at the national Russian level, and to produce quality legislation.  The 
Ministry simply had no time for them.  
Meanwhile, the Ministry’s functions were given to new, independent agencies. This 
once again fragmented EP delivery and created competition between EP structures. 
The Ministry finally lost its status following the 1996 general elections, which was won 
by Yeltsin thanks to strong industry support. The Ministry was downgraded back to a 
committee – Goskomekologiya – and subordinated to Minresursov (Ministry of Natural 
Resources), thus losing its influence, independence and resources. 
Nevertheless, Goskomekologiya demonstrated unexpected persistence and dedication 
to EP. Despite the obvious conflict of interests, it rejected nearly 40% of its parent 
Ministry’s projects as environmentally unsafe52, and continuously tried to expose to the 
general public the Ministry’s violations of environmental regulations and the general 
poor state of the Russian environment53.  
Goskomekologiya also found ways to overcome resource constraints. EP was mainly 
funded by the state budget, which could cover only 10% of total EP expenditure in the 
1990s after being reduced54, and through environmental payments (pollution permit 
charges, fines and license payments), which, given the fragile state of the transitional 
economy, were kept intentionally low by Minresursov so as not to suffocate the 
struggling private sector. Notwithstanding the resulting lack of finance to implement EP 
and having lost two thirds of its staff, Goskomekologiya nonetheless managed to 
continue raising the qualifications of its EP inspectors and the number of inspected 
polluters55. 
Unfortunately, offering salaries at 25% below the national average fostered survival-
induced corruption at the lower levels of implementation, and the EP regulatory system 
took on increasingly fiscal objectives56. At the same time, falling capacity in monitoring 
compliance with governmental regulation of all types stimulated staggering 
lawlessness and corruption in the country57. As paying fines became cheaper than 
legal compliance and the risk of getting caught was low, noncompliance became the 
norm rather than the exception. Even when caught, regulatory bodies and courts had 
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trouble with collecting issued fines58. Some have therefore concluded that significant 
environmental improvements of the 1990s were mostly due to “compliance without 
implementation”59: a result of economic decline and forced deindustrialisation rather 
than public policy. Nonetheless, Goskomekologiya must be credited for striving to 
achieve its mandate in defiance of political opposition in other government structures. 
Meanwhile, as Russia’s economic recovery in the late 1990s became increasingly 
dependent on the extraction and sale of natural resources6061, the newly forming 
governing elites began to increasingly see EP as holding back economic growth62 and 
their own influence63 in the new political order. EP thus came into direct competition 
with these objectives and frequent reorganisation of EP structures can be explained by 
a struggle for power between ruling elites within government. In 2000, 
Goskomekologiya was finally disbanded. All EP functions passed to Minresursov, 
returning to the pre-1988 ideology. A super-agency with too much on its plate, 
Minresursov became simultaneously responsible for exploitation and protection of all 
natural resources, including mineral resources, water, forestry and fishery. 
Consequences for the environment were aptly summarised by a former EP Minister, 
Danilov-Danilyan: 
Authorizing the Natural Resources Ministry to deal with environmental 
problems is like asking an alcoholic what the price of vodka should 
be64. 
The 1991-2000 period therefore became known as environmental 
deinstitutionalization65, ecological subversion66, de-ecologization of the Russian state 
policy67 68, or, simply, de-greening of the Russian government69. The Service for 
Environmental Protection – Rosprirodnadzor, whose role is to ensure environmentally 
safe use of subsoil – under the renamed Minresursov is the last survivor of post-1988 
institutional EP development and was staffed with as few as 15 personnel in some of 
its regional departments70. In 2002, Environmental Funds were scrapped. These were 
independent institutions set up at federal and regional levels (regions are otherwise 
known as Federal Subjects, or FS) in 1991-2 to accumulate and redistribute 
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environmental payments to fund regional EP efforts. At the regional level, they were 
described as “the most important economic mechanism of environmental protection”71. 
In real terms, EP funding increased significantly under Putin’s administration72, but with 
institutional transformations necessary for effective implementation purposefully 
undermined, some concluded that: 
“There simply is no environmental policy in Russia—the existing 
policy could be construed as intending to destroy environmental 
policy” 73.  
The continuing power struggle between ruling elites saw further restructuring in 2004, 
when responsibilities for environmental permitting, compliance and enforcement were 
transferred from Minresursov to a newly created Rostechnadzor (Federal Service for 
Ecological, Technological and Nuclear Supervision) under direct control of the central 
government. Rostechnadzor enjoyed considerable power and authority and advanced 
government’s control over the hydrocarbon sectors. In theory, its autonomy and status 
should be welcome, but observers worried it would become just another tool for 
controlling political descent, much like the tax authorities were used to bring down 
Yukos in 200374. Such worries could explain the 75% reductions in Rostechnadzor’s 
environmental staff 75 . In 2008, Minresursov was renamed Minprirody (Ministry of 
Natural Resources and the Environment) without internal change.  
	  
Environmental protection at the regional level 
Despite the serious shortcomings of environmental protection at the federal level, 
significant changes to subnational policy administration inspired considerable hope for 
institutional growth and effectiveness in the Federal Subjects (FS). From the early 
1990s onwards, federal and FS governments began sharing competence on many EP 
policy elements. At the same time, a range of powers was delegated from central 
government structures to their branches at the FS and municipal levels76. This meant 
that EP was implemented by both EP departments of FS administrations and by local 
branches of the federal Goskomprirody. On the one hand, this gave the FSs a degree 
of legislative and regulatory autonomy77, allowed them to retain most of their collected 
environmental payments and gave greater freedom over their spending. In theory, this 
could have been conducive to a more targeted approach to solving environmental 
problems peculiar to individual Russian territories. On the other hand, this created too 
many points of jurisdiction 78  79  with shared and overlapping powers and 
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responsibilities80 all essentially competing to control local resource rents. This fostered 
competition rather than cooperation on EP implementation, which contributed to the 
inefficient use of human and capital resources, further slowed down regulators’ 
reaction to issues, fostered responsibility evasion and decreased accountability81.  
Power struggle for the control of natural resources brewing in Moscow in the late 1990s 
resonated at the FS level, between federal and FS structures. Unlike the renewed, 
elected and publicly-visible central structures, the FSs’ administrations were more 
prone to corruption and prioritisation of economic objectives over environmental ones82. 
The reorganisation of EP responsibilities tipped the sub-national balance of power in 
favour of FS governments, and by the end of the decade they solidified control over 
EP, including over FS branches of federal authorities8384 and EP implementation (EPI) 
became mostly used for non-EP objectives. Gross EP violations became routinely 
overlooked, either to protect the fragile economy or due to regulatory capture85. Severe 
budget and staff cuts at all levels of federal EP structures following Goskomekologiya’s 
subordination to Minresursov in 2000 86  further strengthened FS administrations’ 
position and led to “a sharp deterioration” in actual EP87.  
Recentralisation began in 2003. EP was split by natural resource type and allocated 
between different government levels. Different natural resources (and even different 
stages of the same business project) could now fall under the auspices of federal and 
FS jurisdictions, federal and municipal, municipal and FS, or only federal / FS / 
municipal regulators. This fragmented enforcement and complicated compliance as 
firms had difficulties keeping track of whom to report to and what to submit. The 
majority of EP responsibilities passed to new, mutually independent federal agencies88 
– including Rosprirodnadzor, Rostechnadzor, Rosnedra, Rosgydromet – which in 
practice meant that control over hydrocarbon (and other monied) industries passed 
back to the centre; but there were also beneficial EP outcomes.  
Moscow became more attentive to FSs’ EP performance while leaving FS 
administrations fully accountable for overall EP outcomes, including for the 
performance of federal regulators on their territories. This increased political will for 
genuine EP implementation by the FSs, whose administrations became increasingly 
innovative in filling EP capacity gaps. Some replaced abolished federal agencies with 
FS-funded alternatives89, or created additional EP structures, some – particularly the 
northern FSs 90  – supplemented falling federal environmental spending from FS 
budgets, while others managed to secure environmental funds from international 
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donors91. However, such positive trends were more characteristic of richer FSs or 
those, whose gubernators (governors) had personal interest in EP92. 
Institutional recentralisation had some negative impacts on legislative processes, but 
these have been (partially) offset by other developments. Firstly, transfer of decision-
making to the centre weakened mechanisms for ensuring accountability of federal 
regulators locally. Secondly, passing decision-making to those with little contextual 
knowledge of environmental problems that the regulations were meant to solve led to 
the bureaucratisation and politicisation of the decision-making93. Thirdly, it exacerbated 
federal legislators’ tendency to prioritise own opinions over research- or experience-
based evidence94. Resulting EP regulation can be, unsurprisingly, inconsistent with 
private or public sectors’ capacities. Therefore, it can be difficult to implement.	  	  
Nevertheless, FS administrations reserve the power to pass supplementary legislation, 
which, despite previously mentioned obstructions, allows regulatory development at the 
appropriate spatial scale and administrative level of the environmental problem95 96. 
This includes ability to fill in gaps in federal laws, tailor them to specific circumstances, 
clarify guidance for implementation and place additional requirements on targets – in 
so far as these do not contradict federal provisions. This means that FS legislatures to 
an extent have the power to regulate areas failed by the federal legislature 97 . 
Furthermore, public hearings on private sector’s projects with potentially negative 
environmental impact became a legal requirement. This created a formal arena for a 
range of immediately affected stakeholders to scrutinise economic activity and receive 
answers directly from the polluter. Although not strictly binding, the process has rebuilt 
some trust98 and fostered cross-sectorial cooperation on EP, thus improving potential 
for implementation. 
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Appendix D – History of oil firms in Nenets 
The 13 oil firms that work in Nenets comprise a wide range of entities such as Russian 
state-owned firms (RSOFs), including both giants Gazprom and Rosneft, and a firm 
owned by the Nenets FS administration: Nenets Oil Company (NOC). There are also 
Russian private firms (RPF) and firms that used to be private, such as Bashneft, which 
was bought out by RSOF Rosneft under suspicious circumstances in 2014-2016. By 
contract, Polar Lights, owned by a RPF Rus-Oil since 2015, used to be a JV between 
American Conoco (and then ConocoPhillips) and RSOF Rosneft. 
Conoco was the first foreign oil firm to enter Russia, forming Polar Lights JV in Nenets 
in 1992 and leaving after two decades of successful partnership with RSOF Rosneft 
after the latter fell victim to Western sanctions in 2014. ConocoPhillips also had a JV 
with the largest RPF, Lukoil. Together they formed Naryanmarneftegaz (NMNG) JV in 
Nenets, but once ConocoPhillips realised that only RSOFs had rights to develop Arctic 
offshore, it sold its shares to Lukoil in 2011. This marked Conoco’s departure from 
Russia altogether. In 2015, Vietgazprom,	  a JV between Gazprom and a Vietnamese 
state-owned Petrovietnam, got licenses to develop Nenets’ Arctic shelf. If not for 
Western sanctions, ConocoPhillips could have taken Petrovietnam’s place in this JV. 
Petrovietnam has also been working with RSOF Zarubezhneft in the Rusvietpetro JV in 
Nenets since 2008. 
Apart from JVs, foreign oil firms (FOFs) also work in Nenets as part of a PSA with 
Russian firms. Nenets hosts the Kharyaga PSA – one of the only three PSAs left in 
Russia. Kharyaga is one of the largest Nenets’ oil fields and has been pumping oil 
since 1984 (all other notable fields were developed in the 2010s). The PSA was signed 
between Norwegian Equinor, French Total and local NOC in 1994 and was recently 
extended until 203199. RSOF Zarubezhneft joined in 2009 and took over operatorship 
from Total in 2015, after Total failed to hit targets for utilising Associated Petroleum 
Gas (APG), as reported in the local media. There could have been a second PSA in 
Nenets – at Trebs and Titov, the other major oil field group. A consortium of American 
(Exxon, Texaco, Amoco) and Norwegian (Statoil) firms worked here between 1994 in 
1997, when Russian government asked Lukoil to finalise a PSA. Negotiations fell 
through and the consortium dissolved in 2000. Delays with licensing lasted until 2011, 
when Bashneft-Polyus, a JV between then-RPF Bashneft and RPF Lukoil, won 
production licenses. Oil was first pumped in 2013. 
The turbulent reorganisation of oil players described above reflects, to a degree, the 
shifting power dynamics between the Russian state, FOFs and other foreign 
stakeholders. It reflects even more the competition between RSOFs and RPFs, which 
is further exacerbated by the Arctic’s geological barriers for transportation: in the 
absence of pipelines, extracted hydrocarbons must be shipped and Nenets currently 
uses only three ports (some oil is transported by pipeline to ports in neighbouring FSs). 
Lukoil owns Varandey, the main onshore port and, after absorbing Bashneft, Rosneft 
became increasingly unhappy about Lukoil’s shipping tariffs – so much so that in 2018 
Rosneft cut production at its nearby oil fields by 50% as a sign of protest, took Lukoil to 
court and is planning to stretch pipelines half across Nenets to a different port, thus 
substantially increasing on-land environmental risks in the FS100. The Russian National 
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Association of Oil and Gas Services voiced fears that Rosneft might be sighting Lukoil 
as its next takeover target101. 





Appendix E – Limited impact of international agreements on 
Russia’s environmental performance. 
Russia has been party to international and bilateral environmental agreements since 
before the collapse of the USSR. At the time, the USSR was interested in maintaining 
diplomatic relations with countries along its borders, which primarily meant that 
considerable effort was diverted into meeting commitments under those agreements in 
the regions along Russia’s western border with Europe and Scandinavia. This includes 
Nenets, but at that time, there was little going on here and therefore implementation 
efforts were focused elsewhere.  
Since then Russia has become party to almost as many of the international EP treaties 
as other developed Arctic nations102 and has even ratified more of these than the USA 
(see Appendix I). Many of these are directly relevant to the Arctic. However, despite 
formal ratification, Russia’s factual environmental performance continues to lag behind 
the others, including the USA, suggesting incomplete or ineffective implementation. 
Russian federal government’s loss of interest in EP in the 2000s left most observers 
sceptical about tangible improvements to this situation. 
Economic developments of the early 2010s were hoped to re-ignite EP efforts in the 
Arctic. For example, Russia’s ascension to the World Trade Organisation in 2012 and 
the fact that a significant proportion of industrial output from Russia’s western Arctic 
regions is exported were hoped to increase consumer pressure on Russian enterprises 
to become greener and on Russian government to improve its enforcement of 
international and domestic EP standards. However, other international developments 
that also took place during that decade, including Western sanctions, had potentially 
significant negative impact on EP implementation capacity. The combination of these 
events arguably served to confuse the international message about the importance of 
EP, placing into question what exact norms were being diffused and which of them 
were received and internalised by resource rich countries such as Russia. 
For instance, the melting Arctic icecap attracted equally heated debates about the 
need to address climate change and about new economic opportunities for extracting 
the Arctic’s substantial reserves of hydrocarbons, which are now becoming physically 
accessible and commercially viable 103 . At the same time, the international 
conceptualisation of EP has increasingly shifted from nature preservation to 
sustainable development in recent decades, yet new international approaches to 
regulating environmental impact arguably lack due attention in terms of regional 
differences, such as the unique vulnerability of the Arctic104.  
Furthermore, several major environmental cases against international oil firms have 
come to a head in the 2010s and have confirmed the power of oil over international EP 
efforts. Seeing prestigious, international firms ‘get away’ with environmental 
misconduct likely sends the ‘wrong’ message to oil companies worldwide, thus 
reducing their motivation to comply with international EP norms.  
The major exemplary cases in include BP at the Gulf of Mexico and ChevronTexaco in 
Ecuador. With reference to the former, a commercial choice to cut costs in spite of 
international standards led to the Deepwater Horizon disaster in the Gulf of Mexico in 
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  include	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  Forbis,	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  Hayhoe,	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  (2017),	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  Lett,.	  13,	  020201. 
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2010. The incident has often been termed the worst in the history of the oil industry and 
many expected harsh punishment for BP. Yet, the litigation settlement against BP 
stretched out to 6 years and the company was in the end allowed to pay damages over 
the course 16 years, deducting these payments from its profits as ordinary business 
expenses.  
The decision provoked sharp criticism from the US Congress and environmental 
NGOs105, but remained unchanged. Furthermore, criminal and felony charges against 
BP middle and senior management were dropped by US courts106. As such, the firm 
arguably received little if any punishment from formal institutions. One positive 
outcome was the intensified regulation that the USA put in place after the Deepwater 
Horizon disaster in order to prevent its repeat occurrence. However, the new USA 
government was already in 2019 seeking to relax these to pave the way for offshore 
drilling, including in the Arctic107.  
With reference to ChevronTexaco, after 25 years of Ecuador fighting against the oil 
firm in international courts, the international tribunal in The Hague in 2018 absolved the 
firm of responsibility for immense volumes of toxic oil waste it knowingly dumped in the 
Amazon rainforests between the 1960s and the 1990s108.  Lessons based on these 
examples, on top of mixed messaging discussed above, are unlikely to inspire 
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  W.,	  (2016),	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  The	  Maritime	  Executive	  [online]	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April.	  Available	  from:	  <https://www.maritime-­‐executive.com/article/winners-­‐and-­‐losers-­‐in-­‐deepwater-­‐
horizon-­‐payout>.	  
106	  Milman,	  O.,	  (2015),	  ‘Manslaughter	  charges	  dropped	  against	  two	  BP	  employees	  in	  Deepwater	  spill’,	  New	  
York,	  3	  December.	  
107	  Kirchgaessner,	  S.,	  (2019),	  ‘Trump	  plans	  to	  relax	  Obama	  rules	  for	  oil	  companies	  put	  in	  place	  after	  BP	  
disaster’,	  Washington,	  15	  January.	  





Appendix F – Public control initiatives in Tatarstan 
Tatarstan is a proactive FS and frequently puts forward new ideas to the federal 
government or pilots ideas introduced by Moscow, including in the sphere of 
environmental protection. The Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources of the 
Republic of Tatarstan has introduced several new EP initiatives in recent years. These 
include a FS-wide, two-month environmental cleaning project every spring, which 
brings together relevant departments, environmental services, organizations, municipal 
committees and volunteers in order to find and remediate accumulated pollution since 
the previous year, usually due to illegal waste dumping. In 2018, 30% of Tatarstan’s 
population voluntarily engaged in this event, identifing 6,100 violations, as a result of 
which nearly RUB 19.5million of fines were issued.  94% of reported incidents of 
environmental damage were addressed 109 . Since 2016, the number of identified 
unsanctioned dumping sites started to slowly reduce110, indicating that the intiative is 
effective in helping reduce EP implementation gaps.  
Other EP initiatives also exist to ensure year-round interaction between citizens, 
federal EP agencies and FS government. These include “People’s Control” online 
portal, decreed by the President of Tatarstan in 2012. Its purpose is it to improve 
accountability of governmental structures and thus improve their effectiveness111. The 
system included such tools as the online Public Control map, mentioned in the Nenets 
chapter, which is a real life digital map where citizens can add photos and comments 
about illegal pollution. Once such ‘request’ is made, Tatarstan’s Ministry of 
Environment is obliged to act. Once pollution is liquidated, a new picture of the physical 
site is added and the original submitter can feedback on the appropriateness and 
quality of the clean up. The Public Control digital map has been on the federal 
government agenda for some time without a standardized approach to implementing it. 
On 8 December 2014 Tatarstan’s design was recognized as the most effective and has 
since been implemented by other FSs. In 2015, illegal dumps identified during spring 
environmental cleaning events started being added to the map for future monitoring112, 
which might explain the positive results of this initiative mentioned above. 
In 2016, Tatarstan’s Ministry of Environment created an environmental “citizen 
reception”, which consolidates all information on different options for reporting 
environmental crimes. The number of options has also been increasing and today they 
include the People’s Control portal, an environmental protection hotline, email, School 
Environmental Portal (a special smartphone application), WhatsApp and Telegram. 
The “citizen reception” website offers financial rewards for supplying photographic 
and/or video evidence along with useful information113. Several of these channels 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 MENRRT, (2018), Itogi sanitarno-ekologicheskogo dvuhmesyachnika ozvuchil... Available from: < 
http://eco.tatarstan.ru/index.htm/news/1222318.htm >. 
[Accessed on 1 April 2019]. 
110 MENRRT, (2017), Farid Abdulganiev: “My sami dolzhny pokazat primer”. Available from: < 
http://eco.tatarstan.ru/index.htm/news/947174.htm>. 
[Accessed on 1 April 2019]. 
111 Ministry for Information and Communication of the Republic of Tatarstan, (2012), ‘About the 
governmental information system of the Republic of Tatarstan “People’s Control”’, Decree of the 
President of the Republic of Tatarstan. Available online: <https://uslugi.tatar.ru/open-gov/about/>. 
112 All inspectors (governmental or volunteer) have access to the online resource "Ecological map of the 





existed prior to the consolidation but appeals increased by 61% (between 2015 and 
2016) following consolidation measures114. 
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Appendix G – NGO and donor funding rules 
 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Appendix H - Azeri authorities with environmental responsibilities, 
2011116 
	  
Table 7 - Government bodies responsible for environmental protection 
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Appendix I – Ratification of international agreements 
	  






































































































Air Pollution 	   X	   	   X	   	   X	   	   X	   	   X	   	   X	  
Air Pollution-Nitrogen Oxides 	   X	   	   X	   	   X	   	   X	   	   	   	   	  
Air Pollution-Persistent Organic 	   X	   X	   	   	   X	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Air Pollution-Sulphur 85 	   X	   	   	   	   X	   	   X	   	   	   	   	  
Air Pollution-Sulphur 94 	   X	   	   	   	   X	   X	   	   	   	   	   	  
Air Pollution-Volatile Organic Compounds X	   	   X	   	   	   X	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Antarctic-Environmental Protocol 	   X	   	   X	   	   X	   	   X	   	   	   	   	  
Antarctic-Marine Living Resources 	   X	   	   X	   	   X	   	   X	   	   	   	   	  
Antarctic Seals 	   X	   	   X	   	   X	   	   X	   	   	   	   	  
Antarctic Treaty 	   X	   	   X	   	   X	   	   X	   	   	   	   	  
Biodiversity 	   X	   X	   	   	   X	   	   X	   	   X	   	   X	  
Climate Change 	   X	   	   X	   	   X	   	   X	   	   X	   	   X	  
Climate Change-Kyoto Protocol 	   	   X	   	   	   X	   	   X	   	   	   	   X	  
Desertification 	   X	   	   X	   	   X	   	   X	   	   X	   	   X	  
Endangered Species 	   X	   	   X	   	   X	   	   X	   	   X	   	   X	  
Environmental Modification 	   X	   	   X	   	   X	   	   X	   	   X	   	   	  
Hazardous Wastes 	   X	   X	   	   	   X	   	   X	   	   X	   	   X	  
Law of the Sea 	   X	   	   	   	   X	   	   X	   	   	   	   	  
Marine Dumping 	   X	   	   X	   	   X	   	   X	   	   	   	   X	  
Marine Life Conservation 	   	   	   X	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Ozone Layer Protection 	   X	   	   X	   	   X	   	   X	   	   X	   	   X	  
Ship Pollution 	   X	   	   X	   	   X	   	   X	   	   X	   	   X	  
Tropical Timber 83 	   X	   	   X	   	   X	   	   X	   	   	   	   	  
Tropical Timber 94 	   X	   	   X	   	   X	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Wetlands 	   X	   	   X	   	   X	   	   X	   	   X	   	   X	  
Whaling 	   	   	   X	   	   X	   	   X	   	   	   	   	  
Total	  Score	  (signed	  &	  ratified)	  
(of	  26) 
 22  18  25  21  10  11 
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117	  Based	  on	  data	  from	  CIA	  World	  Factbook,	  (nd),	  Environment	  -­‐	  international	  agreements.	  Available	  online	  
from:	  <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-­‐world-­‐factbook/fields/294.html>. 
